See It: Full Trump hearing in Georgia RICO case I MSNBC

merits a little, you can feel free, Mr. seow, eh, but the word is yours, or I can sit and talk into the microphone. That's fine thanks. I think the first thing the court has to address is whether or not there is a first constitutional amendment. as the challenge applied is ready for pre-trial consideration, I am honest with the court, if the court says it is not ripe, then making the rest of the argument is probably not the right time, on the other hand, and we have already discussed under Hall and there are other

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s that have been cited that, as long as we agree, for the purposes of the motion, the facts, not other accusations, but the facts, is correct, so I almost pause to return to court if we are not in that stance and we can do a little quick ping pong here if we have to, just so we know what the guardrails are, so I look closer at Hall and I think there's a follow up

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I think it was Boer, maybe Bayer. I forgot what it was called. um and they're certainly doing it as an applied challenge, there's a little bit of language there. I wanted everyone to give me their opinion on where I think the quote was. It is well established that vagueness challenges statutes that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts at hand, and therefore, if you take the opposite of that, it almost seems that you should not consider the challenges of the First Amendment as they apply, so I. I'm curious to hear your take on that, but putting that side of it, I mean it certainly seems like in other jurisdictions, as applied First Amendment challenges happen all the time, so it could be that we haven't actually had the opportunity here in Georgia to address that on the merits I don't know, but what also seemed clear even reading Halls is that if we're doing an applied challenge, we're within the bounds of impeachment because, unlike Hall, the state has not said that here are some additional. facts that we're willing to stipulate or concede or something like that, what reactions, um, I understand how the court might see otherwise, but I think as written, all the judges agree that it's a First Amendment.

The challenge would be ripe. Constitutional challenge on First Amendment grounds as long as we accept all of the well-pleaded factual allegations in the indictment and do not go beyond what the court has now indicated the state on this point has failed to state or act on. to any other fact, although I think that some of them, for example, the fact of how a letter arrives to the Secretary of State or a telephone call, that is a problem. I think those things are clear throughout the record in this case, but I'm not sure. I am sure that they are necessary for the court to challenge accordingly and, as such, I believe that we can limit ourselves to the facts well alleged in both Rico's first count and the other counts of the indictment.

Well let's get started. There it is, Mr. Wakeford, any kind of reaction to some of those things that I mentioned and in Mrs. House's response, it will upset the court if I really go, you can stay wherever you want, I think we have to start with Hall, your honor. and I'm glad you pointed out that language because it was going to be the first thing I wanted to address today. Hall descends from a case called National Dairy, which in Hall's language, in cases like this, we are confined. look at the charging conduct, that's what we looked at and Hall, of course, they looked outside the charging instrument for these other facts, yeah, so it looks like that's not going to be an issue here because the state doesn't say that here. there is all our theory. of the case, so what prevents us from making a first minute challenge as it applies, just based on the accusation itself, which is limited and you and you have an advantage since you can put whatever you want in the overall accusation , and That's the thing is that when you look at the defendant's post-Heering brief and you also look at the footnote, he's not actually asking the court to look at the well-stated allegations in the indictment, he's actually asking the court to to the court to read aloud certain certain words, all of which have to do with intent, um, so footnote two on page two says that if it says that something was done illegally, knowingly or intentionally, uh , that's not a factual allegation that the court should consider, so the suggestion seems to be oh. let's look at Hall Hall says we can play fast and loose with what the facts are and in this case what we want the court to do is read out loud some language from the indictment not really consider it, let's say we don't understand that extra step and we're just barely getting over that threshold, even if there was no footnote, any position right now on whether we can do an analysis of this as the First Amendment applies, for it to be true in the federal courts, it's like everything would have ended.

Where some courts explicitly stay away from this and other courts look at it, we know that in this case of the defendant in DC, Judge Chucken actually explicitly went ahead and did an analysis based on the allegations in the indictment, but he didn't. all courts do it. and some federal courts stay away from this for a very specific reason, which is that there are still factual allegations that need to be resolved by a fact finder for a jury and the reason is that in looking at all the cases, as you have done you, found cases that I didn't.

I know they're generally going to say we don't have the record, we don't have the facts, but there were some who explicitly said that even though I could just look at the indictment, I'm still not going to make an applied challenge, well, I think that's how we got there. to a case here in Georgia and it's a case that your honor cited in October when you explicitly ruled that we're not going to get into this. circuit case, wasn't that what you're talking about? I'm talking about the lead case, which is the Georgia case, the lead case is where they say okay, this is a pretrial challenge applied to the First Amendment, but essentially what this boils down to is an argument about intent, that's what the defendants really talk about and when you look at what the defendant wants to discuss here today he just says well I was talking, it was just a guy saying things that I was just defending, I was just talking my mind and so Therefore, all this is protected and therefore everything has to go.

I think that's your strongest argument. The strongest argument about whether we are in the analysis of the applied challenge. I'm still trying. get over and really understand the procedural element well and that's what Major says because that question of intent hasn't been answered yet and the jury is the person who is the entity that answers that question, it's premature to consider this, it's No. you can say that the first amendment has been applied or that the challenge as applied can be successful at this stage because there are still questions that need to be answered, but mom, I think it was like a respite from the terrorist threats, right? breathless, but then moves on to an applied challenge, that's the last part of the main question, did they really say premature or did they just say denied?

They say they can't say it's unconstitutional under the First Amendment as it applies to the defendant in that scenario. because there are still questions of intent and that actually maybe suggests that they made a challenge as supply, it's very difficult for a defendant to win that because all you have is the accusation, that's one way you can interpret it. Would you suggest that a challenge as applied cannot be successful under the First Amendment because criminal speech that is integral to criminal conduct is not protected? A well presented indictment will demonstrate that the speech that is alleged as part of a criminal charge is an integral part of the criminal conduct and then there is nothing to decide if you are looking and you are locked up by the indictment so we have two routes here neither of them results in the granting of this motion one says the court says says this is premature there are questions that must be answered any challenge to the First Amendment has to occur after there is a factual record to look at and the other says okay I can Getting to this today is not that I can't, I can, but there is nowhere to go because all of the speech is alleged to be part and parcel of criminal conduct and therefore is not protected by the first thing an indictment could imagine.

I don't know if I don't remember if Alvarez was a post-trial or pre-trial thing, but could you imagine an indictment where maybe it was drafted exclusively for the Target speech because of its falsehood or something, so maybe it's helpful a challenge applied in that type of situation, that's a fair point, your honor, it's just not the situation here and it's not going to be the situation in almost any case, which was a special case where, of course, you have a unique statute that punished that, but that was also really a facial challenge because it said this only punishes falsehood for lack.

On their own, none of the charges in this case are about falsehood employed as part of a pattern of criminal conduct in numerous ways, so there is nowhere to go and I believe it requires dismissal or denial at this stage because either you can get to it because there are more facts, there are facts that need to be established, or the prosecution establishes that none of the speech is protected by the First Amendment and the investigation ends immediately. to you, mr pig, uh, let's move forward with the idea that we are making an applied challenge limited only to the impeachment, uh, this is not a facial challenge, it is not saying that any of these statutes are correct, unconstitutional, uh and your argument is that this is the core political discourse, right, so some crimes can be accomplished solely through discourse through terrorist threats, you know, request, why is that now what's happening here as it is? allege?

