Robert Gates: Is Anyone Still Afraid of the United States? | The Foreign Affairs Interview

I'm Dan Ctzen and this is the Foreign Affairs

interview

. Has US policy over the past few years basically undermined or weakened the deterrent effect of US policy and US power? Clearly no one seems to be

afraid

of us and the question is how to change? That last fall, Bob Gates, the former Secretary of Defense, took to the pages of Foreign Affairs to issue a warning as the United States faces the most dangerous geopolitical landscape in decades. Dysfunction in Washington threatened to turn that danger into disaster. Today Russia and China are testing the international order. Iranian proxies are attacking U.S. forces on a daily basis, and as Gates writes at the very moment when events demand a strong, coherent response the United States cannot provide one, Gates worries that such dysfunction at home could lead to America's enemies to make risky bets with catastrophic consequences for both. with the country and the world, Secretary Gates, thank you for the trench and the essay on the dysfunctional superpower that you wrote for our November and December issue and for joining me today, it's my pleasure, so I want to start with something in the headlines that seem so crude.

To demonstrate the point that drove your recent article, we are at a time when it seems increasingly likely that the United States will not approve an additional aid package for Ukraine, given the dysfunction of Congress, as you see it, what will the consequences of not approving that package? Both for the war in Ukraine and for American leadership in the world, the interesting thing is that not actually passing this package or a similar package affects not only Ukraine but also Israel's humanitarian assistance to Gaza and Taiwan, so is very comprehensive in its incompetence in terms of Russia. and Ukraine I think this is very dangerous.

The good news is that in recent days the European Union has reflected on economic aid to Ukraine worth 54 billion dollars, which is both a moral boost for Ukrainians but also an economic lifeline for the country in terms of pension payments and government costs etc., what the Europeans cannot do is fill the military side with weapons and ammunition etc. They have some capacity, but it is very limited, and they promise to do more in the future. but adding that the capability will take at least six months to a year, so we are at a point where the Ukrainians are on the defensive, I wouldn't necessarily characterize it as a stalemate because the Russians are being very aggressive in the East , they now have more troops in the East than they have had at any time during the course of the war, having lost between 315 and 350,000 soldiers, wounded and killed, two-thirds of their tank force, etc., but they have mobilized the country that Putin has mobilized. the Russian economy has mobilized its defense industries and they are now producing a lot of new equipment in addition to what they are getting from the Iranians and the North Koreans, so the Ukrainians are really in a situation and you know there are some trickles and monotonous that can come out of the Pentagon, as a friend of mine says, the Pentagon finds a lot of money between the cushions and the sofa, but not enough to provide the kind of support that Ukraine really needs, so I think that without this Military support package for Ukraine that Zalinsky will be under enormous pressure later this spring or this summer.

Enter into some type of negotiation. The Russians are pressing their maximum demands. People who have spoken to people in Putin's circle say that he is adamant in terms of not only Ukraine seeding those four districts in the east, but also the southern coast up to and including Odessa, a change of government in Kei that puts in power to a pro-Russian RO government and promises that Ukraine will never join either the EU or NATO, so that's where Congress has put us, yes. I wish we could say his fish was OB in this regard right now, but I'm

afraid

we're looking at a pretty good demonstration of everything you presented.

One of the criticisms you hear from some of the aid skeptics is that neither Ukraine nor its supporters in the Biden administration have presented a clear theory of victory or really presented a viable strategy. Is there anything you would adjust in our policy if you were sitting in one of your many old jobs helping to make American

foreign

policy. My old friend and colleague Steve Hadley and a colleague at the Atlantic Council published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal in recent days laying out what I think is a fairly persuasive strategy that recognizes that there probably won't be a ceasefire. and that the Ukrainians will not be able to dislodge the Russians, but basically asks that the Ukrainians be given the means and that they adjust their strategy to a defensive strategy in the East to ensure that the Russians cannot achieve a breakthrough with forces that they have assembled to defend what they have a massive support of military equipment that gives them additional capabilities that would allow them to attack Russian military targets in particular. in Crimea, but also in Western Russia, which supplies those forces, as they ask that there is no reason for the Kersch Bridge to remain standing, then they ask that Ukraine be put on the path to NATO membership and that Ukraine Focus on rebuilding your own defense.

