Ukraine will 'become untenable' for Putin as air defence fails to stop attacks | Chip Chapman

The Russians' ability to make offensive advances is really being inhibited now. The other thing is that the American weapons and the British and French Swedish weapons release authority have allowed the Ukrainians to wage a much deeper campaign with the firing ranges in Crimea now, that's significant because it's almost turning Crimea into Korea. be unsustainable for the Russians in terms of strangling it as a legist IC Hub that pushes its air defense further and its naval forces further away. Hello and welcome to Frontline for the times, radio with me K Jabo and today we are catching up with Major General Chip Chapman, he was a platoon commander in the Falcons conflict and went on to command Parah Chips, former British military advisor from US Central Command and spent 33 years in the military

chip

Chapman, welcome to Front Line, well. to see you again, can you start by giving us your overview of the current situation on the battlefield in Ukraine?

Well, it's interesting, Kate, I've actually been away for the last two months traveling the world and if I had been in a time machine I could almost give you the same analysis two months ago that I would do now, apart from one thing and that is that so the Ukrainians were, I think I characterized it as losing slowly and that the American aid that would come would be necessary to match. On the battlefield, that would be a situation that was very similar to the situation on June 22 and I think that actually happened In a nutshell, the Russian offensive is really everywhere you look, both in the north and northeast of the K city in Lans oblast and in Donet oblast, they are really a well-timed offensive and they are In reality, only micro gains are made and if the kind of words you use about the situation throughout the front line doesn't really change when trying to advance unsuccessfully or is marginally advanced, these are still just minor tactical games that really have no operational importance and Well there are a number of reasons for this and the first is the impact of these weapons and particularly not just American weapons but the kind of weapons release authority granted by various Western nations and by that I mean capability. to attack, you know, deeper into Russian territory because, although right now seninsky has been warning that there is still a group of forces from the north of uh that is 90 kilometers from khi, essentially the second echelon of forces that you have to be able to bring . that second Echelon of forces to support and with the Liberation Authority the Ukrainians have been able to attack troop concentrations, logistical buildups um Road Convoys and things like that, then they

will

be able to take this second Echelon to Bear when the first Echelon is being trapped in the mud , I don't think they

will

because one of the things that we have seen throughout this campaign is that, although you know, communications and digital profiles act and operate at the speed of light, we really have people who are operating at a very slow speed in terms of fiscal opportunities, so all of this means that the ability of the Russians to do offensive games is really being inhibited now, the other thing that the American weapons and the liberation authority of the British and um the French weapons The Swedes have allowed the Ukrainians to wage a much deeper campaign with the firing ranges in Crimea, which is now significant because it is almost making Crimea in Korea unsustainable for the Russians in terms of strangling it as a logistics center that further distances its air defense. and their maritime forces further afield and it is significant that as you know on June 10th there are a number of S300 and S400 air defense systems taken out by um I think 10 American attack systems and the suggestions that the Russians are going to move their S500 Prometheus, their anti-ballistic missile defense to Crimea to try to have this air defense bubble around Crimea now, that would be significant to see what the Sword versus The Shield would be in terms of Russian air defense. against Western technology and Western missile systems, one of the things that can be said about the S300 and S400, which have been quite successful in exports to the Russians, is that they don't really work very effectively and that's also a Of the reasons for example, that it is not being activated in support of the Syrian air defense profile when the Israelis have been attacking Iranian targets in Syria, IRGC targets for the last four or five years, what do you think is the current strategy Ukrainian regarding Crimea? changed or remains the same because, according to some analysts, for example, the need to destroy the Kirch bridge no longer exists and you have mentioned those successes and the

attacks

on Crimea.

Well, I think recently you've seen again a number of ferries that are being taken out as part of the logistical support route, so to speak, towards the year of the crime. I think psychologically dropping the K Kirch bridge would be helpful, but I don't think they see the Ukrainians dropping it at this point. uh because you need to set the conditions for that operational and strategic success to knock down that bridge and that's when Putin would really be on the defensive because again it's the Crimean policy from a Russian perspective that really matters, you know, it was that guy In 2014 there was this idea that he was lifting up and rallying the Russian people by annexing Crimea and therefore everything from then on would be a piece of cake and of course that has not been the case so if Crimea disappears and it is unsustainable, then Putin potentially loses power.