I think it requires some kind of detailed analysis, so if I'm sure it's okay, so the first thing we have to decide is yes or no, and we're talking about President Trump, we're not talking about the actions of others, we have to look and see if what has been alleged as the facts are, in fact, the core of political speech political speech protects its speech at its zenith. I don't think there's any doubt that statements, comments, speech, expressive conduct that has to do with campaigns or elections has always been at the zenith of protected speech, what do we do?

We have an electoral speech here, so we must immediately determine whether it constitutes a central political speech and I suggest that now it does make a difference. Ultimately, yes, because the more central speech, the more protected it is, the less the government should be involved in restricting it. I don't think there's any real doubt about it, so the question is that the mere fact that the state here represents that it is false or fraudulent under the statutes is enough, now that I just listened, I think the state's position would be yes, all we have to do is say that it is false, it is part and parcel of criminal conduct, it is fraud, and therefore it cannot be unconstitutional as applied.

I don't think that's what the law says. I think what the law really looks at is each individual application of a law, whether falsehood in and of itself is sufficient or not, on its own, and I think the case law indicates that that's not that particular and I don't need to go into it again. detail everything that Álvare Red said, but I think that Álvarez is important because even when you talk in terms of and I will start with, we are looking at the majority, what I would do, actually, I suppose it would be the opinion of the plurality, according to Justice Kennedy, but for purposes of interest to us, The Chief Justice and Justice Mayair agree, so now we are talking about two people who are still on the court, and I am looking specifically at page 723 in which The court goes on to say where the court should hold that the interest in truthful speech alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on the speech, absent any evidence that the speech would be used to obtain a material advantage, would give the government a broad sensory power unprecedented in the cases of this Court or in our constitutional tradition, so that is the initial part of the plurality saying.

The way to attack false speech or false political speech or central speech is with the truth, which is precisely what was happening in this period of time without moving away from the accusation that you are talking about at the same time that the accusations are being made. accusations. factual allegations in the indictment there are others who are fighting the government's position it would be with TR State's position with the truth going beyond Alvarez, in part you have Justin Kagan with Judge Brier and here I think it gets to the crux of where we are. and this is the concurring opinion that goes through a litany of false statements cases in which the government's position in Alvarez is false in itself is enough, once it is determined to be false we are done, but that is not what says the concurrer and that is not what the dissenter says, the concurrer says uh basically thatThese judicial statements cannot be interpreted as meaning no protection at all.

False factual statements can serve useful human goals, for example, in social contexts where they can avoid embarrassment d da da da da in public contexts. where they may stop or panic in the face of danger and even in a technical, philosophical and scientific context where, as Socrates' method suggests, the examination of a false statement, even if deliberately made to deceive, can promote a way of thinking that ultimately helps in understanding the truth and then goes on to say that even a false statement can be regarded as a valuable contribution to public debate, as it generates the clearest perception and most vivid impression of the Truth produced by its collision with error, so this is the proposition that it is not just the falsehood that controls, but the context in which the speech is given and whether it is considered false and for the purposes of the accusation that we have. assuming it is false because that is what the facts have been alleged, that doesn't mean that is the end of the analysis, why don't we have to assume too since it is an accusation?

I think you say in your writing that it is illegal, intentional and knowing. false because at least our position, President Trump's position, is that those are words, they are not words, in fact, those are words of legal connotation and although they have meaning, that would allow, for example, let's go to Alvare and The Stolen Valor Act just because they alleged that so It was illegal doesn't mean it won, I mean it doesn't mean the government won, but that's because they decided it wasn't a crime at all. I mean it was a face challenge where they said this statute even if you violated it violated the First Amendment you've said the RICO statute can be violated and you don't know it's not a right so we make us put legal conclusions on the accusations all the time.

I think that will be part of Mr. Schaer's argument in just a minute. um I mean a moment ago you said that just because the state alleges it you don't think that's enough in an asipi challenge and I'm trying to figure out as far as the statement, like the legal conclusions are illegal and so on now. If there had been, I suppose if the accusations had been broader, maybe we wouldn't be at that crossroads, but those are not facts, the facts as I have summarized them or we have outlined them in our report, take the open acts you look at those acts open and then those at the same time and then look at the substantive offenses or conspiracy offenses in the rest of the body of the indictment, words like illegal don't change that, at least that's our position, so now we're talking in terms that go back to Álvarez and the concurring opinion, you are speaking in terms of falsehood alone is not enough, there are things, there are situations, contexts that simply nullify falsehood alone and that is again political discourse, political discourse the more significant it's for certain issues clearly being president of the United States at the time, dealing with elections and campaigning, questioning whether what had happened at least in the 2020 presidential election, that's the height of political discourse and then you even get to The Descent, which I think is um. so important because now you have Alo and Thomas and the members of the current court and I go to that, but I think it starts on page 750 1 um and it says even where there are broad scholars and this is 752 even there.

Excuse me even. When there is broad academic consensus on a particular issue, the truth is served by allowing that consensus to be challenged without fear of reprisal. The wisdom accepted today sometimes turns out to be wrong, and in this context even a false statement can be considered wrong. make a valuable contribution to public debate as it generates a clear perception and a more vivid impression of the Truth produced by its collision with error, uh, to quote the US Supreme Court, that is the essence of what we have here, are the facts that have been essentially alleged as The state's position is because, as alleged, what President Trump said in his speech or expressed through his speech or conduct, which is still freedom of expression because that is false in the eyes of the state, you have lost all the protections of the First Amendment and the concurring opinion of the opinion you submit. in Alvarez suggests just the opposite, if anything, given the circumstances, he needs more protection, not less protection, so with that in mind, let's move on to not leave Rico aside for a minute, let's move on to the conspiracy charges, which are charges 9 11 13 15 177 19 basically what is the state's position on this because you took this position previously in your September 27, 2023 filing in response to what was presented by chesbro and of course I'm aware of the court order that he went with chesbro and he didn't do it.

I don't deal with applied, so I'm dealing with it and well and more so in that case, when I go back and look at it, there was a much more concerted effort to present facts outside of the indictment, just what they started talking about. there was a transcript in the meeting there was this, you know, so it didn't really seem to be a certain right of challenge as applied, but as the court noted in its order at the time, it did not determine that it was ready for a pretrial challenge, so I'm taking what chesbro said the state as it applies now because it says in that brief that these were both facial and applied challenges essentially what it says is um as to the count of those charges 91 um 13 15 17 19 as to to 911 and 17, the mere fact that you allege fraud is enough, that's what's on pages five and six um, since each of those statutes prohibit conduct that involves fraud, we don't go any further and I'm suggesting that it is wrong that you should go further, you should look at the speech itself, the expressive conduct itself in relation to that specific statute, that is what applies, the fact that it is a fraudulent statute, now you want to look and see for what, given the circumstances. here the language of the president's speech falls within that and if you look at it in that sense the mere fact that it is false is all they have, they don't have it, the speech itself is not found beyond the speech itself to be fraudulent.

