A new plan for Ukraine to defeat Putin | Professor Anthony King

What I see happening is a major battle developing around the Dones area, particularly around the type of what in 2022 was called the Sloan Pocket, that area on the east bank, sorry, West Bank of the SEO Denes River and personally, i might even think about retreating to crors and sloviansk or some of the towns that say towns, that's a bit of an exaggeration, the kind of towns, the bigger towns on the outskirts of those two, two bigger cities, um, uh. So, and fortifying those urban positions, I mean, one of the things that's really noticeable in this war is that the defensive positions have been very powerful because of the drone surveillance because of the long-range artillery fire, so the defense has been very strong and when that defense is in the urban it becomes even stronger I am Professor Anthony King, I am chair of security defense studies at the University of EXA and also director of the Institute of Strategy and Security, the issue of the concept of bold defense, why did I use the word in bold because, one needs, the moment you talk about defense, it sounds like it's a retreat, it's a negative act, but the point we're at is The Ukrainian war seems to me to have reached a crucial point if you look at the balance of forces on the battlefield.

Things have moved in the last six and eight months very significantly in Russia's favor. First of all, in terms of number of forces, estimates are that Russia has deployed around 400,000 troops in Ukraine, which is much more than the total. The first year and indeed the first 18 months of the war, while the Ukrainians, estimates are possibly 300,000, have a larger militia, but in reality they force 300,000, but it may be less, so the Russians have a personnel numerical advantage and also have a growing advantage in terms. of air power and especially artillery, so the Ukrainians are firing about one shell for every Russian well, it depends slightly on the area, but between seven and ten shells, so the Ukrainians have ended up in a position where it is very difficult or almost impossible to maintain. the positions they are in and currently their forces are being quite decimated and ATT in the positions they hold around areas like chass and along the front in the dbass, so at this point it seems that this was the purpose of In the tweet, it seems important that senior allied commanders, especially allies who want to support Ukraine, perhaps adopt a different, bolder but alternative strategy, and a strategy based on active defense rather than gradual attrition of forces.

On the front, it's extremely easy for me. for a civilian to sit in the UK away from danger and invent strategies, um, and it's an easy and, in many ways, a despicable thing to do because, um, you don't run any risk or responsibility here and it also has to be said. . that when we look to develop a different Ukrainian strategy, this is kind of a more active defensive strategy, what I'm tal

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about here is a very difficult operation, so it would require the Ukrainian forces to essentially continue to hold the front line for a while and then behind them, reconstitute a force, build fortified positions that I would recommend around the main urban areas and then withdraw the force in the front, now that is called retrograde operation and they are the most difficult in military operations, so it is difficult, you know, and it's In some ways, it's impertinent for a civilian to suggest such a thing, but we've come to that conclusion.

It seems to me that all the analysis now points to a very significant operational change on the battlefield with the opening of a new front in Kev. This provides even more evidence to the case that the battlefield, the balance of power has changed and it seems to me that at this point it is appropriate to encourage Ukraine to take a more radical approach rather than simply persist with the same approach, and There is another point. Here the Ukrainian forces are being frankly pushed back, they are in retreat, the Russians have the initiative and what also worries me is Western aid, which of course, the Republican Party was deeply concerned about giving more aid to the Ukrainians than Western aid. .

They should be discouraged if all they see is a slow, gradual

defeat

in detail and that, to me, both in terms of what might work on the battlefield but also in terms of encouraging maintenance, demanding greater Western support, it seems that a more positive strategy should be implemented. is in place and, ironically, to me, the only plausible positive strategy is a defensive one and this is where I would say, oh yes, it can't just be a retreat, it has to be a retreat with a view to

defeat

ing and inflicting damage on the Russian forces more effectively while managing and preserving Ukrainian forces, so it's a disengagement, not a withdrawal, an even lesser route, uh, that's that, that's the position that I would promote what my position would be in terms of retreat lines, where should The Ukrainians retreat to this because it is a bit of a complicated issue and certainly one that a military commander in Ukraine would have a better understanding of what plausible lines of defense would be available because the best line of defense will be It is also determined by the condition of the Ukrainian forces, which of course is information that only they would know, but I certainly want to say that in no way would I contemplate giving up on Dones, where the key for me is the key theater, that is the area clue.

