Until The Very END! The Tragic Story of Alaska Airlines flight 261

General Alaska 261 we are in a tailspin here but we have lost vertical control of our plane as a pilot, there are some situations that you hope you never have to experience and one of them is obviously a complete loss of controls of your plane. plane without a checklist available to help you figure it out, this will be a chilling account of one of the most significant aviation accidents in modern hi

story

, but it is also a

story

of flying skill and the willingness to continue flying the plane no matter what. Whatever happens, stay tuned. The story of Alaska Airlines Flight 261 took place on January 31, 2000, but that was not when this story really began.

What happened here had its core deep in something I call organizational creep and to understand that we will have to go back many years. decades since the certification of the aircraft involved and after that we must also take a look at the company that operated it. The accident aircraft was a McDonald Douglas MD-83, which is a variation of the original DC9 introduced in 1965. The DC-9 was in production until 1982 and was then followed by the MD-81 82 83 88 and finally the Boeing 717, Although later types included many improvements, the core design and systems still date back to the original DC-9.

The port of the aircraft that will be important in this story is the empanash or rear wing of the aircraft. It consists of the vertical fin which together with the rudder stabilizes and controls the aircraft around the Euro axis and is therefore known as vertical. stabilizer above the vertical stabilizer, the horizontal stabilizer is now located the horizontal stabilizer and the elevators control the aircraft around the pitch axis or in other words, they are the controls that can point the nose of the aircraft up or down and this control This is mainly done in two different ways, if the pilot wants the plane to, for example, climb, he can pull the control yoke rearward, which will mechanically activate small control tabs on the back of the elevators of the plane. plane.

These control tabs will then move down to force the main movement. The elevators are raised with the help of aerodynamic forces and that movement will, in turn, begin to tilt the nose of the plane upward. The elevators provide the primary pitch control, but continually piling up on the yoke will be

very

tiring over long periods of

flight

and, in addition, the amount of push or pull required would also change depending on the aircraft's speed settings and changes in the weight, so there must be a way to neutralize those forces somehow and this is where we come to the use of the movable horizontal stabilizer, which is basically e

very

thing The horizontal rear wing on which the elevators are mounted on the movable horizontal stabilizer of the md-80 is about 40 feet wide and as I mentioned, it is mounted on top of the vertical stabilizer via two hinges on the ACT Spar and on the front where there is a single jack. screw assembly that can increase or decrease the leading edge angle of the stabilizer by making the aircraft trimmable to relieve the pilots control forces and this is also how the autopilot primarily controls the aircraft in pitch when activated now.

It's going to get a little technical here, but this explanation is absolutely crucial for you to understand what ultimately happened to this plane, so stay focused to control the amount of stabilizer movements. Pilots or autopilot can do this in different ways in the York control. There are two switches affectionately known as Picton switches which, when pressed simultaneously, will activate a primary electric trim motor which is mounted with its gearbox assembly connected to the front Spar of the horizontal stabilizer. There is also a set of backup switches on the center pedestal that can activate a backup electric motor mounted at the same location and this is also the motor that the autopilot is now using in the event of a power failure of both switches, a pair of adjustment handles next to the throttle quadrant known as suitcase handles can also be used to activate the main motor manually, but what do these motors do?

When either motor is activated, they will begin to rotate a torque tube inside an Acme screw that passes through an Acme nut connected to the vertical stabilizer below. This means that as the Acme screw rotates in either direction, the screw will lower or raise the angle of the stabilizer in a smooth, uniform whale, similar to the way you jack up your car when you need to change the tire. Now obviously there are restrictions as to how much this screw is allowed to move and that is achieved by programmed maximum and minimum setting values ​​which will stop the electric water from running when those values ​​are reached, but should they fail there are also mechanical stops in the upper part. and the bottom of the Acme screw that serves as the maximum guarantee that the screw will not move beyond the maximum and minimum positions.

Additionally, there is also a primary trim brake switch in the cockpit that can be used to stop any trim movement. in case the engine starts running now, those of you with engineering eyes have probably already noticed that there is only one Acme screw and no in this system, shouldn't a system that carries primary control loads of the aircraft be duplicated to redundancy? Well, the way McDonald Douglas initially addressed redundancy was to show authorities that both the Acme screw and the torque tube within the screw were individually capable of maintaining the structural integrity of the system, this means that if one of them were to break the still another could hold the screw assembly together and thus achieve the necessary redundancy.

