'Armoured' and 'Unarmoured' Carriers - Survivability vs Strike Power

Hi everyone, I'm sure these videos bounced off some flame wars somewhere, as the topic is controversial, to say the least, in at least some circles on the internet. What is the topic you asked for? Well, those of you who sign up at this point without notice. In the title of the video the topic is the merits of the so-called British armored carrier approach versus the so-called American unarmored aircraft carrier of World War II. Now let's start by pointing out that cooling one side armored and the other non-armored is a big task. Oversimplification, both nations' aircraft

carriers

were armored along the hull the main difference around which debate generally revolves is the flight deck on British aircraft

carriers

.

Involved in this debate are at least the flight deck, which is the highest and most complete deck the plane from which it took off was also an armored deck on American aircraft carriers, there was no armor present in the horizontal plane, as it was much higher. Down on the ship, under the hangars, it must also be taken into account that the deck armor of the British aircraft carriers did not work. Along the entire length of the flight deck, the hangar and its roof formed an armored box and the ends of the flight deck were reinforced but not completely armored and let's also point out that there are extreme views on both sides, you will have some that do.

I'm going to say, oh yeah, the Royal Navy was stupid, their carriers were worthless, they destroyed themselves and any American carrier would run over them and sink the big metal coffin in one fell swoop. Those people are idiots, on the other hand, there are some people who will say. Oh well, the British aircraft carriers would ignore anything the Americans threw at them, it doesn't matter if 98 percent of the British Air Group is wiped out, a single passing bomb will wipe out the fragile American bath toy and those people too They are idiots. We are going to look at the boats in question, the design choices that influence their construction, the pros and cons in the most important areas and then evaluate the results, of course I have my own opinion, but the main goal of this video is set up to hold the fair and let people make their own decisions because, frankly, not even leading naval historians agree on the effectiveness or otherwise of the two nations' approaches, as read by Brown Friedman or Lincoln Gaskey or anyone else. , a number of highly respected naval historians. and each of them has their own opinion on the matter, so to try to say that no, this is the only and definitive and true opinion, would be arrogance on a colossal scale now for the purposes of this discussion that we are going to have. look at five ship classes on the royal navy side we will see the hms ark royal of the illustrious and implacable classes and on the american side we will see the yorktown and essex classes like these five ship groups are more or less contemporary and cover the period in question.

The original USS Wasp is discounted because it was deliberately built light to utilize the treaty tonnage and therefore would not be a fair example to use now that the ships were designed and built in the following order, the Ark Royal followed by the Yorktown, then the Illustrious, then the Implacable and finally HMS Indomitable Essex, the last of the Illustrious class was a sort of middle ground between no such class and the Implacable. Now the first thing to keep in mind. about the two navies is that their aircraft carriers were designed to operate mainly in specific environments, although obviously both navies had global commitments and this is quite telling from the beginning, especially in the case of the Royal Navy, the American aircraft carriers were designed to operate mainly in the Pacific against Japan, the Yorktown because at the time Japan was considered the main likely enemy when the okkk tails were being built and most of the Essex were built when Japan was physically the main enemy, in contrast the British built the HMS Ark Royal when they also believed that The most likely enemy was going to be Japan, while at the time when the Illustrious and Ruthless Classes emerged, the most likely enemy for the United Kingdom was definitely a European

power

, which in turn led to different priorities in self-defense, such as an American carrot or In the real arc in the wide expanses of the Pacific, the most likely enemy and in the most imaginable circumstances, the only possible one, was going to be another flying group of aircraft carriers or possibly small groups of aircraft from various small island bases, as no one expected that aircraft like the Zero would have organized More comparable to a heavy bomber than a

strike

fighter, either way, such opponents would have a finite supply of aircraft which was within the ability of a friendly carrier to match, as both sides would face similar operational limitations when it came to aircraft size and payload as such.

The aircraft would also have a more limited shape and automatic torpedo load compared to heavier aircraft which could be based at major airfields in the area and any attack package would not be composed entirely of attack craft, as any group of aircraft carriers would also have to carry their own fighters. The logical concept arose that the best way to defend an aircraft carrier would be to equip it with as many aircraft as possible to match and hopefully overwhelm incoming attackers who could not over

power

such an air group without deploying more. carrier hulls to the fight that the Navy in question and the US were pretty sure they could build almost any potential combination of enemies in this scenario: you would either disintegrate and destroy the incoming attacks with your own aircraft or weaken them as much as possible. enough that the fleet's anti-aircraft batteries and a bit of approach and dodging would allow the ships to evade impact, at which point their large air group could counterattack Massa large enough to destroy the enemy in the European theater with the confined waters of the Mediterranean. and the North Sea and the other associated areas, the main expected threat and indeed the only threat unless and until another European Navy actually built a functional aircraft carrier was a land-based aircraft, this posed two further major problems beyond the expected opposition in the Pacific, first of all.

