"What is THAT?!" Nightmare at Los Angeles airport.

(airplane whistle): Two planes, two groups of crews and passengers traveling somewhere with a purpose. Maybe they have plans to visit family or go on a work trip, or maybe it's just a normal work day. No matter

what

the circumstances, these passengers and crew will soon be forced to share something truly terrible. Stay tuned. February 1, 1991 was a nice, cool day in California, United States. Visibility was good, with only a few high clouds, and air traffic arriving at Los Angeles International Airport was flowing smoothly. As the afternoon progressed, the tower's air traffic controllers continued their duties like any other day and nothing seemed out of the ordinary.

Los Angeles Airport or LAX, as I will call it here, was already, back then, a huge sprawling

airport

with four active runways. Now, at LAX, controllers operated a little differently than at other US

airport

s, in that all of their runways could be used simultaneously for both takeoff and landing, while the other airports typically assigned some runways for takeoff and others exclusively for landing. The fact that LAX didn't do that meant that the workload in the tower could sometimes be quite high, but this afternoon it was relatively quiet with only a fairly moderate flow. That same day, a SkyWest Airlines Fairchild Metroliner was scheduled to operate several short flights within California.

Finally, there was a crew change at Inyokern Airport, where the two new pilots took over the plane and then initially flew it to Los Angeles. They then continued operating to Fresno and then back to Los Angeles where, at around 5:30 p.m. local time, they were finally preparing for a flight to Palmdale. This Metroliner had seating for up to 19 passengers and since it operated under FAA Part 23 commuter regulations, it was allowed to operate with only two pilots and no cabin crew, so on this leg, towards Palmdale, there were 10 passengers and two pilots on board and used the call sign SkyWest 5569.

The Metroliner was a large small aircraft, powered by two turboprop engines on a low wing. And although it had a fairly tall landing gear, the entire plane was still quite low, especially compared to a Boeing 737. And that will be important later in this story. The other thing worth mentioning here was its exterior lighting. It consisted of a standard green and red navigation light on each wing, along with white flashing strobe lights on the wings and tail, a white navigation light, also on the tail, and a red anti-collision light mounted on the top of the tail. rear fin. .

This anti-collision light had a brightness of 100 candles or 1,257 lumens, which was about four times weaker than the current standard in 1991, but since this aircraft had been certified in the early 1970s, it was still approved. Another peculiarity of this anti-collision light was that it was partially obscured by the rudder, which meant it was difficult to see at angles of around 5.4 degrees above and behind. Now, in addition to all those lights I just mentioned, there were also forward-facing landing lights, taxi lights, and a pair of ice detection lights illuminating the wings. All this aircraft lighting basically had two main purposes.

The first was like the headlights of a car to illuminate where the plane was going when it was taxiing, landing and taking off. And the other, more important purpose was to make sure the plane was visible to other planes and to air traffic control. But this was mainly something that was considered important when the plane was in the air. On the ground, only certain parts of this lighting were normally used, such as the taxi light, navigation lights and anti-collision light, so as not to blind other traffic. As SkyWest pilots helped their passengers board, another plane, a US Air Boeing 737-300, was already in the air and headed to Los Angeles.

He had started the day in Syracuse and was headed to his final destination in San Francisco with intermediate stops in Washington DC, Columbus, Ohio and Los Angeles. There had been a crew change scheduled in Washington, where the current pilots had assumed command. And since the captain had flown the first leg to Columbus, the first officer was now the pilot of flight 1493 and they had 83 passengers on board. The day had gone very well so far and the two pilots were in great spirits as they continued their approximately four hour and 40 minute flight at a cruising altitude of 35,000 feet.

The captain was 48 years old and very experienced, with a total time of 16,300 hours of which 4,300 had been flown on the Boeing 737. He had risen to the position of captain about six years before this flight and was very comfortable in his role. The first officer was 32 years old and had just over 4,300 hours of total time, 982 of which had flown on the 737. He had previously flown on Learjet before being hired by US Air just over two years earlier. The pilots were joined by four members of the cabin crew and one of them, during boarding, stopped at the exit of the wing and asked a passenger who he saw was very, very young if he would be able to fulfill the duties of a man without disabilities. person in case of evacuation.

