Why the IRA Lost The Irish Civil War 1922-1923 (4K Documentary)

The long and bloody guerrilla war in Ireland between the Irish Republican Army and the British Army finally came to an end in January

1922

. But the division of the island provided for in the peace treaty proved more than controversial: the new Irish State only It is only a few months old when it descends into

civil

war. The Anglo-Irish War of 1919-1921 saw the Irish Republican Army fight the British Army and local police in the cause of Irish independence from Great Britain. Backed by the republican party Sinn Féin, the IRA used guerrilla tactics to ambush police patrols, assassinate officials and degrade British power.

The British responded with the first major war veterans to the Black and Tan paramilitary police, introducing martial law and cracking down with brutal reprisals. By 1921, the IRA was on the brink of collapse and UK public support for the war was weaker than ever. A truce ended the fighting, followed by a controversial peace treaty signed in early

1922

. The Anglo-Irish treaty included many controversial articles. Ireland would not become an independent republic, but would remain in the British Empire as a Free State. Six largely Protestant counties in northeast Ireland would be divided and remain in the United Kingdom, while members of the Irish parliament, the Dáil, would have to take an oath of allegiance to the king.

The treaty was also signed under controversial circumstances. Eamon De Valera, president of the self-proclaimed Republic of Ireland, did not attend the negotiations in London and led opposition to the treaty. He led support for the treaty by Michael Collins, a popular figure in the republican movement. He claimed that the treaty was not perfect, but that it was a stepping stone toward full independence in the future. In the end, the Irish parliament approved the peace agreement in a closely contested vote and de Valera resigned. Thus, Ireland had a peace treaty and partial independence, but its political and military leadership was now bitterly divided into two factions: the pro- and anti-treaty.

Supporters of the treaty established the Provisional Government in Dublin and wanted to implement the treaty quickly. They claimed overwhelming public support, and although anti-treaty politicians blocked a plebiscite on the issue, 24 of the 26 southern Irish councils passed resolutions in favor of the treaty. Sinn Féin founder Arthur Griffith became president and Collins became president of the Provisional Government. Anti-Treatyists led by de Valera refused to accept the new government, claiming that it had no authority to disestablish the republic that had been announced in the Easter Rising of 1916. The IRA also split into pro- and anti-Treaty factions. Much of the experienced HQ leadership supported the treaty, but the Dublin-based HQ had limited control of IRA units in the field.

Of the 16 IRA commands in Ireland, only five fully or partially supported the treaty; the south-west region of Munster soon became the anti-treaty heartland. Tensions were increasing and in February 1922 violence between rival groups was barely avoided. The split in the IRA was further exacerbated when the Provisional Government created an official armed forces, the Home Army. The army was based on the British model of conventional force, and supporters of the treaty attempted to present it as the successor to the IRA. In March, anti-Treaty forces held a series of banned IRA conventions and formed a new Army Executive separate from the Home Army.

With around two-thirds of the IRA brigades represented, the Executive stated that it would no longer answer to Dublin. The new group elected the commander of the First Southern Division, Liam Lynch, as its leader. That is not to say that all cooperation with the IRA stopped. Contrary and pro-treaty leaders, including Lynch and Collins, continued to work together in the divided northeast until April 1922. Both factions made plans for a unified offensive against British control, but never acted on them. Thus, when rival Irish governments and armies were formed, the British quickly and quietly abandoned the territory of the future Irish Free State.

The departing British handed over barracks and equipment to whichever IRA brigade controlled the region, and the British often left behind a power vacuum. Law and order in Ireland quickly began to suffer after the British forces left. Sectarian violence, agrarian unrest, strikes, robberies and looting became more common. Republican unity had largely kept the peace during the Anglo-Irish War, but it was beginning to break down. The pro-treaty minister, Kevin O'Higgins, described the difficult position of the Provisional Government: “Simply eight young people in the City Hall find themselves... in the middle of the ruins of an administration, with the foundations still unlaid and with wild men screaming through the keyhole. .

