WHY did This Airplane MISS the RUNWAY? | Qantas flight 001

A Qantas Boeing 747-400 is taxiing rapidly down

runway

2-1 left in Bangkok, Thailand, more than two-thirds of the

runway

is already behind the plane and both pilots are frantically importing maximum manual braking, but the plane just It doesn't slow down, stay tuned. Many thanks to nordvpn for sponsoring

this

video. At first glance,

this

story seems easy enough to explain. It is easy to understand what and who was to blame for what ultimately happened, but it turns out that, once again, this is much more complicated. It looks and that's why I'm going to put a number here on key moments during the story which I'll then explain towards the end of the video, so make sure you stay tuned until the end to really appreciate what led to this Qantas Flight 1 is. what we now call the kangaroo route, are the regulatory notes that Qantas uses to connect Australia via an intermediate stop in Asia to the United Kingdom and September 23, 1999, which is when this story happened.

The

flight

began in Sydney, Australia, then headed to Bangkok in Thailand and then to London in the United Kingdom. The

flight

was flown by a 747-400, the queen of the sky, one of my all-time favorite

airplane

s aboard the flight there. In the first leg there were three pilots, 16 cabin crew and 391 passengers. When the accident occurred, the captain of the flight was a 49-year-old man with 15,881 hours of total time, of which 724 hours were on the 747-400 and part of his experience was also doing what we call base training, which is the touch and target training that is done with pilots who have recently been transferred to a new type or who are allowed to fly with passengers and this is actually going to It became very important to fly along with him.

He was also a very experienced first officer. He was a 36-year-old man with 8,973 hours of total time, of which 5,187 flew on the 747-400, so he had a lot of experience in the type he flew. His training history shows that he was a good pilot with even slightly above average skills. The second officer who was sitting in the jump seat on the flight was a 35-year-old man with 6,685 hours of total time (2,961 hours on the 747 400) and had previously come from the Australian Air Force, so he was also considered a Very experienced pilot in the cockpit of this flight.

She was also the second officer's wife, but the fact that she was present in the closet will have no bearing whatsoever. In what is about to happen, the first officer was appointed flight pilot for the flight and the initial taxi, takeoff, climb and cruise to look at Bangkok were uneventful. Nothing out of the ordinary happened as the crew began to close in to observe Bangkok and began to get the weather and weather report from Bangkok indicating that there was going to be a 2-1 left or right robot to land. The surface wind was 240 degrees at 10 knots and visibility was 9 kilometers in rain with thunderstorms in the area of ​​this type.

The weather is nothing out of the ordinary in Bangkok and Thailand in this type of year because September often has heavy rain and thunderstorms, so the pilots didn't think there was anything out of the ordinary, but the first officer had handed them passed the controls to the captain and began preparing for an eyeless approach to runway 2-1 right in Bangkok and they chose to use flaps 25, which is the second highest flap setting for the 747 at 400 and also the confidence inactive reverse that the company was. procedure at that time, the aircraft left cruising altitude flight level 350 at 22:16 local time, which meant that it was now completely dark outside and when they began to descend, they were very quickly handed over to the Bangkok area controller as soon as how they changed. frequency at that new frequency they were informed that they were number two in sequence behind a Thai Airways Airbus A330 and that they were going to land on Runway two one on the left not round with two one on the right that they had initially prepared for Runway two on the left is a little narrower and also a little shorter than the one with two and one on the right, but it is still a very long runway, it is more than 3,000 meters long, which is within the performance capability of the 747-400 due to the runway change, the first officer now had to report back on this new wireless approach because, even though it is for parallel runways, things like Minimus, things like frequencies and of course the performance are going to differ, so he made this report on the new approach and noted that if they were going to land.