That has always been directly or indirectly Ukraine's notion of Victory, in the same way that Russia understands that it cannot geographically seize all of Ukraine's territory and its Victory theory goes along the lines of altering the West's slightest determination. to support Ukraine and therefore lead to an agreement that is on Russia's terms and that is really the big divergence that we have seen in the last week between the Russian notion of a peace plan versus the Russian notion of peace. Zelinsky. plan in Switzerland last week, yes, but Vladimir Putin's notion of a peace plan to seed occupied Russian territories, I mean Russia, I mean, was ridiculous, he knew it was going to be rejected before he even presented that plan, Wasn't it okay? not necessarily from the P perspective of the axis of dictatorships and not necessarily from those people who sort of support their notion of a multipolar world and see the Americans as an imperial power, but if we look at all the various notions of the agreements of peace, I would probably say it's a humanitarian peace because it

stop

s the killing but of course if you throw that coin it's a surrender piece because the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine has been diminished.

They would have to get it. outside of the explosions that you already know, Lans theet Zaria and hon, which the Russians have not even taken, so the other two explosions we do not mention in terms of the situation on the battlefield at the moment. Lance, the offensive continues there, but uh, operations on the um kopans satovi Pria line remain unchanged, it's another one of those defensive areas when it doesn't change and then D, although there has been progress in the direction of chass chassa, particularly in the last week, these are again just micro profits and Three months ago I said the same thing that the backbone of the Ukrainian defense denet is the line of katos Sloans that could threaten POG Ros, but it is the same as three months ago, it has not done because they haven't really had anything else. that glal Gaines said that the mod in London reports that Russian forces are within striking distance of the main supply route for Ukrainian troops defending the eastern region of Donbass as it continues to advance towards the garrison city of poov, what would that mean if they cut off the supply route and what happens if they take that city?

Well I don't think they're close to that, it would be very significant, but in terms of geography I still think it's about 80 keters away so it would mean they would. achieve one of their goals for the year because the entire Donque oblast would

become

untenable

for the Ukrainians if they got that far, but there is a lot of fighting before we get to that position, so I don't think that notion of encirclement and cutting is credible right now, so I don't see that as something that's going to happen anytime soon, short term, the real kind of attack and launch right now is. between the kind of sword and shield, I think between the ISR drones, the intelligence surveillance reconnaissance drones of the Russians that are the target of the first person view drones of the Ukrainians and within that you have this bubble of electronic warfare where you know the notion of who. win the electronic battle between drones, counter drones and guided weapons is really significant as it will inhibit or allow forces to move in the future and that really comes back to this notion of air control because everything that has to do with drones actually It's just a democratic democratization of air battle and delivering it at a lower level than it has been with the use of air power historically, so it's just another notion of air power for the future and that's also really interesting when you think about it. comes to, for example, Notions of the F-16 because there were four factors for success in 20th century warfare, the first was air control, it is absolutely a necessity, the second is the second and the third are the shock and the surprise that the Russians may have had in terms of their offensive towards K City, but that started on May 10, so it's already been six weeks without much gain, and the fourth is offensive, now all that, unless you have all those factors together, your ability to achieve it.

Operational success is really something quite limited in front of you, so they're just not there for either side, so restoring that kind of mobility and advancement on the battlefield is what each side seeks to achieve and one of the interesting stuff. I think this week was the capture by the Ukrainians of one of the Russians' turtle tanks. Now it'll be interesting when they look into that because the turtle tank is actually a large shielded transporter that appears to be immune to Loitering Weapons and First Person View Drones, but it carries an electronic array and an entrenchment or flail type tool on the front. to try to clear some sort of path for forces to pass through the sort of notion from the little heart of the expanding torrent where you have a narrow breakthrough. and then you can deploy to achieve operational success, that really shows you the electronic battle that's going on, so I think there will always be two and then the ECM battle, the electronic countermeasures, the battle, you know? side develops a side counter

attacks

, that's the one I think will be interesting to see in the coming months.

The first F-16s are expected to arrive imminently and the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, General Cki, has said that aware of that, Russian forces are trying to make the greatest gains as quickly as possible to From what you're saying, they're not doing so well at the time. What impact do you think the arrival of the F-16s will really have? well, I don't think their arrival is going to be imminent, to be honest, I would be surprised if they were here or in Ukraine this summer, now the F-16, yes, the F-16s, you know, for several reasons that have to do With both.

It is not necessary, it is simply not piloting the plane, it is fighting the plane, it is doing the engineering on the plane, the support of the plane, all those things matter by having trained personnel along the entire chain, that of launching a fury in the air. and it generates a series of sorties, which means it can fight multiple times, so what we do know is that the number of aircraft engaged is still 85 and rising, that the pilots are being trained at a certain speed, but I think they still They are not really interested. the kind of advanced weapons modules that are out there right now and they will make a difference because one of the things they will do is set back the Russians' ability to use their cockpit gliding bombs the way they have. been doing right now and those are the things that are really doing the large scale destruction of um, you know, the cities that have been attacked particularly in the um Car City area and around the front line, it's possible that be the U the one that you already know is the most pertinent because about 80% of that has been destroyed.