What the state wants to do is say that we have a goal, we have an objective here, that we propose to steal the elections illegally. I say change that for a second to a legitimate concern about the validity of the election if that was the way it was focused. about that, what is a way to do it as it applies even with the facts with what President Trump said in those aspects, being protected speech and the answer is that it has to be because the only thing that makes it fraudulent in the state saying that each one of those is false and they say okay, it is not false, it is protected, the only reason why it is unprotected in the opinion of the state is because they call it false and that is what Álvarez does not allow in itself, it cannot simply be the content. based it has to be Be contextual and the contextual here is a core political value that is addressed in elections and campaigns and that goes for all those who deal with conspiracy and then deal with counts 29 and 39, which are charges for false statements.

Now it's clear that the Supreme Court would find that a statement made under 1001 18 USC a0001 would constitute, say, a summary or unprotected conduct or speech, but the Georgia statute is a little different here because we don't have an element of materiality. , is the mere fact of falsehood. which violates under Georgia law, counts 29 and 39, you do not have to do anything other than make a false statement, even if it is political speech, even if it is in the heightened context that I have suggested, if it is false, it is a rape. of the law and I'm saying it applies to political speech that cannot be constitutional as it is applied, remember there is no materiality just the fact that he said it so essentially, what would be the state's position on it, he had no to be sent to um, anyone of importance in the state agency, it just had to be said, uh, in fact, if you look and the best example is probably Count 39, which is a letter written after the elections in September 2021 by President Trump to um Secretary of State in which he has agreement with that statement and that constitutes agreement with the falsehood of the state, but it is clearly a political speech and it is clearly related to the activities and, uh, the issues of election and campaign, even after the fact, is still related only to that which it seems. at 29 and 39, I think you have a situation where falsehood alone is all they have applied here to political speech, it is unconstitutional as applied under the First Amendment and finally you have 27 quick questions about that if there were made.

I didn't find one if you had found anyone who ever attempted a facial challenge in 161020. Yes, I actually don't remember the name of the case, but it was confirmed even though there were references to the fact that maybe materiality should be part of it. of. It has to be that way, that's the way it is, okay, yes, apparently so, but Haley of course didn't go to the extent of trying to determine whether it applies in a particular context and, again, I won't repeat what I just said. . but here we're talking about the greater value of the core political discourse and then with 27 we're talking about the presentation of a false document again, the only thing that involves President Trump is an antiation, uh, about the complaint, now all that. what is referred to in the indictment is the complaint, but again we are talking about the act, the falsity or the presentation of a false document is the falsity in the document itself and I am suggesting, given the circumstances, that and that alone would not violate that statute as applied, regardless of the facial challenges, the question here is the mere fact that the state says that fraud or misrepresentation is enough to get by and, as applied, the challenge and our suggestion is that It's not now, let's go to Rico and I think Rico is more difficult.

To be honest with you because we're talking about a much broader statute at the same time, when you look at the allegations against President Trump, all of the allegations involve expressive conduct or speech, we have false statements over and over again. all of which are core political values ​​political speech you have false statements in the acts 1 5 7 8 17 93 97 108 113 133 135 and 157 purely the only accusations there is falsehood there is no allegation beyond the fact that those statements are made and I am suggesting that again heightened political speech needs to be viewed differently when it comes to tweets, which is at least the way the state states it is also political speech uh and here certainly by the then president of the United States.

Tweets at 22 26 27 32 75 100 101 1 106 114 128 138 and 139, so most overt acts involve false statements or tweets that are clearly political speeches, what's the best way to deal with that, given the circumstances , to prosecute those under a broad RICO charge. supposedly with challenging an election through, I guess, illegitimate speech or expressive conduct, or the way we're set up as a country is that the First Amendment plays into this by others, by those who complain that is false, proving that it is false, showing the truth. that is the essence of what Alvarez has said, that is the essence of what, um, a case called Brown v.

Hartlage that is cited in Alvarez, is 456 us 45 at 61, 1982 decision, they all speak in terms of When it comes to that speech that is political speech, it is better to approach it through the P, promoting a vision contrary to the Truth, no no, prosecuting the author of the speech or the person who articulates his political views. Here we have done the opposite, we have decided that because those views were unpopular and in the states the opinion is false, we must prosecute them to prevent them from happening again, which is again the essence of why it is unconstitutional as applied because that is not what the law says, finally the rest of the excessive acts, whether phone calls or meetings. or requests without false statements are just acts expressive acts and they are also there those are political acts and for the benefit of the Court, as I know, there are many excessive acts, those are nine 14 19 28 30 31 40 42 43 44 90 95 112 uh, what was in the old indictment is 3 paragraph number two, now I think it is 125 130 131 140 and 156 nothing is factually alleged against President Trump other than political speech, so what this court has to decide is the position of the state. that fraud or misrepresentations in these circumstances, which I suggest, is really just, it is enough to obtain it by an applied challenge, our position is that there is no other way to look at this, they are going to argue at the same time that it is part and parcel of criminal conduct, but what is punished is the speech that is the criminal conduct, if it is not the criminal conduct there would never be a RICO indictment against President Trump or any of these other charges, eliminate the political speech, there are no charges political criminals. speech uh I'm not foragree with the basis of all charges.

I think that's the best way for me to summarize where our position is right. Thank you sir, okay Mr Wickford or Mr Floyd if there are any points you would like to address or respond to. um well I'll start maybe start with this, it certainly seems like the main case driving the lady's argument would be Alvarez and you know, because it's kind of a fractured pluralist opinion. I wonder if you have any. I think about how much that can drive this and I know that the state in December was also citing Alvarez as the lead case.

I wonder if that's the best for her arguments. I think to address the first elephant in this courtroom. um the thing is that a charlatan judge in DC has evaluated all these arguments uh under the precedent of the Supreme Court already um, so I would refer your honor to the analysis of that Court because I am hardly going to improve the conclusions of a federal judge, no matter how much I talk .specifically to Álvarez which is a plural opinion with several different concurring SEs, several different opinions written by other judges, what everyone agrees on is that Álvarez does not change the law that speech integral to criminal conduct is not protected by the First Amendment and that that was not what Alvarez was about, it was about punishing falsehood for its own sake, so the question is what is the state doing here and by fundamentally rewriting the indictment, the defendant is suggesting today that that is in some ways what the state is doing when in reality, what the state is saying is that all of these statements made by the defendant were used as part of criminal activity, various conspiracies, frauds, deceptive intentions and violations of law, It's not just that they were false, it's not that the defendant was dragged into a courtroom because the prosecution doesn't like what he said, he is free to say, make statements, file lawsuits and make other legitimate protests, which is not is allowed to do is use his speech, expression and statements as part of a criminal conspiracy to violate George's RICO statute, impersonate public officials, present false documents and make false statements to the government, that is what he allegedly did , never, is not charged under 161020 because he told some lies, although it is very interesting to hear Mr.