Runway 2-1 on the left, they were going to have to taxi towards the end of the runway and taxi on the Sierra taxiway and with that they chose configuration 2 of the automatic brake which corresponded to a landing distance that would facilitate a good taxi. on Sierra taxiway. He also noted that drama 2 on the left had a slightly steeper glide slope to the right, so while the standard glide slope sits at three degrees, this island had a glide slope of 3.15 degrees, The reason this is important is because if the glide slope angle is steeper than normal it could be more of a problem for the pilots to slow down and we could have to deploy the flaps earlier and that is why we always include that type of information in the briefing, but throughout this briefing there was no After a discussion about the state of the runway, whether this rain that was at the airport was going to have an effect on the braking action, the aircraft continued to descend and approximately four minutes after the approach briefing was completed, the area air traffic controller informed the aircraft ahead of Qantas one that there was now heavy rain at the airport, the captain of Qantas one responded that by selecting automatic brake 3 instead and said that due to the water now this would indicate that he saw a potential problem with a lot of rain on the runway, but There was no further discussion on this, the tower also reported a visibility of four kilometers on the airport and at that time Qantas had a landing first officers limitation of 1,500 metres, but as four kilometers was well above that there was no need to change the plan, as they approached the pilots should have looked towards down on the web radar screen and realized that there was quite a bit of storm activity around the airport because the first officers began discussing that in case of a

miss

ed approach they should head down. headed south to stay out of the weather, but they were still pretty far away, over 70 kilometers from the airport at this point, and the thing about thunderstorms is that they move pretty fast, so even if there's a storm over the runway when You are so far away that it could have disappeared a long time ago when you landed at 22 30 there was a new weather observation that made the information uniform and transmitted on the 80s frequency, which is the automatic trans

miss

ions that are sent , the weather was two four series at nine, no visibility at five kilometers with heavy rain and thunderstorms, this weather report was copied by the second officer, whose job was to monitor the weather for information, but also talk to the company and organize things like buses and anything else they needed. might need at time 2233, the aircraft was getting so close to the approach that they were handed over to the Pro controller and after this the crew completed their approach checklist, they reconfirmed that they will use flaps 25 and I will reverse the confidence. during landing they were now also allowed to see a final 10 nordic miles from a left 2-1 and as they approached they began to reduce speed to prepare to take out the flaps, they selected flaps one, five and the plane was decelerating normally At this point everything seemed normal, but what the crew didn't know was that this time, as they prepared to intercept the glide runway towards Roman 2 on the left, there was a special observation of the water sent Tango information and in this information the visibility has now dropped to 1,500 meters under heavy rain that fell at 750 meters, meaning that the rain was now getting worse on the runway, but as the crew never received this information, they have to actively listen on the last frequency in order to get This and Air Traffic Control did not receive any warning about the availability of this new information, the crew did not realize this, the crew now captured the left Runway 2-1 ILS approach and while doing so, the control The air traffic controller informed them that when they passed the outer market, which is a specific point on the ILS approach, they had to contact the Bangkok Tower to obtain landing clearance, unbeknownst to the crew, they had now become the number three to land instead of the number two they thought they were on.

Among them, Air Traffic Control had managed to get in a Boeing 737 that was also Qantas Flight 15. Now, as the crew descended the glide runway and the Thai Airways Airbus 330 that was originally in front of them managed to land, but the Qantas 15 The flight actually turned around when they encountered really heavy rain and lost all visibility at about 350 feet descending into the ILS. Now the Qantas crew would have heard this if they were actually on the tower frequency, but as they were now descending and were waiting to pass the outside marker, they were still on the old frequency, so they didn't hear this plane turning around. .

The plane is now descending the glide slope and the crew can clearly see the rumbling lights ahead of them. You can also obviously see that there is rain on the approach, but at this point during the approach there is relatively pleasant weather with good visibility, so the first officer decides to disengage the autopilot and external throttle and fly the aircraft manually to Gain some manual flying experience. Since when you fly long distance you may not do it very often, at time 22 45 the crew switches to the tower frequency and when they talk to the tower, the tower tells them that they are cleared.

