The Rise & Fall (& Rise) of Auto-Train

When Japan debuted its Shinkansen bullet

train

in 1964, it took the world by storm. Until then, the idea of ​​a purpose-built high-speed rail system was purely conceptual. Now, after years of planning and development, this futuristic dream had finally come true. No other country came even close to building a system of this caliber. Even the United States, which had enjoyed immense economic prosperity after World War II, had let its rail infrastructure rot. Commercial airlines and national highways or popular new ways of traveling, and the passenger rail industry were on the verge of total collapse. Japan's new achievement was a kick in the butt for American politicians, who suddenly realized that the United States might not be number one at something.

A year later, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the High-Speed ​​Surface Transportation Act into law. This would begin a decades-long journey to research and develop high-speed rail projects across the United States. But in a broader sense, this bill was designed for new concepts in rail travel as a whole, which could move people more efficiently and reduce the number of cars on the roads. One of the first ideas that were studied was actually of European origin. Specialized long-distance

train

s, such as the UK's Motorail, allowed people to take their personal vehicles to their destination. This saved the hassle of driving hundreds of miles and gave passengers the opportunity to relax, get some sleep, or eat a hot meal.

The idea had been floated before in the United States, but overall, it would be a new concept for the American public. And in just a few years, it would become one of the most successful transportation projects in the country. From 1966 to 1967, the United States government conducted significant research on the car-train concept. In this first vision, passengers would travel in their vehicles inside specially designed carriages. There would be common spaces on board for walking, relaxing and eating. But for the most part, people would sit and sleep inside their own vehicles, since there would be no coach seats or standard sleeping compartments.

Service was proposed to run between Washington DC and Jacksonville, Florida, a distance of approximately 750 miles. It was estimated that between 4 and 5 million people drove between the Northeast and Florida each year. If the train could capture even a small portion of this market, it would be a financial success. But in 1967, the Department of Transportation faced some severe budget cuts, which effectively killed the project. In the House Committee's own words: "If the project is economically viable, there is no reason why private industry cannot continue with it." In other words, the train was basically guaranteed to make money, so there was no need for the government to support it financially.

All that was needed now was a private railway company to take over the project and execute it. The problem was that none of them were interested in taking it on. Passenger service only accounted for about 5% of the industry's total revenue, while freight transportation provided a much more reliable business. Investing millions of dollars in an experimental passenger service was out of the question. The study gathered dust for the next two years, until it sparked new interest within the Department of Transportation itself. Eugene Garfield, a young lawyer and assistant to the Secretary of Transportation, found the study lying in the office.

He later recalled: “It was just reading material.” “I was looking for something to read that night, so I took the study home.” “When I finished that report, I thought, 'My God, why hasn't anyone done this before?'” Garfield soon resigned from his government position and founded a new company, Auto-Train Corporation, on April 11, 1969. Ultimately, it would take him two years to convince Wall Street investors to fund this risky new venture. . But by 1971, the company had raised $7 million by selling public shares. As other railroads canceled more and more unprofitable passenger trains, Congress finally intervened. They formed a new government corporation called Amtrak, which would keep America's passenger trains running with taxpayer funding.

Most private railroads were happy to pass on this responsibility, and Amtrak launched on May 1, 1971. Meanwhile, Gene Garfield was assembling the fleet for his Auto-Train company. He ordered new locomotives from General Electric and snapped up some of the best second-hand passenger cars on the market before Amtrak could get them. Among these were almost all of the Santa Fe Railroad's full-length dome cars and almost all of the Union Pacific's half-length dome cars. He also purchased a fleet of freight cars from Canadian National. Renewing all this old equipment would be much more profitable than developing new railcars from scratch.

For the route itself, Auto-Train would closely follow the original proposal. The northern terminus would be in Lorton, Virginia, near Washington DC, while the southern terminus would be in Sanford, Florida, just outside Orlando. Sanford was chosen over Jacksonville because this would bring travelers closer to the central Florida resort. This was also about a half-hour drive from a new destination that would open later that year: a little place called Walt Disney World. In addition to standard platforms and check-in facilities, both terminals would have specially designed ramps for staff to take vehicles on and off the train. One train would operate in each direction daily, leaving in the afternoon, running overnight, and arriving the next morning.