Industries and that is not a solution to the problem, there is no solution to this problem unless Russia withdraws, which is not going to happen. However, the interesting thing is that the only piece of this Ukraine war that could create real problems for Putin is the potential significant loss or destruction in Crimea, which is the most critical part as far as he is concerned, so I think Hadley and his colleague have presented a pretty good strategy and I think the key is to persuade the Ukrainians that this is their best bet now. Given where they are, but like any other sensible strategy, it will require more assistance, particularly more military assistance to Ukraine so they can defend themselves against Putin.

If we do nothing, Russian forces will eventually force their way into eastern Ukraine, it is simply inevitable. and without significant military assistance for the Ukrainians, the long-term consequences for Europe and, frankly, for global security, I think are enormous, I think there is a school of thought, especially in parts of the Republican type of

foreign

policy establishment , including people close to the former and perhaps future President Trump, who argue that Ukraine is really a distraction from the larger challenge we face in the Pacific from China and that every dollar we spend in Ukraine, every weapon we send to Ukraine should go to Taiwan or Elsewhere in the Pacific, how do you understand the relationship between the two theaters?

There are certainly some trade-offs there, but there are also some more complicated dimensions to that connection, so the irony is that those who advocate that view are simply now rejecting support for Taiwan and support for Ukraine, so where is the logical coherence in that I think the problem with that line of thinking is, and we've seen it too often in the past, that people don't see the connection of different challenges around the world, for example, the biggest international beneficiaries of the attack from Hamas to Israel have been Putin because that conflict in the Middle East has diverted attention from Ukraine and XI Jen ping because it helps him in his relationship with Iran, but it also distracts the United States from the Far East, so the problem with that way of thinking is that I can't believe people think that the United States not supporting Ukraine wouldn't undermine Taiwan's confidence that the United States would support it and, furthermore, confidence of our other allies in the Pacific if the United States does not work or cooperate with its NATO allies to block this aggression in Europe, why would

anyone

in Asia have confidence that we would defend Taiwan, where the risks of a major war?

The confrontation with China is much greater and the costs of conflict much greater and more likely to involve the United States directly. I can't imagine people not understanding the XI. Jen Ping is watching this very closely. One of the concerns I have. Dan is that because we have had three presidents in a row essentially indicating that we wanted to get out of the Middle East and that we wanted to focus on Asia, we have given the attitudes toward the NATO alliance of former President Trump and many Republicans that the United States Americans They are wondering if we will be there as allies and what I see is that countries around the world, our allies and friends, are trying to gauge whether or not the United States will be there for them if they get in trouble if there is an aggressor. against them and not supporting Ukraine and then a possible Russian takeover of Ukraine would be a gigantic strategic setback and to think that would have no impact.

She's thinking about what we would do in Taiwan. I think it's incredibly naive when you refer to Xiin Ping in the recent Foreign Affairs, I mean, you mention the disturbing analogy of World War I and note that while there was nothing inevitable about World War I, there were stupid leaders and arrogant in Europe that led us to war; that's a Waring comparison that a lot of historians have made as they look at the global landscape right now, including the relationship between the United States and China, when they think about the kind of policy mistakes that could lead us down that path in China, which worries them and , looking at our China strategy, how close do you think we're going to get it right?