Trump's Council tell us about the usefulness of lies. He is not being prosecuted for lying. He is being prosecuted for lying to the government. A state. An act that is illegal because it damages the government. That's why it's illegal. That is why it is different from the statute evaluated in Álvarez, the same with presenting a false document, it is not only that you made a false statement, it is that you swore it in a judicial document and presented it to the court, that hurts the judicial system, that is obviously different than that. falsehood be punished by itself and that is what each and every charge in the indictment demonstrates is that these statements are part of criminal conduct that is larger than the simple false statement itself, especially with the charge RICO where what we see is that this is a criminal organization whose members and associates participated in various criminal activities, including, but not limited to, false statements and writings impersonating a public official, forgery, presentation of false documents, influencing Witnesses, computer theft, computer invasion, and so on, what the defendant is suggesting to you is trying to avoid the fact that because it's almost saying that because these statements are false these charges should be dismissed, it's like you can't punish falsehood on its own and yet every time If you look at the indictment, the government says the state is saying he lied, so that should be the end of the investigation, but that's not the end of the investigation. end of the investigation at all, that is not what the indictment says, it is not just that he lied again and again and Again, as the defendant's Council points out when listing all the cases in the indictment, it is that each of They were employed as part of a criminal activity with criminal intent and we finally got to a place where I knew we would end up. above, which is to say that I think his honor was asked to think of it not as lies but as a legitimate concern about electoral issues.

Well, that sounds like a judgmental argument to me, but that's why I started talking about intent with your honor, because I knew we were going to end up in this exact place where he said, "sure, you can see them as lies because they weren't true" or you could to think that these are simply well-intentioned concerns of an American citizen speaking his mind and that, of course, probably would be a pretty good argument to make before a jury and I hope we see it, but it is not a basis for dismissing the charge. . No doubt the whole question of intent will arise.

It can only be determined by a jury, but what? what we heard here today is an attempt to rewrite the indictment to eliminate the parts that are inconvenient and just say well, it's all speech, it's all talk and he was just a guy asking questions and not someone who was part of a conspiracy global criminal who attempted to overturn the election results of an election he did not win by violating the RICO statute by making false statements to the government, submitting false documents, impersonating officials, and engaging in a host of other activities that are harmful in addition to the falsity of the statements used to happen, so I think there has been a suggestion that your honor may reframe what you are seeing, but Alvarez does nothing to change the basis on which the court must base itself when evaluating the accusation, i.e. this is this speech is punished solely because it is false solely because of its point of view or it is speech that is demonstrated to be an integral part of a pattern of criminal activity and, finally, the fact that it speaks to political concerns or central political speech and this is something that the court in DC, uh, addressed in depth does not change the fact that it can be used as part of criminal conduct, the mere fact that you are talking about issues of public interest or core political speech that may be completely fine and protected in certain cases in most cases. contexts does not mean that you cannot be charged if you use that type of speech to carry out illegal activities, that is the nature of the question, so it is very circular and I would like to direct your Honor to pages six to seven of the post-trial brief. audience. presented by the accused Trump who says that the speech integral to the criminal conduct, exception of the First Amendment, does not apply here because all of the accused conduct constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment, which is a very clear circle, the first amendment protects us because all speech is protected by the First Amendment and in the end, no matter how much we hear about uh, obviously, the noble protections that the First Amendment provides, this is all an effort to keep your honor from looking at the basic fact of than this speech, this expression, all this activity.

It is used as part of a pattern of criminal conduct in many ways and because he is honor bound by the accusation and he has to look at the accusation and he cannot look beyond it if we are to get into this at this stage. then there is nowhere to go as I said at the beginning because this is all alleged to be part of a pattern of criminal conduct and is not protected by the First Amendment. Any argument for the other is just trying to pretend that's not true, okay, thanks. You, Mr. W, thank you, your honor, may I briefly add a point?

Sure thanks. Wait a second. They are duplicating us here. This is not a trial. I think you can handle it. Mr. is down. To get on a specific point, don't duplicate the argument presented earlier. I think defendant Trump fundamentally misunderstands the role of an overt act in a conspiracy case, as we have discussed many times before, this is a RICO conspiracy case and that is why we heard from Mr. Sow. discuss various excessive acts and say well, but this is just a tweet, this is just a phone call, this is just acts, the unspoken thing underlying an incorrect premise, then it is that every excessive act must be a crime, as we have discussed several times and as the state has widely established in multiple writings that this is not true.

The purpose of an overacting is to show that conspiracy is an operation, it is not a separate crime, it does not have to satisfy the elements, it does not have to be declared. with that level of detail as a recognition of honor in an order, I think it's two weeks old, so to speak, we can't mention this particular act or this particular conduct because it's not a crime or it's protected by the First Amendment the The answer to that is actually so what? because it could be the first, it could be legal conduct, it could be conduct protected by the first amendment that also shows that there is a conspiracy at work and that is, as long as it serves that purpose, it is fine and therefore the acts open should not be examined by a standard that has no application to them they are not separate independent crimes um and there is case law that and we need to be able to cite it it is said that an excessive act can involve First Amendment activity its purpose is not to be something that charged separately here separately subject to a separate sentence its purpose is to show that there is a conspiracy and it is an operation um Georgia requires Georgia Rico to request an overaction by any defendant so of course the r would stand in any case any of the 161 on the acts that supposedly constituted an open act, you would only need one, you don't need any from Mr.

Trump, um, but the point is that we have a lot of them from Mr. .Trump and for the purposes of the RICO statute and the way it works, it doesn't matter whether it's First Amendment conduct or not. I mean, my colleague has

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y explained why much of this conduct is not protected under any circumstances by the First Amendment, and I don't mean to contradict that in any way. respect, but it is important not to lose sight of the role that overacting plays, the role it plays in a conspiracy case here because it is not the role suggested by the accused Trump, okay, thank you, Mr.

Floyd, okay, sir, I'll give you a pair. minutes uh final word, thank you sir, if I heard what Mr. Floyd just said, that if everything that President Trump said was assumed to be true and was included in the RICO indictment and therefore now we are talking about true political speech, not false assumptions, could still be prosecuted. for the rape of Rico, but the overa as alleged, let's say that even the overa um committed a violation of the First Amendment, is saying that it would not be fatal to count one because at that moment, if there could be something else, they prove that it is is not alleged as an overt act, that's fine, as I understand it, as I also understood it, but what I am suggesting is that if all overt acts are nothing more than central political speech or expressive conduct and it is not alleged anything but that is not protected by the First Amendment then you have an insufficient basis for which you have been charged because you are being charged for the First Amendment uh Speech and not for unprotected speech and therefore the statement that was made about that If it were true we could still use it as an overt act, uh, it suggests that they can process true speech, um, which is what we're trying to get at here, is the nature of speech, political speech, the high value of it, what makes this situation different from others and the fact that it is coming. from the then president of the United States, uh, going back to what the state also said, what the state claims is criminal, here he is lying to the government, that's what he said, that's the exact reason why in several Supreme Court cases have been found. must be protected because it deals with the government and falsehood in the sense of communication with or to the government is best dealt with through true speech spe not through prosecutions because prosecutions chill speech and when it involves core political speech What I know What I don't want is to be calm.