I think they will make a difference. I think Zinsky has said that he would like between 120 and 130 to give some kind of parity with the Russian Air Force. It talks about various notions of air supremacy, air superiority and air parity, but it depends on where on the front line you know it because you want to maximize your combat potential at a particular point to achieve an effect or result at that moment, one of the things they will do. What we need to do is give them the capability again in the electronic warfare sphere to probably negate a number of the Russian capabilities and give more freedom of action to the Ukrainian forces and again we will have this discussion abouthow does this work. for example, they are creating some of the weapons systems that will be integrated into the F-16s that will focus on the GPS Jammers um and that the Russians are using, which is hindering in certain aspects some of the drones of the For the Ukrainians now again, that depends on the type of encryption software the Ukrainians are using, it is much easier to inhibit the signal to a commercial.

The commercial system available compared to military encrypted systems is that the main capability that you think will be useful for inhibiting electronic warfare will be one of them because it is a multi-role fighter, both air-to-ground and air-to-ground. Some aspects will also be quite crucial, so its ability to not shoot Russian planes out of the sky and its ability to provide close support to troops on the ground because, wow, that's a good ability when you need it if you're an infantryman. On the ground, what and where do you see signs that American weapons that have been withheld by Congress are finding their way and starting to make a difference?

Do you see any of that? Well, I think you see it in that, in their deep battle. Not necessarily all systems because part of the deep battle of the Ukrainians is, of course, their attacks on oil refineries and yesterday we saw two other refineries destroyed and one in the Tambo region and in the ad digia. Republic, so we now believe that there have been 40 attacks on oil refineries by Ukraine and that at the end of last month 14% of the Sy uh refinery's capacity had been eliminated. I think most of it is by Brits or Brits. and the French Sculp and um sto Storm Shadow systems instead of American tacks, but I think they have freed up Authority for those troop concentrations and logistical concentrations that inhibit some kind of second Echelon from reaching the front and I think one of the things What what the Russians have done is not really planned strong enough to have enough combat PA to really break through the first Echelon if you're not doing that with the first Echelon and they inhibit you from bringing those forces.

The second Echelon will then have a hard time exploding much further than where they are at the moment towards the north and northeast of Ki City, but in some ways that doesn't necessarily matter because even if they would the Russians would like to be within artillery range. from City K's artillery cube. The fact that they are in some sort of gliding bomb range and are hitting the city means two things: First, their deep battle is energized this year, no doubt starting in March . the power grid and we already know that 50% of Ukraine's electricity generating capacity is being destroyed this year, some of which will not be back online for years, of course you can import some from the European grid. but the idea that by winter large areas of Ukraine could be without power for 20 hours at a time and therefore part of the Russian theory of the occupation theory as if it were there in a demilitarized zone is that it creates a demilitarized zone and a depopulation zone really by making it uninhabitable for people who are forced to move and the notion of people moving on a large scale from KH City and other cities, um, it leads you to know that the withdrawal of a population from one place to another can have a truly debilitating effect. on the morale of other citizens, so I think that's part of the way the Russians are trying to fight their operational battle right now.

Sorry to interrupt, what you think is the plan for the hak hak explosion in City Haro. do you think the real strategy is yeah, I do, I do, um now, of course, initially they might want to go around it and you know, take it in a good way, but there's no chance of that happening, so certainly in 2024, in my opinion, so drive. take it out and create a buffer zone, yes, make it unsustainable for Ukrainians to live there, then you know, when at some point you have a peace agreement and no one is going to move towards that in the negotiations right now, then that will be

become

s something that is potentially at stake, it should not be at stake again in terms of Ukraine's sovereignty and, of course, Ukraine would like to see reparations for the damage that has been caused, all of those things will be very big obstacles to reaching which would be an equitable solution.

The solution now is a different equitable solution for each side. Everyone wants the rule of law, but the rules that will be applied are always a sticking point in these things for the future. The Financial Times reports that the US government plans to divert destined Patriot air defense systems. for other countries to Ukraine and by the time this conversation is available it may have already been officially announced and Romania has also donated a system, where are these Patriot systems needed most and how many are enough? Air defense is never enough. I like the coverage throughout the country, but that is one of the problems that Ukrainians have due to the fact that you cannot be strong everywhere.