No police force was functioning in the entire country, no justice system was functioning, the wheels of administration hung idle, beaten beyond recognition by the clash of rival jurisdictions.” (Coogan 30) Talk of

civil

war was also becoming more frequent, including by former President De Valera in March: “The Treaty…closed the path to independence with the blood of fellow Irishmen. It was only after the Civil War that they gained their independence...if you don't fight today, you will fight tomorrow; and I say, when you are in a good fighting position, then keep fighting.” (Irish Independent 17/3/22) Some members of the IRA Executive, led by Rory O'Connor, decided to act while the Provisional Government was weak.

On 14 April, around 180 men from the No. 1 Dublin Brigade occupied Dublin's Four Courts, the most important judicial building in the country. Clearly reminiscent of the 1916 Easter Rising, the move was designed to undermine the authority of treaty supporters in their capital and perhaps provoke a British reaction, potentially rallying the IRA against their mutual enemy. However, at the same time, de Valera and Collins were trying to reconcile. Both suggested presenting a unified Sinn Féin at the upcoming June election, but the plan soon collapsed amid suspicion from both sides. The British claimed that this amounted to refuting the treaty.

When the results of the June 16 election were known, pro-treaty Sinn Fein won a convincing victory, winning 58 seats to the anti-treaty's 32. Britain now put pressure on the Provisional Government to end the occupation of the Four Courts, which had been going on since April. Then, on June 22, two IRA gunmen, both former British Army soldiers, assassinated British Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson in London. The British government declared that if the Irish provisional government could not impose order, British forces would return to Ireland and do so themselves. Winston Churchill made his position clear in the House of Commons: “The presence in Dublin of a group of men calling themselves the Headquarters of the Republican Executive is a serious breach and challenge to the Treaty.

The time has come when it is not unfair, premature or impatient for us to present to the strengthened Irish Government and the new Irish Parliament an express request that this sort of thing must come to an end... If not, we will consider Treated as formally violated.” (Coogan 36/37) With the British gone but threatening to return, and the Four Courts still occupied by anti-treaties, the new Home Army of the Irish Provisional Government issued an ultimatum on 28 June 1922: if the occupiers did not leave , the army would open fire. During its two-month occupation, the IRA had done little to fortify the Four Courts building or develop defences, partly out of a desire not to provoke the Home Army.

There were also no plans to help the garrison if it was attacked and they did not occupy the surrounding buildings. IRA leader Ernie O'Malley estimated that he needed 70 more men to fully defend the large building. Still, the IRA was armed with rifles, automatic weapons, mines and "The Mutineer", a Rolls-Royce armored car. In the early hours of June 28, Major General Emmet Dalton of the Home Army issued an ultimatum to the occupants of Four Courts: surrender or face bombardment from his British-supplied 18-pounder field gun. The IRA refused, so at 4:30 in the morning, after a misfire supposedly rectified with a kick, the Home Army fired the first shells at the Four Courts: the Irish Civil War had begun.

When the bombing began, National Army troops cordoned off the area and probed more closely, but their inexperience began to show. They were reluctant to storm the building, and British General Nevil Macready suggested that artillery was more useful for boosting morale than as an actual weapon: “I agreed to send fifty rounds of shrapnel, which was all we had left, just to make noise for the duration.” the night, because he feared that if the cannons stopped firing, his men would become discouraged and leave... Approximately every quarter of an hour during the night, a shrapnel would burst against the walls of the Four Courtyards, making a lot of noise but causing no damage. . .” (Hopkinson 120) British official Alfred Cope was also unimpressed with the fighting: “it is not a battle.

Rory is in the Four Courts. The Free Staters are in the houses across the street, each firing hundreds of bullets at the other with probably very few hits. A few hundred meters away, people go about their daily activities.” (Cottrell 165) The following day, the IRA attempted to relieve the Four Courts garrison from the outskirts of Dublin, but the efforts were poorly organized and blocked by the Home Army. But a smaller group of IRA fighters were able to occupy several hotels along O'Connell Street, later called "The Block". They were soon joined by anti-Treaty leaders, including De Valera, former Defense Minister Cathal Brugha and Lynch.