Aside from a couple of brief stops for crew changes and refueling, the trains would travel the 850 miles non-stop in about 15 hours. Auto-Train's main target audience would be the middle-aged and elderly audience. Many retirees traveled from the Northeast to Florida each winter to escape the cold weather. But this forced them to drive more than a thousand miles in each direction. Auto-Train presented a much more attractive option, as it would eliminate the stress and risks of a two-day road trip. And this was just the beginning of what would become the company's biggest selling point and an unforgettable experience for passengers.

While Auto-Train would largely appeal to an older audience, Gene Garfield wanted to create a modern, youthful atmosphere that could appeal to all ages. He was the oldest executive in the company, only 35 years old, and most of the employees were in their twenties. Taking advantage of this, they set out to completely subvert the old stereotypes of grumpy drivers and dirty railway equipment. The Auto-Train staff would be young, attractive and willing to help their passengers. The trains themselves would be exceptionally clean and decorated with modern interiors. To define the company's visual brand, Garfield sought the help of employee Caroline Settles, a young designer from Washington, DC.

When tasked with choosing a color scheme for the company, he chose a striking combination of bright red and purple. All railway equipment was soon painted in these striking colours, with a large amount of white to symbolize cleanliness. The staff uniforms were also designed to match this color scheme. Settles herself said: "You have to have something powerful for transportation." "Purple and red are something you remember." "We talked about the feeling we would like people to have on the train." "Finally, we coined a phrase: we wanted the cars to be 'conservatively cool.'" Passengers would enjoy two all-inclusive buffets during the journey, one for dinner in the evening and another for breakfast the next morning.

Movies would be shown on board every night and several nightclubs would offer cocktails and live entertainment. The idea was that their vacation wouldn't have to wait until they got to Florida. You could start having fun as soon as you got on board. To say the public was excited about Auto-Train would be an understatement. Half a year before the trains started running, thousands of people were already trying to contact the company to make reservations. In the end, the company had to publish an ad that said: "To the thousands of people who tried to call to make reservations on the Auto-Train to Florida and got the busy signal: please don't change your mind." "Honestly, we really want your business." "But the response has exceeded our wildest expectations." The inaugural Auto-Train run departed Lorton, Virginia, on the afternoon of December 6, 1971, and arrived safely in Sanford, Florida, the following morning.

Daily service began in both directions and, over the following months, all trains were booked well in advance. Just 90 days after its launch, Auto-Train was already turning a profit. Industry analysts were stunned by what they were seeing. Public interest in train travel has been declining for years. Now Gene Garfield had created something so popular that he could barely keep up with the demand. While Auto-Train was immediately successful, Amtrak had a rocky start. The government-run corporation was supposed to make a profit, but many people were skeptical that this would ever happen. Amtrak had to somehow pick up the pieces of a broken industry and create a cohesive level of service across a vast national network.

Making a profit on top of this was an ambitious goal, to say the least. From the beginning, Amtrak president Roger Lewis held a special grudge against Auto-Train. Railroads were not allowed to compete with Amtrak on the same routes, and there was an argument that Auto-Train was competing with Amtrak services on the East Coast, such as Champion and Silver Meteor. Technically, however, Auto-Train was incorporated two years before Amtrak. And Gene Garfield made it clear that: "We are a different kind of service." "We can't take passengers without cars or cars without passengers." "We fill a different type of need." Clearly not convinced, Amtrak launched a new program a few months later, in April 1972, called Free Wheels.

Through this program, passengers traveling to Florida would receive a free rental car for one week upon arrival. This way, people didn't need to bring their own vehicles and Amtrak didn't have to deal with the logistics of transporting them. It would also be easy to implement this program in new cities in its network, without the need to build special terminals. Roger Lewis told the press: "This is not retaliation against Auto-Train." "It's our way of keeping the driver off the road and giving them a chance to relax during the trip to Florida." Free Wheels was a good idea on paper.

But in practice, it was stupidly difficult for passengers. The promotion was only eligible with a minimum ticket purchase from certain departure and arrival points. And once passengers arrived in Florida, they would have to find their own way from the train station to the rental car office, and then do it all again at the end of the trip. Additionally, Amtrak didn't offer any of the luxuries that Auto-Train was famous for, but Free Wheels somehow managed to be more expensive. Needless to say, Amtrak fundamentally misunderstood what made Auto-Train so popular: the fun, hassle-free experience. The Miami Herald wrote: “Amtrak's only attempt to imitate Auto-Train has missed the mark.” "He offered some passengers free car rental service for a week." "But there are still too many inconveniences when taking the regular train." In December 1972, Auto-Train celebrated its first anniversary.