Land Rover 2-1 on the left, but also caution The runway is wet and an Airbus 330 that landed previously had reported a braking action, so the tower does not mention that the 737, although it is just in front of the monopro, has given turnaround due to rain, meaning the crew is now descending. They have not received a special observation, they do not know that the plane in front of them has turned around and that is important because that could have changed their mind towards a possible return to the air scenario, the fact that the weather is much worse than expected. what were they.

Hoping so, but the crew does not fully realize this, so they continue the approach and shortly after the first officer asks for flaps 25. The captain gives them to be the landing flaps and after this he does comments and says the plane doesn't want to reduce the landing speed they have selected is a v-ref speed of 149 and a flight speed of 154. But at this point the crew is flying about 12 knots faster than at 166 knots. , the captain recognizes that the speed is high but is still within the stabilized landing criterion, which is vref to vref plus 20. So they continue to descend, we can see on the flight data recorder that confidence is momentarily reduced but that eventually principle does not want to reduce.

It's too much because once you have landing failures, you don't want to go back to idle, for example, because the drag of the plane and the time it will take for the engines to run is too high, so you reduce it but then it stays there and the speed never really decreases below this 166 knots at about 350 feet descending the first officer asks the captain to put on the windshield wipers as there is now a light rain coming in and as the rain now it just gets heavier and heavier and heavier and More the first officer begins to drift above the glide slope for the first time the captain points this out saying you are rising now as he looks out and can still see the poppies ranging from three white and one red which is normal You will see on a 747 in front of four targets, but also be aware that they are now so close to the runway that you can no longer judge the landing from the purpose, you have to look at the landing.

Zone so that when the plane descends to 100 feet, the captain asks the first officer is it okay and the first officer responds with oh yeah, they are now passing the runway threshold at 76 feet where they should have been about 50 feet. also about 15 knots faster than they should be, but even though it's hot and high, it's still within the manageable range of a 747 hitting a runway so long at 50 feet that the nose of the plane starts to lift and the captain realizes it. This is pretty early and it says Put it down, put it down, you're inside the flare, the firstofficer acknowledges this, but it doesn't really change anything, it just continues descending at a decent speed of about 300 feet per minute.

What it does is reduce confidence at idle in preparation for landing. Now things are starting to happen very quickly because since the plane was already high and fast above the threshold, it is now doing a very slow flash, which means that it is being eaten. Valuable runway below them and at 30 feet the captain approaches and changes the outside brake setting from three to four, indicating that he is well aware that this is now a potential problem, but does not mention that he is doing this to the rest of the crew. crew simply no time for that at 10 feet the captain announces to turn around the first officer reacts immediately to this advancing the trust levers to which he turns around confidently and preparing to turn around it seems like he was probably waiting for that call but one thing What the first officer does is press the buttons on the robe that would have initiated the flight directors into circling mode because the plane is only 10 feet away and due to the enormous inertia of the 747 there is no way they are not going to do it. landing so that only one second after this the main gear of the plane lands on the runway and something very peculiar happens here because it seems that they are now coming out of the worst of the rain, it means that the visibility is increasing drastically and the captain makes the decision to turn back. his own decision to turn around becomes a landing decision, he reaches out and puts his hand on top of the first officer's hand and reduces the trust back to inactive, but in doing so he actually fails to reduce the trust level number one so that the level of trust is still prepared to turn around, trust that the others are idle and there is momentary confusion as you may understand who really had the controls here because the captain does not tell the first officer that has made this decision, there are several problems with doing things like this and I am going to explain why the captain made this decision and based on what you will see later in the video, but the immediate effect that this has is that as the confidence levels are now being reduced to idle, the spoilers The wings do not lift well, generally speaking, in a normal landing, when the wheel starts to spin and the weight and switches of the wheels feel like they are on the ground, The spoilers will immediately rise on the wing and this will force all the weight. from the plane to the brakes, which makes the brakes more effective, but since the trusty lever on engine number one is not at idle, it means that the plane still thinks that maybe these guys want to try to turn around to which the spoilers don't but, on the other hand, the fact that the other three confidence levels are reduced to inactive means that the outer pause that was set at four years before landing now changes to disarm, so the plane is now on the ground more More than a thousand meters from the runway they already made a very long landing but they don't have the spoilers up, they don't have the automatic brakes working and there is still a bit of confusion about what is happening and the number one engine. is still producing Confidence, the first officer says at this point okay, we're underway and the captain asks have you got it and the first officer says uh, yeah, yeah, and at this point also this is about two seconds after the initial landing that the first officer reaches. and reduces confidence back to idling on the remaining number one engine, meaning spoilers are now appearing even though the sport has lowered the engines that were revving for the turn.