However, these new positions could do little to support the Four Courts. On June 30, troops of the National Army burst into the Cuatro Patios with fixed bayonets. During the brief fight that followed, a large explosion damaged public archives and destroyed hundreds of years of Irish records. There is debate as to whether this was deliberately caused by IRA mines or by munitions hit by artillery. In any case, the explosion marked the surrender of the Four Courts. The Home Army now turned to The Block, where the morale of IRA fighters like Emmet Humphreys was weakening: “We were increasingly frustrated by the fact that we were achieving nothing at all.” (Hopkinson 124) Some IRA men spoke of falling as martyrs, but few were enthusiastic.

Instead, De Valera and others were smuggled out of the city before 'The Block' surrendered on July 5. Brugha, however, went out into the street where National Army troops shot him. The assault on the Four Courts was a disaster for the IRA. 12 of the 16 members of the Executive were there and Rory O'Connor, Liam Mellows, Tom Barry and others were arrested. Liam Lynch was captured, but was later released with a promise that he would not continue the fight, a promise he soon broke. The occupation had not resulted in an increase in public support or sympathy for the republican movement. 65 combatants and civilians were killed and 281 wounded.

Perhaps most importantly, however, the Battle of Dublin clarified the civil conflict: it was now the Irish Free State against the Irish Republicans. The Free State had defeated the republicans in the Four Courts, but the Irish Civil War was far from over. Despite the Four Courts debacle, the IRA still seemed to have the military advantage. In July the Free State announced an expansion of the Home Army to 35,000 men, but many of them were young, raw recruits attracted by a regular salary. The Dublin Guard, made up of IRA veterans and former Dublin Fusiliers, would become the shock troops of the Home Army.

But what the National Army lacked in experience, it made up for in firepower. Britain supplied the Free State Army with rifles, Lewis guns, revolvers, grenades, machine guns, artillery, trucks, armored vehicles and aircraft. The Free State government also ordered the media to reinforce it as the legitimate government: “The Army should always be referred to as the 'Irish Army', the 'Home Army', the 'National Troops' or simply 'Troops'. '. Irregular Forces should not be referred to as Executive Forces or described as “forces” or “troops.” They should be called “bands” or “bodies.” (Kissane 81/82) The Free State estimated that around 12,900 IRA fightersThey were still active, especially in the southwest.

Many of them were veterans of the Anglo-Irish War, although their quality had been diluted by the new arrivals after the truce, and they had only one rifle for every two men. However, three quarters of the country could be considered anti-Treaty territory, and the IRA's largest and most experienced divisions, the First and Second South, were strongly anti-Treaty. Given the weakness of the IRA, Lynch ordered his units to return to his territory to take control of pro-treaty barracks and towns. But some IRA leaders such as Séumas Robinson told Lynch that he was being too cautious: "Liam... it is absurd to stay in your own areas, because they will accept you bit by bit." (Hopkinson 129) In reality, there was little central control over the IRA forces.

In July, the Home Army began moving forward to prevent a rival government from being formed in Munster. The IRA abandoned County Wexford and Lynch attempted to form a defensive line running from Limerick to Waterford. But the line was an illusion: there were few defensive positions and the IRA rarely contested it. On 20 July, the Home Army captured Limerick after a short battle, breaking communications between the IRA in Munster and the north. Waterford fell soon after, followed by Westport, Carrick, Redmondstown and Clonmel in early August. The IRA's successes were limited to clearing the towns of Skibbereen and Listowel of their pro-treaty garrisons.

In most cases the IRA retreated in the face of overwhelming firepower and only fought pitched battles around the villages of Bruree and Killmallock. In early August, General Dalton changed his strategy to focus on the IRA's weak coastal defenses. On 8 August, Home Army troops landed at Union House and Yougal in amphibious assaults, which were detours for the main landing at Passage West, near Cork. Exhausted IRA fighters like Frank O'Connor struggled to mount a coherent defence: "Technically, a landing from the sea is supposed to be one of the most difficult military operations, but how we handled the defense it was very simple." (Cottrell 181) On August 10, the Home Army took the IRA stronghold in Cork, followed by the IRA's last military base in Fermoy.

