Britain vs Argentina: Falklands War - Full Animated Documentary

shortly after 11:00 p.m. On the afternoon of April 1, 1982, a group of Argentine marines landed from rubber dinghies on the Faulkland Islands, an isolated, windswept archipelago in the South Atlantic, controlled by the United Kingdom after decades of failed negotiations and months Preparation for the reconquest of what they called Las Malvinas was underway, it was the beginning of a 10-week war that would end with hundreds of casualties, controversy and profound effects in both Great Britain and Argentina. The Faulkland War had begun, followed later by the main Assa at the center of the events of 1982. It was a complicated territorial dispute over the Faulklands dating back centuries.

Its intricacies are not the subject of this series or this video, but it is worth reviewing the basics. The Falcon Islands were first claimed by the English, colonized by the French and first ruled by the Spanish, when Argentina gained its independence from the Spanish Empire shortly after the beginning of the 19th century, L Mal Venus was considered an integral part of its colonial heritage. Britain disputed this and ended up sending ships to assert control over the islands in 1833, the Falins. It became a Crown colony in 1840 and grew to become an important supply station for Royal Navy ships operating in the South Atlantic.

The dispute over the island's sovereignty died down until Argentina approached the UN in the 1960s for help in realizing its claim, citing continued British control of the islands as an example of colonialism. Britain agreed to participate. in the talks, but was reluctant to allow any transfer of the islands unless the islanders themselves, who considered themselves British, gave their consent citing their right to self-determination, another key UN principle of the mid-1970s. The relationship between the two nations began to decline after a military Hunter took control of Argentina in 1976 at the end of that year, when Osirus severed ambassadorial relations with Britain and sent 50 military personnel ashore in Southern THU, an area fantastically isolated in the South Sandwich Islands which were also controlled by Britain and claimed by Argentina.

Remote as they were, this was a clear attack on British sovereignty over its South Atlantic territories and a shot at the Faulklands issue. It was serious and provoked a response from Britain of nothing, nothing, nothing more. that strongly worded letters the Argentine presence in the South was not expelled the British House of Commons did not even learn of the occupation of the South for two years after it occurred efforts to resolve the problem continued after the election of Margaret's government Thatcher in 1979 who had the novel idea of ​​transferring sovereignty to Argentina but leasing the islands to Britain for 199 years afterwards, this seemed like a smart solution, but it failed in the face of opposition first from the Faulkland Islanders and then from the British MPS, in 1981.

The United Kingdom had no clear plan on the popular lands other than to buy time and try to prevent the Argentines from doing anything too dramatic. The problem was for Argentina. It seemed that Britain simply wasn't that concerned about the islands in 1981, the Thatcher government. announced massive cuts to defense spending after a review by Defense Secretary John Knot White. All the defense budget cuts were nothing new, but this particular round was an absolute hammer blow to the raw Navy that was going to lose both its aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships. Prime Minister Thatcher approved these cuts because she was keen that Britain's overall public spending should be cut and perhaps most importantly she agreed with Not's wish to withdraw the Navy's only presence in the South Atlantic, the patrol vessel HMS Endurance.

The Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, had opposed this insisting that the ship's withdrawal would be taken as a sign of Britain's lack of commitment to the Falklands, but was rejected. Carrington turned out to be quite right: the Buenos Iris government saw Britain cutting its army and eliminating its presence in the South Atlantic and interpreted this as adding to London's lack of response to THU's southern occupation and complete disregard of the Shackleton report of the mid-1970s, which recommended a $12 million government investment in the islands. islands, as far as the hunter could make out, Britain had no interest in investing economically in the islands, no interest in defending them militarily, and no interest in responding to violations of its sovereignty.

If we ask why Argentina invested in the Falon Islands, it could be because the UK government gave them every reason in the world to think they would get their way. It was in this context of British weakness and apparent disinterest that a new Argentine Hunter assumed power in December 1981, led by General Leopoldo Galtieri at the time when Argentina had serious economic problems from which the new president needed a distraction, for which planned for 1982 to be the year of the Malvenas, either Britain would hand over the islands or Argentina would take them to minimize any prospect of a British response to what the hunter planned to occupy. the islands in September 1982, as by then HMS Inurance would be en route back to Britain and the Argentine Navy would have completed the acquisition of 18 French-made Superintend Strike Fighters, complete with modern EXA anti-ip missiles, until then deployment would continue between before the United Nations, Argentine Foreign Minister Nicar Costa Mendes attempted to prepare the ground for an invasion, issuing a statement in February 1982 warning that Argentina was willing to use other means to recover the islands if the diplomacy failed;

It was a diplomatic offensive care

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y planned and calibrated to reach just the right peak. At the time, the invasion was scheduled for September, but suddenly the entire plan was turned upside down by the most unlikely of sources. On March 17, 1982, a group of scrap metal workers landed on the South Island, controlled by the British and claimed by the Argentines. Georgia, about 900 thousand southwest of the Faulklands, were accused of dismantling an old wailing station in Leth, to which their boss Constantino Davidof had bought the rights in 1979. The group traveled on the Argentine Navy transport , bahwen Successo, which had been contracted as a private charter with supposedly no military personnel on board British authorities had given Davidoff's crew permission to make the voyage but requested permission to be picked up at the British base on Grit Vickon Island 2 days after landing, although no Argentinian had reported about the Grit Vicon and worse.

An Argentine flag had been seen flying in Le. Now it's possible that this was simply an overly exuberant metal worker, but it's also entirely possible, as some sources suggest that the Argentine government had slipped some Marines aboard the apparently civilian Charter to try to repeat the South's trick. THU 6 years earlier, either way, the Brits certainly feared that something sinister was going on in the git staff. Vicken informed Rex Hunt, the governor of Faulkland, who ordered that they insist that the metalworkers take down the flag and present themselves to Vicken, the flag was removed soon after. but still no one seemed to obtain the required approvals, as a result Governor Hunt made a report to London informing that what he believed to be Argentine military troops had landed at South Georgia and gave his opinion that the entire expedition was probably a cover for a seizure of the island upon receiving Hunt's message, the British government escalated matters, demanding that the Argentines leave South Georgia and ordering HMS Inurance to sail for the island from Faulkland with 22 Royal Marines on board on 21 March, Bahwen's successor quickly abandoned South Georgia, perhaps.

Because he had been caught putting troops where they should not have been but did not take the metalworkers with him on 23 March, the Foreign Secretary sent an ultimatum to withdraw the metalworkers or the Royal Marines would do so by force. This message from The British were a sharp and sudden escalation and put the Argentine hunter in a bit of a difficult position by deciding that they could not bear the dignity of Argentine workers being arrested and deported at gunpoint from what they considered legitimate Argentine lands. . The hunter sent his men. On 25 March there were two rival armed groups in South Georgia, 20 miles away, and Britain suddenly and unexpectedly responded force

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Argentina now dramatically accelerated its plans, concerned that the British might reinforce Faulkland in the midst of the crisis. Invasion plans were raised and the Argentine Navy was asked to carry out the landings as quickly as possible, a few days later, the March 28, a large Argentine fleet put to sea under the command of Vice Admiral Juan Lombardo bound for Faland Task Force 20, including the aircraft carrier Ventco Deo was present only as a demonstration of Argentine power with Task Force 40 in command of Admiral Carlos Busa to carry out operations against the islands. This group contained the most modern ships of the Argentine Navy, including the two Type 42 anti-aircraft destroyers that had been purchased from Great Britain in the 1970s, when the Argentine invasion failed in bad autumn weather on the afternoon of 28 March.