Confidence when you cut confidence in engines, it's not like a car engine, for example, will continue to accelerate for a while due to the inertia of the fans, so they are still building forward confidence here and because it has Given this confusion, no one thinks about breaking and selecting reverse trusts so that the engines are equal. although they will start to decelerate quickly, they are still producing a Forward Confidence Vector instead of the Inverted Armature Vector they would normally have, which would help even if it is idling, it is still better than a Forward Confidence Vector when the plane passed through. the middle point. on the runway is where there is a signal on the flight data recorder indicating that the deceleration actually begins at this point, in reality there was a small acceleration due to the Indians showing forward confidence, the first officer must have noticed that the plane is not decelerating at all so it is applying maximum manual braking, but as we were discussing before up to this point it has been raining heavily on the runway and this runway does not have slots, there are two different types of runway, or is it the runway that is grooved which has small grooves As the name suggests, it allows water to drain quickly from the runway and leaves plenty of surface for the

airplane

tires to grip on or it is the surface without grooves which in this case is concrete in Bangkok and in this top track.

The track is slightly elevated in the center of the track to allow the water to rinse off, but it takes longer, so as the crew is now trying to get maximum manual braking, they are actually going a bit off course for La left or center line and the flight data recorder shows that as they are breaking the glide system jumps almost immediately and that is probably due to dynamic aquatic planning. Dynamic aquaplaning is an extremely dangerous thing, the amount of aquaplaning you get has to be It has to do with the speed of the plane, the tire pressure and also the grooves of the tires, but if you are in aquaplaning , it's basically like the plane goes up on water skis, okay, it's like going on water eliminating almost all the friction, okay?

This will make the aircraft's braking action essentially port and nil and this is what this aircraft is experiencing now. Both drivers are now giving maximum manual braking, but because the anti-skid system intervenes and makes sure the tires don't move. until you come to a complete stop, the brakes do almost nothing and it is at this point that the use of reverse gear is the most important thing you have, but they are not selected nor will they be at any time during this Landing role when there is a thousand meters away. left of the runway, the airplane's speed is a stamped 134 knots and the airplane is now slightly to the left of the centerline and it's probably because they are not on the centerline and they are moving toward the edges, there it is where there is more water, which actually makes the situation worse, the plane passes the opposite threshold at 96 knots, passes the stopway at 88 knots, then leaves the paved part of the runway and 117 meters later runs into the locator antenna that is in place. on a concrete base approximately one meter high.

As it does so, the nose wheel collapses and so does the outer main landing gear on the right side, causing the nose of the plane to sink into the soft ground, as well as both engines on the right wing 103 meters later, The plane finally comes to a complete stop with its nose resting on a slightly elevated airport perimeter road. Now, what happens after this is an almost equally interesting story and I will tell you all about it after this short. message, we bring this video to you together with nordvpn. Now you know as well as I do how important it is to protect yourself and your data today.