In addition to the single-engine aircraft, two three- and four-engine medium and heavy bombers could be expected to carry larger and more bombs, as well as single or multiple torpedoes, perhaps most importantly, with multiple large-scale airfields from which to operate. . assaults in overwhelming numbers, it didn't really matter if your carrier had one, two or three fighter squadrons, if the enemy showed up with half a dozen of its own fighter squadrons and the same again, its attack planes, assuming that the competition of His enemy was the same. within shouting distance of yours, those attackers would make it through and in fairly large numbers and at that point it would be inevitable that they would hit you, so it becomes more important to protect your ship from the inevitable impact of a series of American war games against the fleet.

The problems of the 1930s also seem to indicate that whoever attacked first would probably directly sink the enemy carrier and the advance in aircraft performance in the period immediately before the invention and deployment of shipboard radar occurred specifically in the field of speed. indicate to both navies that a carrier's own fighters probably couldn't intercept incoming attacks unless they were already in the air for some reason. The lessons drawn from this are becoming quite different and the Americans conclude that the largest

strike

group possible would allow them to do the same. Do as much damage as possible, ideally before the enemy found them, and if not, at least do more damage than the loss of their own carriers would entail.

The British, perhaps more pessimistic, concluded that, apart from having enough fighters for a combat air patrol, the main emphasis should be on Surviving the inevitable to attack again after being hit, there was an additional factor, while that most carrier-based aircraft could carry 250- or 500-pound bombs. Base bombers and dive bombers could be expected to bring in thousand-pound bombs more consistently. or more in play, which could not only hit deeper but also had much more explosive power, so the risk of fatal damage even with one or two hits was much more significant when facing ground opponents and of course, You cannot sink an airfield. which meant you could expect a sustained attack day after day and even if you somehow fought off a much larger ground air defense and managed to destroy one airfield, there would be half a dozen more within reach and a landing strip was relatively easy. repair, as she did not need to spend weeks or months coming and going from a dry dock, this in turn dictated the basic decision on whether or not to use an armored deck for the illustrious and unforgiving vessels designed to operate at a land mass range. based air forces there was no option at all, they were going to be attacked no air group they could get on a single carrier all multiple carriers would be able to stop a massive ground assault and could reasonably be expected to be hit as a result for the ark royal, Yorktown and Essex are theoretically operating away from significant ground support against more limited air groups.

If you could attack one or two large waves of attacks, you could reasonably conclude that the danger was over and that it was unlikely that the enemy could completely overwhelm it, so the flight deck was kept unarmored to maximize the air group. So what impact did this and other decisions have on the ship's overall operation and air group? We will now look at a number of factors that influenced the size of a carrier's air group. and attack capabilities and see how the choice of armored or unarmed flight decks were affected or affected, so deck park is one of the other important differences in the early operational careers of several ships was the use of deck parks. deck, this is where a part of their planes are located. stored on the flight deck rather than in the hangar of American aircraft carriers, this was more or less a larger number of operational aircraft that could be transported simply due to the additional storage space this aircraft offered, of course they are full of stuff They like to burn and explode, but with a flight deck that offered little resistance to bombs, it hardly made much difference where the plane was when a bomb hit; in fact, having them on the deck was in some cases safer as the burning aircraft could be pushed overboard if it caught fire.

While the same plane catching fire in the hangar was a much more complex and deadly problem, there was also the weather in the vast expanses of the Pacific - aside from the occasional typhoon, the sea was generally relatively calm and storing planes on deck posed little risk. . On the other hand, it was reasonable to expect that planes on deck would go down or be swept overboard or damaged or even blown away by these fairly regular storms and rough seas found in the Mediterranean it was usually a bit of karma, but when It got rough, which it did regularly, it got very rough, and being an enclosed body of water, there were very few places you could actually go, whereas in the Pacific you could usually avoid a typhoon with good warning.

