Inside the Deal: how the EU got Brexit done | LSE Event

Ok, thank you, um, during the meeting, thank you for staying silent, uh, very good evening, welcome to lse, uh, if you're not normally here, as I would say, if you're normally here, it's good to see you too, uh, this is. um, an excellent public

event

from the School of Public Policy at the European Institute, um, and it's going to consider the book here published by Stefan, the track called within the

deal

, how the EU achieved Brexit. I'm sure that choosing that title must have given you, given the Editors, a pleasure, um and uh, I should first say that my name is Tony Travis.

I am the associate dean of the school of public policy and a professor in the Department of Government. I am very happy to welcome Stefan, the ring and our long term. uh friend Vicky Price at the London school for the lse today and I welcome all of you of course now what the

event

is about well the event of course it's like there's a lot of things still in Gran Brittany, uh today about Brexit and its consequences, but Steph doesn't understand. He was a close associate of Michelle Barnier who, as you will all know, was the chief negotiator on the European and EU side of the Brexit

deal

and therefore Stefan, as her chief of staff, close in age to Michelle Barnier, had a front row seat to the Brexit negotiations and to the book we are about to hear from him about how he will discuss the way the EU approached this issue and the way the UK responded, how the deal was struck, how the European Commission of the European Union held the line. of a rules-based institution dealing with the UK government, which I think is fair to say went into the negotiations because perhaps the idea is less clear than when they came out, but we will see for those using Twitter the hashtag for the event from today. es hashtag lse rexit um I would like you to put your phones on silent if you haven't already, the event is being recorded and so if you want to ask a question there will be an opportunity to do so soon, you just know it's going to happen record, there will be an opportunity for questions, including those who are watching or listening, I should say online so that you too can have a question answered as well, that's all, so I'm just saying. a little more about our two guests Stefan the rink is currently head of the European Commission representation in Belgium and is a visiting professor at Leiden University, having previously worked as a senior advisor, as I said before, to Michelle Barnier, who was the European representative.

The Union's chief Brexit negotiator, Vicky Price, is the chief economic adviser at the Center for Business and Economic Research. You can't have everything in a free market economy and in fact Vicky is coming back next month to release a new book on economics which you can say a few words about later, that will be on March 7th so For my part, this topic is still very important. Current in both the EU and the UK is the question not only of how Brexit happened and how the deal was struck, but also of how it continues to unfold in the UK and across Europe, indeed beyond that. , the book will be available if you want it.

It's kindly accepted to stay on stage here to sign it for those of you who want a signed copy, but we'll start the night with a performance by Steph Undering. Thank you so much. Well, thank you Professor Trevor Stoney, thank you also for giving me the honor of speaking at the London School of Economics and thank you Vicky for agreeing to be a commentator. I am speaking tonight in my capacity as the author of this book within the agreement and how the EU achieved Brexit and I am not speaking in my capacity as an EU official, so the book came out, we could go on, it covers the period from 2016, the June referendum until early 2021 or until Christmas Day 2020, when we basically presented where Michelle Banye on Christmas Day presented a draft trade and cooperation agreement to the 27 ambassadors of the EU member states in Brussels, so I don't speak as a new official, I speak as an author, but if I utter those warnings, I think you will want it.

I agree with me that the period between June 16 and early 21 provides enough material for a conversation tonight, so a week ago marked three years since the UK left the European Union and the UK's decision United to regain control of its sovereignty. rather than sharing that sovereignty with other EU member states and with the EU institutions was, of course, a momentous issue with many ratifications to this day and particularly in the United Kingdom, where the issue is certainly more topical , I would say, than in the EU member states now. You will not be surprised that I see the sharing of sovereignty in the EU as a political act that makes a country stronger and more influential; certainly, it facilitates relations between neighboring member states by organizing the free movement of people, by organizing frictionless economic exchanges within a common institutional framework. framework and that is certainly an important point for relations between Ireland and the United Kingdom, so it is not just about labor markets and economic efficiency, trade and the export of goods in general, the EU is a system political that seeks a consensus among member states in the light of common political challenges or in light of the need to respond to shocks such as the pandemic or the Russian war in Ukraine today and, as an EU Member State, one is part of that constant deliberation to seek that consensus and look for what would argue and, ultimately, the construction of the common good for the European continent and a country that places itself outside that club places itself, of course, in a different position, it is puts itself in a situation where it finds itself with a European Union that negotiates in its own interest. which is a very different situation, which is what we always meant when we said that the United Kingdom is now a third country or has decided to become a third country, but the statements of some British politicians are based at least on their public statements during the negotiations, they somehow seem to express surprise at times that the UK has had to negotiate with the EU from outside rather than continuing to influence the EU from within and that is certainly something I also look at in this book, now that The focus of the book is the history of Brexit as seen from Brussels. or told from Brussels and it is a very different story from the Brexit story told in London.

The book analyzes the unity of the 27 governments and the EU institutions as their main strength during these negotiations and I have a number of factors that I summarize or want to summarize. We summarize here as an introduction our conversation about how to explain the unity of the 27 governments of the European Parliament and the European Commission during the Brexit negotiations, and the first for me would be the main factor, which was that the unity arose from a feeling of high politics. By this I mean the responsibility of EU leaders, national governments, national prime ministers, people like the German chancellor, the French president, the Dutch minister, the president and other leaders in the European Council, because in 2016 the EU emerged from many crises, the euro crisis had been incredibly divisive.

Brexit was the topic of the day in July 2015, but fortunately avoided migration was a very divisive crisis between member states and national government leaders, what I call EU leaders, many of whom also faced anti-EU or Eurosceptic parties in their internal public debates, so with Brexit there is a risk of an existential challenge to the European Union and I wanted to prevent people like Mateo Salvi in ​​Italy, as I quote in a book, from saying after the referendum that Italy should not be the last country to abandon the sinking ship, so this certainly led to a very strong position on the EU side that membership had to matter, another country being a member of the EU obviously had more benefits than a country that decided to go beyond that sense of political responsibility that I described in the book, especially in the The first chapters, the co-construction of negotiating mandates between us and the Commission and the 27 governments, also with the support of the European Parliament, it was a co-creation and that is not the usual way that sometimes the EU institutions work there. of back-and-forth interaction between council officials commission officials National diplomats to co-create that mandate that led in April 2017 a third factor for me in terms of unity a very clear negotiating mandate General but based on very clear principles It is not the integrity of the single market that safeguards the autonomy of EU decision-making without the UK's Brexit and a number of other principles and it is interesting to note, in my view, that this is also a trade-off because people It was realized that the UK leaving the EU would be a short-term cost for the European Union, but the decision was made to safeguard the internal market to safeguard the autonomy of decision-making and create those clear principles because in the medium and in the long term without these principles the costs would have been higher.