With public demand stronger than ever, the company announced it would acquire two more trains to eventually double its capacity. The Orlando Sentinel later wrote: “Only in the game of Monopoly can owning a railroad system be considered a path to wealth…” “success, after 15 months of operation, should be proof enough that the reported death from train travel was not only greatly exaggerated, but obscured tremendous potential.” However, just two days later, the Auto-Train corporation would face its first major challenge. On the morning of March 13, 1973, a southbound Auto-Train was passing through Hortense, Georgia. A truck driver approached a rural road crossing that had no warning barriers and in the dense morning fog he could not see the train approaching at 70 miles per hour.

In a fatal miscalculation, the driver collided with the second locomotive of a train, causing a catastrophic derailment. The cars were grouped together like an accordion and the passenger vehicles were thrown off the train into the surrounding swamp. A passenger later said: “The train started movingabruptly, so my wife and I yelled at everyone to get on the ground.” “After the accident, I helped get people out of my car and walked to the front.” "The engine was sunk in a swamp and the second engine was on fire." The truck driver died on impact, but only a few people on the train had to be taken to hospital for their injuries.

The accident certainly could have been much worse, but it was still a huge headache for the company. Virtually all passenger vehicles were damaged, many of them beyond repair. Auto-Train was insured for these types of accidents, but this was of little comfort to the 300 people who were now stranded in rural Georgia without their cars. While the collision itself was not Auto-Train's fault, it was a humbling reminder that no railroad is immune to catastrophe. Despite the challenges, the company was able to recover quickly and learned some valuable lessons from the experience. Even before the launch of Auto-Train in 1971, Gene Garfield had planned to expand the concept to other markets.

There were proposals for a West Coast version, reaching as far north as Portland or Seattle, and as far south as Los Angeles or San Diego. There was even greater interest in a service between Chicago and Denver, which would tap into the winter skier tourism market. But the low hanging fruit was closer to home. Studies showed that more Florida tourists actually came from the Midwest than from the Northeast. Using the Sanford terminal, the company could open a second route to the Midwest to capture this lucrative market. In the summer of 1973, Auto-Train announced plans to open a second route to Louisville, Kentucky.

The trip would be longer than its East Coast counterpart, covering 990 miles over the course of about 22 hours. It would take about a year to launch the new service. But in the meantime, Amtrak didn't take the news well. They argued that this would illegally compete with their own Florida service, which operated on the same route. What's more, Amtrak announced that they would be launching their own

auto

ferry service and this was one of the routes they were interested in using. Now, for the past year, Amtrak had been quietly planning to compete with Auto Train more directly, with a new service called AutoTrak.

They had originally targeted the West Coast, where car carriers would connect to the existing Coast Starlite service. But these plans ran into legal problems with the Southern Pacific Railroad and ultimately went nowhere. With Auto-Train's new plans to expand to the Midwest, Amtrak was now determined to launch AutoTrak on the same route. The plan was to attach

auto

mobile carriers to the Floridian for a good portion of its route, between Indianapolis, Indiana, and Poinciana, Florida. Despite this aggressive move, Auto-Train's leaders did not appear threatened by competition. Gene Garfield told reporters: "We are very advanced in developing our service in the Midwest." "However, we seriously doubt that Amtrak's automated passenger ferry service can compare to the luxury passenger comfort-oriented services and facilities offered by Auto-Train Corp." Meanwhile, in late 1973, the country's attention was firmly fixed on a historic gasoline shortage.

Suddenly, Americans flocked to alternative modes of transportation, and the Auto-Train was praised as one of the most fuel-efficient ways to travel. The Miami Herald wrote: “Looking at all this now, one would suspect that Eugene Garfield and his associates had a remarkably clear crystal ball.” "The promoters of the Auto-Train surely foresaw the energy crisis, as it fits perfectly with their grand design of getting cars off the roads and onto the rails." As a benchmark, Auto-Train saved more than 14,000 gallons of fuel on each trip, compared to all vehicles making the trip individually. With such significant numbers and with public demand higher than ever, Amtrak and Auto-Train reached a truce.

The oil crisis would generate more than enough business for both of them, and encouraging each other to save fuel was good public relations and good policy. In the spring of 1974, Amtrak acquired a fleet of car transporters for its AutoTrak service. They filled them with rental cars and began testing equipment, but problems immediately arose. These old freight cars were not designed for the higher speeds of passenger trains and vibrated so violently that they damaged the vehicles inside. What's more, the tracks between Indianapolis and Louisville were in such poor condition that they were on the verge of being unusable.