Sufficient advance notice, this meant that, regardless of hangar storage space, an American aircraft carrier of equal size could typically carry more aircraft in total, at the risk of losing part of its air group. If the weather was especially bad, an extreme of this was seen after one of the major typhoons that hit. In the Pacific Theater, towards the end of World War II, several American aircraft carriers had lost a significant number of aircraft and decks. Seeing the state of their own ships, Halsy pointed to the nearby ships. of the British Pacific Fleet to report its status after the typhoon HMS Indefatigable whose armored hangar enclosed in the bow and flight deck had withstood everything well quite cheekily indicated which typhoon we now look at the hangars these were particularly affected by design decisions American aircraft carriers tended to opt for the so-called open hangar and British armored transports for a closed hangar, in small part due to the weather, but largely due to the nature of the flight deck, an armored flight deck needed a lot of support and theThe sides were therefore necessarily part of the hull, which meant that they and their support beams etc. were considerably thicker and would take up more space, which also limited the available volume but provided greater safety assuming the deck The flight deck would remain armored since all sides of the hangar were also armored.

To protect against splinters, explosive shells and gunfire the height of the hangar at the time they were designed was also taken into account, of course they would fit the aircraft being used but if they were built just high enough they may future aircraft will not fit on British aircraft carriers. In this case, due to space and weight limitations imposed by defensive systems including armour, hangar heights were generally lower and this would prevent them from operating some modern aircraft types later in their lives, interestingly, while The Illustrious Yorktown and Essex opted for a single hangar and the Illustrious had a hangar about three feet lower than the American ships, the Ark Royal Indomitable and the Relentless actually had two hangar decks, although on the latter both decks had only fourteen feet high compared to just over seventeen feet in the American.

The ships illustrious single hangar actually had about four-fifths the space of a Yorktown and the Indomitable and Relentless had more space than the American design, but the deck portion of the Yorktown allowed for a greater total number of operational aircraft to be carried in the practice. Of course, Essex takes the cake and also the most operational aircraft and many spare parts including aircraft bodies, although interestingly, with deck pox involved, the Relentless actually becomes the most efficient ship in terms of aircraft carrier . Her tongue is probably due to that second hangar, assuming they will fit, of course, it is worth mentioning that the number of aircraft aboard American aircraft carriers was often in varying degrees. of variation with the number of operational aircraft due to the practice of carrying spare aircraft strapped to the hangar roof in various states of assembly, while the British opted for the Unicorn class of support aircraft carriers to deal with repair and resupply of airplanes, for example.

At one point in her career, Yorktown theoretically carried 88 aircraft, but 22 of them were non-operational spares and 66 were airworthy, but at other times she would appear to carry fewer aircraft, but in reality she would be able to fly more now, the planes itself, obviously. Those used by the Feres Navy also have some relevance to their own overall capability towards the end of the war. There will be Avengers and Corsairs and other similar aircraft, and in both navies, carriers, but the United States Navy had much better folding wing designs for its carrier planes and This was especially telling at the beginning of the war, when the two Navies operated very different aircraft: the British tended to have aircraft that folded their wings back and forth, while American aircraft folded their wings upward taking advantage of their tall hangars, plus American aircraft carriers tended to be slightly smaller than their counterparts.

British, which further helped bring more aircraft into limited space, the Wildcat and Dauntless, for example, were smaller than the full bar and spike that were their Royal Navy contemporaries, only the American torpedo boats, the Devastator and Avenger, tended to be slightly larger compared to their counterparts, the Swordfish and Barracuda, and useful for United States Navy torpedo bombers which were transported in smaller numbers compared to dive bombers. and fighters on both Navy ships in general, then the aircraft operated meant that for a given amount of space the Americans could usually get a few more planes compared to the British, at least until they started using the same machines.

Now let's look at the anti-aircraft armament that forms part of the space and weight allocated to any aircraft carrier of this period. from its anti-aircraft battery now using the ship's designed anti-aircraft arm, we can see where the priorities of the two navies are now, obviously all carriers would receive upgrades and additional weapons in the future, but this is for obvious reasons that exceed what they were. designed for the interesting thing is that it shows that it was actually the Royal Navy and not the United States Navy that put much more emphasis on the ship being able to defend itself when looking at the total anti-aircraft package, both counting and subtracting.

