The Putin Files: Antony Blinken

MICHAEL KIRK - Let's start with an early phase for you, going back to 1999, when Putin became president. What was said about him? … Were you worried about anything, or did you think it would be more of the same? TONY BLINKEN - The end of the 1990s was truly a time of tremendous hope and optimism about the relationship between Russia and the United States. We had just signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act in Paris with President Clinton. It's notable, when you think about it, because one of the things President Clinton said at the time of signing this was, “We're no longer in a zero-sum world. “This is a win-win, where NATO’s strength can be a gain for Russia and Russia’s success can be NATO’s success.” That was really the atmosphere we had.

So I think when President Putin came, we knew him. He had been national security advisor. In fact, I remember being in Europe at a summit with then-National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and going downstairs from our hotel work area to give Sandy something, and he was at the bar. He was sitting next to this guy, Vladimir Putin, the first time I saw him. He was Sandy's counterpart, he was National Security Advisor. So we met him in that capacity. I don't think anyone in the '90s, or the late '90s, anticipated that the Putin they knew then would become the Putin we know now.

MICHAEL KIRK-So when you first saw this guy, who is he? What is the appearance of him? That you thought? TONY BLINKEN-he looked like an old spy transformed into a diplomat and then president. And very circumspect, but also, again, especially according to people who dealt directly with him, like Sandy Berger, very direct, good at dealing, with his cards on the table. Remember, he came from St. Petersburg. He came from the more liberal side of the Russian house. I think people anticipated that he would continue the reform effort started by Gorbachev and then Yeltsin, and that he would continue to push Russia's integration with the West and with the rest of the world.

That was what we anticipated. MICHAEL KIRK-And when did he know that he had the strong impression that it was not going to be a continuation of the democratic resurgence? TONY BLINKEN - I really think not until Putin returns to the presidency. He had given it to Medvedev. Medvedev was president; Putin was prime minister. It was unclear exactly what the relationship was between the two, whether Medvedev was an independent power source. And Medvedev himself, at least in the early days, had a very progressive line and seemed to want to pursue the integration of Russia, he wanted to build a Russian Silicon Valley.

We were deeply committed to it in the early part of the Obama administration. It was unclear whether Putin would remain the power behind the throne, a secondary figure, or whether Medvedev was actually a substitute for him, and on his way back. But as soon as he returned to the presidency, we saw an increasingly hard line. MICHAEL KIRK - Let's go back to the reset moment. Why is it called "reboot"? TONY BLINKEN - It's called a “reset” because, at the beginning of the Obama administration, we were under the impression that the relationship between the United States and Russia was at a low point and could and should improve; that despite our deep differences, there were many areas in which it made sense to try to cooperate, and was worth trying.

Vice President Biden was the first to advance the reset. The Obama administration's first foreign policy speech was at the Munich Security Conference in February 2009. That was Biden, and that included the reset. While everyone focused on the language of the reset and the headline was: “US wants new relationship with Russia,” if you read the speech carefully you can see that there was a flip side to the coin. Biden was very clear that even as we sought a reset with Russia, we were not going to renege on our core principles. We were not going to return to a world of spheres of influence in Europe or beyond.

We were not going to accept the proposal that a country like Russia could tell other countries what they should or should not do, who they should or should not associate with. So the reboot was very balanced. He looked for a better relationship, he saw possibilities, but he was also clear about our basic principles. MICHAEL KIRK - Hadley said at the end of the Bush administration: "I think we flushed our relationship with Russia down the toilet." From the beginning, when Bush had said, "I looked into his eyes and I saw his soul" and whatever, it seemed like there were things that happened during those eight years in which Putin, as he tells it, and the Russians, as they They tell the story... we don't listen to Putin; that we were showing in many ways that we didn't value that relationship as much as we should, and that had angered Putin in some ways;

That revenge seemed to be on his list of things he wanted to do. What is your reaction to that? TONY BLINKEN - I think there's been a lot of talk between them over the last 25 or 30 years. The United States really sought to advance Russia's integration into the West and into international institutions. We are really looking to support Russia. We wanted a strong and successful Russia, not a weak and contained Russia. We invested a lot of money in Russia after the fall of the Berlin Wall, trying to support it economically, trying to support democratic institutions. We seek a partnership with NATO.

We were later Russia's biggest advocate for joining the World Trade Organization. Russia saw something very different, and certainly Vladimir Putin saw it too. He continued to see the United States trying to restrain Russia, to contain it. NATO enlargement seen through Moscow's eyes was an effort to keep Russia in its place. Iraq was certainly a chapter in which, possibly, we did not listen to Russia's opinions. Then, if we moved quickly into Libya and other places where we got involved, that only fueled Russian suspicions. I think part of this narrative is the fact that we didn't speak the same language.

Now, I think Russia got to a point, under Putin in particular, where even if we had been speaking clearly and directly, we were going to disagree, because either Mr. Putin started with a zero-sum vision or he developed it . of the relationship. That's really the problem he defines today. … MICHAEL KIRK - During the Arab Spring, he almost always, from the beginning, as we heard him, believes that the United States, that people are gathering spontaneously, that the United States is there, that USAID is there, that someone is there . there, promoting them. TONY BLINKEN - Yes, it's true. He saw America's hidden hand everywhere.