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Then click on the link which is the nordvpn.com pilot and you will get a huge 73 discount on the two year deal plus four additional months absolutely free, so go down and click on the link and start protecting yourself on Internet today. What happened in The back of the cabin was done and after the plane stopped completely, this is a really fascinating story, as well as the plane landed at time 22 46 30. The person started to welcome Bangkok pa um, but he quickly realized that this was not the normal landing, so he stopped the public address system at the same time some of the cabin crew at the back of the plane also understood the same thing and started shouting brace brace and with the head down, grab the ankles the way they had done. trained to do so, however not all cabin crew did this for unknown reasons when the plane came to a complete stop in the cockpit the first officer quickly initiated his rote items which included putting out the Indians using the fire switches at the same time as the captain.

He tried to make a couple of calls to the passengers, he tried twice but it didn't work and the reason was because the nose gear had been pushed into the body of the plane and had damaged the electronics bay which is located just behind the nose gear. and in that electronics bay was located the type of circuit for the public address system and the intercom system, which meant that not only could the captain not make a public address to the passengers or the cabin crew, but he could not even access the intercom system and neither could the cabin crew, so they could not communicate with each other and this turned out to be a big obstacle.

When the captain realized this, he told the second officer to run down and contact the purser, who is the Chief of Cabin Crew. It is important to understand that the Boeing 747 is a really big plane. Okay, it's divided into six different zones called A to F, where A to E are on the main deck and F is the upper deck. There are 10 emergency exits. on the main deck and there are two emergency exits on the upper deck. There are 16 cabin crew and to each of these 12 doors there is a cabin crew assigned and your responsibility if something like this happens is to stay by your doors and be ready to evacuate.

In a very short time when the second officer came out and spoke with the purser, you could tell that from the forest they knew that there was no fire in the cabin and that there were no serious injuries, so the purser left his door unattended and went up with the second officer to the cabin and told the captain that his assessment was that all cabin crew were ready to evacuate if necessary and that there were no signs of fire or serious injuries in the cabin. The captain took this into consideration when he decided whether he was going to evacuate or not and, based on that, decided not to do so at that time while this discussion continued.

The first officer tried to talk to a traffic stop and the traffic stop kept calling.

qantas

1 to see what its status was because they couldn't see the plane from the tower, but at the time the first officer tried to transmit he couldn't get through to traffic control, so ATC kept calling about a minute after the plane was gone. off the runway Air Traffic Control received a report from some airport workers who were working near the location where the plane was shot and these workers told them what had happened, so they suppressed the accident button and sent the equipment toward the end of the runway, but because it was still raining and the ground was so soaked that the emergency vehicles were unable to access the aircraft immediately, they had to turn back and use a perimeter road to access the aircraft and that actually took quite a while during this time. the captain told the person to go back to the cabin and check the entire cabin, talk to all the cabin crew and check the situation, the person did that and when he reached the middle of the ship on the wings, the cabin crew and the passengers sitting there complained. that there was a very unpleasant smell in that area, it smelled like rubber or electricity, he brought that information to the captain and the captain then told him to open the general exits to ventilate the plane, but the problem with that is if you want to open it. the doors to ventilate but not blow up the slides, you will have to dismantle the Sprite opening of the slide, which is what the chemical effectively did, leaving those emergency exits unusable at the same time, although in the area that is close to where it is damaged nose.

In Wheel Wars there were more passengers and crewcabin complaining about a really unpleasant smell and in their case they felt smoke, they had trouble breathing and their eyes filled with tears and in fact there was an engineer working for Qantas who was sitting in that section who recognized the smell of hydraulic fluid, unfortunately that information did not reach Captain Atom 2253, this was a full six minutes after the plane came to a complete stop, the captain finally managed to contact Air Traffic Control by radio and asked them if the emergency service is arriving. Air Traffic Control tells them that they have already been dispatched and that they should be there a moment earlier.