After a series of Home Army victories, the so-called Munster Republic ended and some IRA men began to talk of surrender. Instead, Lynch ordered his forces to form flying columns and carry out guerrilla operations. This was a return to his old methods and led to new successes. On August 22, 1922, Michael Collins toured the southwestern regions recently captured by the Home Army despite warnings from his colleagues. He officially went to inspect the troops, but oral evidence suggests that he wanted to start peace talks with the IRA. In the early hours, Collins and General Dalton left Cork in a convoy consisting of a motorcycle scout, a Crossley tender, a passenger car and an armored car bringing up the rear.

Passing through the Béal na mBláth valley, the convoy asked a local for directions. Unknown to Collins, the local was also an IRA sentry, who recognized Collins and informed the unit about him. Assuming that the convoy could use the same route to return, the IRA blocked the road with a cart and mined it to prepare the ambush. But by 8 p.m., the convoy had not returned and most of the ambushed group left. There were five men left to dismantle the blockade, but just as they began, the convoy arrived. The IRA men launched an improvised ambush.

Dalton told Collins to go ahead, but Collins ordered his men to go out and fight. The resulting firefight lasted 30 minutes, during which the armored car's machine gun jammed. Towards the end of the skirmish, Collins emerged from hiding with his rifle in hand and was fatally shot in the neck. He was the only victim on both sides. The death of Michael Collins is perhaps the most controversial moment of the Irish Civil War, and it is still hotly debated who fired the fateful bullet. The most common suspect is IRA member and former British Army marksman Sonny O'Neill, but there are other theories.

Some Republican historians suggest that he was murdered by his own entourage, including by Dalton himself, because Collins wanted to make peace. Some have said that De Valera prepared the coup, and others point to the Scottish gunner of the Home Army armored vehicle as he later joined the IRA. Many of these theories first emerged long after the event, based on statements from people who were not there at the time. In any case, Collins, the most influential of the treaty's supporters, was dead. So the Free State had

lost

its leaders, but the Home Army still had the upper hand and now suppressed the IRA harder than ever.

W.T Cosgrave replaced Collins as president of the Provisional Government. At first, the British had doubts about the civilian Cosgrave, but he soon proved to be a willing commander. Collins had been largely reluctant to instigate tougher policies against the IRA, many of whom were his former colleagues. Cosgrave would have few such reservations. Beginning in August, the war began to resemble the Anglo-Irish conflict that had preceded it, a reality that General Dalton recognized: “They have now adopted a type of warfare, of which they have years of experience. They now operate in territory they know. They are now better armed and better trained than when they were against the British.

In short, they have put me and my troops in the same position the British were in just over a year ago.” (Hopkinson 174) In August alone, the Home Army

lost

58 men to IRA ambushes, and it now became more difficult to counter-attack IRA groups. When the war began to resemble an insurgency, National Army troops became frustrated. Often the IRA would fire the first volleys in an attack, killing or wounding soldiers, and then immediately surrender before the Home Army could respond. Under such circumstances, commanders reported that it was difficult to prevent their troops from executing prisoners. Pressure increased on Cosgrave to allow the official execution of captured fighters as a deterrent to such tactics.

The result, in October, was the Army (Special Powers) Resolution. It allowed the military to set up special courts to try suspected IRA fighters and execute them if necessary. Commander-in-Chief Richard Mulcahy had a strong message for the Irish parliament: “Lives must be taken, if necessary, and it is the responsibility of the government to say that they must be taken.” (Enright 26) The Catholic church also lent its support. Captured IRA fighters were to be denied communion, and an official pastoral made the Church's position clear: “The guerrilla war now carried out by irregulars has no moral sanction; and therefore, the killing of National Soldiers in the course of it is a murder before God. (Kissane 89) In response, Lynch ordered the murder of all parliamentarians who voted in favor of the resolution.

But the attacks were immediately responded to by the firing squad. In November, the first executions were carried out based on the resolution. Eventually, senior republican figures such as Rory O'Connor, Liam Mellows and Erskine Childers were executed, supposedly in response to IRA attacks. The brutal government policy appeared to work, as Lynch abandoned attempts to assassinate him in December. The government's resolution also allowed for official retaliation, which also became increasingly common. The Dublin Guard gained a gruesome reputation in Kerry for their brutality, including executing IRA prisoners with landmines. However, unlike British reprisals in the Anglo-Irish War, the Home Army generally directed its attacks against specific individuals, not entire communities.