His movement was captured by British intelligence. Britain was desperate to prevent an Argentine invasion and pushed out the United States, who had established themselves as allies. of Argentina in the 1970s to warn the hunter of such a course of action. President Reagan eventually spoke with Galtieri, but without success, the UK government also began taking military action in the hope of being able to perform some last-minute deterrence. Three nuclear-powered attack submarines were launched. It was hastily prepared for shipment to the South Atlantic, but the first would not arrive for another 10 days. Meanwhile, HMS Endurance, sailing as fast as she could back to the Falklands on March 31, would be very lonely, as far as her captain Nick Barker knew.

The British naval unit was in Gibraltar 7,000 miles away on the afternoon of 1 April. Task Force 40 was approaching its landing points near Port Stanley. Final preparations were made. Rear Admiral Buer addressed the Landing Force aboard the assault ship Cabo San Antonio. We have been chosen by Destiny. To carry out one of the most beloved ambitions of the Argentine people to recover the Malvinas Islands, I expect bravery from you in battle, respect for your enemy and generosity in Victory. I warn you that if there are excesses against enemy troops, women or private property, I will impose Maximum penalty at 9:30 p.m.

On April 1, the Type 42 destroyer Santia Trinidad dropped anchor about a mile off the coast of Stanley, the capital of the Faland Islands. Rubber boats were lowered into the water and just under 90 Argentine commandos began their journey to the coast. It took an hour. and a half for the Marines to head for shore, get stuck between Cel beds along the way, and end up making landfall at Lake Point, some distance east of their intended landing area at Mullet Creek, which meant that They would have more ground to cover to reach their destination. objectives and would need to advance commands divided into two groups, the bulk of his forces under the command of Lieutenant Commander Sánchez Sabarot headed 6 miles northwest to Moody Brook Barracks, where the Royal Marine Garrison of around 70 soldiers was expected A smaller group of 16 men led by Lieutenant Commander Pedro Jaino began a trek to the government house to arrest the governor and take control of the island.

The Sabarot company surrounded the barracks at 5:30 a.m. m. to leave the marines with no escape. They were shocked to discover that the barracks were in fact completely deserted, but this did not stop them from throwing gunshots, tear gas and other grenades at the building, regardless of the fact that this sudden eruption of fire at Moody Brooks was clearly audible several kilometers away, at Stanley, where the raw Marines were actually positioned under Major Mike Norman, they had manned a variety of locations to the east designed to intercept an Argentine Force landing on the expected beaches west of Cape Pembrook at 6:05 a.m.

The sound of gunshots coming from the west of the State House set off alarm bells for Major Norman. Most of his troops were facing the wrong direction. If the attack came from this direction, he ordered two sections to relocate and take positions west and south of the house.government to reinforce its defenses and rushed there at 6:15. Lieutenant Commander Jakino still stuck to the plan that assumed the raw Marines would be sleeping in the barracks. He approached the back of the building with four of his men. They barely made it to the grounds at the rear of the house before gunshots rang out from the defending Marines, mortally wounding Lieutenant Commander Jakino. and pinning down the others, a furious firefight now began with machine gun fire and stun grenades thrown by the Argentine commandos at 620.

The attack had stalled and the Argentines withdrew leaving Zino and two other wounded behind. Fortunately for them, reinforcements were on the way at 6:30 the main Landing Force began arriving west of Cape Pemr with 20 am TRS departing Cape San Antonio and coming ashore carrying troops from the Second Marine Battalion advancing towards the South. They took the airport and assigned an Army platoon to clear the runway and then pushed. Through narrow terrain known as the Neck, two British platoons under Lieutenant Bill Trollop prepared to engage the column outside Stanley at 7:15, firing on the leading group with two anti-tank launchers.

The initial shots were fired, but when a vehicle approached. At less than 150 M it was hit twice by rockets and began to billow with smoke. The Royal Marines had no time to celebrate this success, although fire from the other tracks intensified and soon forced them to retreat to Stanley, they fought a rearguard action. towards the government house exchanging small arms fire with the Argentines who were approaching at 8:00 a.m. The situation was deteriorating for the British commanders Moody Brooks had pushed east and were now involved in increasingly intense fighting around Government House, while the Royal Marines ultimately did not have the equipment to confront the Amas.

As they advanced through Stanley reluctantly at 9:30 Governor Hunt agreed to stop fighting. An Argentine flag was raised over the government house. and the battle ended against all odds, the Royal Marines had held out for three hours and suffered no casualties of their own. The numbers of dead and wounded in Argentina are disputed and range from one dead, two wounded to perhaps 20 to 30 casualties, but there are a number of conflicting accounts within hours of the end of the battle, defeated British personnel were taken from the islands by plane, although not before propaganda photographs of them lying face down were taken and widely distributed and repatriated back to the UK via Uruguay in the coming days.

On the afternoon of April 2, more Argentine troops arrived to assume their garrison duties and a team of officers arrived to establish their civil administration of the islands. The last Malvinas had been recaptured and there were scenes of joy in the streets of Buenos Aires. The mood was quite the opposite in London: news of the invasion slowly filtered out on April 2, sending shock waves throughout the British government. Their attempts at deterrence and delays over the years had failed. Margaret Thatcher faced a fierce House of Commons on Saturday, April 3, far from Being the acclaimed Iron Lady who would later be known as Thatcher had to fight for her government's political survival in a chamber angry at her handling of the crisis both on the part of Argentina and its administration.

The prime minister's attempts to explain the government's actions in the previous days were thwarted. First with a mocking laugh yesterday morning at 8:33 we sent a telegram at 8 and then with general indignation. I contacted President Reagan that night and asked him to intervene directly with the Argentine President. We promised in the meantime not to take any measures to escalate the situation. dispute for fear of precipitating the very event that would face political oblivion if the nation allowed this seizure of popular territory to continue. Thatcher announced that the government has decided that a large task force will set sail as soon as all preparations are complete.

HMS Invincible will be in The Leader and I will leave a report on Monday behind this short sentence was the largest and riskiest mobilization of the British armed forces in three decades. The islands were 8,000 M away and occupied by a nation with over 300 modern aircraft that could fly from air bases just a few hundred kilometers from the islands, a British task force would be outnumbered and would need the support of a logistics train that did not exist at the beginning of April 1982. It would be the riskiest military deployment since the The disaster of the Suez crisis, three decades earlier, did not prevent the Royal Navy, under the leadership of Admiral Henry Leech, convinced himself that it was possible;

Defense Secretary John KN was pessimistic. Leech told Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that the first wave of a full task force, including two aircraft carriers, could set sail within days and the Navy could recapture the island by force if necessary, convinced by the admiral's enthusiasm. You. Thatcher gave the green light and Her Majesty's Naval Service swung into action in a stroke of good fortune for the Navy. He had the core of a large-scale deployment already assembled in Gibraltar, the first failure having been conducting exercises under the command of Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward at 2:30 a.m. m. on April 3, a few hours after the Argentine invasion of folkland Woodward departed for the South Atlantic leading a group of five frigates and five destroyers that would make up the core of the aircraft carrier group in charge of recovering the islands in England.

Frantic work was just beginning to provide the Woodward ships with some carriers to escort when Argentina invaded, both British carriers alongside. at Portsmouth Hermes was even in the middle of a 6 week maintenance period, there was furious activity to get them operational in early April, within days the anti-submarine Sea Kings were being lifted from raw cauldrons at the Naval Air Station linked by helicopters transportation and all available. rnas yelton's sea harrier with its vertical takeoff and landing capability, the sea harrier was able to land directly on the aircraft carriers while they were still in port, saving valuable time.