Now, a healthy person is someone who will be able to help the cabin crew with things like opening emergency exits, and potentially help other passengers, should it be necessary in an emergency. And only people who can do so will be able to sit next to the emergency exits. In this case, the passenger responded that he was 17 years old and thought he could do it. Now, when he heard this, the cabin crew agreed, but still decided to inform him and the other passengers on how to operate the emergency exit, something that was actually not standard back then.

Keep it in mind. Now most of you are probably already quite familiar with the Boeing 737. But for those of you who don't know, the 737-300 is a twin-engine jet airliner with a passenger capacity, in the case of US Air, of 128. Since From a technical point of view, this was a very modern aircraft at the time and this particular individual was six years old and his interior panels and furniture were largely original. No technical defects were recorded in it, but one thing worth noting here is that in 1985 new rules regarding the fire retardant properties of aircraft furniture were implemented.

These new regulations required that the materials used in new airplanes had to be highly flame retardant, but this airplane was manufactured just before these regulations went into effect. It now had a partial renovation in 1989, but most of the overhead bins and interior walls were still made from the original materials. Another technical aspect of the 737 is where it stores its flight crew's oxygen cylinder. In the event of rapid depressurization at high altitude, passengers will receive oxygen through masks dropped from overhead compartments. I'm sure you've seen it. These masks are connected to oxygen generators that, by combining chemicals, will produce oxygen for approximately 13 minutes.

This is generally good enough to allow pilots to make an emergency descent to 10,000 feet, where the air becomes fully breathable again. But pilots don't get oxygen from an oxygen generator. Instead, their masks are powered by an oxygen cylinder located under the cabin, just forward of the forward cargo hold. And this oxygen cylinder will soon play an important role. Anyway, around 17:40, the crew of US Air Flight 1493 received their first descent clearance to LAX and were told by the area controller that they were cleared for the CIVET TWO arrival and descent profile. The captain read this and the co-pilot began the descent, checking at the same time that this was the arrival route for which they had already informed and prepared.

The sun had just set below the ocean in the west and it must have been a beautiful sight as the pilots were now descending into the darkness below them. The plane was cleared to descend steps towards Los Angeles and were also told that they could wait for runway 24 right or left to land, but that they would later be informed which of those runways it actually was. The pilots continued to follow normal procedures, including notifying the cabin crew when they were about 15 minutes from the airport. And that prompted the cabin crew to secure the cabin. Everything worked like clockwork.

At 17:57:28, the LAX terminal radar approach controller, TRACON, ordered Flight 1493 to intercept the right runway 24 localizer and then continue its descent to 10,000 feet. About a minute and a half later, the same controller also asked the pilots if they had the airport in sight. Both pilots began looking out the cockpit windows into the now dark night and could barely make out the lights of the airport in the distance, as they were about 25 miles away at the time. The captain responded "Assert," prompting the controller to clear them for a visual approach to Runway 24 Left and also told them to descend to cross an RNAV point called DENAY at a minimum of 8,000 feet.

When he heard this, the first officer disengaged the autopilot and then began the visual transition to the center line of Runway 24 Left. The captain read the clearance again, but since they had been following the ILS localizer for Runway 24 up to that point, the first officer asked him to confirm that the clearance was actually for Runway 24 Left and not Right, which the captain then did too. The controller confirmed that they had heard right the first time and that the weather was absolutely fantastic, so I'm sure the first officer was really enjoying the manual flying here. I often zone out a little more when the conditions are right to feel and enjoy the plane a little.

It's part of

what

makes this job so fun. Now the two tracks in front of them were the same distance apart. So, although there was no active instrument landing system for left runway 24, the first officer could still use the glide slope indicator for the other runway as a way to assist in vertical maneuvering. This had all the makings of a great approach, but what the pilots didn't know was that ahead of them, several now very unfortunate circumstances were beginning to align with each other and I'll tell you all about that after this... Did you ever Have you found yourself in a situation where you are somewhere abroad desperately trying to access some crucial online service and you come across a blocked website?