Color revolutions left, right and center, he thought the United States was behind them. It's not true, and it's an unfortunate misinterpretation of what people really felt, whether it was Georgia, Ukraine, and later other countries. But I certainly think that's how Putin really perceived it. That also created a lot of animosity in the relationship. MICHAEL KIRK - Did he really believe that the man who gave the Munich speech could hand over power to Medvedev and let him be president of Russia? TONY BLINKEN - Ultimately, we thought Putin would remain the power behind the throne, even when Medvedev was front and center.

There was certainly a view that there was a good chance he would try to come back and become president. But I have to say he wasn't 100 percent. There was certainly a period when we thought it was possible that Medvedev had developed his own center of gravity and source of power and challenged Putin's power, or that Putin allowed him to continue holding the reins. That was an open debate. Then it became increasingly clear that no, Putin would remain the power in one form or another. MICHAEL KIRK: Were you at State or NSC? TONY BLINKEN - I was on the NSC for Obama's first six years.

MICHAEL KIRK - So what does Obama think? … TONY BLINKEN - President Obama was deeply pragmatic in his view of most things, including the relationship with Russia. So no, there was certainly not a very broad vision that we were going to become partners and best friends, but there was a clear vision that there were reasons for cooperation; that working together was to the benefit of both countries. In fact, I think during the early years of the Obama administration we demonstrated that principle. We negotiated a new strategic arms control limitation treaty, a New START, which was good for the security of both countries.

We cooperated with respect to Afghanistan, where Russia played a positive role, particularly in allowing our forces and equipment to transit to and from Afghanistan. Russia was a good partner in addressing the Iran nuclear issue and played a productive role there. In these and other areas, we think there are reasons to work together. Wherever Russia sees it in her own interest and we in ours, we should do it. MICHAEL KIRK - I guess it will be 2011 when the people will rise up. It was a bad choice; things are messy. It has obviously been maneuvered, to put it mildly.

What was the White House's perspective on the meetings in Moscow and Putin's response? TONY BLINKEN - Well, there was a deep disconnect here too, because we were watching this from a distance. We had nothing to do with it. Putin thought, or at least said he believed, that we had everything to do with it. In particular, I believe that statements made by then-Secretary of State Clinton, suggesting sympathy for those protesting, fueled Putin's deep suspicion, if not paranoia, that the United States was the hidden hand behind these protests. I think the protests disconcerted him. He was taken aback by the passion of the opposition and had to look for where to point the finger.

He targeted us. For the United States, for the Obama administration, we saw this for what it was: a spontaneous uprising. It's too strong a word, but it's certainly a spontaneous reaction to Putin's overreach at home, to the fact that he was crushing democracy in Russia, that he was building what turned out to be a kleptocracy to stay in power. That response from the people in the streets was a profound warning sign for him. MICHAEL KIRK - When Medvedev says, “Oh, we've decided to turn around” or “We're going to go back to the other side and he's going to come back;

Putin is going to return to power”, what did the president think of that? TONY BLINKEN - I think all of us thought, including the president, that it was going to be a challenge, that we would have to deal with Mr. Putin as president, as the major power. He was taking on an increasingly adversarial role with the United States and increasingly viewed the relationship in zero-sum terms. MICHAEL KIRK - That's an evolution from the kind you saw coming when you were in the Clinton administration, and the expectation that somehow there will be some kind of partnership, maybe even membership in NATO, to wherever it is in 2012.

What happened? TONY BLINKEN - Well, I think there was a series of events. We continue the process of NATO enlargement and continue to keep an open door. That sent a message to Putin that the United States and the West were trying to slow him down, contain him. There was a confrontation that began during the Bush administration over Georgia and the Russian invasion of Georgia. Then we saw this color revolution in Ukraine, even more significant, from Russia's perspective, because the largest country on its borders, the one where, if democracy were successful, if that model took hold in Ukraine, it would send a message very strong to the people. in Russia about what the alternative really was.

All this is happening. At the same time we have Libya and, from Russia's perspective, it had supported a United Nations Security Council resolution, in a sense against its own judgment. Then, when Gaddafi ended up losing power, Russia felt betrayed, feeling that we had used the Security Council resolution that she had supported to compromise regime change in Libya. If you take all these things together, the spiral goes up and up. MICHAEL KIRK - And Putin, at that time, 2012, who is he then? TONY BLINKEN - This is where we made, at least in my opinion, a miscalculation. We continued to believe until quite late in the game that Putin and Russia's interest was to deepen their integration with the international community, with the West.

And in fact, until very late in the game, we were the leading supporter of Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization during the Obama administration. We thought Russia wanted to get there. What we misjudged, at least in my opinion, until almost after the fact, was that Putin had gotten to the point where he had built this kleptocracy. That was the source of his power in Russia. Controlling the money and finding sources of money was absolutely essential to maintaining his power and continuing to buy off the elites. An integrated Russia that had to respect the rules, that had to be transparent, that had to be open, was totally antithetical to sustaining that kleptocracy.

The two things couldn't go together. At a certain point, pursuing Russian integration became contrary to Putin's personal interest, because he could not accept the rules, transparency and norms that come with it. That would undermine the kleptocracy he was building. I think it took us a little while to realize that. At that time, we really were in a zero-sum worldwhere, from Moscow's perspective, Russia's strength was our weakness and our gain was its loss. MICHAEL KIRK - That's right. And she needed...I guess she still needs America to be the boogeyman. TONY BLINKEN - You need to be able to explain why Russia is having internal problems, why its economy is stagnant, why it is not delivering for its own people.