As for the Ackman nut, it was shown to be able to operate with up to 90 percent of the nut threads worn and its redundancy was achieved. By inserting more threads than necessary into the knot, as well as double spirals of thread, the aquamanot was made of a slightly softer alloy than the screw, so any wear would naturally occur on the knot initially. Initially it was certified that the knot had a surface life. of 30,000

flight

hours, but shortly after certification, inspections revealed greater than expected wear on the nut threads and because of this inspections were implemented at regular intervals to measure this wear and when it reached a predetermined value it was The assembly was supposed to be replaced now, as many of you will know, as long as you have mechanical parts moving against each other, there will be friction between them, the more friction you have, the faster the wear will be and because of that, the Ackman that will not unscrew needs to be lubricated at regular intervals using a type of certified aviation approved grease and this is where we get to the operator Alaska Airlines and the FAA initially thank you for the certification of the original DC-9 McDonald Douglas recommended that screw assembly lubrication interval of the cat every 300 to 350 flight hours This was later extended for the md-80 family to every 900 hours, but in 1996 a review of general maintenance intervals included lubrication at each C check, which was performed only every 3 600 hours or 15 months, whichever comes first.

Now Alaska Airlines followed. They followed these recommendations and extended the interval for the lubrication tube in their case to every 8 months, which was actually more conservative than the manufacturer's recommendation, but obviously that is only if the actual lubrication procedures were done correctly. When the airline requested this extension from the FEA, it was immediately approved. as it complied with the manufacturer's guidance at the time, but it was later discovered that the inclusion of lubrication in the C verification program had not actually been approved or explained to the original McDonald Douglas engineers, it had simply been incorporated. There, with several other maintenance checks without evaluation of each individual task, now in terms of procedures, according to McDonald Douglas, the greasing of the nut was supposed to be done by pressing grease into a connector of the knot until the grease came out on top and below the nut. knot after that, the screw itself needed to be properly greased before the stabilizer was moved completely up and down a few times to properly lubricate all the components involved, this was supposed to take around four hours each time, but when the line engineer who was the last to deal with the crashed plane.

He was asked how he would do that procedure. He said that it would take him about an hour to do it and that he could not explain each of the individual steps in addition to this due to the greater than expected wear and tear on the Achaemonauts. A procedure had been designed to measure this wear using a tool that would tension the knot toward the Agma screw and measure how much it would move. This was supposed to be done using specific clamping fixtures manufactured by Boeing to establish the correct tension, but Alaska Airlines had decided to manufacture their own models, which looked and functioned slightly different than Boeing's designs.

It was recommended that wear checks be performed every 30 months or 7,200 hours, whichever came first, but Alaska Airlines had written in their manuals that this check would have to be done every 30 months, but with no limit on hours, this meant that with the tight flight schedule that Alaska Airlines was operating at the time, it would take about 9,550 hours between each of these checks and the crashed plane. was nearing the end of these 30 months, can you see how the organizational cheese slices are starting to intersect? This brings us to the fateful flight on January 31, 2000, but before we get into the details, this is all you have.

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On the new crew were three Seattle-based flight attendants who were putting things in order for the 83 booked passengers and two very senior pilots was Captain Ted Thompson, 53, who had been working for Jet America. and then for Alaska Airlines since 1982. Before he began flying airliners, he had flown for the US Air Force and at the time of this flight he had flown. Just over 17,750 hours of total time and more than 4,000 hours in the MD-80 he flew alongside First Officer Bill Tansky, 57, who also has some prior military experience, in his case from the US Navy. The US had accumulated 8,140 hours of total time. who flew more than 8,000 hours in the MD-80, which gave him a lot of experience in this type, the plane appeared to be in good flying condition and there were no problems or history or problems in the last flights that the captain was able to see when I was looking at the technical log book.