At this point, what I see happening is a major battle developing around the Dones area, particularly around the sort of what in 2022 was called the Sloan Pocket, that area on the East Bank, uh, sorry, West Bank of the um. SEO defines River and personally I might even think about retreating to the cremators and sloviansk or some of the cities, when I say cities that's a bit of an exaggeration, the kind of villages, the larger villages on the outskirts of those two. two larger cities, um uh, and fortify those urban positions. I mean, one of the things that's really notable in this war is that the defensive positions have been very powerful because of the drone surveillance because of the long-range artillery fire, so the defense has been very strong and when That defense is in the urban area it becomes even stronger so if we look at battles like the Battle of B mut the Battle of Marapole or of course the Battle of Keev um in each case the powers of the defender were multiplied by being in urban areas Due to that it is difficult to enter as an attacker, it is difficult to maneuver.

Buildings offer multiple opportunities for fortification, concealment, defense, and urban areas offer amplified defensive capability, so to me, that's why I could recommend. even think about a concentration of ukrainian forces at cremor and sloviansk even though it would effectively cede a lot of ground to the russians, but here is the thing that the land is ceded so that it effectively becomes what the military calls a kill zone, i.e. target boxes on which artillery fire can be directed, so to drive those cities deeper into the dunes, i.e. Crors and Sloans, the Russians will have to try a long way , they will have to attack across large areas, which will open them up. um, heavy attrition from artillery fire and that's exactly what happened in 2022, so in the keev battles and the subsequent attacks they did in the dbass area, this is exactly what happened, that they were terribly umed while trying surrounding or going into urban areas with the result that a Counterattack was possible and in a sense would suggest that perhaps by retreating to some Urban Fortress with a view to maximizing the damage that the Ukrainian aerial artillery drones can cause, a Counterattack might be possible. late 2024 early 2025 I mean, I don't think we're tal

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about a full counteroffensive by any means.

I think that's probably unlikely this year, but essentially what I would argue for is whether it's worth thinking about a significant organized withdrawal and concentration of forces to create the conditions to inflict very serious damage on the advancing Russians, I mean certainly in this moment to the attempt to simply hold a line, which is what the Ukrainians are nobly and bravely trying to do with balance. of forces they have at their disposal does not seem to be working brilliantly for them at the moment. The troops on the front lines are very weakly defended, but the distance between the Russian troops and the Ukrainian troops is No, it is not much, and they are effectively fighting the ACR in certain urban areas such as Chazar, but in the fields, in These not very dense fronts that are similar to World War I or World War II, but aren't they?

They're not the same in the sense that they're not as densely controlled, but if you retreat, let's say you retreat 10 or 20 kilometers and concentrate your force so that you put an infantry force in a city on the other side. what main roads they pass through, so Russia has to advance on those roads through that city to be able to take more territory, the infantry controls that territory, that city, be it crors, is in sloviansk, the Russians have to advance to expel them as they move forward to drive. they form, they must form columns Advanced columns uh of vehicles trucks tanks Armed personnel Vehicles, etc., you have to know that to be an organized attack you have to form an attack column, well, what we know about 22 and in fact 2023 Those attack columns are deeply vulnerable to artillery attack because there is ubiquitous drone cover so the Ukrainians can see when there is a concentration of Russian forces.