This is classic. Every time you are mismanaging your own country in one way or another, you have to point the finger elsewhere. You have found it helpful to point us to the West. But something deeper is happening. For Putin, when Western democracy succeeds, it is the deepest criticism of the system he has built in Russia, a country that began to embrace democracy and capitalism after the end of the Cold War, but which has now become this kleptocracy, this illiberal. democracy and, indeed, a self-recognized illiberal democracy. I think Putin came to the conclusion that the more he could do to undermine the Western democratic model, to foment problems, to create tension, difficulties within the West, between the United States and Europe, within Western European countries, within the United States, United States, it would be better.

He could tell his own people: “You see, his model is no better than ours. They lie; they cheat; they steal They fail just like us. So stick with what we have. There's no difference". MICHAEL KIRK -...What was Estonia? What was that? Were those first investigations? Was that a preview of something that will manifest itself in our 2016 presidential election? TONY BLINKEN - I think Mr. Putin came to some conclusions. One, of course, was that the success of democracy, particularly on his borders, was a real threat to him and the system he had built, so he had an interest in trying to put some obstacles in the way of the process, wherever that might be. could.

It is also true that he wanted to protect the Russian-speaking populations in these countries and considered himself their guarantor and guardian. These two things combined probably prompted him to look to see if he could take advantage of the situation and cause a little trouble. That was one thing. The other thing is that he knows that he cannot frontally and militarily challenge a NATO country. That would be incurring the full wrath of NATO. That would be inviting the United States into a conflict. He has no interest in that. MICHAEL KIRK - Because of Article 5. TONY BLINKEN - Because of Article 5.

MICHAEL KIRK - Explain Article 5. TONY BLINKEN - NATO Article 5 says that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all members , and all promise to come to the defense in one way or another (exactly how is not specified) of any NATO member that is under attack. There is a real trap there, and a head-on military confrontation between Russia and a NATO country is not something Putin or any Russian president would risk. But what it is very intelligent and very skillful in is the use of so-called asymmetric tactics to pressure, incite, probe and provoke without a frontal military attack.

It's everything from buying politicians and centers of influence, disinformation campaigns, investigations and limited military actions that go unnoticed, support for separatist forces in these countries, all of this together becomes an asymmetric strategy that, with very few resources, and with a much weaker hand, it can cause tremendous damage. MICHAEL KIRK-He can fight above his weight. TONY BLINKEN-He can fight well above his weight, and that's what he's been doing. I think Putin has been playing very, very well with the weak hand. MICHAEL KIRK - He's in the world's spotlight with the Sochi Olympics, but in the meantime, there's a bonfire burning beneath him in Ukraine and Crimea.

Tell me the story of how you found out and thought about it. We spoke to Toria Nuland and others about his role. So take me there. Take me back to 2014 and 2015 and what is the outlook for the United States. TONY BLINKEN - In the fall of 2014, Ukraine and its president, , promised to seek membership in the European Union. People love him; That is the direction the country is taking. As they move in that direction, the president takes a very dramatic turn, at the behest of Moscow. That provokes this revolution, the Maidan, where people take to the streets, because their president had promised to seek Western integration, to seek a relationship with Europe, and he pulled the rug out from under them.

At the same time, I think there was an opinion among the public that corruption was devouring Ukraine, so it was these two things together. It was the unfulfilled promise of moving towards the West and corruption. These things together created the Maidan, they brought thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of people to the streets. Then the government, in classic style, overreacted. Instead of letting people express themselves, he began to use violence to stop them, repress them. This surprised everyone in Ukraine. It began to surprise people all over the world. At that time, Europeans, Western Europeans, became deeply engaged.

Our initial reaction was to support them, but let them try to reach some kind of agreement to calm things down. When it became clear that this was not being successful, we intervened. President Obama felt strongly that we needed to work hand in hand with the Europeans to try to prevent some kind of mass violence in Ukraine, so we engaged directly with the Russians. . President Obama communicated directly with President Putin on multiple occasions to see if we could forge some kind of agreement, get a deal, restore peace, and avoid a massacre. And indeed we did. It was agreed that President Yanukovych would serve his sentence for another six months.

There would be elections and we would let the Ukrainian people resolve this. Just when an agreement was reached and that agreement was consummated, and we thought we had this out of the way, the president fled. From Putin's perspective, we were somehow behind this. In a vacuum, his own party, in effect, ceded power to more democratic and European-oriented forces. Moscow saw another successful color revolution, a second in a sense, in Ukraine, and thought we were behind it. We had nothing to do with the president's escape. In fact, the same day he fled, he had had a scheduled phone conversation with Vice President Biden.

Biden was trying to talk to him on the phone; We couldn't find him anywhere and, in fact, it turned out that he had left kyiv to flee. Suddenly, we have exactly what Russia was seeking to prevent, which was the Democrats taking power in Ukraine, the same people who wanted to follow the European direction for Ukraine that Russia thought had derailed in the fall of 2014. So they sparked a counter -Maidan. They entered Crimea and then caused a crisis in eastern Ukraine in the Donbass, a crisis that didn't exist before they created it, where they backed a very small number of separatist forces that took control of a portion of eastern Ukraine. .

And that is the crisis we are experiencing today. MICHAEL KIRK - Of course he doesn't recognize it; in fact, they openly lie about what they are doing, first in Crimea and then in Donbas. TONY BLINKEN - That's right. MICHAEL KIRK - These “little green men”… tell me that story. TONY BLINKEN - Russia, again, is a classic example of the use of asymmetric tactics. It did not frontally invade Ukraine, nor Crimea nor Donbas, in eastern Ukraine. He sent a small number of special forces who allied themselves with local separatists, gave them training, gave them equipment, gave them money, gave them direction, and then Putin denied his presence.