First Officer Bill was to be flight pilot for the first flight with call sign Alaska 261 to SanFrancisco and then Captain Ted would take over and fly the last leg back to Seattle. It was a beautiful day to fly with light winds and good visibility conditions, once the 83 passengers had boarded, the doors were closed and the engines were started while backing away from the doors, the takeoff trim was calculated at 7 degrees nose up, which was set up without any problems and Decked at 1:37 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, Alaska Airlines Flight 261 took off normally from Puerto Vallarta and began its climb toward the northwest.

He flew the plane manually to about 6,200 feet, where he made sure the plane was properly trimmed and then engaged the autopilot. After that point, as the airplane continued to climb to observe its planned cruise altitude of 31,000 feet, the autopilot continued to adjust normally using the slowest speed of the standby electric motor as it was designed to do, but without the pilot If I knew it, things have now begun. This happened at the rear of the plane, inside the acumenat that was holding the exact screw assembly together for several thousand hours, the screw had been tightening the smoothest threads with hardly any grease to lubricate it and now only a sliver of the screw was left. the original thread to guide the screw as the autopilot turned it as the plane climbed.

Through 23,400 feet, the last stabilizer adjustment movement was indicated on the five data recorder and after that it was frozen in a setting 0.4 degrees with the nose down. We can't know for sure now what caused it to freeze, but it's possible that the tips What was left of the Acme nut thread now became so weak that they began to bend under the load of the screw, causing the screw to seize. would get stuck. In any case, the way the pilots would have realized this would have been by seeing that the autopilot was unable to maintain speed and climb rate as he simply could not move the stabilizer.

Initially, the aircraft continued to climb at an indicated speed of 330 knots, but then slowly began to level off until reaching around 26,000 feet, as expected. As this happened, the speed began to decrease and then it resumed its climb again and the speed dropped further to 285 knots. At this point, the adjustment warning light would have also come on, giving a clear indication to the pilots that something was not quite right with the trim system, so the first one out of the building disconnected the pilot. automatic and took manual control of the aircraft. We now have no voice transcripts of this initial part of the flight as the cockpit voice recorder only recorded the last 30 minutes, but we can assume that he was the first to exit the building.

He would have immediately realized that he needed to exert up to 50 pounds or 22 kilos of force to keep the plane climbing and when he tried to adjust it, the stabilizer adjustment did not work as I mentioned at the beginning of the video. The main reason for the stabilizer adjustment is to remove crew forces and since the aircraft was adjusted for a 330 knot climb and the speed was now back at 285 knots, much more back pressure than normal would be needed to keep it climbing for the rise Over the next few minutes, the elevators were diverted upward to continue the climb to 31,000 feet, and after they leveled off, the amount of back pressure needed was reduced to about 30 pounds or 13 kilos, which is still a lot, but clearly manageable.

This backpressure was also reduced further by increasing speed and gradually reducing fuel weight, so that ultimately not much backpressure was needed to continue flying in level flight, as this happened the crew would also have gone through the inoperative stabilizer inoperative. normal checklist in their quick reference manual and that checklist would have instructed them to try to use the two backup systems to fix the problem and get the aircraft back into balance if that failed, the checklist instructed the crew to not activate the autopilot again because the fact that the trim did not move with either motor indicated that something else was causing the jam and therefore it would not be advisable to continue trying to activate the motors, which the autopilot would definitely would despite this after the plane had flown manually for almost two hours along the Route, the autopilot was activated again at 15:47.

The reduced weight of the aircraft combined with the increased airspeed would have made the necessary stick forces small enough to allow the autopilot to reengage and it is possible that the crew simply wanted the additional capability. to continue solving the problem. Now you may be wondering why the pilots didn't turn around and divert back to their departure airport as soon as they noticed the problem they were having with the information they had at the time, a direct return would have led to an overweight landing. with a higher than normal approach in landing speeds and from a strict handling perspective the problem they thought they had was not that serious and the abnormal checklist was not.