I use it, luckily I have a lawyer attached who can sort things out and help me report to the court, until the computer shuts down, and I watch what Haley says just to give you an idea of ​​how. the Georgia Court, the Supreme Court might consider this, there is a quote from Haley that says that while there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact, such misstatements are inevitable in free debate and the punishment of error risks induce a cautious attitude and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press, consequently, the first amendment requires that we protect some falsehoods to protect speech that matters and I think that is what we are talking about here to put an end to this and again we are focusing on um the conduct of President Trump at the time when he is, in fact, the head of the executive branch, there are references to this in Brown V Hartage and I cited that previously a well publicized but false complaint in the eve ofelections raises the concerns that raises the concerns. that may have some impact that would affect an election, but the preferred First Amendment remedy of more speech does not apply.

Silence has a special force. The basis of our reliance on more expression is the presupposition that correct conclusions are more likely to be drawn from a crowd. languages ​​that through any type of authorized selection for many this is and will always be crazy, but we have opted for all that and because the discourse related to public affairs is more than an expression of self-oppression, it is the essence of self-government and that comes from Garrison the Louisiana, which is also cited in Alvarez, the bottom line here is this, if it were not for the protected speech of the First Amendment, President Trump would not be indicted in Rico or the other county, eliminate the protected speech and has no underlying basis for accusation. him and since that violates the Constitution as it applies to the charges here and his speech here and his position here, this is correct for a constitutional challenge one step further if not right now and we get into the intent, when does it determine the court that?

After we have a trial, I think it will be the directed verdict stage. Would all the inferences be sufficient evidence? Yes in favor of that is quite a question. I mean, did we go through the whole trial? God forbid there is a conviction and then we come back to try to determine if it applies. I'm suggesting the reason it's right now and the reason we don't even get to a trial is because it's unconstitutional force and the defendant, whether it's the president of the United States, the former president or anyone else. will be tried for protective speech um and I think that's what Alvarez and the progeny before that and then they say okay, thank you ma'am okay, Mr.

Gill, do you need a minute before we dive in or can we? We started no we're pretty good so we're just setting this up um uh I know there's a good portion of your motion that goes back a lot of ground. I think we covered that well in the December

hearing

or excuse me, let me start. In the wake of some good news for the court, I'm happy to hear it, I see the smile that's already on the Court's face, myself, ours, our general and specific objection, a big part of that goes to the areas of Rico that the court not only ruled but also heard other arguments on which we have not yet ruled, but it was only talked about in October.

The ruling of the 17th addresses many of the issues that were addressed, so I'm not going to do that. I'm not going to redo that ground that the court has heard, you know, aware of the government's position. I know it will probably ruin Mr. Floyd's day by not allowing him to get up and come back. uh in your experience in Rico, I'm not going to do that, what I would like to do, although today is move forward into some areas that I think should be and the question really is when did the court say, do I want to have oral arguments today or not and so the question was well, you know, because as far as RICO goes, I think I probably could have said that if it was just the RICO component, I would have said well, let's do it in the documents that you have.

There are a lot of other things that I wanted to talk about and have the court focus on as it relates to some of the other aspects of the Demmer General deur special and focus on that in this way, number one, I want to talk a little bit about some of public officials representing the council. I want to talk about the forgery, the false statements, uh briefly and talk about that, but I also want to raise this issue before the court now. We argued that in our briefs, but the defendant still filed additional motions on these same issues and did a very, very good job on many of his arguments.

We know that the court granted the stay to defendant Ste because he is from the state legislature and therefore, if that had not happened, Mr. Beaver would be here with me talking about these issues. I think the petition still addressed many of the issues that were raised in the state's response and So, with the forgiveness, hope

full

y, of my dear friend, Mr. Beaver. I'm going to mention some of the things that you mention, but I hope that on behalf of the defendant the court can still hear what I say, but also before ruling on these particular issues it could give the defendant the opportunity to have his own day of oral argument. so that you can more fully address these issues and that is and I would appreciate it on your behalf when we speak.

Go on, we're talking about impersonating a public official and we talk about that when we talk about that, we talk about whether or not he knows Char, a public official, right? Yes, impersonating a public official, counts a uh. we say that he is subject to dismissal, you know, in that relevant part it says that on October 14 in or about December 2022 they illegally falsely represented themselves as duly elected and qualified presidential electors of the public officials of the state of Georgia with the intention of cheat. Now what we did in our brief is we said well, that's flawed because under Statute 2151, as a public official there is no reference there to presidential electors, it's not like public officials and therefore it should be that way. should

trump

for us the state's response uh says well, not so fast Mr.

Gillan uh we have cases here that talk about situations where uh 2151 doesn't

trump

and it's not right, not even the cases, I mean the statute itself that's right, I mean, you're taking it exactly out of the ethics statute, so I'm not really sure why you would look at public officials all over the code and it's just one of those question marks hanging around. I suppose so what the state does and you know and I and I can understand the Court's point of view. I'm not going to argue that what I'm going to say is that what they're saying is that they locate cases where there are individuals who are impersonating agents, you know, police officers, law enforcement officers or anti-human trafficking task force agents. of Metro Atlanta, okay, that falls into that category, traffic, uh, uh, on the task force or a federal agent, those are things that the state responds to, I think that in the fixed motion, covers some of the concerns that the court may have regarding this public official issue and why we think we should prevail on this as well again hoping that Mr.

Beaver will have his day, well, do me a favor, actually, I have. I put the fixed moves in a box and I haven't opened it yet, so make those arguments for me. I'm going to do it, eh, but not so articulately. I'm sure Tom could do it, but I'll give it to you. I'll give you an idea, the idea is that in the fixed motion that we adopted after it was introduced, it talks about how other case law in Georgia when it talks about, first of all, 161023 does not define public official, so we start from that professional that we have out there, it doesn't define public official now, but the petition still says that the question of who is and who is not a public official.

It is addressed in another context in Georgia law, usually in quo merito proceedings, where someone is trying to discover the legitimacy of someone holding or holding a particular office and in that context, there are cases that decide where they still It is alleged that Addressing this same issue, they cite Brown V Scott U and as a case in which the Brown V Scott case, you know whether or not an individual has a designation or title given to him by law or exercises functions related to the public. assigned to him by the law they cite Brown, that doesn't mean the investigation doesn't really end there, um, the George Supreme Court has noted that the term public CER implies the idea of ​​duration-of-tenure fees on monuments and powers , as well as Duty's and that's uh McDuffy V pergerson and that really has to do with grand juries, so when someone says well, it's a grand jury a public official and the court, you know, analyzes an analysis talking about that saying, not really because the grand grand jury can only meet for a few days uh you know they're not, they're not essentially uh you know uh um they're not there for any kind of duration or tenure uh they don't take the same prescribed oath of office for uh public officials and they lack the element of permanence and duration that must exist to qualify as a public official, so how would that apply again to a purely fictitious work group?