As a result, on 5 April, both Hermes and Invincible left Portsmouth in a blaze of publicity intended to declare to Argentina of Britain's determination that only 3 days had passed since the Argentine invasion, as well as the warships. Britain also had to find ground troops capable of landing and liberating the Faulklands. Three marine battalions and two parachute battalions were quickly assigned to service in the South. Atlantic, but the Navy had no way of getting them there to resolve this, the British government resorted to its former power to commandeer the nation's wartime merchant ships, Canra's 45,000-ton cruise line that, by coincidence , was in it.

The way back to the UK from the Mediterranean was quickly attacked. UK officials boarded the ship at Jalter to assess the modifications she would need for service in the South Atlantic. A plan for a custom-made helicopter landing was designed. Pat to go over the pool. an envelope sent by telephone to the United Kingdom and manufactured even before the liner returned to England. Canra docked at Southampton on 7 April, disembarked, her passengers underwent extensive modifications and set sail 60 hours later with 2,500 Royal Marines and paratroopers on board. It was a remarkable turnaround, absolutely nothing has been allowed to stand in the way of their departure, it was a similar story across the country, as dozens of civilian ships were pressed into service for all sorts of roles as Britain attempted to build a logistics chain of 8,000 miles long.

From scratch, within a few days, at the end of April there were 65 ships at sea, of which 40 were Royal Fleet auxiliary support ships or civilian ships commissioned sailing south as fast as their diesel engines could take them . The next working group headed first. for the British-controlled Ascension Island in the mid-Atlantic upon reaching its peace meal during April and May 1982, this small, quiet island in the Atlantic was subjected to a frenzy when the task force ships arrived and the The RAF lifted everything the task force needed but could. Not for some reason brought with it from the UK in its heyday, the islands airport handled more than 400 flights a day, briefly making Ascension the busiest airport in the world.

This huge operation was largely supported by the United States, although secretly since the Americans were trying to negotiate a diplomatic solution to the crisis, the air base on the island was run by the US to support a NASA satellite tracking and its commander, Lieutenant Colonel W Brighten, reportedly said he had been ordered to help but not to be caught doing If the United States kept the Ascension fuel tank full and channeled delivery of the latest type of air-missile Air Sidewinder into British hands after a brief stop, the Rear Admiral Woodwards carrier battle group departed Ascension Island on 18 April, it would take another 2 weeks. for the aircraft carriers to reach Faulkland, but Britain was not going to wait that long to begin military operations, sailing ahead of the main force was a task group bound for South Georgia, a British territory about 900 miles to the southeast. of Faulkland that the Argentines had seized.

On 3 April, HMS ANM Plymouth and the tanker Tides Spring had been sent to recover it with a company of Royal Marines and D Squadron of the SAS. This force would join the resisting HMS Ice Patrol ship which had remained at sea. Monitoring the Argentine occupiers since the beginning of the month, the task force under the command of Captain Brian Young arrived off South Georgia on 21 April. Wasting no time, the British ships immediately began operating against Argentine positions, but ran into trouble when two West , but it was a stark reminder of the danger of fraud that comes with operating in this part of the world;

The situation did not improve much for the British when intelligence came in the next day that an Argentine submarine was in the vicinity of South Georgia, this was a massive threat if a submarine could attack one of the British ships, which could spell the end of the South Georgia operation and possibly the entire Fulin campaign. If the political and public will to continue collapsed in the face of a military setback, Captain Young withdrew his Force out to sea for security reasons, where they were reinforced on 24 April by the frigate HMS Bright, which had been separated from the group's Vanguard.

I have been working for a few years. days earlier and arrived with two anti-ub submarine helicopters with this additional force, the British force returned to South Georgia with the exception of the RFA tid spring which was carrying the company of marines and remained outside Harm's Way for the time being in the tomorrow. On April 25, the British warships mobilized their helicopters to hunt the Argentine submarine that was again headed by the anims W 63 nicknamed Humphrey and piloted by Commander Ian Stanley Stanley and his crew initially searched only with the naked eye to avoid being detected by their opponent. .

Before resorting to a single scan of the helicopter's radar to see if they could locate the ship, the AR Santa Fe almost immediately appeared on Humphrey's radar screen. The Marine submarine was steaming northwest on the surface having dropped a platoon of Marines at Grit Vicken to reinforce the Argentine garrison there, Lieutenant Commander Stanley called out to its location before launching two deadly charges, one of which ricocheted physically in the Santa Fe command tower before exploding. At this time, the submarine turned toward the sand near a small oil slick that became visible on the surface, an indication of damage within.

A Link from HMS Bright was next to arrive on the scene firing a guided torpedo before bursts from Endurance and Plymouth opened fire with their AS12 rocket missiles (the first of them from the left) and Commander John Elc's plane was the first missile fired by the Royal Navy at Anger the. The missiles were not large enough to cause serious damage to the submarine, but they punched enough holes in the conning tower to prevent Santa Fe from sinking, harassed by nearly half a dozen helicopters. Santa Fe limped her way to the port of Git Vicken, where her crew abandoned the submarine and headed for the garrison position at King Edward Point.

It was at this stage that the British began totake advantage of his advantage, the element of surprise had already disappeared and it would not be good to allow Argentine reinforcements to settle in, it was time to Major Cedric delves into command of the SAS in South Georgia, putting him in contact with Instinct Fast and Furious, the Royal Marine company who was to lead the assault on Grit Vickon was that afternoon still 200 miles away aboard RFA Tidde Spring, so any rapid assault would have to be carried out without them using SAS troops and a handful of Royal Marines who were aboard the other ships.

They would face about 100 defenders in prepared positions, but they had the crucial advantage of naval gunfire and helicopters. The operation began. at 14:30 With the SAS and Marines being driven ashore by Humphrey and Brilliant Bobcats, they landed south of Grit Vickon and moved up Brown Mountain Ridge, while 4 and 1/2 at Naval Shel bombarded King Edward Point, although Aiming at this stage to land near the Defenders in order to demoralize them rather than cause casualties, ground troops under the command of Royal Navy Major Sheridan then advanced to within a few meters of the garrison before HS ANM entered directly into the bay and threatened to shoot directly at the Argentines unless they gave up their voice soon.

Returned to the radio without firing, without firing, the Argentine commander, Lieutenant Commander Lewis Lagos, appreciated the overwhelming strength of his opponents and, like the British Marines 3 weeks earlier, wisely decided to surrender with this and the surrender of Lieutenant Alfredo AES in Leaf the next day. South Georgia was returned to British control. Captain Young sent a signal which was transmitted to London proclaiming that he would be pleased to inform His Majesty that the white ensign was flying alongside the Union Jack in southern Georgia. God save the Queen. What Happ had begun as a tense and almost disastrous operation ended in complete success for the British, with an early victory and the Navy's credibility to conduct operations in the South Atlantic consolidated.

There was only one death: South Georgia Chief Petty Officer Félix Artuso, who was tragically shot to death after the rough surrendered when a Navy guard thought he was trying to sink towards Santa Fe and so, with the first victory military in the B, the Royal Navy ships departed and Captain Young's ships rejoined the main British task force on 29 April, the aircraft carriers were now approaching Faulkland and the prospect of any diplomatic solution was rapidly diminishing. Faulkland war was about to begin in earnest and begin with one of the most controversial military actions since the second world war in early May 1982 the popular crisis had lasted a month since the Argentine invasion and without resolution, a working group The British had spent the second half of April pushing relentlessly southwards and resolved to use Force to recapture the islands if diplomacy failed.

The only distraction had been to recapture South Georgia and the ships involved in that operation returned to the main task. Force Under the local command of Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward on 29 April, as the Royal Navy headed south, the British government had established a 200 m maritime exclusion zone around Faulkland designed to limit Argentine reinforcement by prohibiting entry. of any ship under penalty of sinking. As the task force approached the islands and the risk of military attacks, the confrontation intensified in late April. The UK government increased the strength of its measures. The Exclusion Zone was expanded to become a full Exclusion Zone and aircraft are now also prohibited from approaching Faulkland.