The IRA's guerrilla campaign in late 1922 began to falter in the face of government executions and the republican cause was in trouble. By early

1923

, IRA morale had plummeted and men were already disbanding and returning home. Politically too, the anti-Treaty side was in tatters. De Valera was increasingly marginalized by military leaders and failed to form a viable political alternative to the Free State. Meanwhile, as the Home Army moved into cordon and search operations, more IRA fighters and leaders were arrested or killed. On April 10, Homeland Army troops fatally wounded Liam Lynch in County Waterford. At the time of his death, 12,000 IRA fighters were in custody.

Lynch's replacement, Frank Aiken, understood that the fight was over. On May 24,

1923

, he ordered all remaining Republican units to lay down their weapons and return home. De Valera's joint statement suggested that future operations might be possible, but in reality the Irish Civil War had ended: “Further fighting on their part would now be in vain and the continuation of armed struggle would be imprudent in the national interest. Military victory must be allowed to fall for the moment into the hands of those who have destroyed the Republic.” (Cottrell 187) By the end of the fighting, around 750 pro-treaty soldiers had been killed, along with a similar number of anti-treaties, at least 78 of whom were executed by the Free State.

So why did the IRA, which seemed so effective against the British, fail against the Home Army just a year later? Historians have suggested several reasons. Firstly, the IRA, a largely irregular formation, was not suitable for conducting positional wars or defensive battles. Liam Lynch's decision not to press in Dublin has been criticised, as he gave the Provisional Government time to breathe, receive British support and eliminate isolated IRA brigades. Many Home Army officers were former members of the IRA, so they understood IRA tactics and even knew the locations of safe houses and hideouts. The occupation of the Four Courts has also been identified as naive, wasteful and poorly executed.

Even at the time, IRA commanders were criticized for acting like ordinary soldiers and many were captured as a result. But perhaps the most critical problem for the IRA was the lack of public support. The occupation of the Four Courts did not gain sympathy from the Easter Rising of 1916, and throughout the civil war, IRA commanders complained of local hostility in some regions. Anti-treaty leader Harry Boland admitted that the population was against them: "There is no doubt that the majority of people are against us at the moment, believing that we are to blame for the present state of affairs." (Hopkinson 127/128) Part of the public opposition to the IRA was based on the dire economic situation.

Many of the anti-treaty regions were the most economically damaged by the Anglo-Irish War and IRA activities, and the need to raise funds limited economic recovery. The IRA's attacks on the railways in particular earned public scorn. For a considerable section of the public, the Free State appeared to be the only institution capable of delivering security, peace and economic recovery after years of conflict. The IRA was no longer the face of the popular rebellion, and although guerrilla tactics of attrition worked against a perceived “foreign occupier,” they were much less effective against a government widely considered legitimate. But the end of the civil war was not the end of violence, especially in the divided north.

Sectarian violence and murders would continue, even after Ireland gained full independence from Britain in 1937. In the 1960s, rival paramilitary organisations, some of which sought to continue the IRA, would engage in a 30-year conflict. years in Northern Ireland, simply nicknamed 'the Clouds'. Only in 1998, after almost a century of violence, the Good Friday and Belfast agreements brought to Ireland a peace that has lasted more than twenty years. The bitter and tragic Irish Civil War is just one of the conflicts we think is important to cover in our documentaries. We also made an epic

documentary

about the Battle of Berlin in 1945 called 16 Days in Berlin.

It's 4.5 hours long and has 18 episodes, and it takes you along. through the battle day by day. Featuring original film footage from Soviet cameramen, never-before-seen photographs of the battle, detailed maps and animations, and expert interviews with David Willey of the Tank Museum, Ian of Forgotten Weapons and more. Unfortunately, we cannot upload this series to YouTube because it shows the grim reality of World War II, and that would be demonetized or worse. So where can you watch 16 Days in Berlin in 4k resolution? On Nebula, a streaming service that we created together with other creators and where we can upload content.

We would like to thank Mark Newton for his help with this episode. As usual, you can findall our sources for this episode in the video description. I'm Jesse Alexander and this is The Great War, a Real Time History production and the only YouTube history channel that believes there's no doubt the main people are with us.