With these logistical problems piling up, the AutoTrak project would eventually be shelved indefinitely. Meanwhile, on May 24, 1974, Auto-Train finally launched service to the Midwest. The inaugural tour was named after a bottle of Kentucky bourbon and departed from Louisville for the first of many tours between the Midwest and Florida. Although the dispute with Amtrak had ended, Gene Garfield had once again emerged victorious. But while expanding the company into a second market was a significant achievement, he already had his sights set on more ambitious projects. Just a few months after launching the Midwest route, Garfield announced plans to franchise the Auto-Train concept to a group in Mexico.

He and the other executives would provide guidance in getting the company off the ground, but the trains would be owned and operated by a new Mexican corporation, and partially financed by the Mexican government. The route itself would begin in Nuevo Laredo, just across the border from Laredo, Texas. Over 620 miles, the trains would take tourists to central Mexico and end in the city of Querétaro. As part of the agreement, Auto-Train would receive 3% of gross revenue and a 10% commission for each ticket sold. Less than three weeks later, Garfield announced a new side business called Truck-Train, which would be offered exclusively to long-haul truckers.

The idea arose from the fact that Auto-Train's business model could only work in high-volume tourism markets. On the other hand, there were many more commercial truck routes in the United States and business was much more consistent year-round. The Truck-Train service would offer truckers the possibility of covering long distances without having to drive the entire way themselves. Instead of being behind the wheel all night, they could relax, enjoy a hot meal, and get a good night's rest. While diversifying the company in this way was certainly exciting. Garfield and his team were losing focus on their core business.

The Midwest service had just started and there were already rumors that it was performing poorly. This did not help when the company reduced service to just one train per week in early 1975, less than a year after its launch. The Tampa Tribune wrote: “The corporation would not officially comment on the reasons, but insufficient ridership is believed to be to blame.” “Sources close to Auto-Train said ridership on the northbound Louisville train had been low, while the southbound train had moderate ridership.” The problem was that the company only had one train available to travel the route. Given the distance he had to cover, he could only run in each direction every three days.

This awkward schedule attracted fewer passengers, and with fewer passengers came less revenue, so the company could not afford more trains. This put a financial strain on the company, but a ray of hope would come from an unlikely source. In March 1975, Roger Lewis retired from the management position at Amtrak and was succeeded by Paul Reistrup as the company's second president. In stark contrast to Lewis' aggression in previous years, Reistrup's ride was much more Auto-Train friendly. Almost immediately, he began collaborating with Gene Garfield to find new ways to achieve their business goals together. Under their new partnership, Auto-Train equipment would be attached to the back of Amtrak trains.

Their ticketing and in-flight services would remain separate, but consolidating their operations in this way would be mutually beneficial. For Auto-Train. This would open the door to Amtrak's national network, making it much cheaper to expand into new markets. For Amtrak, this would finally give them the autoferry service they wanted and bring some much-needed revenue to their network. Garfield told the press: "We think it's a great day for Auto-Train." "It is a positive step towards expanding our service." "I envisioned this type of service early in Auto-Train's life, and this gives us the opportunity to do it." The two companies would need about a year to work out the details and launch the joint service.

But in the long run, this would stabilize Auto-Train's finances and eliminate the problems they were facing in the Midwest. On the afternoon of March 7, 1976, a southbound Auto-Train passed through Quantico, Virginia. Fifteen cars suddenly left the tracks and six of them fell into Quantico Creek. Fortunately, all 350 people on board were safe and only a few suffered minor injuries. But more than 60 vehicles, many of which had been submerged in the creek, were severely damaged or completely destroyed. The cause of the accident was unclear, but investigators found: “Track markings indicate something was crawling several hundred feet.” It was suspected that some of the brakes had slipped and the wheels had locked, but the investigation continued over the following weeks.

Less than two months later, on the morning of May 5, a northbound Auto-Train passed through Jarratt, Virginia. This time, 24 carriers jumped the tracks and again derailed in a catastrophic manner. There were no injuries among the 560 people on board, but more than 200 vehicles were damaged. Investigators noted the striking similarities between the two events and identified the cause as broken wheels on car transporters. The problem was that the Auto-Trains were unusually long and their passenger and cargo equipment used slightly different braking systems. According to a writer for Trains magazine: “An engineer I spoke to explained, “It's like driving a freight train with quick-acting passenger brakes.” "Everything must be done slowly and very carefully." This caused unusually high brake wear and excessive heat in the wheels, leading to hairline fractures and eventually catastrophic failures.