The British task force crossed into the Exclusion Zone on the night of May 1, with diplomatic negotiations over and now fully backed by the United States, Britain loudly announced the arrival of its task force, launching bombing raids on Stanley and Goose Green airfields and bombing Argentine ground positions around the capital. Argentina responded in kind by launching more than 40 aircraft engaged the British that afternoon and, bringing its powerful naval forces into play from the northwest in two groups, the bulk of the Argentine naval force arrived, including Mayia's aircraft carrier Ventco. with his Skyhawk attack aircraft. The British had positioned two of their nuclear planes. submarines in this area to try to find the aircraft carrier but they had not been able to locate it to the south of the islands.

A third group was advancing towards the east composed of the old cruiser General Bel Grano and the destroyers Hippolito Bad and Pedra Buena. The two destroyers were from La Mayor. The concern was that they were armed with EXA anti-ship missiles that could strike targets with a devastating warhead from 22 nautical miles away. Since the morning of May 1, the submarine HMS Conquistador was in contact with the Belgrano group and reported its progress to the British working group. As the day progressed, the British became increasingly concerned about the whereabouts of the Argentine carrier and the conquistador reported that the Belgrano group was heading east.

The Royal Navy was concerned that the aircraft carrier was doing the same, establishing a pinso movement against the British forces. These fears intensified. When during the night of May 2 an Argentine reconnaissance sniffer plane was detected on British radar, a Sea Harrier piloted by Flight Lieutenant Ian Mortimer was quickly prepared and sent to investigate. It did not find the plane, but within an hour after takeoff he detected several. Large radar contacts just 200 miles from HMS Hermes, the Harrier, also detected the same type of radar emissions as those used by the British Type 42 destroyers. They had to have come from one of Argentina's own Type 42s and this almost with certainty it meant the presence of the aircraft carrier.

This was now the crucial moment for the British decision to sink the Belgrano. The British task force was at midnight about 120 miles northeast of Fons sailing on a southeasterly course around the islands 200 miles to the northwest. Rear Admiral Woodward now knew that there was an Argentine aircraft carrier. The group that would be in position to launch an attack on their ships at dawn, 7 hours from now, no submarine was in contact with the aircraft carrier, making it impossible to attack it in the meantime, south of Faulkland, just outside the zone of exclusion, the conquest of the HMS continued. to be in contact with General Bel Granu and his assistant exet armed destroyers, a position report from the conquistador placed him about 230 miles from the task group's area of ​​operations heading east on this course, the Belgrano group was not a threat immediate, but as Woodward puts it.

The speed and direction of an enemy ship can be irrelevant because both can change quickly what counts is its position, its capabilities and what I think its intentions are. The Argentine destroyers could travel at 35 knots, so from their last reported position they could potentially launch into the exclusion zone and be within exet range of HMS Hermes by the time the sun rose the conquistador would have difficulty tracking the three ships to at the same time, even if he could pass through the shallow waters of Birdwood Bank undetected. Rear Admiral Woodward could then be Faced with the nightmare scenario of having to position his ship to defend against an air attack from the Northwest only for 16 exet missiles to appear here from the South faced with this terrible prospect, Woodward decided he needed to sink the Belgrano and disperse the South Group. so that it could at least fully prepare for the expected Air Assault, the problem was that, although Britain had made it publicly clear that any warship that posed a threat could be sunk, its internal Rules of Engagement did not allow the conqueror to engage a ship outside the Exclusion Zone and These could only be exchanged by the London government.

An urgent request for a modification was quickly sent, and fortunately, in London, both Vice-Admiral John Fieldhouse and Rear-Admiral Peter Herbert had reached the same conclusion as Woodward and were setting the wheels in motion. was taken to that morning's meeting of the British War Cabinet an action was taken contrary to the descriptions in many popular media there was no moment in which Margaret declared sinking it but instead a directive was issued that began to positively identify all ships such as Argentine aircraft carrier Cruiser Destroyer frig Corvette or submarine can now be attacked at the time this order was issued.

Belgrano had actually reversed course and was heading west. This was because the planned Argentine attack had been canceled before dawn due to insufficient wind levels for the Skyhawk. planes to take off with the necessary ammunition and fuel. The Argentine Navy had previously been offered an aircraft that could operate in these low-wind conditions, but rejected it. That aircraft was, of course, the Seah Harrier with its forward weather offensive. The carrier group under the command of RI Admal Guelta Ajara was ordered to return near the mainland to await further developments. The British were expecting the Argentine ship Simply Be to reposition for another attempted attack that night and the Royal Navy was unwilling to rely on the weather to prevent it again and so, as the sun began to set, Commander Chris Reord Brown of HMS Conquistador began its attack against the AR General Belgrano, the submarine approached its objective and at 2:57 p.m. fired three marate torpedoes, these were vintage WWII torpedoes with massive warheads that would be necessary to pierce Belgrano's thick WWII era armor, in quick succession two t tedo found their mark flying the bow and causing A sheet of flame crossed the aft deck, the cruiser stopped and began to sink rapidly at 317.

Captain Héctor Bonzo ordered the ship to be abandoned and minutes later General Belgrano was gone. 323 The sailors went down with him, the rest of the Argentine Navy now firmly aware. of the exceptional danger posed by the British nuclear submarines returned directly to port and remained there without Argentine naval power playing any significant role in the war, the sinking of the Belgrano made world headlines as soon as the news broke on 3 May. . The Argentine government announced the loss of the cruise ship before an international audience and described its sinking as a treacherous act of armed aggression, since it had occurred outside the exclusion zone.

The attack on the Belgrano was a brutal shock with hundreds of conscripted sailors killed without warning by a British submarine. International support for Britain faltered, not helped by its own statement about the sinking being riddled with falsehoods. Secretary of Defense John did not address on May 3 Belgrano's approach to elements of our task force who were only a few hours away when she went down. completely false, the Belgrano had moved away from the British ships when she was sunk, the British government for years after the sinking was evasive and secretive about the attack on Bel Grano, both in the public and in parliamentary consultations, although it is frankly strange that They would act like that.

In view of the information available to the British at the time of the sinking, it is difficult to see what other option they had to allow hostile naval forces to continually move into threatening positions at will would be to run a colossal risk with their own ships and eventually , Argentine sailors had begun hostilities the previous month and towards the end of April had been warned in a communique that a ship that could pose a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic would find an appropriate response. The Argentine Navy recognized it, the commander of the Argentine Transport Group later said that after that message On April 23, the entire South Atlantic was a theater of operations for both sides.

Héctor Bonso, the captain of the Belgrano, also spoke arguing that the sinking of the cruiser was an act of war, it was not a crime, it was a most unfortunate and regrettable legal action. For him and other senior Argentine officers hostilities had begun the day before and they could expect to receive blows, in fact Captain Bonso went on to say that if the submarine had been before me after leaving for repairs, he would have opened fire with all 15 guns. until it sank. Belgrano was the greatest loss of life of the entire Fand War and its most controversial moment, but it was only the beginning, as Argentina returned its surface ships to port after the loss of Belgrano, its land planes remained as dangerous as before. . and 2 days later they would inflict a lossdevastating.

Argentina in 1982 had a large fleet of powerful Western Bill aircraft, including American-made Skyhawks and Israeli-produced daggers. The latest addition to this 300+ aircraft Navy was the French Superintendent Strike Fighter, which was designed to operate anti-IP exer missiles capable of delivering a 165kg warhead at over 700mph. The former set was a highly dangerous modern missile and the British knew it would be the biggest threat to their ships during the Faulkland War as a key part of their The Argentine Naval Strike Force had ordered 14 Superintend and 15 Exet missiles, but only five of each before France suspended deliveries in the wake of the Faulkland invasion with such limited stock.