The transparency of the commission and the inclusive method of working with 27 governments and the European Parliament certainly also supported unity throughout these talks. That's where we practiced that method from the beginning in the book I described by Michelle Banier on October 16th. I went to see the first weeks in office. the Dutch government the Romanian government the Irish government I think he also saw the French president in those first hectic weeks of traveling basically and went to see the prime ministers and co-construct that mandate that was presented in April 2017. There are some images in the book, so that's the end of the slideshow.

Help, help, don't worry, I promise there is no help. I wanted to show four images too, don't worry, give you a little feel for the 21 images in the book. from my iPhone mainly and the first one is of Michelle Banye speaking to a German chancellor, thank you, and that is an illustration of what I just said: the symbiotic relationship between the EU leaders and Michelle Banier in building that mandate. Here he is talking to Mayor Theresa to apologize. She told me about the first three issues that had to be discussed: citizens' rights, the islands of Northern Ireland and the financial agreement.

This is a later image, but this is most of the Dutch governments. Michelle Bunny explains with her deputy negotiator to most of the Dutch government ministers who attended. with Margarita on the other side, the Minister President of the Netherlands. uh, this image is not in the book, by the way, the other three are part of the book, so before I continue let me remind us while I say that I look at this topic from the point of view. EU perspective, but the UK went through a very difficult political period in those same months while this was happening in the EU the co-creation of the Mandate the first months of the referendum here were characterized by whether the government could notify whether Parliament was in favor. agreement the media certain media spoke of enemies of the people the betrayal was part of what some media also announced in terms of how the country or how some in the United Kingdom were supposedly dealing with this Brexit with their departure from the European Union, so it was a Of course, the atmosphere here is very different compared to what was happening on the EU side and Theresa also called elections after notifying, not before notifying, hoping to win a comfortable majority and, according to her In other words, making Brexit a success, which of course he also did. will not happen and that is also a key factor that is found throughout the book, how from our site we had to deal with a difficult political situation for the UK government, also, by the way, many people back then thought about Brussels The voter has denied the majority to the government is weaker, in reality it was quite the opposite, as I maintain in the book, and in reality we had wanted a strong government majority so that either party could negotiate with a strong partner on this crucial issue.

The point about unity comes back to the negotiations and the sequence of conversations that I just showed with Nia's three points with Angela Merkel: we avoid conversations about the future relationship and focus on the divorce agreements and the important point for me was that the EU The team managed to comply with what the member states wanted for citizens' rights, mostly 90, with the exception of some family reunion rights and some other issues, the financial agreement we managed to achieve and that certainly created a great confidence on the part of the 27 governments and these 27 diplomats. In the European Commission as a negotiator, unity was already crucial at that time during the divorce negotiations and even more so in 2018 during a volatile British political situation.

For us, practicing patience in these negotiations without those Unity patients would certainly have beenmuch more difficult and I think our site will be patient for the UK to decide what it wants or patient to prevent the UK from imposing part of the economic cost of Brexit on the EU or factors certainly important to us and perhaps before continuing forward. Let me make one more point on this because the unity of 27 governments gave us, of course, a more comfortable position than the one negotiated by the United Kingdom, at least until December 19, when Boris Johnson won a decisive majority in the election because the UK negotiators had a divided Parliament as to who they were negotiating on behalf of and I think those structural political differences are important and probably too easily forgotten by people who criticize the UK negotiators.

Let me move on to a different point in the book. I was surprised perhaps by something that borders on that for us. It was easier to negotiate the future relationship with Boris Johnson in 2020 than with Theresa May in 2018. And perhaps it could be attributed to Johnson's majority in Westminster or the fact that at that time in 2020 Brexit was

done

, a problem that Brexit had not been

done

, which certainly tormented Theresa May and her negotiating approach, but I look at history from Brussels, however, and from Brussels seen from Brussels, I maintain that the fundamental reason why the negotiations with Boris Johnson and his team, David Frost, were easier because they accepted than leaving the single market and leaving the Customs Union. it would lead to trade barriers that did not exist between EU members and this was something Theresa May did not want to accept and wanted to basically change our mandate, which said that if you leave the single market and the customs union, there will inevitably be friction in trade .

Because it does not accept the same obligations as an EU member, we have now had difficult discussions with Boris Johnson to be clear and David Frost, his negotiator in particular on the level playing field that David Frost initially contested over the minimum free trade agreement that would have to include. Level playing field commitments and strong level playing field safeguards because, in his words, as the UK's equal EU sovereign, those issues had no place in such a free trade agreement. My book has a specific chapter on level playing field that explains it. It would have been impossible for us to negotiate any Free Trade Agreement without having strong safeguards for a level playing field.

In fact, the first conversation I document in Barnier's book with one of the leaders of Margaret's government and it was clear from October 16 that the level playing field was a decisive factor for many national governments, so that remained clear to us already in the first months after the referendum, but the discussions with Frost and Johnson were somewhat easier because they accepted the paradigm underlying our mandate to have a free trade agreement. and therefore inevitable frictions that did not exist between EU members in those difficult discussions on a level playing field and also on fisheries with the Johnson government, there was often confrontational rhetoric that echoed in some ways of May's approach before negotiations began, the Lancaster House speech on January 17.

There is no better deal than a Bad Deal, that rhetoric certainly also returned in 2020, when Boris Johnson repeatedly threatened to walk out of the negotiations and I document in the book two things about how those No Deal threats galvanized EU unity and also how they did not. I had no material. impact on us as negotiators because I say in the book that negotiations are not about trying to crush an opponent or influencing an opponent to adopt different mandates or different things that the opponent or the other party should say instead of what the opponent in negotiations asks.