It was surprising, because I remember multiple conversations between President Obama and President Putin. We would be in the Oval Office, and the president would be on the phone with Putin, and Putin would deny, and in fact outright lie, about Russia's presence in Ukraine. Obama told him: “Vladimir, we are not blind. We have eyes; we can see." And Putin would move on as if nothing had happened. It became very, very challenging, because we were really trying to find a way out, an "off ramp," as we called it, for Russia, that would restore sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, but also made clear that Russia's own interests could be affected.

We firmly believed, and Obama told Putin: "We know that Russia has a unique relationship with Ukraine (history, geography, culture, language) and there is no reason that it cannot be preserved." famous reset speech in 2009 at the beginning of the Obama administration, which was also sacrosanct for us: there are no spheres of influence; there are no larger countries that change the borders of the larger countries small by force; no country tells people in another country what their address is; Putin did not agree - When Obama talks to Putin on the phone, what does everyone look like? TONY BLINKEN - Putin is extraordinarily calm. and I practice.

He may say harsh things, but he says them. in a very calm, almost natural way. Interestingly, Obama is no different. He is also extremely even-tempered. So here you have two very even-tempered guys talking to each other. The difference is that, unfortunately, President Putin simply tells falsehood after falsehood and tries to misinform. But he does it as easily as he breathes. MICHAEL KIRK - And President Obama's response to you after hanging up? TONY BLINKEN - There's a lot of head shaking that says, "Look, it's a challenge dealing with someone who just doesn't tell the truth and evades the facts." But Obama was extraordinarily persistent, he kept pushing, he kept looking for ways to move forward and, you know, we would make progress.

Every time the two managed to talk, they agreed on some move that would try to calm tensions and see if we could find some kind of roadmap out of the crisis. That would work for a few weeks and then Russia would return to its previous tactics. It was a bit like I had my hand on the rheostat. In Ukraine it was not an on-off switch. It would raise or lower the temperature, depending on how much heat we were exerting. But Obama led this very systematic and determined effort to, in a sense, address the problem asymmetrically ourselves.

That is, it didn't make sense for us, from Obama's perspective, to try to confront the Russians directly and militarily in Ukraine. They were there; We were not there. They could accumulate forces much more than us. Ukraine was not a member of NATO. Russia's weak point in Ukraine was not military; It was economical. Hence the sanctions; hence the United States' effort to lead Europe in imposing very significant sanctions on Russia that made it pay a real price for its adventurism in Ukraine. MICHAEL KIRK - …Let's back up a little. Tell me about Nuland's phone call with the ambassador and why it seemed to matter at the time.

TONY BLINKEN - I think Russia probably interpreted that call as if the United States was a hand or a hidden hand behind what was happening in Ukraine, which was not the case. We were defending our basic principles. We were defending our partnership with Ukraine. But we were also trying to find a way to resolve the crisis, calm things down, make sure the violence did not get out of control, and protect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. That's what it was about. But I think what he heard from Moscow probably confirmed to Putin's ears that the United States is the real power behind the throne in Ukraine.

MICHAEL KIRK - Everyone seemed really surprised that it was published. I mean, phone calls are collected; Wiretapping happens all the time. But for some reason, this one is implemented. And for some, it signals a change in the way Russia will act in times like this. TONY BLINKEN-I think Putin became very sophisticated in the public use of misinformation, and/or even in the use of information that he had acquired through traditional means of espionage, that would not normally be disseminated publicly or used. It would simply be collected for informational purposes, to discover some type of weakness or influence.

What changed were the so-called active measures, where not only would the information be collected, but then it would be turned around and used in some way against us or against other countries. Russia was becoming increasingly sophisticated in doing this, and Putin saw it as a very profitable weapon. MICHAEL KIRK - During this time there is also a lot of fake news; there are lies; There are active measures such as taking over local news outlets and essentially also spreading incorrect information. Are we paying attention to that? Do we know those things are happening or are they on the margins?

TONY BLINKEN - We were very focused and extremely concerned about this rise in misinformation and about Putin using, in a sense, our strength against us. This was where he was extremely skilled. We have an open country and an open set of countries, where information flows freely. Information is increasingly in the hands of more people, the possibility of using it, with technology. Putin turned it against us. He turned a fortress of the United States, of the West, against us and turned it into aweakness through the use of misinformation, the use of propaganda and lies. This was very much at the center of our discussions and debates within the administration.

We saw this happening and it became a real challenge to figure out what to do about it and how to act effectively, because what Putin was trying to do was show that everyone lies, everyone cheats. There is no objective truth and there is no difference between what you hear in the Western media and what you hear, for example, in the Russian media. That was the line, and he increasingly managed to blur it for people, even in the United States and the West. Now, the interesting thing was that in Ukraine we were in an information war. Putin lied and denied that there were Russians in Ukraine.

When the separatists shot down the Malaysian plane using a weapon brought from Russia and given to them, Putin denied it. He created other scenarios, other stories, tried to point the finger at the Ukrainians, point the finger at us and muddy the waters. We realized we were in an information war, not a physical military confrontation, but an information war, and we spent an incredible amount of time trying to figure out how to fight it, gather the information, get our intelligence community to release things that we normally wouldn't. I would not do. I don't want to be in public for fear of compromising some of their sources and methods.