It was decided that the Int would only deploy from its base. at Rio Grand in pairs, when opportune moments arose to attack the British carriers on the morning of 4 May, one such opportunity presented itself when a Neptune reconnaissance aircraft detected the British task group southeast of Folklands. Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward had his flagship HMS Hermes about 75 south of Stanley, keeping his ships relatively close to shore to support the coastal bombardment and reconnaissance operations being mounted against Argentine land positions. May 4 was expected to be a relatively quiet day with a single airstrike on Goose Green the only operation planned 450 miles away.

A pair of superintendents had other ideas as they took off from Rio Grande at 8:45 a.m. Piloted by Lieutenant Commander Augusto Bakarat and Second Lieutenant Armando Mayora, the superintendent flew east without escort relying on surprise and the long range of their missiles to mount a successful raid, normally they would not have the range to hit the reported British ships, but were able to refuel in the air from a Hercules tanker to massively extend their range 120M outside of reported contacts, the two aircraft descended into flight. just 50 feet above the sea so that the curvature of the Earth would hide them from British radar screens flying in poor visibility at 9:56 a.m.

Bakarat and Mayora appeared and briefly turned on their radars searching for the British ship, they found nothing so they dropped. at sea level once again moving at over 500 knots towards where their target should be less than 50 miles away the British fleet was sailing southwest the task force ships were positioned in anti-aircraft formation and had had to deal with repeated false alarms That morning, above the incoming hostile aircraft, at the eastern end stood the most important ships, the aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible, each accompanied by a porter ship armed with the short-range Seawolf missile positioned as the last line of defense. defense, in front of them there were layers of protection, the most important ones. of which were the three Type 42 anti-aircraft destroyers located 20 miles forward of the main task force center, Glasgow and Sheffield were tasked with intercepting any hostile air attacks before they could reach the carriers and cause critical damage.

There will also be SE harriers in the air. executing combat air patrol to the northeast, but due to low cloud base on 4 May, its ability to respond quickly to threats was limited to 956 and 30 seconds, HMS Glasgow detected radar emissions from the first attempt of the tender to establish contact with the task. forcing her operations room was launched by correctly identifying the bitter as a superintendent and broadcasting a warning to the rest of the task force, but HMS Sheffield, which was closest to the approaching aircraft in Glasgow, fell silent at the time, the type 42 further south was using its satellite. communication system that blocked certain radar frequencies and meant that Sheffield could not see the same contacts as Glasgow.

Could Captain Paul Hoder of Glasgow have previously banned the use of this system on his ship during daylight hours, but Captain Sam Sheffield had therefore not done the same? Same in 958 Bakarat and Mayora showed up again for a radar scan now just 20 miles from the task group, this time they were able to make out two radar contacts, one smaller than the other, believing the larger ship to be an aircraft carrier, They pressed their attack and prepared to launch their missiles, Glasgow already had direct radar contact with the approaching attack aircraft. The ship's anti-aircraft warfare officer, Lieutenant Commander Nick Hawkyard, quickly reported the incoming attack, but was frustrated with the response from HMS Invincible, which was not convinced that the latter's alarm was not another false warning as they had been. others that morning SE harri is on his patrol route were not diverted to intercept incoming contacts at 10:00 a.m. now somewhat frantic Glasgow radioed a warning of the incoming attack on Sheffield but again there was no response at this critical juncture both the Anti-Aircraft Warfare shipsThe officer and one of the radio operators had left the operations room leaving her.

Sheffield had also not yet made radar contact with the Argentine Jets, this was now partly because Glasgow had given the orientation of the contacts as 235°, but from Sheffield the plane would have appeared on a heading of around 300. This Confusion led Sheffield radar operators to look in the wrong place and see nothing. The superintendents were now only 12 M away. They turned sharply to starboard lining up firmly on HMS Sheffield. 10 seconds later. The officer yesterday was urgently called to the operations room via the ship's intercom. This was the first indication to almost all of Sheffield's crew that something was wrong before she could get there, although at exactly 10:02 Bakarat and Mayora launched their exet missiles and turned around.

It was difficult to start their sprint back to Argentina with a former group traveling at over 700mph in their path. The British ships now had only seconds to react. Glasgo quickly fired chaff clouds of small metallic filaments designed to confuse the access radar and cause it to miss the ship on board. Sheffield, the anti-aircraft officer, returned to the operations room, but misidentified the attack as a pair of Mirage 3s, as he believed the fleet was beyond the range of the exet carrying the superintendent. A few seconds later, the ship's bridge crew saw the Trails missile heading toward them. in no way, but no messages were related to the operations room, the captain or the crew, no wank was fired on board Glasgow.

Captain Hoder ordered his ship's Seaart missile system to attack the speeding Exet, but the system was designed to attack high-altitude missiles and had trouble attacking. Meanwhile, Sheffield SE Dart couldn't even see the exercise sets on radar, most of her crew didn't even know there was anything to worry about and then, at 10:03 exactly, time ran out for HMS Shack, the first exet probably fired by Bédar rats, crashed into the starboard side and amidships of the ship, causing a large fire in the auxiliary engine room. The ship immediately lost half its power and communications. Thick black smoke forced the evacuation of the bridge and the operations room. and a broken fir tree paralyzed firefighting efforts to make matters worse, the computer systems for the ship's missiles failed, leaving Sheff F defenseless against any attack from Suben in the computer room, a team of five commanded by Lieutenant Commander John Woodhead remained at his post desperately trying to restore the ship's defenses even as choking smoke filled the air and scorching fire approached; they eventually succeeded, but all five men were killed in the process not long after the exet hit.

The Yarmouth and Arrow reefers arrived to offer assistance by providing hoses and pumps to try to put out the fire which quickly engulfed the center of HMS Sheffield. Helicopters began evacuating victims to HMS Hermes, where her arrival was captured by shocked media cameras in Shefield. Firefighters fought the fire for 4 hours in an attempt to save. the ship, but it was a battle they consistently lost at 1:50 p.m. Captain Salt considered that the ship's combat value was now essentially nil and that keeping the crew on board was not worth the risk that fire could reach and detonate the Seaart magazine.

He ordered a ship Bandon, the crew to cross to Yarmouth and arrow while Captain Sal and some of his officers were flown via links to Hermes to report to Admiral Woodward Woodward, grappling with the implications of that morning's events, told him to Captain Salt I suspect that someone had been very careless. 20 men had been killed and Britain had lost a third of its anti-aircraft specialists. The planes left the task force dangerously exposed until reinforcements in the form of ships such as HMS Exitor and HMS Cardiff could arrive as the task force absorbed a blow. severe several hundred miles away.

Bakut and Mayora were returning to base after having shot down 40% of Argentina's exet stockpile. When news emerged about the sinking of Sheffield it was generally seen as revenge for the sinking of the Bel Grano 2 days earlier, but that was not how 2nd Lieutenant May saw it, we did not feel it was retaliation for the Belgrano operation. It was never like that, but we felt like we had proven we had the ability to sink one of them too. The burning Hulk of HMS Sheffield remained afloat for several days after she was hit; once the fire was extinguished, the ship was taken under control.

In Yarmouth she reached the edge of the exclusion zone, but began taking in water through the hole the exet had created. Eventually, she founded Sheffield and capsized, sinking in the Atlantic, where she rests today. The loss of Sheffield was a brutal shock to Britain, it was the Royal. The first Navy warship lost to enemy action since the end of the Second World War, a very sudden reminder to the British government and the public of the realities of fighting war militarily, forced the Royal Navy to be more cautious with his task force staying further east. and away from the military base at Rio Grand, but also strengthened their resolve to bring the campaign to a victorious conclusion.