In a negotiation one party gains influence by offering something of value to the other party rather than constantly rejecting what the other party wants or what the other party says it is absolutely necessary to conclude an agreement before concluding let me discuss an example of an episode of negotiation which I found particularly revealing in many of the aspects that I have discussed so far and which underline that Brexit in London was seen very differently to Brexit in Brussels in November 2018 we reached an agreement with Theresa May and her government was a very difficult period for the government David had resigned a few months earlier Boris Johnson as foreign secretary had resigned Dominic Rapp the Brexit secretary would resign that night over the government's agreement with the deal that we had negotiated a softer Brexit and what Teresa May had originally announced in her first speeches and we were waiting in Brussels for Dominiccraft to come or a press conference, a little hesitant to press, it's just a photo of us at the press conference which was at a solo press conference that Michelle Barnier gave the end after Theresa May had spoken. here in Downing Street to announce the agreement we are part of the central negotiation team looking on Twitter what the people behind us tweet about what Vania says on the podium we all like that photo so it's in the book like this that um but to come Returning to the story, the story was a few days after we left that famous tunnel, which is that dark space where the negotiator protected us from transparency, a usual transparency with national diplomats, we are negotiating with the Theresa May's team, particularly on Northern Ireland, Ireland. avoiding the hard border that had been dominating the discussions and the book shows that when Barney's team presented that agreement to the 27 ambassadors there were many questions about whether that could work, there were many doubts and the agreement was in the United Kingdom would remain in its entirely in the Customs Union with the EU unless and until another solution was found for Northern Ireland.

I describe how a Dutch journalist in a technical briefing, the gubernatorial MP sitting here on the left asked whether member states could accept such a soft cushion for Brexit in Britain and a few weeks earlier eight ministers had officially met to discuss their concerns about what Banier was doing and not to worry that fishing member states would give up some influence in future negotiations by agreeing to the backstop as it emerged and, ultimately, with Theresa May's team and us, as negotiating team, we took a calculated risk using the political capital that we thought we had and in fact had with the member states to ensure that this agreement was accepted and it was accepted because it had strict level playing field conditions that Teresa would also never challenge;

On the contrary, she always said that the United Kingdom was also a champion of state competition policy and high standards and could therefore easily accept that the investment reaction there was somewhat On the other hand, some parliamentarians who are more The Brexit side rejected the deal because they wanted a second referendum before any deal came into force and people on the Brexit side of the argument argued that the EU had trapped the UK and its rules and customs in its trade policy, but how to put it and without the ability to do your own trade deals, ultimately that is a fundamentally different view of seeing the world, but what Theresa May saw as benefits some of her MPs and her party were disadvantages, but we in Brussels we had to work. to make sure this deal was passed, long story short, more divisions arose in Westminster, as you know, UK voters came to the rescue to end the gridlock on December 19th and according to Boris Johnson, Bob was his uncle .

I believe this, but I quote Us in the book and its with the revised protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland. I have a photo in the book and I conclude after the one that was taken exactly when the tellers announced in March 2019 the results of the second significant vote and I would like to look at the faces of my colleagues on the other side of the table it is 10 o'clock at night we had had some red wine, so it was an empty glass and sisters at 10 at night we were looking and we looked at it in light of the accusation that people like Dominic Cummings allege that at least that's the team of the EU was trying to sabotage the Brexit that we were looking at if you see the two ladies on the left to the right for you from your perspective, the discouragement or the despair on these faces for I speak a thousand words in terms of how we would have I wish the deal had been passed and Brexit had basically been done anyway, we are now in 2023 so let me conclude from the EU side if you look back to 2017 and our initial fears.

An initial fear that certainly did not materialize was: how will the loss of a net contributor of 10 billion a year to the EU budget be absorbed? Will this lead to haggling between national treasuries, today we have the next generation of the EU and a borrowing capacity of 800 billion? the UK's 10 billion net contribution at the time was the result of a small virus with a big effect and, I would say, there is more unity in the EU today than before 2016. If you look at how it dealt with the pandemic or how it reacts now to the Russian war in Ukraine, I wrote this book because I hope that we, who I am respectful of the United Kingdom in this book, respect the philosophy of the negotiators who had to work in very difficult circumstances um and I hope that at the explain the logic of the EU we can come to a better common understanding of what happened in that period by looking back and I think looking back is important in terms of moving forward and hopefully a better common understanding and understanding the logic of the European Union on how you negotiated can also be helpful or a more constructive relationship from now on thank you very much okay now we're going to have a response from Vicky Price who also like I said uh I should have said this before uh to her current position, of course, she was once head of the government's economic service and uh, chief economist in what is now the business department, thank you, thank you very much for walking us through what The book says and you and I We discussed a little before to know what to focus on.

It's really interesting when you look at the UK response or think about the whole process compared to where you come from. I think there was a big misunderstanding in terms of the balance of power between the UK and Europe and I think there was a belief that Europe can do without us, but obviously it can and it was also obvious to anyone watching from here, particularly with a bit of European background I got in Greek and of course having seen how Europe dealt with Greece that writing didn't stand a chance and that's exactly what happened at the end of the day but I think it's pretty interesting Just read something than what you have in the book because it seems that what we have here in the UK is a bit of a curse of Brexit.

If you look at what happened to all our prime ministers, I mean, Cameron had to resign. We took over when no one else wanted to have that job because I think everyone knew it was an impossible job to do and, in fact, it turned out to be impossible for her. Then we had Johnson, well, he's not there anymore. So we trust briefly. Now we have Richie Sunac. uh most of the people mentioned voted or half of them voted to leave, half of them voted to stay, but no matter what they voted, if they were politicians, they really had a pretty hard time and I think that reflected the history of the UK's views on Europe and I'm going to quote from your book, which says quite clearly that the UK has had a history of basically being an uncomfortable partner and member of the EU, so, Margaret Thatcher, as you came here and received a custom refund from the budget in the UK, so he managed to get that, which is something, but of course it became quite objectionable during that period.

John Majors' main EU achievement was getting opt-outs in Masters, so he again backed down. a little bit of what was happening in the EU Gordon Brown signed the Lisbon Treaty by himself, skipping the ceremony with all the other EU leaders, he just thought he didn't want to contaminate himself by doing it alongside them, he decided Leave it aside, well , David Cameron, one of the few prime ministers not to attend the Nobel Peace Prize award in 2012. You took the Conservative party out of the influential European People's Party and that was a big mistake at the time, uh, and year. of the UK hardly agreed on what it meant to be a member of the EU, so we wanted to just be in but out at the same time, which I think is pretty much where we were, so it's not really a surprise how The meaning of the leave vote is different, but how did they interpret the leave vote?exit?