Light anti-aircraft up to 20 millimeters that gradually became obsolete during the war, both in terms of total number of guns and gun power per turn, the Royal Navy is significantly ahead even compared to classes built with some experience in times of war, being the implacable Zand. At Essex the particular effectiveness of any anti-aircraft weapon can now be discussed for hours on end; The 1.1-inch machine guns and cannons on earlier carriers were found to be quite wanting and were replaced with a variety of 40-millimeter Bofors or 20-millimeter Pom-Poms and Oerlikons on later ships, but it is clear that from the point of Viewed from the design, the Royal Navy clearly expected that ships would have to defend and protect themselves separately from their groups much more than the United States Navy.

The commitment to air defense with all the associated heavy munitions, additional crew quarters, and other materials and supplies would, of course, consume the carrier's ability to operate and transport aircraft. Now let's take a look at the size of the boat. One thing that is not always appreciated is the size of different aircraft carriers. People tend to assume that they are all more or less the same, but this is far from the truth. American aircraft carriers tended to take on less water and be slightly narrower at the waterline, but also to be considerably longer. Travel also varies by Yorktown standard. displacement being the smallest by a considerable margin and the Essex the heaviest by an even greater margin, the greater volumetric density due to the armor and heavy anti-aircraft batteries of the British carriers can be seen in the fact that, although all three British vessels ranged from just over 2,000 tons to four thousand tons heavier, all being considerably shorter than the Yorktown and much shorter than the much heavier Essex.

This difference in physical dimensions, especially length, which was possible due to her lighter construction, would allow American ships more space and therefore more aircraft. per ton in the Orcish cities, the sectional density of the Essex class was much higher, although on par with British ships, but it had an armored hangar deck almost as thick as the flight deck of British aircraft carriers, which probably explains this and also Wyatt's. The aircraft per ton ratio is significantly worse than Yorktown. The main advantage of her over all other aircraft carriers under construction is the simple size which gives her more capacity regardless of any other factor, since the Essex even in the shortest version of her was designed with approximately 4,000 tons more displacement. than the next largest aircraft carrier under construction in the two navies and ended up with a standard displacement that was considerably larger and partly because of this, they are approximately 100 feet longer than the British armored aircraft carriers and almost as wide.

This is not to say that the Essex was not a good design, it definitely was, but at the same time a ship several thousand tons heavier and 100 feet longer would be expected to be a better aircraft carrier, even if it were just an average design, so its margin of superiority over everything else isn't exactly surprising now let's look at the durability of the boats, this is where most arguments about the two design philosophies tend to circulate. There are actually three forms of durability to consider, which are often overlooked. One is tactical durability, this is basically if hitting the ship, can it happen with your protection system preventing or minimizing the damage to the extent that the ship can continue with immediate tactical operations or can return to its operational state in time?

If the ship fails this test, then it has to go into survivable durability, this is if a ship takes a hit and is knocked out of action due to severe damage, the ship survived long enough to reach home port and return. into action via dry docking, this also covers at the lower end the damage that leaves the ship out of significant action for most or all of the current tactical operation, even if some form of operational capability is later re-established. at the top end. It covers the scenario where the ship is basically a floating wreck, but the key part is a damaged floating ship.

After all, a ship can be repaired. A ship that sinks or is unsalvageable is a total loss and eventually you have three strategic durability. This assumes that the ship is so damaged that she requires time in the shipyard. This aspect covers the time she needs at the dock. comparable to the attack directed at it and also how the attack fundamentally affects the ship in question in subsequent operations, for example, if the ship is torpedoed but after repairs functions as new, then it is good in this category, conversely, if a ship is torpedoed in the same place by the same weapon and would now be forever restricted in maximum speed due to the impact deforming all the frames, then the ship is pretty bad in this category, durability must be considered per ship, the total number of boats present, all lined up. replacing it is kind of irrelevant again, for example if you drive a car that breaks down after 24 hours and needs a week in the shop to fix it and the fact that they are so cheap you are no more prepared and you can just cycle around them to stay on the road does not make the cars themselves particularly durable, although their transport system is there of course, a lot has been written about this, some good and some terribly slanted in both directions, some of the latter sound very knowledgeable but they mix. in complete falsehood with some facts, so there are two main types of attack in which this durability difference comes into play, conventional bombardment attack and kamikaze, this means leaving out ships that were sunk by torpedo shots, etc. ., unless they have also been attacked in other ways before, in which case.