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The aircraft proceeded from terminal six, along the North Route to Gate 32 and then to the holding point on Runway 24L. But since the Metroliner was a relatively small plane, they wouldn't need to taxi to the end of the runway to take off. Instead, they planned to use what is known as an intersection takeoff position, higher up the runway. We pilots often do this to minimize taxi time and it is perfectly safe to do so as long as the performance has been calculated with that in mind. Now, at this point, we also need to start talking a little bit about the air traffic controllers that were working tonight and the way they were handling traffic.

LAX had, likeI mentioned before, four tracks and they were divided into two sets of pairs of parallel tracks. Runway 24 right and left formed the northern pair and runway 25 right and left formed the southern pair. Between the pairs of runways were the main terminal buildings and, just east of them, the air traffic control tower. Inside the tower, there were six controllers working this afternoon: four fully qualified controllers, a development controller, who handles one of the ground frequencies, and an area supervisor. Now, when multiple air traffic controllers work together, they have to do so through some type of organized system.

And the way things were done back then, and mostly even today, is by using something known as flight progress strips. These strips are filled with information about a particular flight and then passed from one controller to another when they hand the plane over to each other. In this way, the controller in charge of the aircraft knows that he has responsibility for it, what authorization he has already received and, approximately, what sequence that aircraft is in in relation to the rest of the traffic. Normally, these strips would follow the same sequence as the handovers, that is, from the delivery of the authorization to the ground and then to the tower controller, who would be in charge of takeoff.

But at LAX, they had decided to change this slightly so that the stripes would go from the clearance delivery controller directly to the tower controller to reduce some of the workload on the ground controllers. This meant that an aircraft could, at any time during taxiing, come into direct contact with the tower and request, for example, a takeoff at an intersection. Now this was very convenient for the aircraft crew, but it meant a lot more workload for the tower controllers who now had to, in addition to separating landing and departure traffic, sometimes also look up and try to locate traffic at the airport. to be able to respond to your requests.

The work of the controllers was carried out mainly visually. But they also had to have some electronic aids at their disposal. One such system was called the Airport Surface Detection System, or ASDE, and was essentially a surface radar built to detect major airport features, including aircraft and vehicles, and then present them on a radar screen for the controller. But it was a very crude system and prone to malfunctions, especially when used for longer periods of time. And that particular afternoon, it wasn't working. Another more advanced and reliable system had been requested to replace it, but for some reason its implementation continued to be delayed, resulting in no surface radar system being available that afternoon to assist the active controller.

Another factor that will influence this accident was the location of the tower in relation to the northern runways. As the tower was located quite close to the ends of Runway 24, controllers could perfectly see the beginning of the plane's takeoff runs, but as the plane began to taxi further down the runway, four sets of towers were built. ramp lights to illuminate the runway. ramp next to Terminal 2. These lights were built so high and at such an angle that during dark times, their glare would restrict the controller's view from Intersection 45 and 47 to Runway 24 Left. This was reported to someone who, according to verbal reports, had apparently changed the angle of those lights, but even though this issue was reported as resolved, the glow was still there on the night of February 1st.

And then we come to the controller itself. The tower controller in charge this afternoon had only been working in her position as a full-function level controller for approximately two and a half months. About a month after her initial certification, she had been subjected to an evaluation by her supervisor at the time, while working in the tower, and this evaluation was conducted in an effort to find weaknesses that could be used for additional training events under something known. as a Technical Assessment Program or TAP, so it was not a pass/fail event. In the evaluation, his supervisor identified some key weaknesses in his performance, including loss of awareness of aircraft separation, misidentification of an aircraft through use of an incorrect call sign, and failure to complete two required coordinations with other controllers. and failing to issue the required notice to an aircraft.