We did not plan them to land at the nearest available airport, But that doesn't mean the pilots didn't think about detouring. In reality, this was exactly what they were discussing in the CVR transcript that finally began at time 1549 and 49 seconds when the pilots were. He was still troubleshooting issues with the jam stabilizer and the captain was in touch with Alaska Airlines' operations and maintenance frequency. The engineers had been reviewing the maintenance history and had been unable to find anything, especially nothing related to the stabilizer, Captain Ted's advice in any case. maintenance and operations who wanted to divert to Los Angeles International Airport LAX instead of continuing to San Francisco and when operations heard this, they were clearly upset by this fact and wanted me to clarify why they couldn't just continue to San Francisco now.

It's the kind of thing that makes my blood boil. A pilot never requests a detour unless he deems it absolutely necessary. A detour will always prolong the work day and create inconvenience for passengers, crew and company, so it's not a I diverted something that a pilot would simply ask without the proper heading. This appears to have also been the opinion of Captain Ted, who explained to Alaska operations that he simply did not want to go through any suitable airport with this type of problem and that the winds and conditions at LAX were normally more suitable for landings.

With problems like this, the operations controller said that of course he should do what he thought was safest, but he also informed the captain that this could also cause delays on the flight back to San Francisco later. Like problems getting landing clearance for an unscheduled international flight to LAX, these all sound like additional ways of trying to pressure the crew to continue to their original destination, which did not go unnoticed by the captain, who complained about this with his co-pilot. One more thing that is important to remember here is that the flight was still under control at that time and no urgent or emergency call had been made, which meant that the flight was treated like any other aircraft in the airspace and that too To explain the relaxed attitude of the Alaska Airlines operations controller, the pilots decided to continue their route until they approached Los Angeles and then deviate.

This way they could burn a little more fuel to reduce weight and landing speeds and would also allow them to have more time to continue troubleshooting and make a plan for your arrival. From the conversations the crew had, you can clearly hear that these were two very experienced and well-trained pilots who were capable of thinking outside the box. Ask the operating frequency if instructor pilots were available, as they might think of something the pilots had missed. This is a very good idea, but unfortunately there were no instructors available. Captain Ted also reported on the operations he intended to conduct. descend the plane to a lower altitude and start configuring it to see how it performs.

Doing this is an excellent idea when dealing with flight control problems, as it is much better to be aware of possible additional control problems at higher altitudes when there is more time to rectify them and then make a new plan for landing at time 1559 and 44 seconds the captain handed over the controls to the aircraft which was still flying on autopilot at that time to first officer bill and then changed the frequency. He walked over to listen to the automated terminal briefing at LAX, where the weather was fine, with nearly straight winds on the runway, good visibility and only a few clouds.

With that done, he continued talking to LAX operations about how to calculate landing performance numbers for them, as well as an update on the winds in San Francisco to make sure the weather was actually better at LAX, all of which were preparations. standard deviation and everything was still under control at this point, but the change soon occurred at times 1607 and 51. Within seconds, a new engineering voice called flight 261 on the operations frequency and said he just wanted to know if it was still They had the same problem with the stabilizer and had they really tried all the different options including the selector switches on the control wheel. and the handles of the suitcase, the captain replied that they had indeed tried everything together and that they would love to hear if he had any other suggestions, like hidden circuit breakers or something like that.

The engineer responded that he was double checking the CB guide but just wanted to verify that they had actually tried everything that Captain Ted said they had definitely done and that the AC meter, which is an instrument that shows alternating current charging, showed a large increase in electrical load when they were using the normal setting switches. This is important information because it clearly shows that the engine itself was running, but failed to move the screw, which is a sign of potentially serious damage to the entire jack screw assembly, but it would have been very difficult for the pilots to discover.

From the little information they had at that time in later versions of the quick reference manual checklist the crew will be clearly instructed not to retry the operations of any trim system if it did not work after having tested it. first time and very soon we will see The reason for this now, due to the repeated questions of the engineer, the captain now seemed to have had an idea because at moments of 1608 and 59 seconds he said to the first officer, I'm going to turn it off, you understood and the First official. Bill responded well, 10 seconds later the captain continued saying let's do that and this will turn it off, followed by the autopilot disengaging.