What would you change if you went back to one of your old jobs? Well, I think a big part of the problem and the challenge is having a sufficient deterrent force in Asia to cover the costs of China's attempts to invade Taiwan are too high economically, politically and so on, and part of the Paralysis in Congress includes the failure to pass a defensive appropriations bill, so all this wonderful rhetoric from the Hill and, frankly, from the administration about all these new programs. and replicator drones and more ships and submarines and so on, etc., it's just rhetoric, there is not a cent in the National Defense Authorization Act for the Department of Defense, you have to have allocations that the Department of Defense has not had. an appropriation approved at the beginning of the fiscal year 14 years from now that is an abdication by Congress of one of its main responsibilities and when you have these continuing resolutions you can't start anything new, you can't do anything else, everyone agrees I agree that we need to improve and expand our shipyards and our submarine capacity, but right now it's all rhetoric: no one is spending money to do any of those things and that's what the Chinese are looking at and they have a long-term view of these things. , so they are looking at 5 10 15 years in terms of their objectives both in Asia globally and with respect to Taiwan, so if we wanted to signal to the Chinese our determination to prevent them from taking Taiwan through an invasion, we would move forward in All of these things. we would vote on this aid again the rhetoric is simply contradicted by the facts there is a backlog of 1.199 billion dollars in weapons that we have agreed to sell to Taiwan and that we have not delivered it is a backlog of several years, so you know, this is going to At the heart of my article, in each of these cases, the failure of the administration or Congress to actually do things to get the money to vote and then spend it effectively and urgently is sending the wrong signals. to China and is sending the wrong signals. signals to our allies and friends Are you at all concerned that we are going too far when it comes to sending a strong signal to China?

I mean, you can see us as kind of a reverse Teddy Roosevelt at this point where we say a lot of things. A lot of acute things that you see in sort of increasing rhetoric about Taiwan and other issues without really backing it up consistently is that there is a risk in terms of setting off a sort of cycle of escalation without really being prepared to respond when there is escalation. . Well, I think the Administration has been quite careful in trying to lower the temperature in the relationship with China, frankly, I think the Chinese don't want a war with us, they don't want a war in the Far East, their whole historical approach, uh , goes.

Going back to Sunu and so on, it's about how to win without fighting, so we have to think in those terms and therefore the political signals that we send are important, but I think we know that we have a lot of military power out there that maybe we don't have There are as many ships as them, but ours are technologically, at least at this time, more technologically advanced and in particular we have a significant advantage in terms of the quality of our Submarine Force, so it is not as if we are playing with bad hands in Taiwan directly in southern China, I see it now, but if we look in five or ten years, that hand looks worse and worse if we cannot move forward on some of these measures that are being taken, the fortification of Guam, dispersion of forcesU.S.

Air Force in the region these are all smart things to do, but we need to back them up with additional capabilities and some of that we've been talking about since you were Secretary of Defense, well I mean my favorite example, so I said that the area where We have a significant technological advantage in submarines, so there are a lot of people on the hill who argue that we should produce three Virginia-class attack submarines every year. The actual budget contains funds for two, but the IND can only build 1.2. year, so that's the reality, no matter how much money is spent on the problem, if production capacity is not expanded, we will be left behind, you know, the Navy has been shrinking year after year and as they dismantle ships more old, but the pace of boat construction can't even begin to keep up without mentioning maintenance, so again this is one of those cases where rhetoric is one thing but reality is quite another.

We will return after a short break in a world where Knowledge is not just power, but a means to ensure security and prosperity. The need for trained intelligence professionals has never been greater at Georgetown University. Our online Master's in Applied Intelligence offers concentrations in national security intelligence, cyber intelligence, law enforcement intelligence, and competitive business intelligence for more information or to apply visit S cs. georgetown.edu security and now, going back to my conversation with Bob Gates, in the Foreign Affairs article he refers to a Sino-Russian alliance. Do you see that convergence as a lasting feature of the geopolitical landscape that the United States will face for years or longer? decades to come or is there some way to divide it or manage it like you and your colleagues did at the end of the Cold War.

I think it's a partnership of convenience. I don't think it is a true Alliance. I think it's been very interesting to see. The Chinese are certainly sending a lot of dual-use equipment and technology to the Russians, but they have been very careful to stay within the red lines that the United States has drawn in terms of providing actual weapons and military equipment to the Russians. The economic relationship has expanded dramatically in the last two years since the invasion of Ukraine. The Chinese love to buy discounted oil and gas, but you know, I think sometimes she might wonder if he's hooked her country and himself into a troubled state, so you know, I mean.

