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DISAPPEARING Engine! The Incredible story of Nationwide 723

Mar 21, 2024
- All multi-

engine

pilots are trained to deal with a possible

engine

failure during the takeoff run. But very few pilots ever experience true engine failure, and even fewer will experience the madness that these two pilots had to endure, stay tuned. - 100, 50, 40, 30, 20, 10. Around lunchtime on November 7, 2007, a crew operating for Nationwide Airlines gathered in the crew lounge at Cape Town International Airport in South Africa . They had just enjoyed a pleasant overnight stop in Cape Town and were now signed up to operate together on a flight to Johannesburg, departing at 1:15 p.m. local time. The crew consisted of four cabin crew and two pilots.
disappearing engine the incredible story of nationwide 723
And the cabin crew was headed by cabin controller Marilyn Rink. One of the airline's most experienced cabin crew. This was a routine flight for her and she started the day by informing her three colleagues, as she always did. The two pilots who were going to fly together had widely varying levels of experience. In command of the flight was Captain Trevor Arnold, 50. He had a lot of experience with 13,860 hours of total time and nearly 3,300 hours on the Boeing 737-200 that they were going to operate on this flight. He started flying for Nationwide in 1997, but then had a few years off flying for other operators, until 2006 when he returned again.
disappearing engine the incredible story of nationwide 723

More Interesting Facts About,

disappearing engine the incredible story of nationwide 723...

Instead, his first officer was 25-year-old Daniel Perry. He was new at the job. He had begun flying for Nationwide only a month before the flight and had accumulated just over 1,000 hours of total time and 278 hours in the type, for which he had obtained his type rating earlier that same year. Captain Arnold was known as a very skilled aviator and strict in following rules and standard operating procedures. Something that I guess First Officer Perry was probably very happy about, because generally, the less experience you have, the more important it is for everyone to follow procedures because that's really the only thing you have to hold on to until your experience builds up. .
disappearing engine the incredible story of nationwide 723
In any case, the pilot started by reviewing the pre-flight briefing material and it seemed pretty good. The weather in Cape Town was pretty miserable, with light rain, northerly winds and low cloud cover, but the weather for the alternative destination looked a little better. The plane they were going to fly was a Boeing 737-200 Advanced, a true icon of the 737 family. It was part of the first variation of the 737 family, called "The Originals", but most of us simply refer to them as "The Jurassics." When I joined my current airline we were actually still operating the 200 and unfortunately I never got the chance to pilot one, but all my colleagues who did said it handled like a sports car.
disappearing engine the incredible story of nationwide 723
It's a fantastic airplane that has the dimensions that the 737 was supposed to have before it started stretching to accommodate more passengers. This particular model, the 737-200 Advanced, first came on the market in 1971. And it was equipped with slightly more powerful Pratt & Whitney JT8D-15 engines, improved aerodynamics, automatic brakes, and increased fuel capacity compared to the 200 original, which gave it better range and overall efficiency. The two Pratt & Whitney engines were low bypass ratio turbofan engines, making them very long and thin, almost like cigars. They were used because when Boeing was designing the original 737 they wanted a plane that had a low ground clearance, so that it would be easy for ground operators to work on, as Boeing assumed it would operate primarily at smaller airports where facilities are located. .
It may not be so good. This meant that the engines were mounted directly on the wing without pylons. And those engine mounts will play an important role in this

story

. The engines were supported by two main supports. One forward and one aft, and then a secondary mount assembly ahead of the aft motor mount. The engine mounts are now bolted to the wing using tapered bolts, which are built to withstand any normal loads the engine may experience. But if a strong enough force is applied to them, for example if a gear landing were to occur, the bolts were designed to shear and free the engines and therefore protect the wing and the main structure of the aircraft in general. .
It was extremely important that these bolts be mounted correctly with the exact amount of torque applied to them, to avoid overloading the bolts, which could cause metal fatigue. This was a known problem, especially on the older type of engine mounts that were fitted to this particular aircraft. That's why the FAA had issued an airworthiness directive several years earlier, outlining strict inspection intervals that had to be performed at least every 700 cycles of these brackets and bolts. And this brings us to the airline of the