We wanted to see if we could offer more to the public. And work with our own partners and allies to show them that what Russia was saying was not true, that the things that were appearing in the European media about Russia having nothing to do with Ukraine, that its soldiers were not involved, nothing to do with with the demolition of the plan, which were lies, plain and simple. At the end of the day, the most effective resource we had was President Obama's credibility, because even when leaders and the public in Europe, for example, might disagree with some of the policies he was pursuing, they never doubted his his word.

When he said it, they tended to believe it. There is a famous story about the importance of an American president's credibility, and it dates back to the Cuban missile crisis. At the time, we were implementing a quarantine in Cuba and needed to bring our allies on board. President Kennedy sent very high-ranking emissaries to our main partners to convince them that Russia had indeed placed nuclear weapons in Cuba. He sent former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to our most finicky partner, France, and de Gaulle was then president. Acheson went to de Gaulle, explained the situation, and said, "President Kennedy has authorized me to share with you our secret satellite photographs of these missiles." De Gaulle raised his hands and said: “No, no, no.

That is not necessary. If President Kennedy says it, I believe it.” The word of an American president matters a lot in these situations. MICHAEL KIRK - Were there other conversations? There must have been. And why wasn't it possible to confront him and play his own game? If fake news is the way you want to play it, we can create some fake news. If cyberwar is the way you want to play it, we can prevent it and ruin your economy. That must have been raised. Why didn't he fly? TONY BLINKEN - Sure, they raised it, but they rejected it because it is a very dangerous downward spiral.

If suddenly we are doing the same as Russia and we are no better than Russia, then Putin wins. He is right. The same story that he's trying to tell the public about him, that there is no difference, that democracy is no different from the system that he established, this illiberal kleptocracy in Russia, so he won; we have lost. If we don't hold on to our own values, our own way of doing things, then he is right. That's why it was very important for us to oppose what Russia was doing, but to do it on our terms, according to our values, not theirs.

MICHAEL KIRK - We talked to a lot of people about arming the Ukrainians... The president decides not to. Can you explain those arguments to me and tell me why the president landed where he landed? TONY BLINKEN - It was a very difficult and close decision. This was something that was deliberated and debated multiple times, at all levels of the administration and the National Security Council, including the president. On the one hand, some of us believed that it made sense to give the Ukrainians lethal defensive weapons, particularly anti-tank weapons, because at the time, one of the most dangerous things used against Ukrainian soldiers were the tanks that the Russians provided to the Ukrainians. separatists or, in some cases, used them themselves, and against which the Ukrainians had no effective defense.

The argument was that if they had these anti-tank weapons in their hands, they could start doing a lot of damage, defend themselves, but also cause damage and maybe create a little bit of a disincentive for the Russians to continue doing this. because the Russians would begin to lose strength and would have to explain it at home. So that was an argument. The other argument was that if we started to get into a tit-for-tat with Russia for military reasons, the situation would start to escalate: we would put more weapons, they would put more weapons; we would try to match it, they would surpass it, and that was going to be a losing game for us, because for Russia, this was really existential, or at least for Putin it was existential.

And they were there; We weren't. They were right on the border. It was very easy for them to gain a lot of strength very quickly. We were always going to be behind in that game. … What made the most sense was not to enter into a military tit-for-tat that escalated, but to attack the most vulnerable point, which was Russia's economy. After all, that's where President Obama came out. I think the Europeans, including Chancellor Merkel, thought that was the best direction to go, but it was a constant discussion within the administration. MICHAEL KIRK - Where were you? TONY BLINKEN - Well, look, I don't want to say it.

I think it's not appropriate. All I can say is that my job was to give the president my best advice. That 's what I did. But when he made a decision, we carried it out. MICHAEL KIRK - And the argument... that he's a schoolyard bully, someone has to step up and say, “Stop this. He's testing hard power and other things. If you do, he will back down.” TONY BLINKEN - Well, a few things. First of all, it's not like we weren't doing anything on the defensive side of the ledger. Otherwise. We were providing the Ukrainians with a significant amount of equipment, defensive in nature but very important.

We were giving them increasing amounts of sophisticated training. That started showing real results over the course of a couple of years. Of course, we were providing very significant financial support. That's on the side of the ledger. On the other side of the scale, while Putin seemed to be having some tactical success, our firmly held view was that he was not going in a positive strategic direction in terms of Russia's interests, because in a sense, everything he was trying to prevent it, was actually precipitating it. This intervention in Ukraine cost him a relationship with the vast majority of the Ukrainian people in the distant future.

Russia is now hated in much of Ukraine. NATO received a spectacular new boost thanks to Russia's intervention in Ukraine, led by the United States. Our presence, even in countries bordering Russia, is much more regular and significant than before the crisis. Europeans became more united when it comes to energy security, also because of this. Generally speaking, Russia was actually strategically acquiring a weaker position. Then, of course, sanctions, most importantly, along with falling oil prices and Russia's own mismanagement, were gutting the Russian economy going forward. So tactically, yes, Putin was doing quite well. Strategically, a very open question.

MICHAEL KIRK-he Gives him a lot of ammunition to get quite angry with us. TONY BLINKEN - That's right. And again, I think he fueled his own worldview. He fueled a sense of a zero-sum relationship, and this, despite President Obama's repeated efforts to try to find a way out for Russia, to try to demonstrate that there could be a win-win situation and not all. they win. But obviously we were not successful. MICHAEL KIRK - …Let's go back, just for a minute, and capture one of the other motivational things. You mentioned it, but I just want to make sure we know your opinion on it.