Otherwise you end up being weak everywhere. One of their dilemmas is that they probably like some Patriot systems. be ahead protecting an air defense envelope over K City to

stop

some kind of ballistic missile and other attacks there that would make them increasingly vulnerable now, in terms of military philosophy, we talk about a center of gravity, the source of all your strength , so protecting the capital city is almost always the first idea one has and the s500sx is there to be part of Moscow's ballistic missile defense replacing a system in the future, but it is always a political necessity to protect your capital and then I think that Ukrainians need to protect those areas that you know are very far from the front line, because that gives you security in the rear, it is where people can live in greater harmony, without being psychologically under pressure. uh and take it from there so you know the capital is always the first thing you're going to get.

Supply routes from Europe and your other major cities. LOL in the west, um, but there will never be enough air defense to reach all parts of the coast. This coastline around Adessa and Hon um from the explosion is also important because I have no doubt that the Russians would have really liked to take the entire sea bridge and turn the coast into a Russian lake again and I don't think they would have done that . Is there any possibility to do it? How do you expect the war to play out during the summer months? Do you think the combination of American aid and the new ability to use foreign weapons on a limited basis inside Russia?

These developments could mean that the war will take place during the summer months. The most dangerous point for Ukraine has already passed this year, yes, I think the most dangerous point for Ukraine has already passed, but again we return to how wars end. Neither side will be strong enough to conquer the other in military or military geographical terms, so If you go back to World War II, you know, me and the I directive, because our duty was to go with the allies to the heart of Europe and destroy the German armies, you will not see Russia in a position.

To do that, you also won't see Ukraine in a position to do that to the Russian military and therefore you go back to how wars end and they end in three ways, firstly, through a decisive military victory. The chances of victory remain quite low, and the second, because of the indecision of military Victory leading to some type of negotiation, uh, that is not in the cards at this time or the third that will be in the cards for both at some point, but not yet because the political military sociological population economic social cultural social economic whatever you want the costs are too great for one side and therefore the will and determination to move forward decreases to a point in the that it is necessary to reach an agreement essentially that is what happened with the destruction of the will of the Russian army in 1917, which led to the Treaty of Bressler and one could argue that I do not think it is likely at this time that with 1200 casualties per day by the Russian side with very marginal gains, you know you could get to a point where the Russian military leaves the battlefield, I don't think we're going to see that yet, the second is of course the centrality of Crimea for the myth of Russian imperialism, if that becomes unsustainable, then the elites in Russia could say enough is enough, Putin and his cronies must be overthrown and the bottom line is that the people of Russia have had enough and, you know, get up and, in a way, dethrone him now, you probably will.

That in a dictatorship is very, very difficult, but historically it only takes 3.5% of the population to take to the streets and show their massive ascendancy to achieve some significant change, as we saw, for example, in the revolutions of 18 of 1989 that they deposed. Chesco and some of those other Eastern bloc countries, none of them I think are sustainable in the next three months, although the Ukrainian troops are also tired, they need to be rotated, they need to rest, new troops need to be trained and quickly, what is it so good? Whether the military leaders in Ukraine will face that challenge is a really interesting question because, of course, it's not just about mobilizing people, it's about demobilizing them, and one of the things that's being put on hold in Ukraine is the demobilization.

The Demobilization Law should have been like this later. 36 months of service and being very tired, they would allow you to leave the service, but then you are losing a card of very well trained and professional people and the second was that you needed, the idea was that you needed qualified troops every It's been 6 months now that they both have been in trouble due to the limitations of Manar for Ukrainians. In fact, we had a new mobilization law in May that didn't mention those things, but reduced, for example, the um age of conscription from 27 to 25 and put a number of other conditions, you know, it's always been that way since Since the war started, men under 60 are not allowed to leave the country with some exceptions of course, as there are always so many. there really are problems in mobilization for both sides, there is a kind of crypto-mobilization on the Russian side and now we have the Ukrainians, after two years, really reflecting what was a kind of policy on the Russian side with an ability, for example, to now.

Recruiting people who had been in prison in Ukraine was now a forced method with Prien, of course, in the Vagner group in the early days of the campaign, but that's one of the other things they're looking at. along with, for example, increased fines for evading draft, so it's tough times for that, but if you think you know that freedom and democracy are worth fighting for, then you'll hope there are enough people who come forward and, certainly, opinion polls. In terms of those who still believe that Ukraine can win within Ukraine and understand the consequences of losing to Russia and Putin's Russia in particular, it means that I think things will stabilize there in the future.