story

, Nationwide. At the time of this accident, Nationwide was operating 11 Boeing 737-200s.
And they did all the maintenance in-house, in their own maintenance organization. But that organization had been experiencing some problems for the last few years before 2007. Key administrative staff, in most cases the quality manager, had ended up quitting their jobs just before the Maintenance Organization renewal audits. of Air or AMO approval, and it was It's not so hard to see why. Because the audits always highlighted several non-compliance with existing rules and regulations and most of these findings were never properly addressed or closed, which is why, probably unbeknownst to the pilots, the AMO actually lacked a formal license to operate at the time of the accident.
Maintenance work continued based on an unofficial email sent by South African civil aviation authorities allowing them to continue for now. But in reality there was no provision for such an extension. One of the findings that was later revealed was that the crashed aircraft had no record of engine mount inspections for the five years prior to the crash. But as I said, the pilots were happily unaware of this when they proceeded to inform their cabin crew and began preparing their plane for departure. Now, just to put this in perspective, as pilots we have to trust that the maintenance organization is doing its job, and the only thing we can really do is verify that all documentation is available and that all applicable certification dates are in place. date, and obviously that the plane looks good during the tour.
As the pilots exited the plane, Captain Arnold asked if the first officer wanted to be the pilot for the flight to Johannesburg. Now, First Officer Perry was happy to do so. He loved flying the plane and he was interested in showing his senior colleague what he could do and maybe also get some tips and tricks on how to improve. He began preparing the plane for departure from runway 01 in Cape Town and then proceeded to brief the captain on how he intended to fly it. Part of that briefing included a full emergency report, including actions to take and the route they would fly in the event of engine failure.
This is common practice. And on most airlines, we also touch on exactly what we will do in the event of an engine failure on takeoff. Both in the stopping and driving scenarios. And this is something we normally do during the first flight of each day. That's also what this team did. And by doing so, this would have stayed fresh in his muscle memory. And the idea was that this would hopefully speed up decision making with no time available in case an actual failure occurred. And on this day that will be very important. But before I tell you the full story of what happened, here's this: Have you made your travel plans for this summer yet?
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Now, let's go back to the video. Once the crew was done and all checklists were completed, Nationwide Flight 723 requested rollback and go, and began taxiing in the rain to take off on runway 01. There was a lot of incoming traffic at the time of its planned departure. , so the ground controller asked them to accelerate their alignment and be ready for an immediate takeoff as soon as a South Africa Express landing CRJ had cleared the runway in front of them. This was read by the crew who aligned their Boeing 737 with the centerline and began starting their engines. They knew they had to react quickly and start taxiing as soon as they received their takeoff clearance, because there was another SAA aircraft in the last four nautical miles behind them.
That's why as soon as takeoff clearance was received, First Officer Perry advanced the thrust levels to the takeoff EPR and the airplane began accelerating down the runway. Once the takeoff thrust was set, he removed his hand from the thrust levers and the captain took over, ready to take the controls and reject if anything happened. But initially the takeoff took place completely normally. Captain Arnold shouted "80 knots," to which First Officer Perry responded, "Check." They were now in what we call the high-speed takeoff regime in which an aborted takeoff is actually only executed if an engine failure, fire or wind shear predictive warning is heard, or if the runway is blocked or the plane is not safe or cannot fly.
The reason we reject only those things above 80 knots is because it is usually safer from that position to take the plane in the air and fix any problems it may have when it is already in the air. That will give you more time to think and troubleshoot, and then you will have full use of the entire runway to land if you decide to return. Remember, the plane would have consumed quite a bit of runway accelerating to this point. And the speed would also be relatively high, so while of course it would be entirely possible to stop the plane safely up to the decision speed of V1, it would probably be safer and better to fix any minor problems.
The air. This is what we call having an active mind. And most airlines have adopted this philosophy today. In any case, there were initially no indications that anything was wrong during this takeoff. The captain yelled "V1", withdrew his hand, and then "Rotate", causing First Officer Perry to begin pulling back on his yoke and rotating his aircraft slowly, approximately three degrees per second to get the aircraft airborne. But here something started to go very wrong under the right wing of his plane. What happened was that the aft taper bolt holding the engine in place had developed a small fatigue crack, and during rotation, this crack suddenly gave way and the bolt fractured.
Now, under normal conditions the secondary engine support assembly is supposed to be able to hold the load if the aft support fails, but unfortunately, this secondary support has now also failed. We will never really know what happened here, because the secondary support was never found after the accident. Either it also broke under stress or, as some newspapers reported after the accident, it may not have been installed at all after the last engine overhaul. In any case, the consequence of both mounts failing was that there was now nothing to hold the rear of the engine in place while it was still producing maximum takeoff thrust.
This essentially transformed the front engine mount into a pivot point, around which the engine could move. And the terrifying consequence of that was that the engine began to spinviolently forward and upward. Since the thrust levers were mechanically connected by a control cable to the engine, this cable was now pulled rearward with the full force of the starting engine, causing the right engine thrust lever in the cockpit to move towards back and crashed against the pedestal with such force. , which left a deep indentation in him. The other immediate consequence was that the right engine suddenly began to produce an upward thrust vector on the right wing, causing the airplane to turn rapidly to the left.
Fortunately, First Officer Perry reacted quickly and pressed the right aileron and left rudder to keep the plane under control as it slowly pulled away from the runway. As this all occurred after the aircraft had passed V1, the decision speed, refusing takeoff was no longer an option. From that point on, it was all about keeping the plane flying and figuring out what was going on. Now, the front engine mount could not withstand the type of forces it was being subjected to. The outer taper bolt was cut as designed, but the inner one did not have time to do so, with the result that the engine now simply ripped off what was left of the mount.