This idea that Hillary, speaking in 2011 on that audio tape and on the Web, encouraging people to stand up or whatever she did, at that time and when you look back on it, [was this] a strong motivation for Putin to visit Regarding a specific Secretary of State? TONY BLINKEN-Secretary Clinton, being such a well-known figure around the world, that she has, I think, not only recognition around the world but great respect around the world, when she spoke, people listened. She made a difference. But she wasn't inciting the protesters; She was simply defending the right to have her voice heard and to have democracy in Russia, which was what the Russians claimed to want and what we firmly supported.

I think Putin saw this as a real threat. He saw her, and therefore us, as somehow instigating the protests, not simply supporting the protesters' right to speak. He was deeply, deeply concerned that if she didn't put a stop to it, this could get out of control and start to really threaten her rule in Russia. MICHAEL KIRK-Did she know how angry she was and that he was blaming her? TONY BLINKEN-We knew at the time that he certainly wasn't happy about it. But if anyone thought, fast forward, that this would become a casus belli for Putin to try to stop Secretary Clinton from becoming president of the United States, I don't think anyone would have imagined it at the time.

MICHAEL KIRK - Let's go to summer 2016, or maybe spring. …What was the first time you had a pretty clear idea that it was about Russia? TONY BLINKEN - Well, at least in my case (and at that time I was in the State Department, no longer in the White House), during the summer of that year, from July to August, we were seeing increasing signs and There were growing concerns that Russia was trying to meddle in the elections. The first thing we thought was happening was that Russia was actually trying to get into our election systems and somehow affect the outcome.

This sent us into overdrive to ensure we could uphold the integrity of the election. A massive effort was made to ensure that the electoral systems themselves were secure. We determined that this was the case. We determined that precisely because it is a decentralized system and these things are not connected to each other, it would be very difficult for Russia or any other country to physically affect the outcome of an election. But that was the first concern that arose. So we thought that actually what Russia was trying to do was not necessarily affect the outcome but to create doubt about the integrity of the election.

Even if he couldn't change a vote or deny a vote, if in people's minds there was something wrong with the election, that would do its job. That became our assessment of what Russia was doing. Only later, much later, did the intelligence community determine that Russia was not just trying to sow doubt about the election, but was actually trying to prevent Clinton from winning and help Trump win. MICHAEL KIRK - …Cozy Bear is in the State Department, the Department of Defense and the White House. So you're probably just arriving in the state? Did you guys know about that?

TONY BLINKEN - I think what changed, what we saw and what we possibly didn't immediately understand, was that when we saw Russia making these various efforts early on, we believed that this was a traditional spy. They are spy games and everyone does it. We are trying to get information about them; They are trying to get information about us. Normally that information is stored somewhere; It's analized; maybe they will find a way to create leverage against someone. Build your information base. What was new was turning it around and actively using it against us to affect some kind of outcome, in this case, the election.

That's what took a while to clear up. MICHAEL KIRK - That's the addition of WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, DC Leaks, all of that. TONY BLINKEN - That's right. MICHAEL KIRK - When you hear that, you know something else is afoot. TONY BLINKEN - Yes, this is a completely new game. And we went into overdrive, first, again, protecting, making sure we could protect the integrity of the system, but then directly confronting the Russians. And that involved John Brennan, the director of the CIA, notifying his Russian counterpart about him, I think in August of that year. Then a couple of things happened.

We thought the most effective way to deal with the Russians was to send a very strong bipartisan message of concern. So in August, Brennan and other Intelligence Community leaders, as well as our chiefNational Security Counterterrorism at the White House, Lisa Monaco, went to Capitol Hill to talk to leaders about what we had learned and what we were seeing in terms of Russia's efforts to meddle in the election. They spoke to the eight top leaders of Congress, the so-called Gang of Eight. To our surprise, some of these leaders refused to believe what they were hearing from the Director of Central Intelligence and accused us of playing politics to help Mrs.

Clinton win the election, and therefore rejected the idea of ​​any kind of bipartisan statement of concern and determination to not let this continue. That was a very, very unfortunate moment. MICHAEL KIRK - What did you attribute it to? TONY BLINKEN - The only thing I can attribute is to hyperpartisanship in Washington. Unfortunately, I suppose one could conclude that those who refused to believe what the director of the Central Intelligence Agency was telling them, in some sense, believed the Russian Vladimir Putin more than they believed their own director of the Central Intelligence Agency. . Well, I don't know how to interpret that.

I think he's deeply, deeply unfortunate, deeply troubling, and he really set us back, because it took another month to get to the place where we finally got a bipartisan expression of concern from Congress. In between, President Obama directly confronted Putin at the G-20 Summit in China. MICHAEL KIRK - Were you there? TONY BLINKEN - I was not there, but I participated in the preparations for that summit and I certainly understood what happened. He gave him a very clear and harsh warning that if Russia's meddling did not stop, there would be significant consequences. The interesting thing is that, as far as we could see, after that meeting, Russia seemed to back off.

We didn't see these efforts continue to try to get information and turn around, but the damage was done. Much of the information, of course, at the Democratic National Committee, from the Clinton campaign, had already been exfiltrated. He then moved on to cuts like WikiLeaks and others, and continued to trickle down, even after the meeting between President Obama and President Putin. But Russia's own direct efforts appeared to be on hold. MICHAEL KIRK - Were you present as part of the preparation for Hangzhou? Was an agreement reached with the president on what to tell Putin? Was there any plan to corner him and separate him?