You mention the reason he didn't really know what this was all about or what he thought Brexit would be like, so it occurred to him that Brexit means Brexit, uh. which was really interesting, I don't know if you remember at the time, I live in Lambeth, who voted, it was probably the highest voting Council that stayed, except Gibraltar, and apparently they were still looking for the only person, Gibald, who I voted for I'm in favor of leaving, but it's extraordinary because obviously the council took it very seriously, at least they tried to deal with it, so I remember a lot of things happening in Bridgeton shortly afterwards.

I live very, very close to Brixton and you were driving down Acre Lane and there were big banners enticing you to go to Brixton and do various things there. Juan Banner said to visit just one market, which I thought was pretty interesting in itself and another said. Brixton means Brixton and I drove around and laughed out loud every time and he was there for quite a month so you can imagine the kind of contempt we all felt because this meaningless Brexit phrase means breakups and I think that has been the essence of the real problems, uh, that we all have, we've all had, um and it's also interesting what has developed since then because you say in the book and I'm very glad to hear that, uh, the people who knew what was going on.

Now there were the civil servants, of course, the civil servants in the UK had never signed a trade deal because it was all happening all over Europe, so there was a lot they had to learn, but compared to the politicians, I mean, they knew what they were doing and you found a deal with them in a pretty convincing way, but of course the current government doesn't seem to think very highly of them, we heard about Jace Jacob Bruce Morgan to, well, reduce the number of civil servants that plan the way has been abandoned, but still there are many attacks on the Syrian servants who do not do the right thing, they do not even come in when they work because everyone wants to work from home, what exactly are they contributing?

But in the book it's pretty obvious. that the only people who knew anything about what was going on were public officials because you also attack, attack, well I shouldn't say that because of course you're still an official, but you say some interesting things about the media. and I think what you're saying is that the influential reporters and columnists in London don't understand you at all, probably don't speak any of the languages ​​and write basically what the Westminster Bubble tells them, uh, and that's what they do well. If that's the case, then obviously the population here thinks differently too, which is why things appear to be a big win for the UK or at least are sold as a big win and not a win at all. there was victory for the EU and, in fact, the unity that you describe is absolutely what has held everything together and made it such a big and clear game at the end of the day, and talking again about the politicians and how much they knew and they understood one of the photos that you didn't show and you were absolutely amazed I think that when that happened when the photo was taken and it went viral it's in one of the negotiation meetings um David Davis supposedly appears uh who was in charge of the shipwreck of the as call Brexit department or the department to leave the EU um and the picture shows Garnier with stacks and stacks of papers and very, very knowledgeable on one side of this table and on the other side of the table, David Davis with no newspapers at all and of course it's not very surprising because I remember watching the BBC, a sort of Westminster channel, and David Davis was asked in Parliament about this report produced by the Civil Service which had examined the government's application in every aspect of the economy and its departments and were asked to prepare a report on what the implications would be.

That report was pretty damning because it was leaked, people were able to access it, and David Davis was asked, well, but have you read? the government's own reports he said well, I don't bother reading anything from the economists, do I? or something like that, which of course adds to Michael Gove's comment um. I mean, this country has said enough of experts, so the evidence was not really heard and even during those negotiations, the background that the politicians came with was already fixed in their minds now, where are we now? I mean, it should have been the 50th anniversary of our joining the European community, which of course we are now gone.

This is, of course, the third year of it coming out properly, but it is also the tenth anniversary of Cameroon's Bloomberg speech announcing the referendum which, of course, led to Brexit at the end of the day and the problems we all have. suffered since now, well, you could say it's okay, we're gone, and we can deal with it and we still have some kind of relationship with Europe, but the truth is that the economic implications have been very, very significant when you look at growth when you look trade when you look at people when you look at scientific collaboration all the calculations are that we have already lost in terms of productivity and competitiveness but finally the population is starting to wake up it is quite recent opinion polls now show that "Most people thinks it was a mistake.

It's extraordinary to think that over the years such an important country was given misinformation about the whole question of EU membership and not really focusing on what the single market can offer us now. I'm talking not just as a remainder or Ramona or whatever you can label like that, but as an economist who had done quite a bit of work in this area and quite a bit of work not just recently. the first people who worked on the takini report, that many of you are too young to have been born when it was made, what was called the cost of non-Europe in the late 80s, so I was responsible for some of it. a partner at KPMG and there were other consulting firms that looked at or looked at particular sectors and then we put it all together and looked at the implications of this, which were very significant in terms of having a Single Market because of the benefits that it eventually brings to low prices.

For consumers there are direct short-term impacts and there are also long-term dynamic impacts. Well, this particular study has been reviewed, so I'll end with this and it shows some extraordinary data and that was just a couple of years ago. a while ago, showing that the Single Market has increased trade between EU members by an average of 109 for goods and 58 for tradable services, far above what a Free Trade Agreement could actually provide, which of course that is what we are now with this Free Trade Agreement. Trade agreement that has supposedly reduced our trade intensity in the economy and reduced our exports and imports to the EU, so those games were huge economically because the GDP is positive where it has actually been much higher than we had anticipated and Of course, of course, if anything, with a change in the institutional framework that has taken place after the financial crisis and the terrible things happening in places like Greece, we now have much more basis for growth in Europe compared with the United Kingdom and enormously. greater ability to borrow and invest in sectors such as green energy than in the case of the United Kingdom, which is at risk of being left behind, so the latest polls show not only that the majority of people think it was a mistake, but also that if they voted today they would vote to remain well, just before we reach the audience both at home and in the theater.

I just want to ask a question, I want to say clearly, as you described, the EU was indeed negotiating. knowing what he wanted, he had agreed what he wanted from the dla deal where the UK government, for all sorts of obvious reasons, didn't know how to put in these symbols, they were negotiating something with no end point, now that's an easy accusation, but you might argue that I think the case is the other way around, that the EU didn't have to present what it was negotiating to 27 legislatures as it went along, while the UK did now.

I'm sure those who support bricks would see that need. However, you think it worked well or poorly by pointing out that the UK stands up for whatever it was trying to negotiate before its legislature in a way that the EU didn't have to and that doesn't get to the heart of some of the criticisms made. by the people who were pro-Brexit about the way the EU works first we had the legislative, we have the European Parliament, but not the individual nation of states, no, no, not because of the withdrawal agreement and in the end, nor because of trade and cooperation agreements, I suppose. what you are saying is that it is more political here than on the Brussels side.