After days of fighting at sea and in the air, attention would now turn to plans for a large amphibious landing. scale in the popular lands and some of the most tense days of the entire war, but before any landing could take place, the British had to discover what they would face in the planned landing areas on the night of 10 May, The reefer HMS Alacrity was ordered to pass. through Faulkland in an attempt to see if the Argentines had mined the channel between the two main islands, as reality was not sunk in this process it was assumed that no mines were present so the decision was made to land British troops in San Carlos Bay.

In East Faulkland, far enough from the main Argentine positions to be confident of a safe landing, but not so far away that it was impracticable to mount an offensive towards Stanley, there was a major problem through an Argentine INE base at Pebble. Island, just off the coast. On the northern coast of the main islands, it was home to a small air base which the British thought would house Picará ground attack aircraft armed with bombs or rocket pods, as well as 20mm cannons. These propeller-driven aircraft could cause serious damage to British troops as they attempted to reach land and were based just a 4-minute flight from potential landing beaches, this made Pebble Island a substantial risk and was not one that Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, the local commander of the British carrier group, was willing to tolerate. base neutralized but there were not many good options to achieve this bombing by air or sea was ruled out as being too imprecise, could not guarantee the destruction of any aircraft and carried the unacceptable risk of the explosives hitting the civilian settlement on the island Fortunately For Woodward, the Special Forces contingent aboard his flagship had a plan that could solve both problems under the command of Major Cedric Delves.

D Squadron of the Special Air Service has been aboard HMS Hermes since early May following her involvement in the reconquest. From South Georgia it was concluded that Deles and his men had been looking for a way to be useful to the task force and had already established themselves on Pebble Island as a potentially lucrative target, they proposed landing SAS troops on the island by helicopter to disable the airfield and any aircraft on hand with demolition charges and anti-tank weapons was a daring plan that evokedoperations similar to those the N SAS had carried out in North Africa during the Second World War.

Woodward was enthusiastic about the idea, but the potential risks were enormous and information about The Target was very scarce. A reconnaissance team under Captain Timothy BS was immediately sent to the area on the afternoon of May 11, but bad weather delayed our ability to observe the Argentine positions until dawn on May 13. By then, time was running out. Rear Admiral Woodward had set a deadline of early morning 15 May to complete the operation later and would overlap with possible dates for the main landings at San Carlos, so as soon as Captain BS was able to report the presence of 11 aircraft Argentines, the operation was quickly given the green light for the early hours of 15 May, the SAS troops would be transported to and from their objective by SE Kings from HMS Hermes, which meant separating the British flagship, possibly the most important in the South Atlantic, to sail almost alone several hundred miles away.

Of the main body of the task group, only the destroyer Glamorgan and the frigate Broadsword would accompany it on a trip that would leave the aircraft carrier very vulnerable. Meanwhile, the main Delves had to prepare their men for a deployment that they knew almost nothing about because the lack of time to prepare meant that the three remaining troops would be deployed to the island with almost no information about what they would face and would have to depend of those already deployed who would act as guides. The plan at least benefited from being brutally simple. It was essentially a frontal attack.

Full squad attack with surprise and chaos as your main allies 18 troops would join the 17 troops already deployed to spearhead the attack with 16 and 19 troops performing support roles, aircraft, ground facilities and aircrew would all be targeted if possible and so on at 6:00 p.m. On May 14, Hermes separated from the fleet and accelerated westward as fast as she could. It wasn't long before a fearsome Gale erupted and the three ships lost speed fighting huge waves. The operation schedule began to slip. a 6 hour trip ended up being more like seven and the Sea Kings containing the assault group didn't take off until 2:25 AM. m., very late when the Special Forces headed towards the objective in the south.

HMS Glamorgan was taking up position. to provide naval fire support to troops ashore as needed, she expected to do so around 4:00 a.m. m., but it was only at 3:50 that D Squadron arrived at Pebble Island to keep its arrival hidden from the Argentines who landed about 5 km from the objective and then had to walk to its position, which lasted until 6 :10 a.m. m., it was not long until dawn; Now, for the safety of the aircraft carrier, the British troops would have to be withdrawn no later than 7:30 a.m. m. Leaving the main excavations at a critical time, dandron mortar was hastily installed and assault troops were sent forward. 18 troops had been left behind during the walk, so they were replaced by 19 troops under Captain Gavin Hamilton.

Pebble Island airfield was defended by a Command Detachment. Lieutenant MGA of the 3rd Marine Battalion when the SAS Force approached, most of them were asleep in their beds, only a four-man circle patrol, including MGA, was on duty, as well as two more on guard duty at the base air, they would have been a little surprised. when around 700 a.m. Suddenly all hell broke loose, troops under Captains Hamilton and Burs charged the airfield and opened fire with small arms grenades and anti-tank launchers at anything that looked remotely hostile. HMS Glamorgan also opened fire, dropping a barrage of high explosives. rounds north of the airfield to increase the sense of chaos and encourage the Argentine defenders to keep their heads down despite this, although several of the guards returned fire, but it was almost impossible to aim through the smoke and half-light of the lighting.

The shells fired by the SAS mortar, Lieutenant MGA and his men were unable to prevent the SAS from reaching the main concentration of aircraft on the western side of the airfield. Within minutes the SAS went to work destroying these aircraft as well before turning to board the plane. South of the Argentine guard hut as the raid progressed, Lieutenant MGA began to worry that the attack was a precursor to a larger landing to seize the airfield, fully determined to prevent the British from making use of the island and moved to activate a series of explosive charges. on the runway to render it unusable this was just as Corporal Armstrong was placing the explosive charge on the sixth and final fukara the massive explosion of the Argentine charges blew him to the ground Landing with a concussion on the other side of the runway the chers also destroyed a Sky Van transport plane, meaning that all the planes on Pebble Island were now on fire with their mission largely and the sky beginning to light up.

It was time for the British to go. The main digs gathered his squadron and retreated to Rond VI with the Sea Kings at exactly 7:30 sharp the four helicopters appeared from the east and landed the SAS men boarded and were taken back to HMS Hermes to time for breakfast was an incursion that lasted just half an hour, planned and executed at incredible speed in the face of a brutal Atlantic winter. The 11 Argentine planes present have been destroyed with only three men wounded on the British side and two on the Argentine side, Pebble airfield. Island that was so close to the next landing beaches had been neutralized and the stage was now set for Britain's D-Day in the South Atlantic, but despite all the planning and special operations preparation, the landings at San Carlos were still a fundamentally risky proposition as all amphibious landings are under the leadership of Commodore Mike Applauds, a large number of dedicated warships, landing ships and requisitioned merchant ships would have to sail to shore and remain there exposed to anything Argentina could throw at them for days on end until the five battalions of paratroopers and royal marines had been unloaded. and a secure beachhead was established against the British or an Argentine army under the military governor of Brigadier General Mario Menéndez, knowing that any British reconquest of the islands could only be successful if they captured the town of Stanley.

Menéndez was content to concentrate most of it. of their forces around the capital smaller garrisons were maintained in outlying areas, including Goose Green and at the settlement of San Carlos on Sea itself, they were joined by the amphibious group of ships transporting the troops. With Rear Admiral Woodwards they led a group of work on May 8 and achieved an undetected approach to San Carlos 2 days later thanks to a useful layer of fog. The Commodor Clap ships made their final approach after dark with special forces operations beginning to eliminate an Argentine Observation Post at Fanning Head and suppress the garrison at Goose Green to prevent their interference with The Landings.