How they withstood that assault is not relevant to their loss to the torpedoes, since the torpedoes obviously do not hit the flight decks. In this regard, the tactical durability of British aircraft carriers is quite surprising compared to American ships, so let's look at the bomb hits first. our first example, the USS Hornet, was lost in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. Now her sinking was mainly due to the torpedo hit she received, but during the first assault we could also see that she was hit by three bombs weighing just over 500 pounds. each plus an involuntary kamikaze, as well as the torpedoes, two of these bones were semi-piercing and both would penetrate two by three decks and cause significant damage in total and 97 men would lose their lives from the four bomb hits - kamikazes and the ship would not could continue with flight operations the combined fighters of the Hornet and Enterprise could not prevent the attacks from coming and launching their blows now, although it was the torpedoes in the first and second attacks that would send it to the bottom, there is no doubt that The ship would not have been able to continue operations without major repair if the torpedoes had not hit in the same battle.

Two hits and two near misses from similar bombs on Enterprise caused significant damage, 44 deaths, and forced the ship to retire for repairs, although she was still able to recover aircraft. Now companies have constant friction with the Imperial Japanese Navy. They provide a number of other examples. In the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, she took three hits from 550-pound to semi-armor-piercing bombs, again penetrating several decks and causing heavy damage along with a utility bomb that detonated on contact with deck along with four near misses. In this case, she was again able to recover the plane shortly after the attacks at a cost of 77 dead, but she would need several months of repairs to become combat capable again.

She lost 66 men in the Coral Sea to a single penetrating hit from a 550-pound bomb that would also damage her engines and required three months to repair at Midway. Splinters from a detonation on the deck started a fire in the hangar, another impact penetrated and knocked out some of the Her engines and a third passed through the side.in the area of ​​one of the elevators and caused a collective fire, which stopped the ship. Now excellent damage control was gradually returning the ship to operational speed and working to resume flight operations. For those aircraft that were still on deck when a fatal torpedo attack occurred, now looking at the British ships, HMS Illustrious would suffer five hits from one thousand one hundred and twenty two hundred pound bombs plus a total of seven hits from a mixture of two hundred pound bombs. 550 and 1100 pounds.

Aside from a single 2,200-pound bomb, believe it or not, she could still operate as an aircraft carrier until the 2,200-pound bomb hit, which analysis indicated barely defeated the armored deck, but the impact would start fires and cause damage that would knock her out. the dangerous. action as an aircraft carrier, although the damage report noted that by starting the bomb's fuse and slowing its descent on the armored deck, the bomb exploded in the hangar and not several decks below, where it could have caused devastating damage, an illustrious could do it. safely under a local engine back to port and suffered 126 deaths and required months of repairs at several docks which were not helped by Luftwaffe bombing while at her first dock before heading to the US to finish the repairs and that it also became a refitted Indomitable would receive two hits and three near misses, mostly with five hundred and fifty pound weapons, none of which would reach the armored sections, they did not conduct flight operations and killed 46 members of the crew, requiring several months of repairs, but during the same operation, a victorious was hit by two small bombs that hit the armored flight deck, which, according to the crew, caused the bombs to bounce around the side like cricket balls without causing any real damage.

The formidable would take two hits and almost miss. a 2,200 pound bomb but remained operational even though the bombs missed the center with 12 dead in the attacks overall, this brief summary would indicate that British aircraft carriers would tend to suffer fewer deaths for a given weight of explosive and in some cases could remain more operational, but looking at the battles and operations where these incidents occurred, they were not able to inflict as much damage on the enemy as the American carriers did in exchange for suffering their own damage, furthermore, given the effects of the 550 pound bombs, It is doubtful that the American ships would have survived the hits that Illustris suffered, however, due to the number of hits and the resulting overall damage, the British ships needing work at the shipyard would need more time in repair, while the American ships , despite being more severely affected immediately, would need less time in dock beforehand.

Returning to operational service, now switching to kamikazes, both nations' carriers would take multiple hits, including many indirect hits that caused relatively little damage; However, when looking at the kamikazes that achieved solid hits, there is one important difference that becomes evident in these attacks, the conditions were normal. somewhat different than bomb attacks, car-carried bombs because they tended to weigh around 550 pounds, but their armor-piercing ability was somewhat diminished due to them being still attached to or newly released from the aircraft at the same time. , the mass of the aircraft itself and the effects of any fuel still on board tended to add additional fire risks to many impacts.