I think it was very different here in 2020, when Johnson had a comfortable majority compared to the previous period, so I think we're generalizing too quickly that the UK Johnson government was a bit lost in history. I think the Johnson government and David Frost would say they knew very well what they wanted: a relatively minimal free trade agreement. The problem with that was that we needed enough on fisheries and a level playing field in To be able to come to an agreement on the previous period was a very difficult construction and Vicki says well, Brexit means that Brexit may not be the most illuminating in the context of where Teresa may have had to work, where some members of the MPS and her party said she didn't want Brexit and it had some meaning and it does, and I would say that what the book shows is that she constructed that meaning as it went on, basically the Lancaster House speech was very different from what came out in November 2018 that I just briefly described there. being behind the Legacy um so that's my underlying bottom line would be that Dominic collapses in the book or is dogmatic or legalistic and rigid.

I think the book disagrees with that because with Johnson we negotiated the exit of the hardware and with Theresa May a somewhat softer version. so we negotiated two different Brexits with two different governments and prime ministers. I think that's not something that should be forgotten when people say we're legalistic and rigid and I don't think that challenges that point. Well actually, I'm going to answer a question that relates to this from outside the theater, so I'm going to bring someone home, but unusually, so Richard Corbett says it's you, so it was easier negotiate with Johnson than with May, but wasn't it because he was willing to do so? agreeing points with no intention of implementing them i.e.

Northern Ireland's critical participation in Erasmus, a provision for a security partnership etc., well done Richard for getting the love of an audience when you are not in the room, Your Erasmus suddenly disappeared in the last few days. I think I forgot exactly it was a week before we all finished Erasmus with the officials and then the decision was made. I am not sure why Erasmus would not happen in the common foreign security policy, in fact we had agreed with Boris Johnson in October 2019 the Political Declaration of the Future Relationship which had a specific chapter on what followed the application Theresa May's proposal to have the best possible partnership with the EU compared to any other UK relationship with a third country in the world that was official policy in Government documents from Theresa May and then Johnson Frost said no, not anymore we want it, so I think the biggest difficulty during the negotiations was the fact that Theresa might want to leave the single market with frictionless trade and set up, and that is not the case.

That is why I argued that it was easier with David Frost and Boris Johnson in 2020. There were episodes in 2020 with the violation of international law in September 2020, the backtracking on the political declaration, but there was a different government that backtracked again on the political declaration. It's up to me to defend the UK government, but there was a big difference between Johnson before December 19 and after December 19 because he had a majority. Johnson tried to say that in September 2020 he would present international law. I think that was to apply pressure. we no deal end of June end of August by October no deal we walked out, that never happened, so the confrontational rhetoric and perhaps also the backtracking on what had been agreed never really impressed us and we kept them separate from the agreement to withdraw from the future relationship.

Okay, but I guess the point is that the reason I thought you could have frictionless trade or take parts of the Single Market that suited us um and uh and then we would come and go in and out a bit like what we had done before, to get some strange parts of this and then go on there and have differential agreements with the EU, so it's quite unrealistic what we were doing when she was arguing that that was what she wanted or expected to get. I mean,I guess you were telling the officials that there was no point in even discussing this, so how did you do it?

I mean, how did you come up with something? I wish, I read a little about this, yes, but you were quite surprised. Regarding that demand, in phase one, we were very, very firm regarding the financial agreements, the citizens are right, and if you look at what emerges from the negotiations on December 17, it is the opposite of dinner of Downing Street on April 17, so the United Kingdom changed its position quite dramatically. In those six seven months, which was our first negotiation experience, which was also done, let's be patient, let's focus on what we need and what we can do and I think we could make, as I said, softer and harder breaks within the limits of a mandate, but always respecting the basic principles that we had, so in 2018 we focused especially on the safeguarding of Northern Ireland because the white Customs Union of the United Kingdom emerged from a process of give and take in which, with the level playing field that entailed, we were managed.

To address that issue later with Boris Johnson is that he didn't want those kinds of obligations for the UK and good enough or not to get the corresponding benefits, okay, I'll open it up to the floor, there may be a lot of questions. I have a lot more online, so let's start with, personally, blue in the middle, right there, it's like it's hard for the microphone to catch you. I'll go to others, but I'll take them two out of three so we can get through a lot of questions, so try to keep them short. I will come to you and I will not forget the beginning.

Don't worry, you have equal opportunity up there, don't worry, yes please, I work for an implementing agency. from the Dutch government and study at the moment um you mentioned that um patients had an important role in the negotiations um to what extent that attitude was taken up by the EU and to what extent by the UK and uh could you? I've traded without that patience as a strategy, patience, right, and there was an and there and then one right behind it, now we'll take these three and then I promise you'll come to the audience and the others, yeah, um, hello. m Elise I'm a student at the European Institute here at LSI um guy from hofstadt a uh the new European MEP said I have a dream uh Ukraine and Britain will join the EU in the next five years um he said that on January 30 So, this year recently, do you think that is realistic from the EU perspective?

Would the EU be open and does the EU want the UK to rejoin the EU in the next five years? I think I read that Michelle Barnier quoted the other one. day on the telegraph saying that the EU would welcome you come back any moment back then I'm sorry, I'm sorry to make you run around the microphone, it's my fault right now, in the end I'll go to that person next, okay, hello my My name It's Danny Hatton. I work here at the lse um, the great villain, in quotes, of the referendum. They were the levers, I imagine, that were in the minds of most people here, but I can also see that during the negotiation period, the big villain, in quotes, for the rest.

How frustrating it was in Brussels to see people who at all costs seem to refuse to participate in the process in the hope that they could just stop all this, oops, paradox, in fact, do you want to try those three? Yeah, um, that's a great question for patients. Was it especially necessary when we were faced with the three types of situations? A threat to walking. far away, the United Kingdom, which had not decided what it wanted, the quote from an ambassador in 2018 that it is difficult to negotiate with a country that does not know what it wants and that was in the context of a divided, divided Conservative government.

The party in the House of Commons, some people who didn't want a deal, others didn't want a Brexit, will come to that on the remaining side and what helped us unity, of course, ensured that we could practice that, but also the clarity of our mandate, I think there was no way. that we could accept something and violate the core of our mandate and as long as that wasn't there the member states wouldn't take it on but would basically say just wait I mean in the book I describe and Johnson came to power it was like do or I died I abandoned a I support and remember the States that I also describe in the books, the only thing we can do is wait, so that is an example of patience, basically at a crucial moment in the negotiations.