A rigorous inspection found 120 more sets of wheels that were prone to the same failure. Senior Vice President Richard Goldstein said, "Of these 120, many would have met existing Association of American Railroad standards." “Our standards exceed them. “We’re just not going to take any risks.” "If there are any questions, we remove them." Between the two derailments, 38 cars were damaged and seven of them destroyed. Having less equipment to work with, the company discontinued Midwest service for the foreseeable future. Now they had to cover the costs of repairing damaged carriages, manufacturing hundreds of new wheels, and high insurance premiums.

If the financial outlook was worrying before, it was now approaching a crisis. Towards the end of the summer of 1976, four months after the back-to-back derailments, Auto-Train was finally able to share some good news. Service to the Midwest would soon be restored as part of the company's new partnership with Amtrak. During a six-month trial period, some of the Auto-Train teams would ride on the back of Amtrak's Floridian. If the trial was successful, the service would become permanent and the two companies would begin planning expansions to other parts of the country. Meanwhile, in the spring of 1977, Auto-Train signed a five-year contract with Disney, making it the official family railroad of the Magic Kingdom.

As part of the agreement, Auto-Train would promote Walt Disney World in its advertising. In turn, Disney would host Auto-Train reservation desks at Disney World parks and hotels. This new partnership was similar to one Eastern Airlines had thrived on for years. As the official airline of Walt Disney World, Eastern heavily promoted the park and, as a result, had captured much of Florida's tourism market. So perhaps it wasn't too surprising just two months later when Auto-Train and Eastern Airlines announced a partnership of their own. Through a special cross-promotion, the airline would give its customers the option to ship their car separately by train.

This would capture a slightly different market of tourists who want to get to Florida more quickly by air, but still have their car available after arriving. While these new corporate partnerships were generating a lot of buzz, plans with Amtrak were

fall

ing apart. After several months of operating their joint service, AlanAuto-Train's Menell said: "We thought both trains would benefit from it." "As it turned out, it wasn't financially beneficial for any of us." Perhaps in retrospect, it was a little optimistic to expect two unprofitable trains to suddenly make money when they came together. The two companies conceded defeat, and Amtrak resumed service in Florida on its original schedule.

Shortly thereafter, in September 1977, Auto-Train threw in the towel and pulled out of the Midwest permanently. The Miami Herald wrote: “Among the lessons Auto-Train has learned is one that other railroads spent decades demonstrating: It is difficult for a railroad to make money transporting passengers.” In fact, about a fifth of the company's employees would have to be laid off as a result. Despite this grim news, Gene Garfield told the press, "I've always had faith in the concept and the company." "I've always thought this could be a $100 million company, and I still do." “We have had a pause. We have had problems.

But you put them to bed and move on.” The only ray of hope in this gloomy picture was the East Coast route, which continued to operate as well as ever. The company still had a chance to overcome its financial problems, as long as it stayed focused on its core business and avoided further disruptions. In the early morning hours of February 24, 1978, a northbound Auto-Train passed through Florence, South Carolina. One of the two locomotives and the 19 front cars, all with passengers, derailed. Miraculously, no one was seriously injured and even the passenger vehicles were unharmed. Investigators quickly identified the cause of the accident.

This time it was one of the axles of the second locomotive, which had broken due to a manufacturing defect. This was not Auto-Train's fault, but the failures in the company's management were beginning to become clearer. Garfield and the executive team had never saved any cash to deal with these unexpected events. So while this was far from the worst disaster the company had ever faced, it was enough to throw them off balance and begin a long, agonizing slide toward financial ruin. Auto-Train shareholders were increasingly concerned about the worsening situation. If the company was to survive, it would need constant and rapid new revenue.

Cross promotion with Eastern Airlines began in January 1978 and fortunately met with an enthusiastic response from the public. But while air travel was proving to be a useful ally for Auto-Train, it was also on the verge of historic change. This year would see the complete deregulation of the US airline industry. For the first time, these airlines would be able to set their own prices and fly any route they wanted. As a result, they soon began competing fiercely with each other with rock-bottom airfares. Many of Auto-Train's customers now found it cheaper to fly to Florida and simply rent a car once they arrived.