At the same time, in the back of the plane, the passengers are getting very worried because they remember during these six minutes when I'll be sitting there, the plane has turned off the engines, which means the only lighting they have is the emergency lighting. Also, they have not heard anything from the captain because the public address system is not working and also they are receiving They are really upset with the cabin crew because they feel that the cabin crew is not doing anything, they are just standing by the doors, which is not understand is that in a situation like this, the cabin crew's duties range from being on duty to caring about safety.

The job is to stand by your doors to know, assess the situation, look for fires, look for the situation outside the plane so you can start an evacuation immediately, although it is understandable that the passengers felt that way, this is what you can expect if you find yourself in a situation like this at time 2257, the first firefighters arrive at the scene, they take out their firefighting equipment in case there is a fire and they also place some flood lights on the right side of the plane and start hitting the side of the plane to try to get the attention of the flight crew now that obviously doesn't work given the amount of noise that will be inside but the arrival is communicated through traffic control they also let them know that the buses are on the way to take the passengers, so the captain now decides to initiate what is called a preventive disembarkation, preventive disembarkation is different from a full evacuation as only certain doors can be used, but it is still considered an emergency procedure.

They decide to use two of the doors on the right side because the plane is tilted to the right which means the slides will have a smaller angle on the left side it will be much steeper and they also have the reflectors on that side so it will be easy for the passengers to initially see when the evacuation starts, as they are only using two doors, there are a lot of bottlenecks opening up, some of the passengers take their bags, some of the cabin crew actually allow the passengers take the bikes away, but here's a really important point when you have to use a slide on a plane you can't take. your suitcases with you your carry on luggage with you because you could be hurting other people you could also be damaging the slides so in the circumstances of the North should you ever take your suitcases or carry on luggage with you if you are evacuating a plane to a slide before?

The disembarkation is complete, there is also a group of Qantas cabin crew who had to make the outbound flight from Bangkok that arrives at the location and tries to access the plane to see if they can help with something that was not seen. a great idea given the fact that they had no idea what was happening inside or what dangers there could be at that moment 23 30 almost 43 minutes after the plane came to a complete stop, all passengers, cabin crew and flight crew had abandoned the plane safely but only a few minor bruises, so it was time for the plane crash investigation to take place and this actually turns out to be a very good example of why plane crash investigations They are so critical to the current safety of the airline business because when you look at this accident, it seems very clear from the beginning who made the mistakes, where the mistakes were made that led to the eventual accident, but that is not what the investigation of the plane crash, but the accident investigation team wanted to know what the root causes were so that they could get to the bottom of it making sure that nothing like this happens again and that's why I've been pointing out six different points, six critical points different during this accident that the investigation team also delved into, so let's start with the first one. basic captain training experience, turns out this Captain was a management pilot, he had been a senior Czech captain on the Boeing 767 and was a senior Czech captain on the Boeing 747-400 and that job included quite a bit of desk work.

Working well meant that he flew much less than other pilots in his job as a base trainer. I was going out and flying with new pilots who were converted to the guy, so I was doing touch and go landings and in that job I was very used to having to evaluate the available runway distance to determine if it was safe to proceed with a touch and go landing. start or if he had to reject it, so it formed the basis for his decision to reverse his previous decision to make a landing when the visibility suddenly cleared and he could see that he had almost two kilometers of runway left, which turned out to be a bad decision on this occasion and the research team investigated how much flying experience he had actually had during the previous 12 months and it turned out. that he was significantly less than other line pilots and that led to a recommendation that the management pilot should receive more training on an ongoing basis to make up for that lack.

The second point, and probably the most important, was the policy that Qantas had used in 1999 flaps 25 as the standard flap configuration and idle reverse confidence. This was a decision that was made at Qantas in 1997. When the research team started looking into it, they saw that there had been no actual risk assessment carried out under this policy change appears to have been based only on the desire to reduce the noise and resistance, which means fuel costs and also maintenance on trusty rollover sleeves. Qantas wouldn't have been talking to the guy about this policy change if they had. asked Boeing Boeing would have said that they did not recommend using, for example, idle reverse trust as a standard because it could lead pilots to feel that they would never actually use reverse trust and when they really needed to use it they would not think about it as a possibility and This led to a recommendation that Qantas needed to improve its risk assessment before making major policy changes like this and when the research team began to investigate why pilots had not decided to use flap history if they knew they were doing so. .