Every British armored carrier, except the Relentless, which seemed to have a charmed life, would be hit by at least one kamikaze. then attacks more than one, however, with the exception of a formidable attack where a fragment of armor plate displaced by the bomb's impact damages some of the engines and temporarily reduces speed, the sum of all these karmic attacks RC was minimal damage caused and minimal. casualties suffered with the ship universally back in full flight operations within hours and sometimes less with any damage repaired later at the dock once the tactical operation the ships were taking part in had been completed in reverse of the ships of the classes under consideration Enterprise Essex Intrepid Randolph Ticonderoga Bunker Hill and Franklin received kamikaze hits that caused significant damage and forced the ship to retire for repairs with significant casualties;

Ticonderoga Bunker Hill and Franklin were preserved only thanks to the excellent damage control efforts of their crews. In all these cases, the main difference. appeared to have been the flight deck, the British armored decks stopped the attacks practically dead with little damage below the flight deck level, in a couple of cases the attacks were classified as a glimpse because the kamikazes fell solidly on the deck of the ship but not simply bounce or skid over the side, but while attacks on the American aircraft carriers would penetrate the deck or blow a large hole in it with the effect that significant damage and fire would spread to the hangar, which , of course, was filled with more combustible and explosive material. leading to a much larger conflagration and more resulting damage.

Hancock seemed to have terrible and brilliant luck at the same time that he was hit several times by kamikaze fragments. She was about to finish shooting it down, causing the ship to never be knocked out. For more than a few hours in total, British carriers appear to have had significantly greater tactical

survivability

, especially against kamikazes. Both nations' carriers appear to have had good

survivability

durability, although I think the advantage here goes to the British carriers as they tended to be stopped in the water much less frequently and some losses from torpedo attacks in the British Navy.

The United States could be attributed to the ships being delayed due to malfunctions and engine stoppages. Generally excellent American damage control efforts kept several of their ships afloat when most would have considered it. They were lost in terms of strategic durability. The American ships appear to have been repaired much more quickly, although one could argue that this was because if you damaged two British aircraft carriers through their armor enough to need to dock, you would probably have caused much more damage, but still, no nation. lost one aircraft carrier of the types considered two attacks associated only with bombs or kamikazes and all hull losses eventually came from torpedo attacks.

In evaluating this, it would appear that the British armored system was preferable from the point of view of keeping a ship alive and in action and the United States Navy seemed to agree, as multiple reports from both front line officers and evaluations at home they had a good opinion of the survivability of British carriers and encouraged the use of a similar system on their own ships, in fact largely due to these Recommendations: the Midway class and all subsequent American carriers would have a armored flight deck of some description, however the Americans did not take her on board in the armored hangar box and in fact the British would also leave this behind in their post-war designs, apart from a surviving aircraft carrier. is only part of their capability as an operational weapons system, the discussion about armored versus unarmored flight decks focuses on these ships, which for most warships is fine, but for aircraft carriers whose primary purpose It is achieved by airplanes, it is not the whole picture.

They were limited in air group size and aircraft type even later when their overall air groups increased due to deck parking and other measures, some of this was simply due to them being smaller ships, but there was also a degree of effect due to the greater weight of the defensive characteristics. This meant that aircraft losses hit their overall flight group harder and their overall attack power was lower, for example, and kamikaze attacks left the carriers relatively unscathed, but the aircraft destroyed in those attacks compromised their ability to keep fighting, although the flip side of that is of course, something like Bunker Hill being completely knocked out or it was a 100% loss of the air group;

However, it is overall striking power that is where US carriers unsurprisingly have an advantage. A fairly convincing case could be made that the illustrious class could have comfortably survived and remained operational during the numerous attacks that the Yorktown and Enterprise Hornets suffered in the first half of the Pacific campaign, but there would be very little chance of claiming that they would have caused a damage close to that which the American aircraft carriers inflicted on the Imperial Japanese Navy at Coral Sea Midway Santa Cruz East of Sullivans, etc., so at that point it is perfectly valid to ask what is better to lose an aircraft carrier or in exchange for destroying multiple enemy aircraft carriers or retain all of their aircraft carriers, but at the same time the enemy retains almost all of theirs, that is a decision that obviously everyone has to make for themselves, in general, the fact that both navies would adopt elements of each other's design in addition to the armored flight decks in the US Navy and larger flight groups in the Royal Navy, respectively.

Among other things, it would tell me that the true optimum was somewhere in between, however, based on the information provided in this video, I leave it up to viewers to make their own final assessment as to which was the best weapons system or if they were simply two sides. of the same currency working towards an eventual design of common purpose. That's all for this video. Thanks for watching. If you have a comment or suggestion for reviewing a boat, let us know in the comments below. Don't forget to comment on the pinned post. for questions about dry docking