The engine was now completely free and tore out all the hydraulic and fuel lines as it began to fall towards the earth. And just leaving a gaping hole in the wing where it used to be mounted. A terrified passenger sitting next to the right wing could see all this unfold, which actually only lasted a few seconds. Now, I can only imagine what this poor passenger must have been thinking when he saw the entire right engine just fall off the plane. However, this passenger apparently turned around and told another passenger who was sitting next to him what he had seen.
And then this passenger just calmly said, "Don't worry, these planes can fly safely on a single engine," which in my opinion qualifies this passenger for the travel buddy of the year award. In the cabin, now there was all Pandemonium The pilots had heard a loud bang as the engine separated, and then, a few seconds later, a kind of strange tearing sound and a sudden lurch, this time to the right. After that, the plane finally. It began to handle more the way the pilots had been trained, after a normal engine failure, the first officer continued flying the plane and managed to slowly move it away from the runway as soon as they had a sustained positive climb rate. , the captain brought the plane in and then began troubleshooting the problem.
The immediate indications at his disposal were the delayed thrust lever, zero or decreasing engine indications on the number two engine, as well as a reverse thrust warning. thrust in the same engine. warnings from the hydraulic pump associated with the engine. This is all negative, perhaps the thrust reverser indication were clear signs of some kind of failure in the number two engine, but both pilots were careful not to jump to conclusions at this point. And so far this failure had not behaved like any other failure they had seen or practiced in the simulator. And both were well aware of the misidentification that had occurred to the pilots of British Midlands Flight 092, who, after similar strange indications, had shot down the wrong engine in 1989.
These pilots did not want to make the same mistake, so Once the aircraft had reached about two hundred feet and was reasonably under control, the captain began to review all the indications and finally came to the conclusion that they had suffered some type of severe damage to their number two engine. First Officer Perry, who now needed to push substantial amounts of left rudder to keep the airplane in a straight line, due to the asymmetrical thrust being produced from the left engine, agreed with this diagnosis. In the event of serious engine damage, the Boeing 737 abnormal checklist contains something known as memory items.
These are items that the pilot must do from memory as quickly as possible, due to the critical nature of those items. In this case, the first officer would have asked for the memory items to be completed, and the captain would then have called them to confirm them before performing them to ensure that his first officer agreed with the actions he would have taken. started. "Push lever, engine number two. Confirm closure?" First Officer Perry would then look down, confirming that he was actually about to move the correct thrust lever and then shout "Confirmed", and the captain would have closed it even though, in this case, the thrust lever was already very closed. .
Then came: "Engine start lever, engine number two. Confirm cut?" "Confirmed. Cut." "Engine fire warning switch, engine number two. Confirm activation?" "Confirmed. Removed." All of these memory elements were designed to secure the engine by closing access to fuel and hydraulic fluids from the damaged engine. The last memory item was to turn the engine fire warning switch to release the extinguishers on the engine, in case it was on fire, but that wasn't the case here. Once the memory items were completed, the rest of the checklist could wait until the aircraft was properly established above the minimum sector altitude.
This meant that the two pilots could now concentrate entirely on climbing. And finally, accelerate to retract the flaps, which they began to do above 1,000 feet. They then continued their climb to 3,000 feet, where they finally stabilized. At the airport, several witnesses had seen something large fall from the plane as it took off. And now he could see how the plane was barely climbing, sliding almost 45 degrees to the left and leaving a trail of white smoke behind its right wing. This smoke was actually a mist of hydraulic fluid and fuel that was now being vented into the air.
But weren't the memory elements supposed to prevent fuel and hydraulics from reaching the engine? Well, yes, but in this case these lines had ruptured inside the shutoff valves that were designed to do this job. Therefore, fuel and hydraulic fluid were now gushing out of the supply lines and this would begin to cause its own problems later. The tower controller had also seen what was happening to Flight 723, and from where he was the plane's flat climb path looked almost negative, so he pressed the crash alarm, completely convinced that the plane was about to of crashing. the other side of the track.
And he wanted to immediately alert the firefighters. At the same time, he also realized that there was another plane on short final, which he had already cleared to land when the Nationwide plane was taking off. Now, he called this plane and warned the crew about possible debris on the runway, but interestingly he did not advise them to turn around immediately. This meant that this plane decided to continue its landing approach. And after doing so, they reported to the tower confirming that there was a lot of debris around the center line, towards the last third of the runway.
In the cockpit of Flight 723, Captain Arnold had heard this transmission, which further confirmed his assessment of what was happening. He now declared "mayday, mayday, mayday" and warned that they had lost thrust in one of their engines and were also experiencing hydraulic problems. He told air traffic control that they would probably have to return directly to the airport after completing their emergency checklist. He also asked if it would be possible to clear the runway of that debris, during the 15 to 20 minutes it would take to prepare for the approach. Fortunately, since the tower controller activated the accident alarm, firefighters and rescue personnel were already waiting at the edge of the runway.
Along with all the other staff available at the airport, they are now set to work moving the debris from the damaged plane to the side of the runway, making it usable for the incoming emergency landing, a fantastic display of teamwork. The airport is also closed to incoming traffic. So all approaching planes were diverted to George Airport. Soon, the only plane in the airspace was Nationwide Flight 723. Cabin crew purser Marilyn was called to the cockpit and Captain Arnold asked her if he could come down to the cockpit and take a look to give the pilots a damage report. .
He did so and after a while he returned and informed them that he had seen that parts appeared to be missing from the right engine. Actually, she knew that the entire engine was gone, but she later said that she didn't want to worry the pilots too much. Now, here comes a valuable lesson for any cabin crew or passenger. There is never too much information in a situation like this. As long as the information is accurate, it is much better for us pilots to have as much additional information as possible to plan our course of action. But in this case it wouldn't have made any difference.