Well, I mean, let's forget the purely fictitious task force, we would let that jurisprudence of our Supreme Court how it applies to our case and how it applies to our case is that presidential electors are not people who have long terms in office, which must exist, frankly, your job is to meet for a day, no, I see. your frame is there, but if the frame is really here, where is the foot traffic in Metro Atlanta? It doesn't even exist, well it doesn't exist, but someone is posing as someone posing as an agent, maybe it's a part-timer, I mean it seems like well, you see, we could agree to disagree. here because I think when you're when someone says uh, well, here's my badge, I'm a, I'm a, I'm. a I'm a uh a law enforcement uh agent and then you name a particular entity that doesn't even exist, they're pretending to be a peace, they're pretending to be a government agent that by the The very nature of that job would have permanence would have responsibilities it would fall within the definition that the Supreme Court has given in Brown V Scott and McDuffy V Pearson as to what a public official should be and so, in that context, we have it.

We know we have the same thing, it actually came up again on the issue of uh of uh in moris C Peters, another Supreme Court case dealing with whether or not someone is a public official that had to do with uh a quo warranto against the president of the Democratic Party of Georgia and whether or not he would fall as a public official in the background, as in that case and who discovered that he was not like grand juries and public officials of the party, presidential electors are not public officials according to Georgia law, especially for the purposes of 161023, their labor services are temporary like grand juries, they, they, reposition, it really only comes up once every four years, it is limited to a single meeting on a single day, for what lacks that element. of mandate and duration, which must exist, so you know it's like going back to the Morris V.

Peters political case, which dealt with a state party, politician, president, nominated according to the rules of his party. but only because the fact that they were nominated according to the rules of his party does not make them public officials, just as the grand jurors that the presidential electors do not receive, do not receive their salaries for their service, so all that. His honor tells us that he knows that this particular recount is flawed for the very purpose of these uh these electors cannot be public officials under Georgia law, so he knows that we, although we agree with the position initial of the Court. with respect to limiting the definition of public official in our plea, good old Tom Beaver and the plea has still come forward to rescue us on that point, so if you look at what they did and hopefully Tom will. do a better job of articulating those points in your brief, they specifically talk specifically about some other cases that are in Texas and I think Utah deals more specifically with this as well, but for the purposes of today's argument, I think we have kind of an idea of what I think is happening with the impersonation of public officials, they are not public officials and clearly, under the direction we believe of our Supreme Court, they could not be so judged now, again, I'm not going to spend much time here with the court, but I want to touch on some of the other components of our claim, forgery counts now, you know, we indicated. in those counts 10 and 16 are sufficient for dismissal, you know, writing a check with a fictitious name or form in which the writing was made or in an altered proportion it was made by another person, that is the definition of 1610, we have what we have here in In this indictment we have a claim that a writing or something other than a check in a way that the writing was made by the authority of the duly elected and qualified presidential readers of the state of Georgia who gave no such Authority now that's what they claim let's look at why um and the states respond to us saying they want to focus on the phrase under authority uh and what we have here is the concept of what is uh uh what is authority who's who is this on October 14th who was the uh duly, excuse me who is the duly elected and qualified presidential elector of the state of Georgia who did not grant such authority on December 14, 2020 now the answer to that is that it is a question of law simply as a matter of law and now we return, it is an honor that some of the arguments that we have presented before the court previously on the issue of the supremacy uh Clause were worthy of at least highlighting some of those points before the court, for the purpose of exposeour point here and that is, you know, it's under federal law, as it existed in 2020, when the state of Georgia failed to comply with federal law about having an adjudication of any pending controversy or litigation and as we know in the public record in this court was the pending and unresolved Trump and Schaer litigation over the election now because that lawsuit was not adjudicated under federal law, so the state of Georgia lost its ability after Safe Harbor Day lost its ability to name who should be the electors and as we discussed earlier, I will shorten the argument, but for the purposes of the record, I will only make the following points once that happens and it is very, very clear from federal law and from the uh, Bush Vore's language, the state, any opinion about Bush, yeah, that's true, uh, but as you point out there, it's like they don't see it like they don't.

It's even a serious problem because, a clear reading of the statute would say that if you don't get it done before safe harbor day, then you've lost, and once that happens, the power will return to Congress, by law. We believe that no, you know, it is not a matter of fact by law on December 14, 2020, there were no duly elected and qualified presidential electors from the state of Georgia because of that failure, so I understand your point and I don't. I don't want to go too far into this, but since we're in our world here, wouldn't your allegation of whether a lawsuit was filed, whether it was pending, no, that's an allegation, doesn't that transform this into a speaking objection?

Well, we, we. I don't think so and the reason we didn't do it last time I think we cited the court that the court could take note of the allegations within the court system and I think what we expressed there and I don't think we had an objection from the state could be wrong, but what I remember is that we didn't do it, so we worked from the framework of yes, uh, in this Palace of Justice there was a presentation of a statement, uh, that we are not going to go, this is not an objection to speaking, It's part of the court record, part of the court record says there was a lawsuit that wasn't adjudicated before Safe Harbor Day, so we don't have to go. outside of the indictment is not talking to myr and because of that, when applying the law, these counterfeiters count 10 and 16 in our opinion, the other charges that I would like to go should now go away or the other issue that I would like to discuss is the component of false statement uh and um uh in the false statement counts is that 14 12 18 and 40 uh dealing with false statements now here uh the problem here dealing with a false statement, for example, uh is when they claim that we there was a document inside that was sent within the jurisdiction of the Georgia Secretary of State's office and the governor's official of the departments and agencies of the Georgia government now, we have two arguments for that number one, and again back to Haley Haley talks about this issue and when Haley talks about it, the key is whether or not there was agency with the key phrase with authority to act on it now, there are two flaws, the fatal flaws that the state has when it comes to this issue related to the Haley V state and on the issue related to the safe harbor, as we mentioned, at that time there was nothing that the state of Georgia could act on, they just received the information that it was. simply a kind of ministerial act um, so to speak, but even more fatal to your argument is the second argument that I made a moment ago and which I will not repeat other than to refer to, the failure, the failure, uh, to act before of a sure date at Harvard. it makes any AC activity on behalf of the state of Georgia, whether it be the governor or the Secretary of State, disappear because now everything has gone back to Washington, to Congress to deal with it and the government and the state cannot now say or in any time say well, we're saying that the Democratic nominees or the Democratic representatives for the electors finally became the duly elected ones, you don't, you don't parachute back what happened on December 14th in the world as we know it on the 14th December there were no Democrats or Republicans who were duly elected under federal law and since we believe the false statement uh count should go, thanks Ron, okay.