TONY BLINKEN - Oh, very much. A lot of it is like that. MICHAEL KIRK - Help me with the preparation. TONY BLINKEN - It was determined that if we did not contact Putin directly and if the president of the United States did not do so, we were not going to send a clear message to Moscow. In the Russian system in particular, unless you're dealing directly with Putin, you can send any message you want; It's not going to have the same effect. So President Obama believed that the most effective way to get the Russians to stop what they were doing was to directly confront Putin, and that's exactly what he did.

MICHAEL KIRK - So what were the options? What could he have done other than say what he said? Was there something else? TONY BLINKEN - Sure. And, of course, we put together a number of possible responses and, in fact, possible punishments that were in our toolkit. But the main thing was this. First we wanted to make sure that, as a practical matter, Russia could not, in fact, interfere with the electoral systems themselves. So we worked very, very closely with all the states, did an intense analysis of the electoral systems and determined that, in fact, they were secure and that their integrity could be preserved.

Secondly, we wanted Russia to stop doing what it was doing, and it appears, from the Obama-Putin meeting, that after that they did. Third was the question: what is the appropriate punishment? There we think we have time; We can work on these different options. At the same time, because we believed that Russia's main goal was to sow doubts about the integrity of the system, even if it didn't actually do anything to change or deny a vote, the more we played this in public, the more we would be playing the game of Russia. If the president of the United States got up on the pulpit and started talking about this in the middle of the campaign, even if it was to say, "Russia is trying to do this, but don't worry; everything's fine," actually, that it would probably only raise concern and begin to raise questions about the integrity of the system, exactly what Russia was trying to achieve.

So we thought the best approach was to be very clear and very direct with the Russians privately, to make sure that the system was protected, and then deliberately, perhaps after the election, take appropriate measures in terms of punishing Russia for what it did. In retrospect, I think if we had come to the conclusion sooner that Russia was actually trying to deny the presidency to one candidate and give it to another candidate, perhaps we would have spoken more forcefully in public. But given what we thought Russia was trying to do at the time, we didn't want to do anything that would favor them.

MICHAEL KIRK - I guess, you'll tell me, but I guess if you believed that Hillary Clinton was going to win, which apparently almost everyone did at the time, a different strategy would be created. TONY BLINKEN - I really think that, from President Obama's perspective, the question was what is the right thing to do to make sure that we are protecting the integrity of the electoral system, that we are making sure that we do not advance what Russia is trying to do, that It's creating doubt in that system, and then deliberately deciding what the right answer is.

That was what motivated him, not who was going to win the election and who was not going to win the election. Actually, again, it wasn't until after the election that the intelligence community concluded that there was a very deliberate effort by the Russians to affect the outcome of the election, not just to sow doubt about its legitimacy. . MICHAEL KIRK - You can see why many see this as another hesitant tactical mistake by President Obama. TONY BLINKEN - There is another element that is very important. In addition to this direct confrontation between President Obama and President Putin in September at the G-20, in early October, the director of national intelligence and the director of national security issued an unprecedented public statement regarding Russian election interference .

Normally, that would have been the dominant story, but of course, that same day the infamous Access Hollywood tapes were released. This unprecedented statement from two leaders of our intelligence and national security community was drowned out and lost. MICHAEL KIRK - And in fact, I think WikiLeaks also started doing their big information dump from the Podesta

files

. TONY BLINKEN - That's right, and it certainly raises questions in people's minds. MICHAEL KIRK - But what are those questions? TONY BLINKEN - Well, it would seem that time and time again, information began to emerge at particularly interesting moments when juxtaposed with what was happening in the campaign.

But maybe that's all a coincidence. MICHAEL KIRK - Well, what are you trying to say? TONY BLINKEN - No, I just think that one of the things that, of course, the various investigations are looking at is whether there was any kind of active collusion between anyone involved in the campaign and Russia. Certainly, it at least raises the question of the coincidence of some of these things coming to light at particularly advantageous times for one campaign and disadvantageous times for another campaign. That at least raises questions. So all of this will be investigated in due course. MICHAEL KIRK-What do you think of Trump's initial response, where he essentially says, "Hey, Russia, look at Hillary Clinton's emails." TONY BLINKEN-What was troubling about Trump's response during the campaign itself was that his own talking points could have been taken directly from the airwaves of Russia Today, RT or Sputnik, Russia's propaganda organs.

What they were saying was that our election was rigged. Trump was saying exactly the same thing, seemingly inadvertently advancing the same narrative that Putin and Russia were putting forward. That was deeply unfortunate. MICHAEL KIRK -...So Trump wins. What did you see? When you looked at Putin's response, Russia's response, what did you see? TONY BLINKEN - One of the things we saw was that, on the one hand, Russia had arguably just committed the most successful campaign of disinformation and meddling in an election that we've ever seen. This raised deep doubts, not only about the elections that had just been held, but also about future elections, because, given its success, it had every incentive to continue.

That's one of the reasons President Obama took the actions he did after the election, but it's also one of the reasons why, going forward, there has to be a clear, definitive line on what Russia did. and, of course, our intelligence community and The three main agencies that investigated this were unanimous in their conclusions. There has to be a very clear message to Moscow that this cannot happen again. It will not happen again with impunity. Ultimately, the president of the United States is the one who has to convey that message. It's a message that President Obama delivered when he was president.