With operations to secure their flanks underway, British troops began landing from landing craft at 4:00 a.m. starting with two pairs at the south end. of San Carlos water The Landings were largely uncontested and the only Argentine unit in the area was a Detachment under First Lieutenant Carlos Estban in Puerto San Carlos that withdrew from the settlement once the scale of the British Landing became clear. dawn from a position to the east, the Estban unit fought a fierce rearguard action shooting down two gazelle scout helicopters that strayed too close to their position before being forced to withdraw by the main elements of three parahs that liberated Puerto San Carlos and raised a British flag for the reconquest of popular lands. was underway, but the battle for San Carlos was far from over.

Almost as soon as British troops set foot on land on the morning of May 21, fast Argentine planes launched a determined attack on the beachhead they were operating. at maximum range from their base with no fighter escort for the next few days, they would press against the British ships at point-blank range with only seconds to choose a target once it was in sight and facing a maelstrom of fire from Systems 4 and 4 missiles based on British ships. Half-inch naval guns, Sea Harriers and land-based Rapier anti-aircraft missiles. The Argentine attacks on 21 May focused on British warships outside the main San Carlos anchorage, where they acted as picket ships to draw away attacks from the ship's unloading troops in this body of water.

In Falon Sound soon to be known as Bomb Alley, the frigate Argonaut was the first to be hit by two Skyhawk bombs before H. Anrin was hit by a Dagger bomb in the beginning of a trend that would continue for the whole battle for San. Carlos, none of the bombs exploded as they were incorrectly fused for the altitude from which they were dropped. It was a lucky escape for the British. They were not so lucky in the afternoon, when two pairs of Skyhawks headed towards HMS Ardens, one plane was down. by a sea Harrier but the others managed to get through two 500-pound bombs hit the refrigerator and one exploded, destroying the Hanger area and the ship's standoff missile launcher that had failed to attack the low-flying attackers.

Ardent lost power in her weapon, so she was left practically defenseless when At 2 p.m. Five more Skyhawks appeared and headed straight for the damaged refrigerator. The ship's crew had little with which to defend themselves and were unable to prevent at least two more bombs from exploding on board, opening the hole and starting huge fires that soon threatened the torpedo and missile magazines. Commander Alan To the west, the ship's captain had no choice but to abandon ship with the surviving crew taken out of Ardan, which sank during the night, the first major casualty on the surface of the Battle of San Carlos, it was the end of a painful day for both sides.

Britain had lost hotly while both. Argonut and ANM were out of action until the unexploded ordnance they were carrying could be released 33 sailors were killed, most on board the Ardant and 20 were wounded on the Argentine side 10 Fast Jets were shot down in total a quarter of all launched That day at the end of 21 May, most of the British troops were already ashore, but large quantities of their supplies and heavy equipment were still on board the ships, so, after a pause due to the bad time on 22 May, attacks resumed the following day at 12:40 four Skyhawks led by Captain Paul Cabo approached HMS Broadsword Yarmouth and Antelope south of Fanning Island, one aircraft was ejected by a SEAP missile and another was shot down by 20mm cannon fire, but the remaining two managed to get through and the British made 1,000 bombs that hit the newly arrived Antelope once.

Again they failed to explode, but while attempts were being made to spread the ordinance that night, one of the bombs detonated, the explosion claimed the life of Sergeant James Prescot and caused a large fire which caused the ship to be abandoned and eventually reached the magazine. of SEAP. The dawn light of May 24 revealed a completely wrecked ship that soon sank. Hours later, the Argentine Air Force intervened again, this time with more focus on attacking the British transports. The landing ships Salelot and SAG Galahad were hit, but with bombs that, as expected, by now no longer did so. do not explode May 25 was Argentina's national day, which meant that despite heavy aircraft losses, the Argentine Air Force would muster all its remaining forces for an all-out attack on the British ships at San Carlos;

During the entire air war, the British, knowing the importance of the day to their opponents, expected a major assault to counter this. Rear Admiral Woodward moved his carrier group closer to San Carlos to reduce the flight time of the SE Harrier patrols to and from the combat area. He kept a pair of air defense ships northwest of Folkland Sound, where a better radar picture could be produced further offshore and incoming aircraft could be intercepted. This tactic began effectively during the morning. HMS Centry shot down two Skyhawks with her dark sea missiles, but that afternoon. two pairs approached from different directions simultaneously and everything went wrong, first the seaart centry didn't shoot and then the seawolf swordsman did the same nearSeah Harries, who had been told to keep their distance to allow the ship's missiles to work as they had that morning, could not.

Upon intervening, the British ships were virtually defenseless when First Lieutenant Mariano Velasco dropped three bombs in the center, which exploded, causing the Type 42 destroyer to quickly sink. The bad news for the British did not end there. Furthermore, that afternoon, two armed super attendants attacked the British. Carrier Group struck the SS Atlantic transporter and started a large fire that quickly destroyed the ship and all but one of her vital 11 Shinook and Wessex helicopters. The attack on the transporter was the last major action of the battle for San Carlos, only small-scale raids around the bay occurred after this point, as the exhausted Argentine air force needed time to regroup.

All 62 aircraft available for combat over San Carlos on 21 May were lost in the battle, thus having sunk three British warships and the Atlantic transporter, as well as hitting. Six other ships with bombs that did not explode had they detonated correctly, the damage to their landings could have been much more serious, as the British managed to establish themselves on land and now prepared for their offensive to the east, but their immediate problems were far away. determine. As the loss of the Atlantic transporter also meant the loss of her helicopter cargo, it meant that most of the British troops would have to walk east towards the island's capital, Stanley.

Despite this setback, the British wasted no time and went on the offensive. Elsewhere on May 28. The 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, assaulted an outlying Argentine position at Goose Green on a hard day of fighting that cost the life of the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Jones, the Parz were able to capture the local airfield and surround the Argentine forces under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Italo Pagi. a surrender the next morning that yielded over a thousand prisoners the victory at Goose Green was the first major land victory for the British the reconquest of the islands was actually underway the reconquest of Goose Green was a great first step for the British, but attacking the positions of almost 10 times as many Argentines around Stanley would require many more troops.

The 5th Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Tony Wilson arrived in San Carlos at the end of May accompanied by Major General Jeremy Moore, who would now assume command of all British troops. On the Tupar Islands, which was at Goose Green, after its successful offensive, it joined the 5th Infantry Brigade which was to have the task of securing the southern approaches to Stanley, while Brigadier Julian Thompson's 3rd Commando Brigade consolidated its position towards the north. Speed ​​was essential. With winter approaching and the British logistics chain stretching to Breaking Point in early June, Brigadier Wilson helicoptered into the settlements of Fitz Roy and Bluff Cove after a cursory reconnaissance revealed that no Argentines were present there, moving The rest of the 5th Brigade forward was more of a challenge as the continuing shortage of helicopters following the loss of the conveyor belt forced the Welsh and Scots Guards to be transported to Bluff Cove by sea, instead a disaster at the end of this operation on 8 June when the landing ship Galahad was trapped at Fitzroy. by the Argentine Skyhawks when it still had half the Welsh Guards on board three bombs exploded on the landing ship which was crowned with soldiers waiting to disembark. 48 people died in the fireball that followed, double the number killed in the entire operation Goose Green and Britain's single worst. loss of life throughout the war, the attack on Galahad and the subsequent rescue operation delayed British preparations for the attacks on Stanley, which were approaching despite the setbacks, on 10 June Major General Moore had seven battalions ready to advance towards the Argentine stronghold around the island. capital, three commando brigades, three par 45 Commando and 42 Commando were on the front line, joined by the Scots Guards of the newly arrived 5th Brigade at Fitzroy, two parah, the first gers and the Welsh Guards who have been reinforced by two companies of 40 Commando to To compensate for the losses suffered at Galahad, the plan was to make two consecutive night attacks to seize all of The High Ground west of Stanley, making it impossible for the Argentines to hold out in the city, whatever they were. their numbers, the British command Fully committed to this assault in reserve were only two companies of 40 Commandos at San Carlos and a single company of gers at Goose Green.