These deficiencies were reported to the controller after verification, but no other corrective action, such as additional training, was taken, in part because the supervisor was unsure how the TAP program was actually supposed to work. When SkyWest Flight 5569 had taxied approximately halfway to its departure point, they were switched to a new ground controller frequency. The first officer informed this new controller that they were number two on taxiway tango behind an Aeromexico plane ahead. The new controller recognized this and told them to hold position initially and then when ready, tango right and then 45, transition to uniform and wait. 45 in this case was an intersection with runway 24 left and it turns out that it would fit perfectly with flight 5569 as the starting point for its takeoff.

The first officer read the clearance again and then the Metroliner continued taxiing with the pilots inside completing their pre-takeoff procedures. Intersection 45 was located just beyond the runway 24 left landing markings and within the landing zone. It was also one of the intersections that was affected by those glaring light poles sticking out between the tower and the intersection. At 18:03:38 the co-pilot of the Metroliner was notified to contact the tower on frequency 133.9. He did so and when he called, he told the tower controller: "Skywest 569, on 45. I'd like to go from here if we can." The tower controller responded and told them to taxi to runway 24 left and stay close to it, which the first officer acknowledged.

And so far there was nothing out of the ordinary here and everything was under control. The SkyWest crew was preparing for a takeoff at an intersection like they almost always did at LAX and the controller was very aware of where they were and what sequence they were in traffic. While this was happening, US Air Flight 1493 was still on final and talking to the approach controller, so they did not hear this initial conversation between the SkyWest aircraft and the tower. Remember how I said air traffic controllers use flight progress strips to keep track of their traffic? Well, the tower controller had a slot for SkyWest Flight 5569, but the slot for another Metroliner, which was taxiing behind Flight 5569, had not been released to him due to an error by the clearance delivery controller.

Remember that. Inside the cockpit of US Air Flight 1493, the approach was going well and the two pilots were in good spirits. They were about seven nautical miles away and had just slowed down as the controller had asked them to accelerate their descent to 4,000 feet due to traffic crossing above them. And the drag of the extended gear would allow them to increase their rate of descent without increasing their speed, which is important when approaching. Once they passed 4,000 feet, the approach controller thanked them for their help and then told them to contact the Los Angeles Tower on frequency 133.9, which the captain also read.

After this, the co-pilot began to ask for the flaps to be extended, the speed to be reduced, and the landing checklist to be completed. Remember, I was still flying here and the captain did all this before calling the tower. This meant that the time they would have on the tower frequency became a little shorter, but it was still enough as they had not yet reached the mandatory reporting point. At 18:04:33, US Air Flight 1493 finally called the tower controller and informed him that they were established at the final outer marker position, inside ROMEN, about 5.3 nautical miles from the runway.

This call was received by the controller but he never responded and the reason was that she was now becoming increasingly busy with a problem developing further down the runway. You see, just before Flight 1493 called, the tower controller had been dealing with a plane departing Runway 24 Right and right after that, he was trying to catch up with another plane, which was due to cross Runway 24 Left further down. on the track. clue. But the pilots of that plane managed to switch to another frequency, so the tower controller could not locate them. As he continued to try to reach this aircraft, he also placed a call to SkyWest Flight 5569 and told them to taxi into position and hold runway 24 to the left, while traffic crossed downfield.

The first officer of Flight 5569 read that clearance, released the brakes, and then began lining up on the active runway. Another important detail here is that standard operating procedures at SkyWest at the time instructed pilots to only turn on their landing and strobe lights once takeoff clearance had been received. This meant that while the Metroliner was aligning, the flashing strobe lights on the wings and tail were not yet activated. As the SkyWest plane began to move, the tower controller continued trying to catch up to the other planes to cross the runway before the traffic situation made it impossible.

At the same time, another plane, Southwest Airlines Flight 725, which was a Boeing 737, came on the frequency and told the controller that they were ready in sequence, which meant they could accept takeoff clearance whenever possible. The tower controller told them to continue taxiing toward the holding point from runway 24 left and maintain position there, as after that they would follow the Metroliner in front of them. Now, what this exchange really meant was that, at this point, the controller's situational awareness was still intact. He knew that SkyWest Flight 5569 was on the runway awaiting clearance to take off here. But now, as you can see, things are starting to get more complicated as he was still trying to make contact with the other plane that needed to cross the runway.