I can't say it wasn't stressful at that time. Sometimes you get quite nervous when you are patient. Well, Giver Hofstadt and Michelle Bani, a French goalkeeper who scored in the Daily Telegraph, so you say. I am speaking here as the author of this book. I am also a new official. I have to be a little careful and what I say to that, but what I would say two things is one is that the EU is changing, obviously I talked about a borrowing capacity of 800 billion that is called Next Generation EU after the pandemic, we use a peace. mechanism for financing national weapons to a crane, so national deliveries are financed by the EU, partly financed by the EU for this, to create a defense cooperation, that is, a lot is happening in the industrial agreement, the green deal, so the EU is evolving as much as possible. we spoke well and in depth with eight nine countries that want to join the Balkans, Ukraine and some others, so I would also say that today we are in a different situation and it is not so much about rejoining but about the relationship in the future from that period . of the book, which is a period of acrimony also especially until Brexit happened and then you get to the remaining question um Robert Peston is on the cover there, the Brexit you'll never hear about from a Brit negotiating a major book, but it's also Brexit that you may have never heard of from the people left who came to see Michelle and found a negotiator who said, "Well, I'm working on a deal" and hence my photo that I showed, so we had people from the leftover side coming to us and we need to read the book to see who it is, but the crisis caused by the county in UK politics could be cathartic and then maybe we would get to another referendum or certainly to a free movement of people, there is a way out and we have less freedom. movement of people, but I will still be a member in some way, a bit like an extra opt-out or something or at least some restrictions and we said that just won't happen, you had your chance with a camera in the agreement, you do the referendum that it's in or out and we were working towards a deal, so we were working towards Brexit, although in the end I described how we sacrificed a lot in terms of our private time for a project we didn't believe in but had to deliver on. because it was in our interest to have a deal and so people had to live with it now um Susan Wolf uh I hope you can hear us now that we're closer to the microphone uh send me another message if you can't um I'm going to take three more now, one from Kevin Featherston of the European Institute, who under different circumstances would have been here tonight.

Stefan said it was easier to negotiate with Boris Johnson, but on the Northern Ireland protocol we come back to that. He doesn't fool you. I agreed to something he wasn't really planning to implement, namely no border controls over the Irish Sea. Some might say he lied and got away with it, but I'm talking about taking that to where we are now. In one sense it seems different, perhaps to get the final deal the EU will have to soften its position compared to what was in the protocol discussed, so add that to Kevin's other sharp question and down here, then someone behind I remember it very quickly, but I'll come see you later.

I promise you that I am not in favor of going up there. Yes, please. Thank you. Sheila Page. I've worked on trade deals in the past and that's actually the point of my question. It is not entirely true that no one in the UK had negotiated a trade deal, many of them had negotiated trade deals for other people if instead of doing it in the Brexit department it has been managed in Oda, they have done it with a considerable amount of experience and So my question really is how did the Civil Service note of your entire department learn anything from this because it didn't seem very good on the integrity of everything from the rules of origin to how you make a trade agreement?

I forgot about things like the musicians movement, research funding and things like that, I mean I haven't learned anything about trying to get expertise from the rest of the UK government or even the rest of UK society. United Kingdom. Good question, I'll ask it. Vicky first when we got there and there was another arm down there, hello, thanks for your time, tonight, so from the outside it seemed like all the discussions about the fishing territories and the fishing industries were quite important and contentious, my question. Is this true but also, more generally, do you think that all the weaknesses that come to light in the media largely reflect reality and how public opinion influences day-to-day negotiations?

Good place, let me think what it's going to take. you first this time, but the precise point about let me paraphrase if the Civil Service didn't fail in the way Brexiteers sometimes describe it, but it also failed those who remained, if it failed both, well, the Super Service, of course, I was a civil servant and I worked in the trade department, so Henry, you are right, you have known for a while that, from now on, during the period when we were members of the EU, many of the trade agreements and negotiations were closed. from Brussels with support, um, but one hadn't really sat down and agreed a new deal, but of course every detail of how the single market was being developed was done with all those officials working on this and advising and also when came to the state aid rules that are about to be abolished, it seems that in Europe we knew how to negotiate with that and of course we had all kinds of deals with Europe about what to do with financial services and the services sector in general . trade and more, those issues that have been addressed quite well in the past, but of course when it comes to changing the way of working, you have mentioned the rules of origin, which basically for those who don't know means that the agreement that has been signed requires one to prove that whatever we are selling on the merchandise side is primarily from the UK and anything that is not because we are no longer a member of the Customer Union, must be properly declared and if In the Customs, the tariffs we charge are not the same as what the EU charges, we have to adjust them, that's more or less how it works and we are all, if the percentage is acceptable, you still need to prove that that is the case.

You don't have to pay any additional fees for this, but you do need documentation, so there's all that plus everything else in terms of ensuring that it's gone through various processes, particularly around farm food and health regulations and everything that adds to the cost. , but those things have made everything more complicated and increased the need for companies to get advice before normal exports. There was a lot of support from the various agencies in the department. involved in what they might do after that has become a little more difficult because you need those experts, but also the government has gone out and recruited any trade expert they can think of who may have negotiated a trade deal with someone in some remote island anywhere. uh and they did uh and they brought people um but the interesting thing is that there weren't many of them that you can get from outside the EU itself um that and that they can easily come and do the negotiation with with Europe or maybe help us with other countries, but we brought in a lot of Australians to help us and a few others, has the Civil Service learned much from that?

Well, we have managed to make many commercial agreements. In the last few years, a lot of them were just renewing what they already had and we have done some new ones like with Australia and we have done them quite poorly because we have basically helped those countries rather than necessarily helping our agricultural sector or efficiency, which which is shouting saying "disappointment", so Kevin Featherstones, is that in a sense the way the protocol was signed? I mean, I'm certainly adding to your point something like that in the end the EU will have to give in a little more than I intended.