I started when I started my career at the CIA that same year, the Soviets had a million troops on the Chinese border and there was a huge clash on the Amur River that resulted in huge casualties on both sides and there were even Soviet diplomats doing discreet investigations into the United States. United uh if we would oppose or how we would react if they use nuclear weapons against China and I think the Russians also worry about Chinese influence in Central Asia which used to be part of the Soviet Union and now the Chinese are everywhere. Those countries with investments, Belt and Road projects, influence and propaganda, etc., Putin must ask themselves: you know?

I'm losing that part of the country and, frankly, what the Russians have done in Ukraine has made countries like Kazakhstan very nervous. because if the whole thing is to take care of the Russians who were abandoned when the Soviet Union collapsed, there are millions of Russians living in Kazakhstan and I think all these guys are a little nervous, so I think it's a partnership or an alliance of convenience . and it is a convenience also in the sense that they have complementary objectives in terms of weakening the United States, distracting the United States, and reversing the rules-based global order that the United States established after World War II, if you were to agree. back in the CIA or the NSC is there. anything you would do to try to break that association of convenience or to make the fans absolutely distrustful and this is something that I think is quite strong and I actually wrote a book about, you know, the C War took place in the context of the greatest race armamentist in world history, but because we were able to avoid a war with the Soviet Union, the outcome of the Cold War was actually determined by non-military instruments of power, economic, technological but also by strategic communication, so the agency America's information system was everywhere. in the world and it wasn't just the radios Radio Liberty Radio Free Europe The Voice of America was smuggling materials to the Soviet Union it was libraries and it was people for people's things and so on.

Congress abolished the usia. I mean, just think about the power of usia and the Reagan administration when Charlie Wick ran it or even the Kennedy administration when Edward Rurl ran it now Congress abolished that entire agency in 1998 and now it's a part of the state department which is fairly small and the undersecretary in charge of public diplomacy, that position has been vacant 40% of the time since it was created in the late 1990s and has been vacant 90% of the time in the Trump and Biden administrations now there is a confirmed undersecretary, but only in the last couple of months, so we have nothing to compete with the global strategic communications capabilities that the Chinese have created and it didn't start with XI Jin ping hinau invested like 7 billion dollars In creating this global propaganda communication structure in the early 2000s and We have continued to invest money, there is not a single country on the planet that does not have access to the Chinese Internet, social networks, printed materials, television, radio, etc., so this is one of those areas and we don't have a strategy for example to compete with belon Road cannot compete with them, but we should have a more creative strategy, so in terms of this Convenience Association, going back To the question you asked, you have the Russians and the Chinese and in particular, The Chinese have developed these non-military instruments of power that were so important for us to be successful in the Cold War, but now they are using them and basically We are walking, not running.

You wrote an article for foreign

affairs

four years ago. about the excessive militarization of American foreign policy, it is a drum that you have been beating for many years before and that it seems that we are

still

going in the wrong direction, as far as I can see, yes, one of the most interesting news when I was secretary when I gave a speech calling for more resources for the State Department. It was kind of a man bites a dog story. No one could remember the Secretary of Defense asking for more money for the State, but you know, it's like General Mattis when he was The Secretary said that if they don't give the State Department the budget they need, I'll have to buy more ammunition, so I want to go to the Middle East.

You referenced this briefly before. His article was published at the end of September and finished at the end of September, just before the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7 and the subsequent war on Gaza, how do you think the world has changed since you wrote the article? Do you know another way to say it if you had to add an epilogue? Your essay today on events in the Middle East, what would you say? I think the Middle East is on fire. I mean, there are four different conflicts going on simultaneously, obviously, the biggest and most painful for everyone started with Hamas' horrific attack on Israel in October. 7 and now the Israeli retaliation and the determination to get rid of Hamas, that's the second, the efforts to fundamentally close the Red Sea to commercial traffic.

I have read that in terms of global shipping, revenue for Egypt from the Sus Canal is a 40% drop in the month of January, which shows how many ships are avoiding that area, we

still

have to see how that affects the chain of global supply, but that is a second conflict and basically I think we are playing crazy in terms of going after the Hooded sites. The third active conflict is on the Israeli border and how long will the Israelis tolerate the current situation? They have evacuated 880,000 people from the northern part of Israel. The economy there is stagnant.

