Who Is Flying?! The Unbelievable Story of Kenya Airlines flight 507

- There is nothing wrong with this plane, but it has still rolled over at a 115 degree angle and the pilots are fighting for their lives to regain control of the plane. It is dark and stormy outside, but it is not the weather that has caused this discomfort. Stay tuned. - 100, 50, 40, 30, 20, 10. - Kenya Airways Flight 507 was a normal passenger

flight

scheduled for the afternoon of May 4, 2007. And it was divided into two legs. The first

flight

was scheduled from Abidjan, in the Ivory Coast, and then to Douala, in Cameroon. There, the crew was to make a brief stop to refuel and then pick up some new passengers before continuing to their final destination in Nairobi, Kenya.

The flight was scheduled to be operated during the afternoon and early evening with a departure time of 18:30 from Abidjan and a final arrival time in Nairobi around three in the evening, making it a combination potentially quite tedious flight. The captain of the flight was a 52-year-old Kenyan national who had been

flying

for more than 16 years at the time of the accident. He had just under 8,700 hours of total time of which 3,464 were flown as pilot in command. Most of this experience was done on the Boeing 737, which was the plane they were going to fly on this flight.

The first officer was a 23-year-old Kenyan citizen with much less experience. He had accumulated only about 800 hours of total time, of which about 200 were flown in the 737, making him a very new commercial pilot. Now, the personalities of these two pilots will play a very important role in this

story

, so it is worth explaining a little more about them before continuing. The captain had a rather checkered training hi

story

behind him. During their command enhancement training, back in 2002, several instructors had noted performance deficiencies, including a lack of crew resource management, poor compliance with standard operating procedures, cockpit scans, and simply the general situational awareness.

Now, the notes that really stood out to me from his training records were that even though he had demonstrated good handling skills, such as in stick and rudder handling, his personality showed a touch of arrogance, which was overbearing. with his co-pilots. and that he displayed insufficient flight discipline, which affected his cockpit scans and, ultimately, his situational awareness. These are quite serious issues, but obviously the objective of participating in a training program is to train and improve the deficiencies detected. And that is exactly what Kenya Airways did. At the end of his command refresh training, he was recommended for his final command refresh line check, which he failed due to problems similar to those that had been shown during his training.

But then they scheduled him for a new check, which he eventually managed to pass. Following this, several subsequent line checks and recurring simulator checks within the airline followed a similar pattern with issues which the airline then resolved and retrained him to a sufficient level before he was allowed to return to the line. Finally, however, the head of training contacted him after a poor simulator result in August 2006 and told him that his performance was under review and that the airline needed to determine whether these performance lapses had to do with complacency or incompetence. By the way, that's not something you want to hear from any employer.

All that said, it's also worth noting that several of his colleagues said that he was generally perceived as a pretty nice guy. This meant the airline was keeping an eye on him. But as long as he kept passing checks or rechecks, there wasn't much they could do. He had been rated below average, but still at an acceptable level. And the last simulator test he took, before this flight, he passed without the examiner noticing bad comments. Now, as an instructor, one thing I have discovered is that it is usually very difficult to fix a bad attitude. And part of a bad attitude often includes a feeling of entitlement and bad self-criticism.

And if you don't believe you are doing anything wrong or blame others for your failures, then you will never work to improve. And that's why self-criticism is such a crucial skill. This brings us to the first officer. Now, he was at the beginning of his career, but he had also accumulated a training history that was not perfect. He failed his initial radiotelephony test and his IFR skill test during his initial training. And during the last simulator proficiency check he had carried out in early 2007, his instructors had noted that, although the overall standard was satisfactory, he needed to more carefully monitor errors made by the pilot

flying

and point them out, as well as monitor autopilot operation.