At 18:05:09, the missing plane finally came back on frequency and apologized for making a mistake earlier. The tower controller told them it was fine and finally gave them clearance to cross the runway and contact the ground controller when they were off the runway. The pilots read this and then apologized again, to which the controller simply repeated the same clearance, but this time with an incorrect call sign, a call sign that he had actually dealt with about five minutes earlier and this possibly could have been an indication. that his stress level began to increase. Remember, I still had one plane on the runway and another on the final, which was getting closer and closer.

Now, since the captain of flight 1493 never got a response to his first call, he tried again at 18:05:29. But this time too there was no response from the tower, which was now busy telling an outbound plane to change its frequency. And right around here, somewhere, something must have started happening to the tower controller. At some point, during the conversation with the crossing plane, the departing traffic, and the American air flight in the finale, he must have forgotten about the SkyWest plane that was still waiting on the tarmac. He now asked SouthWest 737 to confirm that they were staying close to the runway and when they did, he cleared US Air Flight 1493 to land on runway 24L.

Now you may wonder, how could he forget about a plane like this? Didn't he have a flight progress strip in front of him that was supposed to remind him? Well, the answer is yes. But unfortunately, the other Metroliner I mentioned earlier with call sign West Wing 5072 had now appeared on the frequency and they had no slot as the clearance delivery controller had forgotten to transfer that slot to it. This fact simply increased the workload even more as I now had to start searching for that strip in the middle of everything else. And in that confusion, and with the number of stripes in front of her matching the only two planes she could see, not the three she actually had, because remember, the third plane on the runway could still have been hidden behind those dazzling lights, the error simply went unnoticed.

And there was no one there to notice and there was no alert system available to notify you. Now, if air traffic control fails, the remaining safety barrier becomes the pilot. This means that the four pilots involved in the situation, plus perhaps others on the frequency, were now,realistically, the only ones who could stop this impending disaster. The pilots inside the Metroliner on the runway should have heard the tower clear the 737 behind them to land. Believe me, when you are stopped on an active runway, you are really putting all your attention on that frequency, waiting for your takeoff clearance.

But there is, of course, the possibility that they were busy, perhaps completing the last part of their checklist or discussing something else. We would know if we had the cockpit voice recording, but, unfortunately, this category of aircraft was not yet required to carry a cockpit voice recorder at that time. In October of that same year, a rule was implemented requiring CVR to be implemented, and in a truly cruel twist of fate, SkyWest had asked the FAA to allow them to install voice recorders in advance. When they did, they also asked the FAA to get an exception to the rule of being grounded if a CVR didn't work, until the official implementation date, of course.

But the FAA had just said no to that. If they installed those devices early, they would also have to work to get the plane airworthy, and the airline obviously didn't want to take that extra risk. This, in my opinion, is bureaucracy at its finest. Anyway, that's why we don't know for sure why the Metroliner pilots didn't speak when they heard the plane behind them clear to land, but what about the pilots inside the Boeing in the finale? Well, after receiving his landing clearance, the captain turned on the landing lights and made sure the landing checklist was complete.

They were completely stabilized when they passed 1,000 feet, and when they did, the captain only made a few comments about everything looking very good. There were no discussions in the cabin about possible traffic conflicts. This could have been because the Metroliner had only been cleared to taxi into position and wait less than 10 seconds after the 737 had joined on that same frequency, meaning that call or its meaning could have been lost. There were also many other calls around the same time, and the phraseology "Place into position and wait" is somewhat ambiguous and could potentially refer to several different things.

So there's a chance that it didn't generate the kind of awareness that a clear queue and wait clearance would have generated. By the way, that is why today we are very careful to use the exact phraseology intended for alignment and takeoff clearances. But this still doesn't explain why the 737 pilots didn't see the Metroliner on the runway in front of them. The weather was good and visibility was great, although by this time it was completely dark. But another sad fact comes into play here, which I have already mentioned above. Remember how SkyWest had, as a procedure, not to turn on those strobe lights until they received their takeoff clearance?