Everything else the British had would go on the attack and would still be barely enough to match the Argentinians in numbers. At this stage of the conflict, Argentina had around 9,000 soldiers remaining in Stanley, of which around 5,000 were frontline combat units. Brigadier General Menendez, the Argentine commander in Faulkland, had placed his units in naturally strong defensive positions in the hills west of Stanley with the 7th Regiment. fourth regiment and fifth battalion of marines on the front line more regiments continued to be retained near the coast to protect against any amphibious landings near the capital the argentine regiments were units of the siiz battalion approximately equivalent in size to the british units to which They would face each other, but stretched much thinner over a wide area to make matters worse, the 5th Marine Battalion was the only Argentine unit that had adequate cold weather equipment and experience.

The fourth regiment to the west had been drawn from the subtropical province of Corantes, near the Brazilian border, so was deeply unused. Due to Fulin's winter conditions, concerned about how isolated and outgunned his troops were, General Menéndez requested reinforcements on June 10, but was denied. General Galtieri and the rest of the Hunter were not prepared to risk any more naval or Air Force resources, so Menéndez was ordered to fight to the end with what he had. The British attack began on the afternoon of June 11 with three battalions advancing to assault the three strong points of the outer ring of the Argentine defenses Mount Harriet dos Hermanas and Mount Longden to the west the offensive began without problems with the 4-2 Commando at Mount Harrier and the 45th Commando at dos Hermanas managing to defeat their opponents of the fourth regime in a few hours of determined assault with relatively low casualties, only one man killed at Mount Harriet and four at two sisters, this was not the case at Mount Longden, which was being assaulted by Mount Longton of three pairs, it was smaller than the other hills attacked that night, but was extremely rocky with outcrops creating narrow channels dominated by Argentine machine guns through which the parat Troopers would have to advance safely.

Not long after the attack, B Company became badly trapped on the western slopes. Four platoons were in particular danger, pinned down in the open field by withering fire from the Rocks on the platoon's commanding officer soon lost his life and their dire position was only relieved when Sergeant Ian Makai led a mad almost solo assault against two key Argentine positions, both were knocked out, but Makai was killed in the process. He would receive a posthumous Victoria Cross for his bravery. Makai's sacrifice allowed his platoon to be in a better position in the battle. Hill and B Company were able to steadily push the Argentine Defenders under Major Carlos Salvador's back, eventually allowing one company to sweep their positions and clear the remainder of Mount Longden.

It had been a brutal fight. 23 Paras had been killed, two of them in just 17 years. elderly and 35 wounded by the end of this long, hard night of fighting, Argentina's defensive ring around Stanley had been severely dented, the three key hills had fallen with serious casualties for the defenders, particularly at Mount Longden where the brutal fighting melee had caused heavy losses. The only consolation for Brigadier Menéndez was that the fighting had lasted longer than expected, delaying and disturbing the British enough that an extra day to regroup and prepare for the second phase of the offensive was needed to be carried out.

These Scottish guards and gers were brought over. William and artillery attacks against the Argentine positions intensified, aided by observation from recently captured points of view. The final British offensive of the Falklands War began shortly after sunset on June 13 with These Scots Guards were forcing the assault on Mount Fallen to begin. There was some anxiety about this attack. The collapse had an almost steep northern face and its southern slopes were ignored by the Argentine positions on Mount William, forcing the British into a direct assault from the west to To make matters worse, the defenders of the collapse came from the fifth marine infantry battalion, probably the best equipped and trained Argentine unit on the islands.

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Scott attempted to mitigate these risks by launching a diversionary assault south of Mount William before the main offensive. To try to divert the defender's attention, this worked well. Company G was able to capture the first third of Tumbl without being detected. This easy success did not last long, although when the Left Flank company took charge of the attack it was immobilized by heavy forces. Argentine firing in open fields on the crest of the ridge took several hours to resume, eventually aided by a heavy artillery bombardment. The fall was steadily secured, but the delay meant that there was no time for the Gerus to attack Mount William.

Before dawn, they would have done so in daylight at the same time as these Scots Guards were fighting their way north, two forces were closing the circle around Stanley with an assault on Wireless Ridge, unlike the other battalion commanders. British Lieutenant Colonel David Charler decided on Noisy Attack for this operation with a heavy artillery barrage beforehand and then overwhelming firepower used to secure his objectives. Paris was supported by a troop of Scorpion and similar light tanks, as well as extensive artillery mortar support and naval gunfire. All this, the firepower soon said driving the Argentine defenders in front of Ridge and allowing the British to launch a curtain of fire in an attempted counterattack under the command of Major Roberto Ber with the loss of Wireless Ridge, the Argentine defense of Stanley had collapsed, hundreds of troops headed east towards the city pursued by British artillery.

The Germans were saved or, in their opinion, denied their uphill assault on the mountain in broad daylight when the trenches at Mount William were found to be empty, feeling that their opponents were defeated. Brigadier Thompson ordered his battalions to continue advancing two Paris in a straight line on the road towards Stanley. and four five Commandos to Sappa Hill, the last remaining piece of High Ground still in Argentine hands, the Welsh Guards were also flown by helicopter to the top of Sappa Hill just as 45 Commando arrived, as a result Brigadier General Mendez was He realized on the morning of June 14, when the game ended, the British had him surrounded by land and sea, they had The High Ground and his troops had little organization of ammunition and morale, he concluded that the only course of action was to surrender. and, despite General Gautier's objections from Buenos Aires, that is.

Exactly what he decided to do was make contact, a British negotiating team arrived that afternoon and terms were discussed and then General Moore flew that night to sign an instrument of surrender with General Mendez Moore and then showed up in London in the early hours. informing the British government. that General Menéndez handed over to me all the Argentine armed forces in the east and west of Faulkland the Faulkland Islands are once again under the government desired by their inhabitants God save the Queen in the 10 weeks between the invasion and the liberation both sides They suffered greatly Britain lost 255 dead and 775 wounded Argentina 649 dead and 1,657 wounded, that's not counting the total PTSD and other mental health problems that many veterans on both sides have lived with for four decades.

Thousands of entire prisoners of war were returned to their homes just days after surrendering and I found a nation in crisis General Garyi had been overthrown the conclusion of seven months of leadership during which he had been wrong about almost everything there was public anguish over the defeat of the nation, attempts by the military to find scapegoats, and ultimately the beginning of a journeyback to democracy For Argentina in the UK, the end of the Hawk War also had a profound effect on the government, but in the opposite direction, the task force returned home during the summer of 1982 on Triumph.

HMS Hermes and Canra were greeted by huge cheering crowds upon their arrival. Port Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government, which had been terribly unpopular only a year earlier and reached new heights of popularity thanks to a rapid and successful victory in the war in fauland, contributed greatly to her landslide re-election in the general election of 1983 and paved the way for the continuation of the presidency. The Thatcherite reshaping of British economic and political institutions in the years to come for Falon's own inhabitants, their belief in their Britishness and their separation from Argentina was, if anything, strengthened by the war.

The islands remain, as always, a colony ultimately dependent on Britain for its economy. and security, but they are a colony under a government of their own choosing thanks to a brief but dramatic war in the South Atlantic 40 years ago. Hello everyone, thank you for watching this feature film of the folk series we produced last year for the 40th anniversary of the conflict. I think overall this is one of the best series we have produced, so I wanted to make it available in this long form and all sponsorships for each episode trimmed to give you the best viewing experience.

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