Here it is important to note that especially feedback on how to point out deviations is very common feedback for new first officers. It can sometimes be intimidating to point out deviations, especially in a control environment, to a much more senior captain, but assertiveness is absolutely crucial in this occupation. Saying things when they start to seem strange or incorrect is probably the most important job any pilot has to do, so this is instilled in us during training and checks, especially at the beginning. Anyway, judging from their combined training history, it seems that the pilots of Kenya Airways Flight 507 were composed of a somewhat overbearing and arrogant captain, prone to failures and situational awareness and cockpit scans and a new young first officer that he still didn't feel completely comfortable. with talking in the cabin.

And this will be important very soon. When the pilots began to prepare for the flight, they saw that the weather in Douala, their first destination, was not looking very good. Many thunderstorms were forecast throughout the period they were going to be there, but with fairly light winds and good visibility between storms. This probably would have caused a bit of concern, but as long as they carried enough fuel, it shouldn't really be a big problem. Storms are usually temporary in nature, so if they could wait long enough, they could probably squeeze in and land in between them.

And if that were not possible, then they could simply deviate. Once the pre-flight preparation was completed, the pilots approached the cabin crew and then briefed them on the flight schedules and possible turbulence that these storms could cause. And after that, they walked towards the plane and began to prepare it for the first flight. The plane they were going to fly was a relatively new Boeing 737-800, which had been delivered to Kenya Airways about seven months before the flight. It did not have any technical malfunctions recorded in the technical log, but there had been some previous problems with autopilot A, but those particular problems had not been noticed after its last maintenance check.

So once the safety inspection was completed, the crew began to board its 55 passengers and at 6:30 p.m. local time, the plane took off normally and proceeded towards Douala. That first flight passed without any problems and they landed in Douala at 22:01 local time. And after landing, they taxied to a position near the Charlie-seven stand, but since there was no signalman present to guide them to the stand, they had to turn off the engines and wait for a crane to take them to the correct parking lot. position, which took about 20 minutes or so. And after that, the disembarking passengers were allowed to disembark.

Now, before I continue explaining the entire accident sequence, here comes a short message from my sponsor who helps me and my team create these videos. Since so much of our personal and professional lives happen online, I think it's essential to use a fast and reliable VPN. And that's especially true if you go abroad. And today's sponsor, NordVPN, is a great option for travelers. NordVPN can help you find cheap deals by allowing you access to websites and online marketplaces that might be blocked or restricted in the country you're traveling to. And another example, did you know that some airline websites and travel booking sites offer different prices depending on your location?

Well, get Nord and find out with just one click. NordVPN gives you online privacy and security, which is especially important when making financial transactions like booking a flight or hotel room. And with this app, you will get access to more than 5000 servers in 60 different countries. So if you visit NordVPN.com/pilot right now, you'll get an exclusive offer of two years plus one month absolutely free so you have nothing to lose. Download the app and enjoy online freedom right now on the go. Thanks NordVPN. Now let's continue the story. While the pilots waited for all passengers to disembark, the dispatcher gave them a briefing packet with updated weather information.

Still, the weather was forecast to be quite bad for the departure, with moderate thunderstorms forecast to last into the early morning hours. After observing the weather, the captain decided that he was going to be the pilot of the next flight, which is a sensible decision because when we fly in very difficult weather conditions, it is quite common for the captain to be the pilot. flying especially when flying with a very inexperienced co-pilot, as was the case here. The pilots decided to load 9,500 kilos of fuel, bringing the total amount of fuel on board to 14,200 kilos, enough for their long flight to Nairobi.

And once refueling was completed, they began to board all their new passengers. In total, 38 passengers disembarked in Douala and 91 passengers boarded, bringing the total number of people on board to 114, 108 passengers and six crew members. During cockpit preparation, the first officer called the Douala tower controller to obtain the latest weather information. Initially there was slight confusion over which call sign the plane was going to use, but once resolved, the tower gave the pilots the following weather information: temperature, 27 degrees Celsius; dew point, 25; air pressure, 1010 hectoPascals; winds, calm and runway 12 for takeoff. The weather seemed to be quite good, so the captain proceeded to report to the planned departure, the EDEBA 1-Echo, without paying special attention to the possible meteorological impact.