Most of those people are in hotels. The Israelis are telling isbah that you have to withdraw north of the Laton River, which is between 12 and 18 miles from Israel's northern border, and they are already shooting at each other regularly, the question is whether that will become a full-blown conflict and some of the Israeli cabinet ministers are urging that already this spring and then the fourth will clearly be militia attacks in Syria and Iraq against US forces in Syria, Jordan and Iraq, so basically we have four conflicts going on at the same time. At the same time, and some would like to say they're all connected and in some ways they are, but they're also discrete and they all go back to Iran, you know, the phrase in the Reagan administration was often that you have to go to the source, well, The source is Iran and I think the administration is right in understanding that the American people do not want another war in the Middle East, they do not want a war with Iran, but, frankly, how can you stop the Iranians from pursuing the role What are they doing? in these four conflicts and I think it's a big challenge and part of it goes back to the question that we were talking about with Xi Jinping and others and that is whether US policy over the last few years has basically undermined or weakened the deterrent effect of US politics and power clearly no one seems to be afraid of us and the question is how does that change over time and that brings me back to what's going on in Congress right now and that is how can we demonstrate to the rest of the world that we will continue to play the role not as global police but as trying to protect a rules-based order for the rest of the world and encouraging our allies to be there with us and support us.

And so on, when it comes to deterring Iran without starting another major war, what would you do to change or escalate Washington's response? I think this is actually a pretty fragile regime in Iran. I think you know it used to be when there were protests in uh. in Iran they would be in Teran and they would be university students and maybe merchants and so on, but starting in January 2018 and later many of these demonstrations have taken place throughout the country and in small towns and cities that the theocracy has designated as its base This is where his support base has been in the past, so I think this is a pretty fragile regime and, frankly, he would do everything he could, both overtly and covertly, to undermine that regime and empower those inside.

Iran, who are opposed to that regime and that would mean that regime change would come sooner rather than later, in their view, there would be a regime change or a significant change in the regime's policies. I mean, regime change has all these negative connotations because of Iraq and everything else, and I certainly think our experience in trying to achieve it militarily is unsatisfactory, to say the least, but I think there are other ways to foster change. that we should employ, let me ask one more question. about the return of the Middle East to the first of those four theaters of conflict that you mentioned before and that is the war in Gaza.

Do you see an Israeli strategy that has a chance of working? Do you see a sort of victory theory when it comes? to destroy Hamas that you believe is viable or see the need for change by Israel and the United States in hopes of achieving it. I think their goal is completely understandable: to destroy Hamas and its military capabilities and demand accountability, which means killing the leaders who planned what happened on October 7, the problem is that after several months of large-scale military operations B, from what I've read, they've killed maybe a third of the Hamas fighters.

Hamas has anticipated that it will have around 30,000 25 30,000 Israeli fighters have apparently killed around a third of them, they have killed less than half of the leaders they were looking for and Israel was left so traumatized by what happened on October 7 that the country was founded to provide a place for Jews where they would never again have to experience either a holocaust or programs of the type they had experienced historically and what happened on October 7 was a kind of combination of a localized Holocaust and a program with all those innocent people and all the wars that Israel has fought.

During the four wars they have never experienced anything like what happened on October 7, so the trauma in Israel is understandable and I think they reacted quickly and are making up their strategy as they go because they wanted to respond as quickly as possible and I I think one of the consequences of this has been the forceful force approach that has been taken and that has led to what I think everyone now agrees is a pretty serious humanitarian disaster in Gaza. I do not see an Israeli path to the complete destruction of Hamas. I mean, if you've beenin this for four months and now they say they are moving towards Rafa in the southern part of Gaza and so on, they will kill many more Hamas fighters, they may kill some of the leaders, but let's stipulate that at some point large fighting scale come to an end and that there are much more specific objectives in small scale operations, what is the future and that is where I think Israel has not thought about what will happen next.