Captain Arnold told him to return to begin preparing the crew and passengers for an emergency landing in Cape Town, and then made a public address call to the passengers where he explained what was happening and the fact that they were returning. Now, in case pilots face a problem like this, there are several emergency checklists that need to be completed. In this case, the crew would have started by completing the engine fire, severe damage, or separation checklist, which begins with the memory items we just discussed and then continues systematically, ensuring that the aircraft is as safe as possible. safe as possible. possible in this new configuration.
This includes things like setting the air conditioning system to not use air bleed from the damaged engine. Start the APU and, most importantly, balance the fuel, since in this situation the fuel would only be used from one tank. And that can lead to a substantial fuel imbalance between left and right, which can lead to handling problems. Now here comes a bit of a catch in version 737-200 of this checklist. In the copies I have found about this last step, the checklist only says "fuel balance", while in the 737NG version of the checklist, which I am used to, this point comes with a very strong condition , that is, if not a fuel leak is suspected.
Because, in this case, the crew had indeed noticed a substantial imbalance between the tanks, but it showed that the fuel in the right tank was much less than in the left. Now if you think about it, if only the left engine is running and therefore feeding fuel only from the left tank, that tank should have less fuel, right? If the right tank is lower, then it is a clear indication of a fuel leak. And they shouldn't have tried to balance the fuel. Because doing so would possibly mean transferring precious fuel through a gaping hole on that side.
But alas, that's exactly what the crew did now. Which didn't really help the imbalance, but meant that they now suddenly had a lot less time on their hands. On top of this, hydraulic pressure dropped rapidly due to leaks in the hydraulic lines, leading to all sorts of problems. So the pilots really needed to get this plane down, relatively quickly now. Captain Arnold had seen how well his first officer handled the aircraft, but with such a serious failure and given the very limited experience that First Officer Perry had, he wanted to feel how the aircraft handled to assess the difficulty.
So, with the main emergency checklists completed, he asked to take charge of the controls. When the first officer handed him the controls, the plane immediately began to yaw and pitch, so he almost immediately handed the controls back to the first officer, which is a great sign of humility and flying skill. He probably would have learned to fly the plane pretty quickly, but his first officer had already flown the plane for about 19 minutes at that point, and was doing very well. So if something isn't broken, don't fix it. While they were busy doing this and executing procedures without external visual references, a new voice from the controller came on the frequency and called them. "Nationwide 723, Cape Town approach?" Both pilots were under a lot of pressure here, and they weren't happy about being interrupted, so they responded something like, "Go away, we're busy." But the controller came back and very calmly said, "Nationwide 723, ground ahead." And then he gave them a new direction to follow, something they quickly adhered to.
The 737-200 does not have the enhanced ground proximity warning system that later versions of the 737-200 do.737. Instead, it has a very basic system that uses radio altimeter, combined with aircraft configuration to issue warnings. The problem with this is that warnings from the ground can come too late. Since it is only really reactive and not predictive like later versions are. This was probably a humbling reminder to the crew of how easy it is to lose situational awareness when faced with multiple failures like this. And how important it is that all links in the aviation chain continue to work together to achieve a safe outcome.
Now, to fly a single-engine approach, the crew would have used the single-engine inoperative landing checklist that instructed them to prepare for a landing with Flaps 15. That meant they would land at a higher speed than normal. , but also with less resistance in case of a turn. The higher speed also meant better aerodynamic efficiency of the rudder, which was really necessary due to the asymmetrical thrust they were experiencing. First Officer Perry needed to use the left rudder almost fully to keep the plane in a straight line at this point. The pilots now completed an approach briefing and would have discussed the possibility of a single-engine round trip even though they knew they were losing fuel rapidly and still had hydraulic problems.
Turning around wouldn't have been great, especially as they were now also receiving weather reports indicating that visibility was getting worse with lower clouds approaching from False Bay. They continued to receive long, wide vectors out of the bay and finally aligned with the ILS approach. They began configuring the airplane with first flaps one, then flaps five, and as the speed began to reduce, First Officer Perry felt that he needed to use even more left rudder, but could still control the airplane well. The captain picked up the microphone again and explained to the passengers what would happen, and also told them to adapt the position of the aircraft before landing.
The ground team had managed to clear the runway of all the debris in a record time of only 18 minutes, so the plane was already cleared to land. 25 minutes after the engine fell off their plane, Nationwide Flight 723 landed safely and safely on the same runway from which they had taken off. At first, the pilots were a little concerned about how their brakes were working, since they didn't know the extent of the hydraulic damage they had suffered, but it turned out that they worked fine. As soon as the plane slowed to a safe speed, the very calm and somber atmosphere in the passenger cabin transformed into a roar of applause and cheers from the passengers.
The plane slowed to taxi speed as the pilot directed it toward the smaller intersection on Runway 34 and then brought it to a complete stop. As soon as they stopped, they were boarded by fire and rescue vehicles, which wanted to inspect the damage, but as there was no fire or immediate risk to the passengers, the crew decided not to evacuate, and waited for some mobile steps to take them away. to the aircraft. While they waited for this, Captain Arnold came out to the cabin to see the damage with his own eyes. And as soon as he opened the cabin door, he was greeted with thunderous applause from the passengers.
When he finally returned to the cockpit, First Officer Perry said the captain had lost all color in his face. Remember, this was the first time he saw the true extent of the damage to his plane. "The engine is gone!" he said. And Perry said, "What do you mean he's gone?" Which is a fair question. Airplane engines aren't supposed to suddenly disappear. This happy outcome was made possible by an