Upon arriving at a potentially flooded runway, they realized that the pilots were not really concerned about runway flooding as an issue. They associated poor braking action with Winthrops procedures, but not with wet or flooded tracks; They didn't even have access to counseling information. in their manuals about landing on very wet and flooded runways and this led to recommending that pilots be given more training in case they went to the queen and landed on this type of runway. Point number three why the plane didn't want to slow down and find an approach and this is quite interesting because Qantas actually had a monitoring system where they looked for risk parameters that were happening across the network to see if something was happening that they needed to attend to and the fact was that The number of approaches that had been carried out at a slightly high or even too high speed had increased quite a bit, about 35 percent, when the change in flap policy to use flaps 25 in instead of flaps 30.

The pilot said that the 747 was easier to handle in the direction of speed with flaps 30, but as the policy was now to use flaps 25 as the standard flap, this had started to happen, so that those figures were available to Qantas, but had not been highlighted and all of this brought this together. to a Qantas that actually ditches the standard 25 flaps and idle reverse policy. Point number four, the captain's decision to reverse his decision to reverse a landing decision, we've already touched on a bit that had to do with the captain's previous experience as a base training captain, but also highlighted the importance of the communication in Dracobit, make sure that any decisions that have been made are communicated very clearly between the three pilots in this case so that there is no ambiguity about whether or not they are in a turn or a landing, this confusion probably led to the first officer to completely ignore that he had not selected reverse trust at all;

It's even possible that his movement from trust level number one back to um to inactive could have resulted in him thinking he had taken reverse trust even though he hadn't due to the stress of the situation, which also led to Some Recommendations Regarding Crew Resource Management CRM Point Number Five Communication After the plane stopped, the air accident investigation team realized very quickly that the The fact that the nose gear collapsed inwards and damaged the circuits that had to do with the APA system and the cockpit entry system had a really severe impact on the communication between the crew of this great airplane, so we made our recommendation to Boeing to make a system redundant that did not depend on two components sitting in the same position behind the nose wheel, which would surely be damaged in any type of general accident like this, they also recommended that the Australian authorities and Qantas install public address systems on the plane because Actually, this was a requirement in the US and Europe but was not in Australia at the time and would have helped in case this had turned into a full blown evacuation and last but not least decision number six , the decision not to evacuate was then asked the captain why he decided not to evacuate the aircraft immediately even though he knew the aircraft had shot up and then probably sustained damage.

The captain said he based that decision on the fact that there was no report of any shots fired. he knew that if the evacuation began there would be people who would get hurt as part of the evacuation. I also knew that it was rainy and dark outside and if I started evacuating before they had any emergency equipment outside, there was a possibility that the passengers might start moving towards the only light they could see, which would be the terminal building, and that would mean they would enter a potentially active track that was headed 2-1 right in Bangkok, so I now had a whole thought process involved here.

If he had been warned about the fumes in the front of the plane, he could have initiated the evacuation anyway, but given the information he had due to communication problems on the plane, he based his decision on the overall safety of the greatest number of people. people. as much as possible and it turned out to be the right decision after this boarding, so what seems like something that doesn't make any kind of sense when you look at it at first glance can make a lot more sense when you really dig into it. which is what a plane crash investigation is supposed to do.

If you want to see another video where the plane started accelerating uncontrollably during landing, then watch this video above or if you just want to watch plane crash investigation videos. I just have a playlist for you here before you go, remember the acronym class. I wanted to report the entire class in the comments section. Next, have an absolutely fantastic day and we'll see you next time, bye.