Once all the cabin preparations were completed and the cabin was ready, the co-pilot once again contacted the tower to request authorization to start the engines, which he received at 11:20 p.m. Immediately following this call, a Royal Air Maroc aircraft also contacted the tower to request a weather update and asked for it to be provided in French. Now, the reason they asked for this update was probably because moderate to heavy rain had moved over the airfield. And it became so intense that the pilots of Flight 507 called the tower and requested to delay starting the engines until the storm passed.

This took approximately 17 more minutes and at 23:54 the pilots called the tower again and said they were ready to start their engines again, which was immediately approved. Here it is worth noting that this severe storm that had just passed over the airfield should have prompted the captain to revise his departure report to include contingency procedures for the bad weather that was now clearly present around the airport, but which was never done. . . Instead, Flight 507's engines were started according to standard operating procedures, and at 11:59 p.m., the first officer requested clearance to taxi. But instead of being cleared to start moving, the tower now told Flight 507 to hold position and wait.

The aircraft was at that moment parallel to the runway with the nose pointing in the direction of departure. So the captain took advantage of this time to turn on his weather radar to get a better overview of the weather ahead. The panorama they saw was very gloomy. There were many storms returning from the starting direction and the captain exclaimed, "This thing is moving," probably referring to one of the storms directly in front of them and then continued, "There's no way here." While the pilots of Flight 507 waited for clearance to take the taxi, the Royal Air Maroc plane asked, once again, in French, for an update on the current weather.

And now a so-called SPECI or special weather report had been issued for the airfield, indicating much worsening conditions with visibility of 800 meters and moderate thunderstorms in all directions. This special weather report was only provided in French at this time, so it is unlikely that the pilots of Flight 507 understood its severity. Later, theAir traffic control pointed out that this was a big mistake, but to be completely honest, the fact that there were moderate storms and that it was raining a lot would have been pretty obvious to the crew. Therefore, this SPECI information probably would not have changed the pilots' opinions in any significant way.

About a minute later, Flight 507 was finally cleared to taxi, enter, and then reverse onto runway 12. The first officer read this back, along with the total number of people on board and the plane's endurance, which was five. hours and 45 minutes. During filming, the first officer expressed some concern about the weather around them and also hinted that he felt the procedures had been a bit rushed. The captain calmed him down but did so in a somewhat condescending way, laughing at him at least twice. This points to the same type of attitude the captain had displayed earlier in his career and would probably have made the first officer even less likely to talk than he already was.

As the plane was now backing off the runway, the tower controller called them to give them his departure clearance and also told them to call him back when they were ready to depart. The first officer read the authorization again and confirmed that they would call him when they were ready. The cabin crew now called the cabin and told them they were ready for departure, prompting the first officer to give a quick public address to the passengers, emphasizing the need for them to check that they had their seat belts fastened, and also sat in the cabin. crew for departure.

Both the captain and first officer now had weather radar selected on their navigation screens and as the plane turned onto the runway, the captain began studying the image he saw to try to find a way to safely deport them. Up to that point, most of the work in the cockpit had been done by the first officer, including initiating the pre-takeoff checklist, which would normally be the captain's job. This could possibly be due to the captain being focused on the weather situation they were in or it could be a further indication of the captain's general lack of discipline in the cockpit.

In any case, the captain suddenly grabbed the first officer's radios and asked the tower controller if they could get a modification to their departure clearance to maintain a heading slightly to the left of the runway after departure to avoid some conditions. climatic. The first officer corrected him by saying, "No, of course." And the captain continued, "Oh, sorry, kind of okay," which the tower then approved. Following this, the captain immediately began advancing thrust levels to 40% N1. He called: "Stable. N1. TOGA." He pressed the TOGA buttons and then began the takeoff roll. Have any of you noticed what's missing at this point?