It is very easy to see and similar Sim simultaneously when there is a concentration of Ukrainian forces. It's very easy to see. but if the infantry of the Ukrainian forces are in the cities, they are difficult to see, but the Russians are easy to see in the open field and the Russians are potentially vulnerable to these air and artillery attacks as they approach and enter the cities And of course, we must emphasize and repeat if we look forward to 2022, this is precisely what happened repeatedly to the Russians, so they closed in on the initial attack on Keev, the airport failed, they attempted a ground offensive in the northwest and the northeast of Kei, both at a frightening level. cost because their march columns were identified by the Ukrainians and ATT with artillery uh with artillery fire sometimes with javelin and you know anti-tank weapons but often more often with artillery fire similarly around K in the summer of 2022 similar at Marip Pole similarly at the Battle of Rabis is similar to the Battle of Bakut, so the IDE idea of ​​a retreat to an urbanized Fortress creates an open space, a very vulnerable open space through which the Russians , if they want to win, if they want to attack, they have a cross and the issue here is that we know from past operations that the Russians are not particularly sophisticated in their military operations and crossing those areas of dead ground where you are open to artillery fire would require a skill Really very extensive SK to suppress artillery cover and camouflage your assault, the Russians have repeatedly shown that they are not capable of doing that, so for me, as I say, it is up to the Ukrainian commanders what they decide to do, it is their responsibility, I differentiate and respect them completely, but what I would anticipate is that we are approaching a The crucial point of this war is to continue with the techniques, the tactics and the type of operational design that the Ukrainians have and that has served them reasonably well.

I think you know I might suggest that that would be suboptimal and perhaps unwise. I think, like me, I say that a bolder strategy may be necessary, although I fully recognize that implementing it, enacting it, is going to be difficult both politically and militarily. Urban areas are incredibly complicated, uh, and it's very easy for Defenders to hide in them, um and uh, and in contemporary military thinking, the contemporary military. The doctrine essentially, um uh, armies like the US Army or the British Army calculate that in an urban area, if you're on the defensive, the combat ratio required to take an urban area is 1 to six or from 1 to 10, so if we have 50,000 troops attacking K and one has 5,000 troops in K, you might be able to repel that offensive, and it's such a big city that it's very easy for Ukrainian defenders to hide in it and fortify certain parts of it, which makes it extremely difficult. for the Russians to take a force of 50,000 is a pretty big force, but it's you, you have a very big city of 1 million um, so it's extremely that those 50,000 soldiers and when you say 50,000 soldiers then you're talking about you, actually take the combat troops, the combat troops are a much smaller element, it's probably 20,000, so they have to rest, they can't be fighting all the time, so the actual combat element of a Force of 50,000 becomes reality in about 10,000 andby the time you have 10,000 A city of 1 million inhabitants is a big target for that Force and if we look at previous battles, for example, the Battle of Mosul, which was fought by the US Iraqi Coalition, the army Iraqi had 94,000 troops against a city of similar size, but there are only 6,000 lightly. armed Isis fighters in KV, you have a population that absolutely does not want the Russians there and you have significant forces with drone artillery and air power determined to hold that objective, so 50,000 soldiers per million for a city of Milli a million is actually a minimum, probably less and the Russians obviously in ke were totally incapable of taking keev with a force of 15,000, it was smaller, but that's why when you get a large urban area required for a successful clearing operation, prodigious amounts of troops are required, if the Defenders really want to hold it and it's so obvious that the Ukrainians do, then the question is, what is the threat to Kwell?

I think it's a threat to K, and my own prediction is that this is why the Russians have done it. It draws forces and diverts the attention of Ukrainian commanders away from the dons, away from that Slovan pocket where operations are now beginning to develop in my opinion, so that's it. Where am I with K Keef? I mean, of course, I could be completely wrong, but I have to say that I think that if the Russians really want to take K, they need a much larger Force than they have currently deployed. So I suspect that it is a way to divert resources, but that is very serious because it exposes the dbass.

I think very seriously and that for me gives me even more weight to think about a new operational design for the dombas and an operational design as I have said of an operational withdrawal for a bold and more effective concentrated defense