In all likelihood, what the captain did here was press both switches and possibly also the hold handles on the At the same time the autopilot was disengaged, a loud clanking noise was now heard on the cockpit voice recorder followed by two weak knocks from the rear of the plane. The next sound was the audible tone of the stabilizer moving, followed by First Officer Bill exclaiming holy shit, the horizontal stabilizer now moved. from its 0.4-degree nose-down position that it had been stuck in for the past two hours to slightly beyond its maximum 3.1-degree nose-down position, the sudden activation of the trim motor would begin to move the aquma screw again causing the remaining threads within the Aquanaut to finally deflect completely allowing the screw and stabilizer to begin moving freely within the knot.

The fact that the risers were pushed up to try to counteract the fall only caused stress on the screw which moved it even further up making the situation even worse now, the reason why we can assume that this is what What happened was because the movement of the trim during the seconds after the two thumbs were heard was not linear as it would have been if the screw was simply rotating normally along the upward threads. The movement of the screw only stopped when the mechanical stop slammed into the bottom of the ammonaut leaving clear marks and scratch marks on it.

The sudden movement of the stabilizer now caused the nose of the plane to pitch forward, causing a rapid dive and with that a large rise. At speed, the first officer shouted what are you doing and the captainanswered. I turned it off probably referring to the autopilot. There was no way for the pilots to know what had just happened in the back of their plane, but this call from the captain actually illustrates a very important point: one of the main reasons we're not supposed to activate the pilot automatic when we have flight control problems it is because the autopilot can mask the control problems and cause a very sudden tone or role if it is suddenly disconnected in this case.

The pilots spent the next 80 terrifying seconds trying to extricate the plane from the dive. The captain called Air Traffic Control telling them that they were in a dive and while he did so a strong vibration could be felt throughout the plane. The captain called. You are stuck, which was not the case, but the vibrations along with the rapid descent speed could possibly be interpreted as this would also explain why here, a few seconds later, you screamed no, no, you have to let go, possibly you have to let go . Referring to the way the first officer was pulling back on the controls, there were several quarters and backtracks between the pilots until the overspeed warning finally began to sound, causing the pilots to extend the speed brake and That seemed to improve the situation slightly, but it still took a combined effort of about 130 pounds or almost 60 kilos of force to pull the plane out of the 6,000 feet per minute dive, the crew finally managed to get the plane more or less above the controller when they reached approximately 24,000 feet.

They then asked our traffic control for an altitude block between 20 and 25,000 feet that would allow them clearance for other aircraft in the event of another dive and then began to discuss what had just happened, both agreeing to stay away from any switches that had touched, had initiated the dive, and also agreed that the situation was now significantly worse with the stabilizer in the nose-down position. They also started talking about how they needed to slow the plane down and take out the slats and flaps to see if they could still control it. but before they could do that, Captain Ted turned off the radio to talk to maintenance again and update them on the new, now much worse situation.

When they responded, the engineers didn't have much new advice to give them, they just said that it depended on whether they wanted to test the trim system again, this advice sparked a conversation between the two pilots about whether or not they should try it again, but here the first officer He spoke clearly and said that he did not believe that would be the case. something good to do first on the bill, also at this point he reminded the captain that he needed to do a PA today, now probably the terrified passengers in the back. Captain Ted agreed and made a short and concise PA without giving too much detail but also without any very well done PA given the extreme circumstances they were in and hopefully that gave some reassurance to the passengers, the traffic controller Los Angeles Air Force now handed flight 261 over to the approach controller and when the captain called him explaining the nature of their problems, they were clear that they should proceed directly to Los Angeles, but here the captain made a truly heroic decision, he probably knew that his was still in very poor condition, so he declined the direct offer and instead asked to remain on radar vectors outside the bay to complete configuration testing in all water rather than on overcrowded land doing so which would avoid damage to third parties if something went further wrong and demonstrates extraordinary situational awareness under pressure.

Once this decision was made, the captain requested additional descent clearance to 10,000 feet to complete the driving tests that ATC initially told them to do. to wait and now again the first officer spoke up and suggested that they should do the test at their current altitude instead of descending to 10,000 feet and doing it there. Now I understand the captain's idea of ​​doing it at a slightly lower altitude with the air being thicker and more similar to what they would face on an approach, but the first officer's suggestion of trying it with more altitude margins also makes a lot of sense.