I mean, they talk about maintaining a security posture, but who's going to police it, who's going to feed them, who's going to rebuild and I don't think they've thought about any of those things and, frankly, you know the administration is starting to move. in that direction, but my only concern is to hint or declare, as David Cameron did in the United Kingdom, a willingness to recognize a Palestinian state; now there is no Palestinian state that can recognize it. Everyone knows that the West Bank government is corrupt, incompetent and does not have the support of the people, so this may be the point at which the administration's strategy of trying to get Arab

states

to take some responsibility for changing Palestinian governance, but it's going to take a while and I think this is something that I'm not sure the administration is fully taking into account.

It will take some time to build some confidence on the part of Israelis that any ruling authority in the West that exists in the West Bank, even if new, will not be a threat to Israel. You know, we had a period where we were training, we had a three star in Israel training the Palestinian police and security forces and the Israelis had some degree of confidence in those forces to rebuild that is now going to take time and a lot energy and I and a lot of smart policies, but I think moving quickly towards a Palestinian state ignores the threat that Israel feels and the reality that exists. no Palestinian entity that can govern even the West Bank let alone Gaza at this time.

Are you worried that the United States will become entangled once again in the Middle East and distracted from Russia and China and other long-term challenges if the fourth administration returns? until George W. Bush's second term, where the United States has been trying to focus elsewhere, but has often failed. I think the notion of the United States diverting its attention from the Middle East was always an ephemeral goal, I mean, historically it's the Middle East. It is important and not only for oil and gas, but for its geographical location where the sea routes to the rest of the world are located, not to mention Israel's role in the region and what will happen there in the future.

I mean, it was one of the great positive things, one of the few positive things that happened in the Middle East until October 7, and that was the reconciliation that was taking place between Israel and the Arab

states

, particularly the Arabs of the Gulf, but also others. This is where Iran is a big player. winner of the Hamas attack because it has put on pause that reconciliation process that began with the Abraham Accords and was moving in the direction of a solution regarding Saudi Arabia and Israel and that may still be on the cards, but not in the short term term.

It appears we are in the early stages of a presidential campaign between Joe Biden and Donald Trump. A moment ago you mentioned rules-based order as a good thing. I think Donald Trump would see it as an example of everything that is wrong abroad. policy setting what would his return mean for American leadership in the world when it comes to all of these challenges? Well, I think the biggest consequence of his return is the unpredictability, you know, I don't know, I mean the Abraham Accords took place during his administration. So that was a positive thing, that was a good thing that happened, but in terms of our allies and so on, I mean, the facts are that you know one of their specific concerns that, frankly, all of us who are involved in defense, uh, coming back for good, was that the Europeans were not doing their part well, you know, largely because of the invasion of Ukraine, the allies have really stepped up their spending on defense and security issues, so I think there has been some response to the criticism he had if they are willing to pay attention to the reality that the Europeans have done a lot since he left the presidency, mainly since the invasion of Ukraine, but I think the unpredictability is the big concern.

I mean, I understand the frustration and anger of Americans about 20 years ago. years of war and what good it was for us to not be able to deal with the global financial crisis in 2008 2009 there are many problems and many mistakes that were made frankly and I understand it, but that does not change the world in which we live. As we live today, we cannot simply stand back and expect the rest of the world to continue and believe. Since Americans have believed for so long that events in distant places, whether Saro or the land of Sudon, uh or in dmbn Fu or training camps in Afghanistan are of no consequence to us, it is a good note to end with Secretary Gates , thank you for the great essay in our November and December issue called The Dysfunctional Superpower and thank you so much for joining me today.

My pleasure, Dan, thanks for listening. You can find the articles we discussed on today's show at Foreign

affairs

.com the Foreign Affairs

interview

is produced by Kate Brandon Julia Fleming comfortable and Molly Mackin special thanks also to Grace finlon Caitlyn Joseph Nora revenaugh Asher Ross Gabrielle Sierra and Marcus Zacharia our topic musical was written and performed by Robin Hilton, be sure to subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts, and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We launch a new program every other Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.