Okay, any thoughts from the state in reaction Mr. Wen, this is yours, yes, judge, why don't we take up the last point? Because I know we've died in some of this, not so much. the Safe Harbor aspect of that argument, but the idea that the governor's office and the Secretary of State's office simply did not have jurisdiction. I know you've said it's a matter of fact that needs to be proven, but it's not. that's also something that could be shown, but as a matter of law potentially um and I know you don't agree with that, so you can cover all that, sure, I don't agree that it's a matter of law, it's a problem. . in fact, um, and we have reported this at length and argued this before believing that even if it is not a question of fact, even if the court were to consider it as a question of law, we have given ample reasons why, under the statute, All of these entities have jurisdiction over many of the crimes that are alleged in the indictment, many of the issues that well, all of the issues where we have alleged that some of these defendants have made false statements regarding that, I maintain that I believe It is a matter of fact whether the jury decides that we have to present that evidence.

We have to ask the GBI officials. Do you know what your duty is? What is your authority? What can you investigate? We have to ask the Secretary of State. off uh individuals while they're on the stand what are your duties what is your job what do you do why are these things relevant why are they material for areas where you have jurisdiction to do something what is your capacity to act These things, I think all of that has have to come to light in the trial and as far as that argument goes, I think it's very premature, um and anything that again, I always go back to the standard of what is a Democratic right, but what I'm just saying that if there was a statute that explicitly said they had no jurisdiction, remind me, what are you saying just as a matter of apparent laws that give the governor authority over this after um?

Safe Harbor Day Judge, I don't have the indictment in front of me, so I need to know specifically what status the statement is in. I think this refers to the certificates or procedures where it is known if a voter does not appear on election day or December 14 so that the governor has to ratify a replacement for that person. I believe there were some documents that were delivered by Mr. Schaefer and his co-conspirators to the governor's office trying to get the governor. To do that, the Statute establishes that the governor, the governor, is the one who has to ratify the replacement, so he statutorily has absolutely the authority to act in that matter.

Okay, but from above I think there was a lot of discussion. time spent on the definition of public official and some of the allegations raised in Mr. Still's briefing, which I think the deadline for his motion should be coming soon, so if you are requesting an argument, we would have it for sure, but if wants to do something initial. reactions a well prepared judge um first I want to make this statement in the past as it relates to Mr. Schaefer and I will make it again, which is that we have to address an elephant in the room the elephant in the room is that Mr.

Schaefer is on the 11th Circuit right now demanding to be recognized as a federal officer, so what are we saying? Are we saying that this voter position is an official or not? I think they need to make a decision on this. um, but as far as well, I actually have quite a bit of ground to cover and I'll take it as it was, as Mr. Gillan put it. I want to start with again and again, as we noted in our answer we don't believe the definition section um and we admit that, but judge whether it applies.

I think it actually supports us because if you look at paragraph B, this is 2153 22b, it says public official means all other elected states. official not included in subparagraph a, so it is a comprehensive definition of any elected state official, so we think that would absolutely cover it to the extent that it is persuasive and demonstrates that presidential electors are public officials. That definition says that any elected state officials are elected state officials. I want to briefly address the cases that Mr Gillan raised, in terms of what Mr Gillan also put into the pleadings he prepared to address them.

First, there was an implication that 161023 only applies to police. law enforcement officials or officers know that is not true because of a case called Kennedy v. Carlton which is 294 Georgia 576 uh 2014 Georgia Supreme Court case where a conviction was upheld for someone posing as a fax clerk He was clearly not a police officer, a peace officer of any kind. then we can dispense with that argument as far as the cases referred to by Mr Gillan are concerned. You know the definition of public official in other contexts. All of those cases deal with the definition of a public official in the context of a uh quento um tres petition.

I think there are three cases referred to in Mr. Still's submission. We'll present our response to that tomorrow, but I can take them in turn. Mr. Gillan referred to this list of ifications in the McDuffy. case 10e emoluments duties, etc., that is not McDuffy's possession, so the way the McDuffy case is structured is that the Georgia Supreme Court says that no one has definitively said what a public official is in the context of what we're doing, look if If you're about to file a response and Mr. Bieber may be asking for oral argument, why don't we save it for when you've had a chance to read these cases and then we can be more productive?

Surely I can skip it. Those cases, but I wanted to touch on a few points, judge, in regards to the statutes that establish that presidential electors are public officials. First, the office itself is created by law, so it is created by the United States Constitution. Article 2 Section 1 Clause 2 and it was also created by uh ocga 21-2 d10 which actually states that there is an office of presidential elector in this state um they have duties that are established by law, that are established in both the Constitution of the States United in the 12th Amendment as well as the ocga 2-2-1 um by law they are elected by the public 21-2 d10 and there was also a reference that they do not receive a salary, that is not actually true, there is presidential compensation electors that is established by law uh in ocga 2-2-1379 refers to it as an office um in two places in particular 21-2 d132a and 21-2 d132 e um and again we rely again on those cases in which Mr.

Gillan discussed the case of Garrison versus the state uh 276 Georgia app 2 243 2005 in which someone was convicted of impersonating a federal agent, an unspecified federal agent and that conviction was upheld by the Georgia court of appeals C was denied by the Georgia Supreme Court and then the freedom case where of course they pose as the Metro Atlanta Human Trafficking Task Force which doesn't exist so we would argue in court that the definition for the purposes of 1610 23 that our courts have applied, our courts of appeals, applied a very liberal definition like a public official doesn't even have to be an actual public official doesn't have to be a state official, anything that claims to be a state official, someone who acts under the authority of the government is a public official and that is certainly what presidential electors do. positions created by law their duties are established by law so jumping to forgery counts again elephant in the room uh 1691 there are at least five ways you can violate the forgery statute the case in which uh Mr.

Schaer The case that Mr. Schaefer is relying on in Jackson v. State, is someone who was charged with forgery based on the claim that a document, uh, was reported to have been made by another person that we did not charge under that 1691 provision. , we accuse under the final provision that it is by the authority of someone who did do it. Do not give such authority. Mr. Gillan says we did not object to looking at these things, you know, and on the record, in other cases, let me make it clear that we objected, that is the definition of going off the record.

We agree with the court that considering those things outside of the indictment absolutely transforms, uh, that into a speaking objection is void, cannot be granted, um, if you look at the charges, the forgery charges follow exactly the statute of falsification, according to what jurisprudence tells us. that that is enough for a general Democrat murder. I don't know if there's anything else to say about those charges, um, as far as the false statements go, again, I addressed that from the beginning, but I would point out that in Haley, uh,where both the conviction was affirmed and the indictment itself was approved the prosecution said this in the false statements said that the accused knowingly and intentionally made a false and fictitious statement and representation in a matter within the jurisdiction of the gbi, an agency government by calling himself the catch me killer and claiming that he killed 16 people, does not allege any of the things that Mr.

Schaefer says in his pleadings that need to be alleged, they don't have to be alleged like they have in other motions. The defendant here is trying to add elements to this ex to this crime that simply don't exist, trying to add plea requirements that don't exist and Haley tells us that the case itself directly cites the indictment, that indictment alleges much less than it we alleged in our indictment and they said George the Supreme Supreme Court said that case is fine. I don't think Mr. Gillan addressed the false documents motion. I believe the allegations that those charges are flawed because they do not allege that the production of the false documents was unsuccessful again, that is not a requirement in an attempt charge and they also say that the counts do not say who actually attempted to plant documents in a mailbox the way we have charged, we have charged all of those defendants individually and as persons involved in the commission of a crime, so it will be up to the jury to determine whether all of those defendants are responsible for what they one of his co-conspirators did it with that.