It's fantastic to see aerial skill and CRM develop in such extreme conditions. Control authorized the plane to descend. 17,000 feet initially, which the crew read back and also reminded the controller that they needed an altitude block that they could turn on to head up to eight zero degrees out to sea and then change the controller's frequency to the next sector, the purser. She was now called to the cockpit and when she entered she informed the pilots that the crew had heard a loud bang at the rear of the plane just before the first dive. The captain thanked him for the information and told him to secure the cabin. and tie everyone up because I was planning to unload the plane and see if I could get the trim to work that way, unloading the plane would mean leaning forward to reduce the back pressure and therefore the load on the stabilizer, it is known that this type of maneuver to be effective in fixing certain types of stabilizer gems on other types of aircraft such as the 737, for example, where this is known as a roller coaster maneuver;

However, trying that again would mean trying to also activate the trim system anyway, the first thing they had to do was To try to set up the plane and see if it was actually controllable, they started by retracting the speed brake and then, in 16 moments, 17 and 54 seconds, Captain Ted took control of the aircraft and requested that the slots be extended first out of the construction and moved the slot handle to the extended position and this apparently made the descent tendency even worse, the captain then calls for the flaps to be extended to 11 degrees and when the flaps began to move the aircraft actually stabilized and became a little easier to fly again now for some unknown reason once the test was completed the captain decided to retract the flaps flaps and slats again even though the airplane was flying reasonably well in that configuration.

He possibly did this because he just wanted to test the configuration for landing later, but he couldn't. He plans to keep it until LAX, so here comes another lesson for budding pilots. If you ever have flight control problems like this and fuel is not an issue, do not change the settings again after you have started setting them. In general, it is better to continue flying the airplane in this new configuration than to try your luck reconfiguring more times anyway. The next thing the captain wanted to do was try to unload the stabilizer and see if that would solve the trim problem. but here First Officer Bill put his foot down and said he didn't think it was a good idea to touch it again since the plane was flying and he also said, "I think if it's controllable, let's order us to try to land it, Captain Ted." He heard it and agreed again showing excellent CRM between the two, but unfortunately this was not supposed to be because just five seconds later a series of faint knocks were heard from behind, followed by the first officer saying: "You feel that the The captain at the controls responded, yes, okay, this indicates that he now needed a lot more force to keep the plane from falling.

What had probably happened at this point was that the torque tube inside the Acme screw had been subjected to flexing. and significant pulling loads during the 10 minutes that had passed since the actmann threads were shared no, those bending loads had activated the existing fatigue cracks within the torque tube and now those cracks are causing the torque tube to completely fracture. into two pieces and thus leaving the knot and stop completely, this meant that the stabilizer was now allowed to move almost freely around its rear hinges and was now crashing into the vertical supports of the stabilizer nose fairing, which they now became the only thing preventing it from moving even further upward, causing the stabilizer angle to move from 3.1 degrees to 3.6 degrees nose down, explaining the additional downward pitch. that the captain felt.

The captain almost immediately asked for these slots and flaps to be redeployed, as the plane had been easier to control with them extended, but unfortunately it was too late for the vertical. The stabilizer nose fairing brackets were not made to withstand the type of loads the stabilizer was now putting on it. At time 16, 19 and 35 seconds a horrible noise was recorded on the cockpit voice recorder and simultaneously several small radar returns could be seen in the air. traffic control radar when the nose fairing was torn off and saturated from the aircraft, the stabilizer now moved upward to an angle too high to measure on the flight data recorder and this caused an immediate and violent pitch forward.

This was a desperate situation to recover from. The entire horizontal stabilizer was now completely out of control, but that didn't stop Captain Ted from trying what he did now: instead of trying to get out of the 70-degree deep dive, he pushed forward and turned the plane up until be inverted. position which effectively countered the downward tilt of the stabilizer, he shouted push push push and roll while the first officer shouted Mayday but without radioing it due to the feature, the tilt decreased from -70 degrees to 29 and then minus 9 degrees. since they were now flying inverted out of the bay at time 1619 and 54 seconds, Captain Ted shouted, "Okay, we're inverted" and now we need it to be indicated that he wanted to put it back in a normal position like he was.