Well, what that meant was that the most conspicuous part of their planes' lighting was now not activated. The plane would still have been reasonably easy to see when it was taxiing onto the runway and then lining up. But once it was stationary on the centerline, its white marker lights would have blended perfectly with the runway's centerline lights. And also, remember what I told you about the red anti-collision light on top of the tail? Yes, that one would have been easy to see under normal circumstances, but unfortunately it was partially obscured by the rudder cover behind and above, right where the approaching 737 was approaching.

And since the runway edge, centerline and approach lights would have been much brighter than the unlit aircraft fuselage, it would also have been essentially obscured, and all of these circumstances meant that the Metroliner was now effectively invisible, as it was standing on the center line in the middle of the landing zone. . If it had been aligned about a meter to the left or right of the center line, it probably would have been a different story, as the lights would have been misaligned and much easier to see. Once the 737 passed 500 feet, the captain yelled, "You're coming out of 500 feet, error plus 12, sink is 700." The first officer checked it and then made sure the landing lights were on and then began to mentally prepare for landing.

He saw out of the corner of his eye another plane taxiing toward them in taxiway uniform, but everything else seemed perfectly fine. Now, pilots normally aim at a point on the runway just before where we intend to land. So in this case, since it was dark outside, this probably would have been right in front of the main lights of the landing zone. We tend to use the PAPI lights for initial vertical guidance, but as we descend, our focus turns more and more toward the runway itself, making sure the landing point doesn't move up or down the windows.

This means that anything beyond that, especially if it's not supposed to be there and is hard to see, would be very difficult for the pilot flying and the monitoring pilot, who in this case was the captain, to notice. have simply been monitoring the instruments. and therefore I have not seen it. The threshold was exceeded at 50 feet at 130 knots and then the torch was started at about 30 feet. The main landing gear landed at the 1,500-foot mark on the centerline exactly where it should be and the first officer began gently derotating the nose to land the nose wheel, while also selecting reverse thrust.

But as he did this, his eyes suddenly caught a glimpse of a red light right in front of him and almost immediately the entire Metroliner came into view with the glow of its landing lights reflecting off its propellers. The co-pilot immediately applied maximum braking, but it was clearly too late and there was no time to make any evasive maneuvers. Time has simply run out. (suspense music) At 18:06:59, US Air Flight 1493 collided with Sky West Flight 5569 just off Interchange 45 on Runway 24 Left. The collision occurred just as the 737's nose gear was landing and most of the impact hit the lower left side of the Boeing's nose, causing a massive fireball.

Because the Metroliner was considerably smaller and lower than the 737, it was completely crushed under the weight of the Boeing, which began dragging the twisted wreckage across the runway. The Boeing's nose gear soon collapsed, meaning all directional control was instantly lost, and sparks from the initial collision quickly ignited the fuel on the Metroliner, whose main body was now completely mangled on the 737's left wing. It is likely that all the occupants of the Metroliner died almost immediately after the initial collision, but there were still people alive inside the Boeing. They just noticed a seemingly normal landing followed by hard braking and then a strong jolt when impact occurred.

This was immediately followed by strong vibrations, a strange light orange glow outside the windows, as well as heat and smoke that quickly began to rise from beneath the floor. When the cabin crew first saw this, the two sitting at the back of the plane unfastened their seat belts to begin preparing for what they assumed would be an immediate evacuation, as did several passengers. But the problem here was that this accident was not over yet. The two planes were still moving at considerable speed and with the pilots no longer having a way to control the trajectory, the burning wreckage soon left the runway and turned left, where it crossed two taxiways before finally crashing into a station. abandoned fire station. .