It's a message President Trump must deliver now if we want to stop the Russians from meddling again. And, by the way, this is not a partisan issue. This time the Democrats were the victims. Next time it could be the Republicans. This is an American issue, a nationalist issue, and a place where we have to stand together as Americans to oppose it, do something about it, and stop it. But that starts with the president of the United States. If he doesn't speak clearly about it, if he doesn't act deliberately about it, the message Russia gets is: we can keep doing this.

MICHAEL KIRK - I think you wrote or said that Putin is the master of the game. What do you mean? TONY BLINKEN - He's made it an art form to take a relatively weak hand, a country that is in a very difficult economic situation, that has a declining population, a declining life expectancy, and is struggling. He took that weak hand and played it incredibly well. The art form he has perfected is particularly in the information space, taking our openness, using it against us, manipulating information, lying, deceiving and creating doubt. That doubt is a very powerful thing.

It takes away our own certainty, our own conviction, our own confidence that our system and our values ​​are really better and stronger. It creates doubt in the minds of our own citizens and tells its own citizens in Russia that there really is no difference, and that helps it maintain its grip on power. I have never seen anyone doing it better than Mr. Putin. And it requires a clear, deliberate and coordinated response, not only from the United States but from our partners across the board. We've seen the beginnings of that. I think the French elections showed that you can be very effective in pushing back and diluting these efforts by Russia to interfere in an election, but you have to start from the top.

It has to start with our own president, making clear that there will be real consequences for Russia if it continues down this path. … MICHAEL KIRK - There's the argument, of course, that Obama made, which is: I'm not going to heat something up right before a new president arrives. My job is to stay a little low. If you want to raise the temperature, do it. TONY BLINKEN - That's exactly right. I think President Obama felt that we needed to put this all together, hand it to the next president, and let him decide what the appropriate follow-up actions would be.

In fact, he asked that our Intelligence Community meet and try to issue a definitive report on what happened. It was in that process of reviewing every piece of intelligence information that they came to the conclusion that they had not reached before the election, that Putin was actually trying to affect the outcome of the election; that is, he was trying to make sure that Mrs. Clinton was not elected and that Mr. Trump was elected. That was really a product of this looking back at everything we had and everything we knew, putting together pieces that we hadn't seen connected at the time.

MICHAEL KIRK - And of course the alternative, the counterargument to Obama, to which I just articulated, is, but wait a minute. Now you know it's Trump. Why not go for leather? Because you know where Trump is on this. Trump has been rooting for the Russians. TONY BLINKEN - Well, you really hope and believe that whoever is elected president of the United States will do the right thing and defend the national interest and the security of the nation. It was our belief and conviction that President Trump should do it and he would do it. It was our responsibility to give him the information that had been developed by the intelligence community—not by a Democratic president, but by the intelligence community—to give him our best recommendations about what should be done.

But ultimately it would be your responsibility. Now, of course, theThe Obama administration did take action while still in office, including expelling some 35 alleged Russian diplomats, who were in fact involved in intelligence gathering and espionage, and closing two compounds that the Russians were also using. For intelligence purposes, and the president having previously notified Putin, we reserved the right and hoped that the administration that followed us would reserve the right to take further action if Russia continued. But now that responsibility, that power lies with the current administration, not the Obama administration. One can spend a lot of time reviewing what we did or didn't do.

It's always important to look back and discover if you could have done something differently or better. But that is no longer the problem. The question is, how can we make sure this doesn't happen again? And that is the responsibility of the current administration and President Trump. … JIM GILMORE-… In the end, what did he achieve and what does it say about Putin that he has seen him evolve over the years? TONY BLINKEN - Putin has been remarkably successful in fueling a crisis of confidence in the United States and the West, particularly regarding our elections, but even more broadly regarding our system.

It's hard to say if that was his design from day one or if he simply took advantage of the opportunities he helped create. But either way, he's been remarkably skillful. We are now consumed by what Russia did or did not do during the election, what it did or did not campaign in collusion with Russia. That has become the dominant story every day in our country, to the point that it has also made it difficult to move forward with other things that are important. But it is vitally important that we get to the bottom of this if we want to prevent it from happening again.

To the extent that Mr. Putin has played a very weak hand, dominating our own national conversation, creating doubt, creating this crisis of confidence and fostering political paralysis in terms of achieving anything, he has been remarkably successful, playing a hand role very weak. That is why it is vitally important that he understands that this cannot and will not happen again with impunity. It's really up to the president of the United States to convey that message directly to Putin, to make sure he understands it, believes it, and acts on it. Otherwise, you haven't seen anything yet. This will be repeated in 2018, in 2020.

Things will get even worse. And Russia will emerge stronger. We will come out of this weakened. Now, one hopes that at some point, somehow, we can return to a place where the U.S.-Russian relationship is a zero-sum process, where we actually work together in areas of mutual interest. But unless Mr. Putin can be made to see that acting this way, looking at the world through a zero-sum prism and trying to undermine the United States and Western Europe on a regular basis, unless he can be made to Seeing that it's not really going to be allowed, that there will be real consequences for it, it will continue, because every signal you get is that it's working and you're not paying a price for it.

So this is really a pressing issue for the United States going forward. And again, the responsibility lies with the president of the United States. He is the only actor in our system who can make it clear to Putin that this has to stop, it must stop, and if it doesn't stop, there will be consequences.