While attempting this, they passed 16,400 feet and still descended at a speed of 208 knots for the next few seconds, the recorded flight data indicating the wing moving in both left and right directions as the flaps retracted. Captain Ted yelled push push push the blue side. indicating that he wanted the plane to return to the right keel again and that was followed by a call to kick the rudder, kick left. The left helm, fairly first off the sign, responded that he couldn't reach it and Captain Tad then said okay, right helm. right rudder this effort didn't work and 10 seconds later Captain Ted said we have to do it again but at least the other way around we are flying but unfortunately this call was followed almost immediately by the sound of several compression losses and the sound of the rudder right.

The engine was probably shutting down due to the extreme angle of oncoming air hitting the engine inlets. From this point nothing more could be done. Captain Tad asked for the speed brakes to be extended, but his last words could be heard on the corporate phone. voice recorder at moments 16, 20 and 56 seconds when he said ah, here we go, less than a second later, the plane impacted the Pacific Ocean and all 88 people on board were instantly lost. Several other aircraft in the area had witnessed the final descent of Flight 261 with the With their help and radar images, the crash site was quickly found, the breeze spread over the sea floor, and it took a week to rescue most of the parts and among them were the flight data recorder, the cockpit voice recorder and most of the Jack. horizontal stabilizer screw assembly with the help of those pieces, ntsp investigators were able to begin relatively quickly to hone in on what had caused this horrible tragedy when they took a closer look at the Acme screw and failed to see that the knot was almost completely smooth with just Remnants Of the threads that still remained inside the Atmos group, they found several pieces of spiral-shaped thread that had been torn from the knot probably during the first dive, but what really surprised everyone was that there didn't seem to be any grease left.

In neither the screw nor the knot, the knot's grease nipple was clogged with a gray mixture of old grease and wear material and the rest of the components were completely dry; there was no lubricant in them, which led the researchers to begin scrutinize In Alaska Airlines' maintenance records, as well as in interviews with mechanics and engineers, large discrepancies were quickly found both in its maintenance manual and in how maintenance work was carried out, which its various technical centers, in addition Of the important management functions, they were not complete at the airline which had caused real confusion over who was responsible which had happened for several years as the Alaska Airlines operation continued to grow and this is what I was referring to.

As an organizational mistake everything had happened in small incremental steps theThe investigation's conclusion was that the accident had been caused by a loss of control due to an in-flight failure of the horizontal stabilizer jack screw assembly. Contributing to the course was Alaska Airlines' extended lubrication program and wear checks, that had been approved by the FAA for those two components. Combined with one or possibly several poorly executed lubrications meant that excessive wear went unnoticed and ultimately led to complete failure of the threads within the akmenot and subsequent failure of the torque tube. There were 24 safety recommendations that emerged from the investigation a few years ago. of them gave clearer guidance to pilots about not repeating actions on the checklist regarding the trim system and not using the autopilot with flight control problems, but the vast majority of the recommendations were directed at Alaska Airlines and The FAA regarding horizontal stabilizer maintenance intervals, lubrication, and wear checks following the accident, the lubrication schedule was immediately changed to be completed every 650 hours on all MD-80 aircraft.

There were also recommendations about not allowing airplanes to be certified unless they could demonstrate that they were not susceptible to catastrophic single-point failures like the What had happened in this case was that the two pilots, Captain Ted Thompson and First Officer Bill Tansky, were posthumously awarded the Airline Pilots Association's gold medal for heroism in recognition of their actions during the emergency and if you think you recognize some of the scenes in this video that's probably because the same glitch was used and Similar pilot actions in the 2012 film Flight, starring Damsel Washington. This was a very scary episode and I know some of you who watched this are probably nervous.

Flyers, know that even though things like this have happened. What happened, it is tragedies like this that have had the most profound impact on improving safety in the airline business and to prevent things like this from happening again, I have created an app precisely for you where you can make your own questions. turbulence on upcoming flights and listen to me explain airplane noises, sensations and procedures. It is available on all devices and you can check it by going to app.mentropilot.com and simply create a user. I really hope it helps you now watch these videos below. and have an absolutely fantastic day.