When that happened, the two planes obviously stopped immediately, meaning that all those people who had unbuckled their seat belts now flew forward and into their seats, aisles and bulkheads. This is the reason why it is necessary to keep the seat belt fastened until the pilots turn off the seat belt signal or the cabin crew tells you to do so. Fortunately, the two flight attendants who had unbuckled themselves were not seriously injured and were able to regain consciousness reasonably quickly. The impact with the building had completely destroyed the left front part of the cabin, probably killing the captain immediately.

And the fire now burning beneath the fuselage soon came into contact with the crew's oxygen cylinder I mentioned earlier. That cylinder had likely been damaged in the initial impact and now began spewing pure oxygen into the fuel-fed fire, dramatically increasing its intensity. Black smoke was rapidly filling the cabin, making evacuation more urgent and more difficult to accomplish. And the fire, which soon also entered the cabin, was able to spread relatively easily into the overhead compartments and older wall panels. The flight attendant in front soon managed to open the right front door, but the main evacuation route quickly became the upper exit on the right side, away from the fire.

The anxious cabin crew had partially opened the left rear door with the slide extended while the plane was still moving, meaning it was now inoperative and the right rear door was being used, but that area was soon filled with dense smoke. black. Now, remember that emergency briefing the flight attendant had given with the 17-year-old boy sitting by the overhead exit? Well, it now turns out that this briefing probably saved several lives as the passengers clearly remembered what they had to do and therefore quickly opened the door. Unfortunately, a passenger who was sitting in that emergency row froze from pure fear, impeding the speed of the evacuation and, in addition, two other passengers at some point began to fight in front of the exit, slowing it down even more.

This, together with a slightly damaged seat in front of the exit, meant that some passengers and a cabin crew member who was trying to help them unfortunately did not have time to get out before the smoke took over. Of the 83 passengers and six crew members aboard the 737, 22 died and 13 suffered serious injuries. On top of that, all 12 passengers and crew on board the Metroliner had also died, meaning that the total death toll in this horrific accident had actually risen to 34 and one more was added a few days later when a passenger died from of his wounds. Now, in the tower, the controllers immediately pressed the crash button as soon as the first fireball was seen, but initially there was quite a bit of confusion about what had actually caused it.

Firefighters were quickly on the scene and did an absolutely excellent job. Of course, they helped in the evacuation and one of them climbed to the right window of the cabin and managed to pull out the first officer and thus save his life. Another firefighter found a propeller inside the right engine of the 737 and called the tower, as they had not initially been informed that there were two planes involved in this accident. This information finally made it clear to everyone what had happened and Sky West Flight 5569 was quickly identified as the aircraft that had most likely been hit.

When the investigation began, he demonstrated that the crash was caused by a failure of air traffic control management at LAX to implement proper procedures to provide redundancy in the event an individual controller made a mistake. In particular, the local decision to allow flight progress strips to bypass the ground controller was considered highly inappropriate. This, along with some other poor procedures, ultimately led to the tower controller losing his situational awareness and issuing that fatal landing clearance that ultimately caused the accident. The recommendations that emerged from this horrific accident focused on improving ATC procedures specifically around intersection takeoffs and reinforcing the need for clear and unambiguous phraseology, as well as for pilots to actively monitor the ATC frequency to detect potential threats. .

This also clearly showed the need to implement CRM and crew resource management courses, which would cover aspects such as communication and threat awareness, both involved in this case. It was also later discovered that the captain of the US Air plane had been using medications available without authorization from his AME and although this had no impact on this accident, it was recommended to further highlight the potential dangers of doing so. This for the pilots. Now, a procedure that also came directly out of this accident, that we are all using today, is to turn on the strobe lights every time we enter a runway, regardless of whether it is active or not, and also consider lining up slightly off center.line to make the plane more visible to surrounding traffic.

Now, of course, several other recommendations were also made in this final report and you can read them all by clicking the link below to my website, mentourpilot.com. There you can also find aviation news and links to my sponsors. Check out these videos below and if you'd like to help me produce them, consider sending a Super Thank You using the dollar sign button below or maybe purchase some merchandise or you can join my inner circle on Patreons. There is a link here on the screen or in the description below to do so. Have an absolutely fantastic day and we'll see you next time.

Bye bye.