Yes, do you remember the controller telling him to call back when they were ready to leave? Well, that was never done, possibly because the captain had taken the first officer's radios, disrupting the normal flow of communication, and this meant that the plane was now taking off without takeoff clearance, which is a major procedural violation. In any case, the takeoff roll proceeded normally and, six minutes after midnight, the aircraft took off and began to climb into the stormy night. After takeoff, the gear was increased and almost immediately the aircraft began a slight bank to the right. This was easily countered by the captain, who simply introduced a bit of left aileron to keep the plane climbing in a straight line.

And the reason for this small tendency to roll was probably that there was still a bit of right rudder adjustment selected from the previous flight. Additionally, airplanes are not 100% perfectly symmetrical, so very small roll tendencies exist in almost all airplanes. And this wouldn't have mattered at all if it weren't for what's about to happen next, because as the plane passed about 1,000 feet of climb, all of the pilot's inputs recorded on the captain's control wheel suddenly stopped. This coincided with the captain calling "Course Select" and the first officer confirming that the HDG SEL lateral navigation mode was indeed active.

This meant that the captain had completely released his control here, but why did he do that? Well, we can't know for sure, but he was probably focused at this point, planning the path the plane should follow to navigate through the storm clouds. Normally, 1,000 feet is where we engage the autopilot and there is a possibility that he may have tried to press the autopilot button, but that he may have done so while he was still applying some force to the yoke. And if you do that, autopilot won't engage. I've actually seen this happen in real life. And it is one of the many reasons why it is very important to always follow the select, check and call procedure whenever any type of selection is made.

What this basically means is that we first select the mode or action we want, then we need to visually check on the flight mode annunciator that the mode has actually been activated and only after that, can we indicate it. But is there no warning telling pilots that autopilot is not engaged? Yes, but that warning is only activated if the autopilot is disconnected. And in this case, he was never online in the first place. In any case, after this there was no longer anyone controlling the aircraft, neither the pilots nor the autopilot. He was literally flying alone.

The captain was most likely looking outwards and toward the weather radar. And now he began to turn the heading error on the control panel away from the runway to the right just as they had planned to do. He selected 132 degrees and as he did so, remember that little tendency to turn to the right that we talked about earlier? Well, now since there was no one holding on to the controls to counteract it, the aircraft began to slowly turn to the right and that was probably misinterpreted by the captain as the autopilot doing his job, turning to the heading he had set. selected.

It is likely that neither pilot was closely monitoring their instruments at this time because if any of them had looked down at their flight mode annunciator, they would have seen that the aircraft was still flying in FD or flight director mode. and not in CMD or command like he should have said if autopilot was on. The captain now said, "I'll keep it somewhere there," probably pointing out the path he intended to follow through the storm clouds. He then moved the heading error further to the right to a heading of 139 degrees, causing the flight director's magenta command bars on his primary flight display to turn further to the right showing him how to turn.

And even that should have been a clue to him that something wasn't right here because when the autopilot is engaged, it always follows the flight director exactly. He never leaves the middle of the command bars. But in this case, since the airplane was slowly increasing its pitch to the right, the command bars would have indicated that an additional right turn was needed, since the airplane was only pitching about six degrees and not the full 25 to 30. degrees you normally would. do. When the plane surpassed 1,500 feet of climb, the autothrottle reduced takeoff thrust to climb thrust and the first officer announced it.

The plane was now banked about 11 degrees to the right and speed had begun to increase as the nose slowly descended. This increase in speed would have caused the aircraft's speed trim system to begin moving the trim wheels, which it is designed to do in case the pilots are not adjusting within certain speed and time parameters. And the fact that autotrim was now taking place might have further confirmed the captain's belief that the autopilot was indeed engaged, but that was not the case. As they were now about to turn beyond the selected 139 degrees, the flight director's command bar began to indicate a left turn necessary to maintain that heading, but neither pilot noticed this change in indication.