incredible

display of skill and teamwork by both the pilots, cabin crew and air traffic control, as well as the ground workers who managed to clear the debris as quickly as possible. they made.
The captain would later receive the Polaris Award for Excellence in Piloting from the International Air Line Pilots Association, which I believe the first officer also deserved, given how well he handled the emergency with such limited experience. But in later interviews, First Officer Perry explained that he was not a member of ALPA when the accident occurred and that Captain Arnold was in command. The accident investigation very quickly revealed that the airline was operating a fleet serviced without a valid air maintenance organization permit at the time of the accident. It also showed that previous maintenance records were missing or very poor.
This led to the grounding of Nationwide's entire fleet, as well as scathing recommendations to South Africa's civil aviation authorities and their lack of oversight of the company's maintenance organisation. It turns out that giving authorization to operate aircraft maintenance by email was not enough. Nationwide Airlines was eventually liquidated in early 2008 as a result of suspending operations. Now, I want to especially thank Mark D Young for an article about the interviews he did with the people involved in this accident. This article, which I will link to below, gave much more color to the story than the 20 page accident report.
And unfortunately the cockpit voice recorder was overwritten when the investigator gained access to it. So all the conversations in this video come from those interviews. Now, if you're a nervous traveler, I hope you've had a chance to check out my new web app at app.mentourpilot.com. I have created this application especially for you and for people with many questions about aviation. The trial is free, but I recommend anyone who regularly has questions about aviation or feels nervous to become a premium member. Then you'll have access to a ton of cool stuff like all my ad-free crash videos in podcast format, 360 wind shear videos and a full 737 setup, and much more.
Watch this video below and consider purchasing a t-shirt or becoming a Patreon member, it really helps the work we do. And remember, any Patreon member above the $10/month tier will get premium access to both of my apps as a bonus. Have an absolutely fantastic day and we'll see you next time. Bye bye.

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