I will accept any questions the court may have. Thank you, sir, thank you, okay, so Mr. Gillan, your last motion that we had for today had like, oh, sure, 60 seconds for the state not to answer or be able to answer the direct question. about a violation of the Safe Harbor rule why would that allow that situation to give the governor or the Secretary of State any authority to do anything that is included in several of the arguments that we have presented, I will not repeat it, but just your argument is let's do an asan and ask the agent whether or not he had authority, not by law, by federal law, they didn't have the authority, it's not about whether any gbi agent thinks you can come here. and tell the jury don't pay attention to the federal law, don't pay attention to the descending opinion in Bush Vore, don't pay attention. pay attention to that, I'm a gbi agent, I say we can do with that, your honor, I'll sit down and then I'll go back and find my other folder, so on your last move here, um pretty much like us.

We were on the First Amendment issue, I think we need to determine where we are procedurally, you know, at the federal level, it sounds like you know this would be a pretty common motion, it would be a surplus motion, Georgia, it's not so clear to us, so excuse me. um, where let's start with just the authority to sort of scaffold an accusation and really weed out the things that we don't like. I mean, your honor, now that we talk about two components of this motion, one is the increase in the strike. and then there's a dismissal that we asked for, which is also a component of the other now, you know, we placed the state Fe Corin, uh, on the question of power, you know, the allegation that the allegation is not entirely unnecessary.

It constitutes a crime as simple overage, we think, but when we read the override opinions that we're talking about, you know, a missing section of code or a wrong date or something, so I don't know, I don't think that's what your character Char , I guess this is where I'm more just a legal conclusion, right, let me be a legal conclusion number one, but it's even more than that, is this, uh, when they continually in their pleadings in the indictment in their pleadings and their in their uh uh extrajudicial comments that they make have bombarded the defendants the voters in this case with the concept of in the phrase of false voters now that that is not uh you know that that is a description a conclusion and a purifying description is a conclusion legal, you disagree with the core of his defense, well I think that is not only a legal conclusion, but it is also something that we have to be strict with because it is just a pejorative statement, I am not saying that I am saying that you know, uh, I can call you something really nasty in an accusation and it doesn't necessarily have to be a legal conclusion about your violation of a particular law and that's what we have here and we have this permeability.

In this case, well I'm trying again based on what we've seen and what's allowed in Georgia, let's simplify if a murder charge alleges that someone acted with malice or foresight, that is a legal conclusion that is correct and it is Someone that the defendant may actually have a problem with, but we don't solve it, we just move on and go to trial in different worlds, different cases, is not the point I'm trying to make, what I'm trying to make is, uh, you already know. and you put Malice of Foresight because you put that there to define the terms.

What's up with this one? There is one that I remember when we talked about nicknames and aliases and I remember that there is one in Georgia of the 9 who put a stomper alias. And he had beaten the defendant to death well and the Supreme Court said it was okay, you know why, because they probably showed that there was an alias of this guy called a stomper which is different from the trial where the states said we're going to prove that you. Well, we are legitimate voters, well, in this accusation, what they have done in the accusation is not necessary, if they want, if they want, and we believe that it should be annulled, we believe that the count should be dismissed, we know that, according to jurisprudence, we have quoted but in the closing arguments God forbid we get to the closing arguments I hope we don't, but if we did and they stood up and said well we thought they were fake, we think the evidence shows they were fake electors, That is one thing, it is an argument, it is a defense, there is no place for it in the accusation and there is no place for it in what they have done, not only in the accusation, but in their allegations and statements that they have made outside the media, what they have tried to do.

Do they want to have ingrained in the minds of the community and jurors the concept that if you were not a Democratic voter on December 14 and you voted in another part of the state capital, then you are a phony? voter and that is a pejorative term that is not necessary for the charges and we should point out that that is the point we are trying to make U and as far as our other arguments related to the dismissal of those charges, I don't think I need to go back. to go over most of my argument or our argument about what it really has to do with the electoral counting law, so I don't think I need to revisit it in case the court we get to really wants to hear that again.

No, I don't think it will, but, in your honor's absence, we believe that number one is that the charge should be dismissed, the reasons articulated above and in our pleading, and number two, that even if the charge is dismissed Besides that. References throughout the indictment to false electors should also be removed. Thank you. Alright. Thank you, Mr. Gan, judge. I'll be quick. Nowhere in this indictment does the phrase "false elector" appear, opinions in which the court says the appellate court says "you literally can't." do that if something is essential to the office if it is essential to allege an essential element of the office you can't overrule it, it's not subject to challenge and I'm just highlighting a quote that we referred to in our brief Malloy v.

State 293 Georgia 350 2013 Supreme Court case and that case says that when an indictment, when the language in an indictment accurately describes the crimes charged and makes them easier to understand or easier to understand, they are not subject to being punished because they are not surplus and That, in doing that in analyzing the language in an indictment, you know, in this context, Maloy also says that the language should be interpreted liberally in favor of the state and, with that again, we rely on our allegations, the phrase false elector. does not exist in this indictment, taking questions that the court may have, but otherwise, nothing more, maybe one, you know, I have seen a number of cases that talk about whether defects that you know can be corrected and a lot of that depended Whether they are material or non-material, is it safe to say that these phrases, the ones highlighted here, votes from legal electors, fake Electoral College votes, and duly elected and qualified presidential electors, would you say that they are material phrases for each of the charges that appear?

So I think it's a great question and I think there's kind of a superficial answer and then maybe a deeper answer. My superficial answer is yes, they are material, in the sense that they make the charges more easily understood. They are accurate to describe the charges. I'm familiar with that line of cases and it's a little bit unclear in the cases whether material means that or whether material means that. You know, if you remove that something from the indictment, the charge falls apart. so I'm not clear about what I know in this context. I don't think it matters because what's being challenged, I think is approved by our appeal decision, if you happen to have gone that route. uh and we take the position that material means that it can still survive General deur um any thought there, judge again, going back to Malloy, the holding in Malloy is that whenever the language in an accusation, even if it is not essential to a matter essential element, as long as it is accurate, describes the charge of offense and makes it easier to understand, it is simply not surplus, if it is not surplus, it is not subject to being struck, but do we believe that these phrases are material and mean that they are necessary to survive a general?

Deor I don't have it in front of me, so I don't have it either and that's why I hesitate to give an answer without the accusation in front of me, that's fine, you know, as long as the Chargers follow the statute, they will survive. a general objection, so anything that's not legal language, I guess it wouldn't fall into that category, um, but then we get into special Democratic territory and uh, that's a completely different situation, fair enough, thank you, judge, okay , thank you all, anything else we need to uh or housekeeping issues anything else we need to address before we break anything from the state nothing from the state is okay thank you Miss Young anything from any of the council is okay um and we'll adjourn thank you thank you judge