Instead, the captain shouted, "Okay, command," indicating that he had now engaged autopilot. At that point, the plane had been flying without any response for about 18 seconds and, although he had already announced it, the autopilot was not yet activated. So this could have simply been a delayed call because of what he thought he had done earlier. As I said before, the selection verification call procedure is critical and it is equally important that pilot monitoring also verifies the selection after the pilot flying has called it. And this is an excellent example of it. Anyway, the plane continued its uncontrolled turn to the right and in the meantime, the co-pilot began talking to the captain about which page he should have selected in the FMC CDU.

The plane's heading had now passed 139 degrees and was continuing to the right, meaning that the flight director's command bars were now pointing completely to the left. The captain now moved the heading error to the left to a heading of 120 degrees. But of course the plane simply continued its turn to the right and the command bars still showed a full left deviation. The fact that he did not realize that the plane was not following his command change of course suggests that he was not monitoring his primary instruments at the time. And neither did the co-pilot, or at least he didn't say anything.

Instead, as the plane climbed to 2,400 feet, the first officer suggested they should set standards on their altimeters. They were cleared to climb to their cruise altitude of flight level 370 so it was not wrong to suggest it but again this pressure setting change should have been directed by the pilot flying and there was no rush to do it. The flaps were still extended and they still had a lot of work to do before completing the post-takeoff checklist. So at this point it would have been much more important for the first officer to monitor what the plane was actually doing.

The next thing that happened was the captain yelled, "Now we're getting into this," probably referring to the storms outside and probably an increase in the amount of turbulence and precipitation. The first officer responded, "Okay." And then he said, "Am I staying the course?" Followed by the heading error which moved from 120 degrees to 165 degrees. This was possibly done by the co-pilot to match the heading and therefore also the flight directors with what the aircraft was actually doing. But of course we can't be sure of that. But when autopilot is engaged, which the pilot thought it was, only the pilot flying should change the values ​​on the mode control panel.

So if the first officer saw something he didn't like, he should have warned him instead of trying to fix it. When the plane reached about 2,600 feet, the captain asked, "It's okay this way, right?" Obviously he's still preoccupied watching his weather radar and trying to find a path through the storm. The first officer responded, "Is he okay?" And six seconds later, the plane's right edge had increased to 34 degrees. And the captain let out an exclamation of astonishment. This was immediately followed by a... - bench angle. - Warning. And now the captain finally put his hands back on the controls and began trying to correct the plane's attitude.

The problem was that this sudden realization of the high angle of inclination must have given him an instant start because what he did now was abruptly turn the yoke almost completely to the right. Now his main instrumentation would have clearly shown that the plane was already in the right turn. And outside his window, there were only storm clouds and darkness, so he wouldn't have been able to use any of the outside references unless what he saw outside really confused him in some way. Sometimes when flying through clouds, a tilted cloud mass can give the illusion of a horizon and that is one of the reasons why it is so important to concentrate on the aircraft's instrument.

In this case, it is also possible that his prolonged failure to scan the instrument and this sudden appearance of a tilt angle warning led to an instinctive, startled reaction rather than a thoughtful and balanced correction. Anyway, this initial input to the right caused the aircraft to quickly turn further to the right, reaching a bank angle of around 50 degrees, which is a pretty steep turn. After this, the captain continued to make inputs to both the left and right, clearly showing confusion about the aircraft's orientation. He also began to push the helm, something he had never done before.we do on the Boeing 737 during a normal flight.

Turns are normally coordinated by yaw dampers, so entering the rudder was very awkward, further indicating his startle and possible disorientation. But it could also possibly indicate that he initially thought they had some kind of flight control problem. The next thing that happened was that autopilot suddenly activated. At this point, the captain had probably noticed that he was not engaged and instead of first stabilizing the plane as he should have done, he simply pressed the button. Now, when the autopilot is engaged and heading select has been selected as the roll mode, he normally attempts to continue flying the aircraft in heading select.