Can I say something? Because I am a public official, so I have to be careful with your question today, but it is very difficult for public officials to work for a divided government. You do it as a public official, you buy time, you try not to compromise, that's why I say in the book, a document in the book from February 2018 where I think four or five members of Theresa Mays' government gave speeches about the future relationship and one contradicted the other, yes. You are a civil servant working for that government, that is not an easy job, so you try to slow down.and buy time, as if you were deliberately ambiguous to keep the Coalition together in the cabinet, right? doing and but people were informing each other, okay, sorry, I describe the two chapters of the book on the negotiations on the Northern Ireland protocol with Boris Johnson and two on Theresa May, and that chapter is quite a bit about the operation of Johnson in Downing Street.

It is notable for the discrepancy between what was happening in the actual negotiations and what some people in Downing Street reported to the media, so there were times when I looked at the UK media with belligerent confrontational rhetoric and leaks, as well as on the same day that We had made good progress in the ongoing talks, which has always caught my attention and I go back to Vicky's initial points about the media, I think, and there is at least one in this room , but there are some brilliant journalists who have made an understanding. Okay, uh, what was happening in these negotiations, so I wouldn't want to make this a blanket statement in the UK media, but I got to know quite a few editors in London as well and from there there were several people who didn't understand what enough to the EU, I was literally told to play its role as the fourth estate and then hold the government to account and there is a section of the media which, as I described again in the book, is of the opinion that pre-existing opinions about the EU simply fuel the angle. from the editorial staff sometimes the desperation of his correspondence in Brussels um so the question is quite direct about um the personality of the Prime Minister is not something that I feel in Liberty I can't I can't look inside his head I just can't It documents in the book that I think he or Johnson understood very well the details of what he agreed to on October 19.

So people who think that maybe he's not the man of details, which is what I call, a question that's certainly not the picture that comes out of the book on October 19, no, yeah, that's a very good one. question again, uh, it was very difficult, it was the last topic standing, yes, after we concluded Level Playing Fields on December 24, 2020, the only problem was Fisheries and partly if you understand that Member States with interests of phishing and your five six seven eight depends a bit, but deliberately accepting a deal that harms your fishing industry is not easy, so for some Member States what David Frost was arguing until October 2020 was basically a No Deal situation because The Prime Minister or a government leader cannot face his fishing community and say: "Well, we have a good agreement and with the United Kingdom it is just not for you, that is not a winning situation, so we had to find a way out and we did it with quite a bit of give and take on both sides, we have a six year transition period where it goes from 100 to 75 and we have maintained the quota over time, this problem will no doubt return in 26. in terms of access to the waters, but there is also the question of access to energy networks and all of that is deliberately linked, so in this agreement the question is: how much was understood about the implications that this agreement would have? because I think you have some work to do right now.

I thought I underlined all this to ask you where an insult was used, which is always nice to see in a book. I don't remember where Frost's Johnson was who says who. he cares about mackerel, um, so I dismissed the whole thing because he doesn't know. Beyond those kinds of concerns, but that means they didn't understand, there was no one there who understood anything about fishing. The book doesn't say that, by the way. that David Frost said that he says that there was a tweet oh claimed that David Frost said that as an expression of exasperation on that last day uh right, let's get to the yeah uh I said we uh then there and then person here and then the front yeah, many Thanks, the names, you and Grant.

Now I am a speaker and writer. I've been doing mainly TV and radio about the war in Ukraine, but I worked on several of their European Union programs as a contractor in Ukraine, including just before and after the Maidan. A lot of what I saw from the EU and the EU delegation was not exactly the raid in its entirety. of international assistance um my question is about um common security and defense and the current war, how do you see the prospects of that leading to better relations, more effective relations in those fields and hopefully, um, turning to other issues?

I have noticed that many commission officials Unlike Member State officials, they are not always comfortable with CSDP issues and that applies particularly to Germany, which I think is a real problem for Member States, the United Kingdom, NATO and the United States. Thank you, okay and, yes, yes, of course, hello, my name. I'm Angelique, I'm a master's student in development studies and I was also lucky to participate in the discussions in 2019 as a trainee at the Greek embassy in the head office and in the Member States, so my question is, what are they? the key lessons learned from the agreement and my further question would be that many have relied on an EU identity crisis, taking into account persistent voices like Urban's, the ECU still has to deal with an identity crisis, has it over this?

What are your thoughts and yes, and it will also go to the front, so this time we will take four. I promise I'll go. My name is Francon and I work in trade policy here in London and my question is to look towards 2024 and 2025, if there was a change in the UK government, let's say Keystone allowed the government to, uh, that would give the ability to investigate the written relations and would leave the possibility of fundamentally changing the RER so effectively that it is a change of government, yes, okay, an intriguing question that neither the government nor the opposition talks about and at the beginning good evening, John Batchelor, please, When answering, could you speak a little closer to your microphones?

What differences in negotiation style did you observe between Davis, Rob Buckley and Frost? They always show the skills that you What is expected of effective negotiators is that they always stick to the brief variations given by their parliaments or there was an element of independent work or policy formulation going on and some indication or warning was given before the first three threw in the towel. Well, there is a very easy one for an official who is going to return to work, it's fair, do it, it's fine. I will always bring it back to the book if you allow me because, as you say, I am an EU official, but I speak to know the author of the book and, in fact, I am very grateful to the commission for allowing me to do this as a public official in my personal quality of response, but first in terms of common foreign security policy.

It is clear that the current situation is already different from the initial stages of post-Brexit Britain, so to speak, we tried with David Frost, Boris Johnson, to convince them and the member states wanted us to convince them to sign a foreign policy partnership and of common security, we even published a text, eh, although we told Our member states, look, David Frost doesn't want it, Johnson doesn't want it, there's no point in asking something that the other side doesn't want and that's because of the style of Negotiation approach, why ask something if the other party says no?

We really don't want that. Meanwhile, it has changed if you think about the first month after Brexit happened, the end of the transition period, the EU ambassador here, diplomatic immunity. That was a little dispute. The UK's first approach was certainly to work bilaterally with member states, but at some point it also changed with the trusted list attending the Common Foreign Policy Council alongside Anthony Blink in other Foreign Secretaries or Foreign Ministers from other countries, so that was already an important change in a way that symbolically expressed that and then there is the European Political Community now, which will also be based in the United Kingdom, first in Moldova in June and then in Spain and the United Kingdom United, so that is also an expression of can we discuss things that are geopolitically strategically important, so it is a structure external to the EU, but it is still an important and important new way?