What else can Ukraine do beyond the battlefield to defeat? Russia likes most things. It is always important to win the information operations battle. What I think we're seeing is a lot more misinformation coming into the realm of social media and the media with a lot of people breaking away. Uh, the Russian talking points really, uh, and this is partly a symptom of a kind of war fatigue and people would like to see a way out, but the dangerous thing about that is that it seeps into the kind of consciousness of the people who, you know, you know. things can be done differently, but there are often Russian points that will come down to things being done differently, particularly in terms of the notion that this is war fatigue for everyone and the simplest thing would be to stop this and everything that everyone would experience. in peace and harmony, which of course is not really true, it is only true in the short-term sense because Putin in my characterization is still someone who wants to regain lost territories and spheres of influence that begin with Ukraine and do not end with Ukraine, Are you suggesting that Ukraine could improve on disinformation?

I don't think Ukraine could have improved. I think they've been masters of that, but the Western press needs to do better or Western governments need to do better. improve on this and that has been one of the problems at the moment, which is actually not just the Western governments of course, there are a lot of fractures within the EU and the United States at the moment, which makes this kind of environment inharmonious, more difficult, um, when you have an absolutely concentrated Russian opponent on the other side. I think we saw it in some ways with some of the comments from one of the certainly one of the um candidates in the um in the general election in the UK recently, who I think was really breaking away.

Uh, Russian propaganda points. I won't say who it is because there are elections, yes, but it will be quite obvious, I think for most people, one of the constants. Criticism of the allies ofUkraine are that they have been slow to provide the weapons it needs and when they do provide them they are overly cautious in saying how Ukraine can use them. Do you think that has changed now? I don't think it's changed completely and that's always been the case. I think because the fear of escalation and what that could lead to, but I think every time there's been some kind of Russian red line that Putin has stated, we've crossed it without any action on Putin's part, so I think that we can continue.

Call your bluff now from a military perspective, giving freedom of action with any caliber weapon systems you want, it is of course how you would like to fight a battle and a war, but you know there is a you that we call strategy is the bridge between political intent and military power and of course you know all wars are fought for political purposes it's just that war is the fighting part so of course we are limited by what concerns to politicians.in terms of the consequences of escalation and I've talked many times about how I see escalation in seven areas that I think are generally objectives, objectives, geographic domains that might be cyber and spatial mobilization and rhetoric, and we've seen an acceptance.

Recently there has also been an increase in rhetoric, particularly Russian nuclear rhetoric and more exercises, and that always puts people on a sort of strategic defensive when, in my opinion, they don't necessarily have to be, there are other things that you would look because if you were saying that Russia was actually going to release nuclear weapons, you know we would look for signs of imminence that would be there and we would be on our kind of warning indicators and warnings in the intelligence committee that we would know about the predictions about how long this will last. war?

It will vary widely. What could be the implications for European security and global security if it lasts several years? Well, I think the characterization we had before February 22 was that all wars would end. In short, and you know, most of the wars in the middle have been in the last 40 years, the wars that we have fought in the west against, you know, in Iraq and other places, war fighting, not war after the war. They have been short, so we need to check the reality that wars may not be short and therefore there are a number of things that follow from that in terms of having the industrial capacity to fight a long war and having the regenerate your military force if necessary. and they don't use any notion of recruitment here to fight beyond the first battle and the Second Battle, but the battles that can occur after that and really the notion that scale is something that has been out of sync with our recent experience and We think so comprehensively. those things for the future are absolutely vital and I have also said before that actually war has two parts, a physical part and a psychological part and therefore it is not armies that fight wars, it is nations that fight the wars, the Ukrainian nation absolutely has I understood that in terms of their mobilization and willingness to fight, we have to really make sure that there is understanding in the Western sphere about those kinds of things because, you know, I don't think Putin will stop, but that doesn't mean.

One of the fractures that could occur. I talked about fractures is that just because you have an article five of the NATO line and let's say that if Russia invaded one of the Baltic countries, Estonia or Lithuania, that doesn't mean that they would have to put an Armored Division to support them, so how Would you do that? You don't know, it's very difficult to watch, so Putin would play with that in a kind of hybrid warfare aspect. I think it's dangerous. In these times and the best way to keep that danger away, in my opinion, is to unequivocally support Ukraine with the weapons it needs and that is the best way to avoid the characterization of World War II and any progress towards World War III , which I think is exaggerated if we, if we support Ukraine, Major General

chip

Chatman, it's a pleasure talking to you, thank you for your time, thank you Kate, you've been watching Frontline for a long time with me on the radio, Kate shabo, my thanks to our producers today Louis SES and Morgan berdick and you for If you want to support us you can subscribe now or listen to Times Radio for the latest news and in-depth analysis or go to Times.co.uk for now but thanks for watching , bye bye.