The railroad was quick to lower its prices to be more competitive. But since the rail industry was still heavily regulated, this process would take a few months. By the time the lower fares were approved, Auto-Train had missed the entire summer tourist season. Things only continued on this downward trend. By the summer of 1979, Auto Train owed its customers more than half a million dollars in unpaid refunds. By 1980, employee salaries were beginning to rebound. The company was also coming under fire from the IRS, which was demanding $2 million in unpaid federal taxes. As Daniel Linhardt of the Interstate Commerce Commission said, "I don't know what the automatic train's chances of survival are." "Any of their creditors could bankrupt them at any time." "They could declare involuntary bankruptcy in a matter of days or hours." Later that same day, September 8, 1980, Auto-Train Corporation filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

This would give them a little more time to continue operating while they come up with a plan to pay off their debts. The United States Bankruptcy Court appointed Murray Drabkin as trustee of the fledgling company. He soon recommended to the court that Gene Garfield and the other executives be fired from their duties. Garfield refused to resign voluntarily, so he was expelled from the company shortly after. In the following months, Drabkin worked tirelessly to untangle the company's finances and get them back on track. He said: "I couldn't have foreseen this company being in such bad shape." “I've told people that as a practicing lawyer, one of the happiest days of my life will be the day I can hand it over to a group of entrepreneurs with adequate capital who can move forward.” But with no new financing available and more than $24 million in debt outstanding, Auto-Train ultimately agreed to cease operations forever.

The trains last arrived in Lorton and Sanford on May 1, 1981. After carrying more than 2 million passengers for nine and a half years, the dream was finally over. Many of the employees had been with the company from the beginning. For them, this was more than just losing a job: it was saying goodbye to a family. On the last day, Garfield was on the platform hugging and reassuring employees who were as sad as he was at witnessing the end of an era. He said: "My own feeling is that this day did not have to happen." “These trains did not have to stop running. “There shouldn’t be a last automatic train.” Despite the company's bad luck, the reserved trains lasted until the end.

The Orlando Sentinel wrote: “The last two trains carried more than 900 passengers, proving that Auto-Train Corp. went bankrupt not because no one wanted to ride, but because it became a textbook example of what is meant by 'a hell of a train'. way to run a railway. With a huge new void in Florida's tourism market, multiple investment groups planned their own replacement for Auto-Train over the next two years. However, none of them wanted to take the risk of running a passenger service. Instead, they all proposed variations of the same idea: transporting people's cars with what was essentially a freight service.

Meanwhile, Amtrak appointed its fourth president, Graham Claytor, in 1982. Claytor was a firm believer in the Auto-Train concept and approached Gene Garfield to discuss the possibility of reviving the service. Trains magazine later wrote: "According to Garfield, Claytor called him one day and said, 'Gene, your Auto-Train is going to work again, just like it was.'" “Garfield, a tireless self-promoter, later referred to Claytor as his best friend.” The idea of ​​Amtrak launching a new Auto-Train was somewhat ridiculous, considering its many failed attempts in the past. Claytor faced great skepticism, even within his own organization, but moved forward with confidence.

The Miami Herald wrote: “If Amtrak can re-establish automatic and passenger transportation service, and make a profit, then by all means do it.” “It would be good for the railroad's finances, good for Florida tourism and a convenience for certain travelers. “That’s a tough combination to beat.” Amtrak had enough spare cars for passengers, but they ended up purchasing a good portion of the original Auto-Train vehicles. They also bought the abandoned terminals in Lorton and Sanford and began fixing them up. Last but not least, they purchased the rights to the Auto-Train name, to help with brand recognition and honor the company's legacy.

Amtrak also made an effort to recapture some of the magic of the original service, with buffet-style meals, multiple domed lounges and onboard movies. Spokesman John Jacobson said, "We're very excited about this." "The advantage Amtrak has over Auto-Train Corp. is that we already have the infrastructure to absorb another service." "We think we can be more profitable because of that." In fact, their entire business did not depend on this single service. If it failed, they could simply cut their losses and continue trading as before. Two and a half years after Auto-Train Corporation dropped off its last passengers, Amtrak's Auto Train picked up its first passengers on the same platform.

The inaugural race left Lorton on the afternoon of October 30, 1983 and arrived safely in Sanford the following morning. After a month, it was clear that the service was a success. Amtrak Vice President William Norton said, "I'm pleased to report that our results are very, very, very close to our projections." "We're looking forward to a long, busy season and we're off to a good start." Many of the passengers were fans of the original train and the general consensus was that Amtrak had done a good job of picking up the torch. After its first year of operation, the new Auto Train became a permanent part of the national Amtrak system, and in the years that followed, the service would continue to prove its worth.

Not as a fad, but as a valuable idea that could stand the test of time.