Well, it was not for lack of trying on our part that we do not have a common foreign and security policy. current political association or a structured dialogue or those kinds of questions on the question of lessons learned and you mentioned Victor Orban in the book. Victor Urban is a strong supporter of EU unity in the Brexit negotiations and at some point UK diplomats tried to work with different countries and it could break down unity which never worked and I would know it so I know why any of The 27 EU leaders would have broken unity for the sake of what for them, you know, what would anyone gain from this? break a unity that is undoubtedly the Franco-German alliance and other countries certainly wanted to maintain and all countries wanted to maintain.

If you look back, the key lesson for me is that if you negotiate, it sounds very trivial, but if you negotiate, you know what you want. Be clear about what you want, there is no point in confronting the other party and saying to the other party, yes, that was quite notable for me, sometimes the negotiators would tell us that you are not asking the EU for the right things, that You are making the wrong decisions. EU, what you are trying to do is not in your own interest. People in the UK would say that the British negotiated would say, "This is our position." If you believe this is the decision we collectively made and therefore we respect the Mandate. on the other side, but trying to work with that mandate, um and then going back to the negotiators where we had four again with David Frost, that government knew what it wanted, it was a harder Brexit, maybe more economically damaging, but that was what the government wanted and that was, therefore, within that paradigm of Canada with a level playing field uh and the issue of fishing, which was complicated um I think the most difficult part with the previous negotiator, especially with David Davis Dominic grappos, they were part of a government that denied that leaving the single market had to have a negative economic impact, that was the hardest part and then they tried to work with trust and would no longer have common institutions that could be trusted We, the members of the United Kingdom, trust each other because they have common institutions. that ensure that what is agreed is implemented and enforced and that ultimately there is a court of law to do so if necessary and subsequently find even the member states if they do not comply with the agreed rules once you are Out of that.

The trust structure is not something that works in terms of trade and standards and all that kind of stuff. Yes, I think so, maybe just a couple of things, but back to whether Boris Johnson did not intend to implement anything he signed. Yes, well, what we've seen is quite interesting is that we haven't done what we said we were going to do in terms of border controls for incoming goods and we certainly have been delaying and delaying them. while they exist across the channel, we don't have them here and we do know that unless it has been withdrawn there is a legal challenge for the UK which actually, you know, there has been yet another legal challenge. recently in terms of you know some of the intentions that we have in relation to the regulations that exist here and there there is a concern and it was in all the newspapers over the weekend that you um make life much more difficult and impose more business restrictions if we start um this this the burning if you like the bonfire of all the regulations that are now in study books that we want to eliminate or get rid of the It's supposed to be at the end of the year, um and of course a lot of them have to do a working environment and standards, etc., if that were to happen and the competitive balance would change, if you like, and the EU will reciprocate with everything we have.

What we've seen so far is that the EU threatens to do it, but doesn't actually do it, so that would be interesting. I mean, I'd like to know if you think we're actually moving toward that more litigious environment, on the other hand. we're supposedly making some progress on the Northern Ireland protocol, so that may help, so that's the only thing, but when it comes to what we could do with the action, um, we were discussing this before, would we be If we were, would we be in Dreamland? that we decided to come back and there is some kind of referendum of the guests there or whatever or at least start to consider it there is a question of whether we join the euro would also be an obligation or not um but also, frankly, so far uh our leaders, including the Liberal Democrats, who had been so in favor of another referendum and that caused them to lose a large number of MPs in the Pollard election.

Everyone is too afraid in this country to really participate. political party to say that we are going to consider returning, in fact, if something is reinforced kirstama The opinion uh, uh, we are not going to return and that we simply have to dostep by step we reached an understanding in exchange for the consent of the members of the legislative assembly of Northern Ireland. we've just passed it, but you know, there's a tradition of certainly a sort of common British political programme. Cheerful question at the end, it's a serious question, as well as some that I think will make people smarter, and actually, although it comes from the vice president of the UK European movement I suspect many on the Brexit side would also be interested ​​in knowing the answer to this question.

Do you think negotiating the UK's re-entry into the EU will be easier or more difficult than the negotiations? in the UK to leave, but there's no ticking clock, there's no ticking clock, that's the answer, but I think first and let's go back to the gentleman's question up there, um, when the letter arrived for us, Brexit was a reality. Unfortunately we turned the page, but we made it while I still follow and continue to follow the UK media. I keep reading about Remainers and Brexiteers. It is a more powerful identity that everyone was conservative. Well, yes, according to political science, but hey, okay, I believe in political science.

It was once won through training fights. I still am, I guess, but to me there seems to be first the necessary debate here about what that means and overcoming that distinction that is apparently a strong identity like you're saying, because then. Yes, I think it is a precondition for any process to be healthy. Do you think that if you emphasize, it will be because you know that both sides are thinking about this? You know who wants to ensure that the UK is less likely to do so and who would like to rejoin if it is such a thing, we are on the table, how do you think it would work well?

What we saw in the referendum itself is that the economy didn't really play the important role that we all expected, but now the economy does. It's getting a little bit more into the debate because everyone can see what the implications of this have been now, of course, we had already covered, we had energy, the war in Ukraine, what it meant for energy, prices, etc., so you can't. You definitely know to separate it, but there is a lot of evidence that we are suffering from a long-term decline in the economy compared to others, so it would really depend, therefore, you know on the productivity of people's livelihoods, which really has already suffered quite significantly, trade. jobs and quality of jobs and compensation for those jobs, is something that I think could determine at the end of the day what people really think about being prepared to go through this process of rethinking reentry and, as I said, the surveys are changing, there is no doubt. that are changing, whether there will be enough political will to do something about it and, of course, how Europe would react, because I read in your book that, as far as you are concerned, Europe is worried about Brexit. done and you have a lot of other things to think about instead of having to deal with those difficult Brits who make your life more difficult and we already have nine countries that want to join us, so we have the General Opera ahead of us. everyone on that topic um, I think it's also worth adding, although the polls have changed substantially, people are still a bit over another referendum, if it comes to that, they are much more skeptical about the horrors unleashed by the referendum or the except this guy. from an almost cultural problem that I think became something like that, anyway we'll see, thank you all for all your questions and those that are online.

I'm sure everyone is online. I couldn't answer all of your questions, but thank you all for joining us. There will now be an opportunity when I copy the book and sign it if you say wish, so I would like to thank Vicky Bryce and Stefan for reading and all of you for what has been a fascinating video.