But since the autopilot was engaged with the selected course way off and the flight directors were indicating a full left turn, he was unable to do so. Instead, Autopilot was activated in a mode called steering wheel control. This is a lower form of automation mode in which the aircraft basically continues flying at the bank angle selected by the pilot. However, he will not accept a bank angle greater than 30 degrees, so if the captain had left the autopilot alone, he would probably have stabilized the turn and returned it from the very steep turn they were now in.

But instead of doing so, just five seconds after engaging the autopilot, the captain again began depressing the yoke and rudder pedals. He first moved the yoke to the right and then to the left and then to the right again along with great bursts of movements of the right rudder. Now, if a plane is in a sharp right turn and you push the rudder to the right, this will cause the plane to yaw to the right, but since it banks when a yaw occurs, that yaw will start to point the plane sharply. the nose towards the ground. which is exactly what happened here.

The captain shouted, "We're crashing," as he continued to move the controls in a panic. The first officer responded, "Sure, yeah, we're crashing, right," as the bank reached 70 degrees and the plane began to descend toward the ground. The captain continued to push the right rudder even though he eventually moved the yoke all the way to the left, but with the high bank angle they were already at and the huge rudder pushed to the right, this left aileron wasn't enough to slow down. momentum. angle fast enough. The first officer, probably realizing that the captain was completely disoriented, began to shout corrections but unfortunately what he shouted was: "Correction, captain!

Left, left, left. Correction, left." Possibly adding to the confusion which by now must have been absolutely terrifying. At seven minutes and 35 seconds after midnight, the plane reached its highest bank angle of 115 degrees to the right. After this, continued input from the left control wheel began to take effect and the roll eventually decreased toward 70 degrees, but at that point, it was only 1,300 feet off the ground and the nose was pointing almost 50 degrees down. Seven seconds later, one minute and 42 seconds into the flight, the plane crashed into the mangrove swamp below at a speed of 270 knots and 48 degrees nose down.

All 114 people on board were immediately lost on impact. Search and rescue efforts began almost immediately, but were hampered by bad weather and the swampy terrain where the accident had occurred. Eventually, both the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder were found in the five-metre-deep crater the plane had created in the soft mud. The investigation finally concluded that the accident had occurred due to a loss of control by the crew due to spatial disorientation after a long and slow journey, during which no instrumental scanning was carried out and in the absence of external visual references due to darkness. and cloudy weather. .

Inadequate operational control, lack of crew coordination, poor monitoring and confusion in the use of autopilot was what ultimately caused the accident. The investigation team made several recommendations to both the airline and governing authorities, but the most important recommendation was the implementation of a formalized training program in disruption prevention and recovery techniques for commercial pilots. Remember, this happened in 2007, two years before the crash of Colgan Air 3407 and Air France 447, which also highlighted the need for this crucial pilot training. All commercial pilots now receive modules of this training every six months of their career. I think this accident also serves as a good reminder of the importance of proper pilot selection.

If you are thinking about becoming a pilot, before you begin your pilot training, you must take a pilot suitability test. And you should do it, both for your own sake, to ensure you don't spend a lot of money on training, only to find out you won't be able to pass the airline acceptance test, and also for the sake of everyone who will fly with you in the future. . Now, if you want to check your eligibility, I recommend you check out the Airline Pilot Club. It's a free resource that will give you one of those indicative tests for free, as well as lots of other great support and guidance for future pilots.

And I've linked them in the description below. Now, watch this video below, which I think you'll find really interesting or binge-watch this playlist. If you want to support the work I and my team do here, please consider joining my beautiful Patreon team. I would love to see you at my next Hangout. You can also buy some merchandising or send a super thank you, everything is greatly appreciated. Have an absolutely fantastic day and we'll see you next time.