Digital Markets Act: Prohibitions and obligations to be imposedJun 09, 2021
Hello, thank you for joining us for this second webinar in our series of meetings on the Digital Markets Law and the Digital Services Law. I am Laura Nathalie, director of mobility and media of technological telecommunications at the Center for Regulation in Europe or Ser. We are the independent agency based in Brussels. think tank that promotes high-quality regulatory practices in the networking and infrastructure industries. We are also a multidisciplinary community that draws on the perspectives of academic regulators and industry and I have the honor and pleasure of moderating today's session which will focus on
obligationsin The dma, as you may recall, published its recommendations in November , a few weeks before the commission adopted its proposals, and the same academic team behind those reflections also published its draft evaluations of the commission's texts, after having digested them and presented them by alexandre. destrell in the first session of this series that took place on January 19, that session is still available through our YouTube channel through our website and the document, in fact, can be downloaded from our website, which is designed for you to describe the structure of today's discussion agenda. we have richard feesey, senior advisor to ser's academic team, and emilia fletcher, professor of competition policy at the university of east anglia.
They are here to give us context on the architecture around the
obligationsand the obligations themselves, including some comparisons on how, for example, the UK Competition and Markets Authority has addressed the same issues which we will then triangulate with a Howard transatlantic perspective Shelansky, professor of economics at the Yale School of Management. We'll move on to an industry panel made up of Amazon Apple, Booking.com and myself. They will present their representatives at that time, first of all they will provide their broad reaction to the EU text to delve into the
prohibitionsand obligations within the dma.
Our academics will close with their key learnings from the panel and we look forward to interactive discussions today. As we had in the first session and we are delighted to note that we already have many participants online on our website and on our YouTube channel, others will continue to join us. I think potentially the dma represents a fairly new way of regulating with its exante measures and its antitrust prerogatives, so it is understandable that it is a hot topic from an academic point of view and a hot potato from a political point of view and, of course, So, we ran a social media poll where we asked our audience for some important insights ahead of today's speaker discussions and we have some graphics to show you.
Here the results are revealed: the prohibitions and obligations in the DNA text are correct and I think the most important answer was that more discussion would be needed. Do we have other surveys? Yes, do the prohibitions and obligations in the Commission text go far enough? or they should be more detailed and then I think just moving forward is that more discussion is needed and some think they are quite fair and many think they should be more detailed so there is a lot to discuss today but we are also and we have some coming soon graphics more, but we also want to leave room for a variety of additional questions and we will make sure that you can submit them through the solido, which you can do by using the hashtag cdma or by scanning the qr code that appears on the screen and I will ask questions to the speakers as appropriate moments arise during the discussion again.
This is the second event in a focused series. We will meet again on Thursday, March 4 to discuss the institutional design and application in ADN and on Monday. On March 29 we will examine the dsa, the high-level closing session for this series. We will post details on this in the coming weeks. Finally, we also warmly encourage you to subscribe to sarah's newsletter where you can get updates on these events. You will find details in the box below if you are following on youtube or on the sales website sales.eu without further ado, let's get started, today we have a very rich program, it's Richard's turn first of all, Richard, hello and that would be great.
If you'd like, you could start with some of your analysis of the architecture around which the commission has framed its prohibitions and obligations, and that should give us a good analytical context for further exploring the obligations themselves. Richard, um, let me. let's say a few words about the general framework and then I think emilia will say well, we'll delve into the details of the specific obligations. As I'm sure many of you know, first there are two lists of obligations. and measures in the dna proposals, article 5, which has been described as self-executing, so these are obligations that the commission assumes, they require no further explanation and, uh, no more, there is no further maintenance, um on the part of the commission or guidance, and I think I think the fact that the commission assumes that they are self-executing is one way of understanding the commission's assumption about the relatively low number of staff that they anticipate will be needed for this new regulatory body 80 80 people in total and and if you assume that these obligations, you know, will generally be implemented and take care of themselves, then that is understandable and there is an additional set of obligations and prohibitions and other measures in article six and there is a job for the commission, the commission can provide guidance, but it appears that that guidance will largely be provided in the context of an enforcement action, so once the commission has determined that a company is not complying with the rules, the commission can provide guidance however possible . to the steps they would need to take to comply, which would be done in the context of an enforcement procedure that was already underway, perhaps the most interesting feature is that companies themselves can also proactively request guidance from the commission. and the commission then has a period of time to report what actions they are supposed to take to ensure compliance.
I think an interesting question that we can come back to is: what are the incentives for companies to make those requests at this point in the commission proposals it's not clear, for example, would they have any exemption from liability or actions compliance or financing, so we might ask whether companies would have strong incentives to express their uncertainties about whether they are in compliance or what steps they would take to get the commission's attention, or whether it might make more sense to keep their heads down and wait until For the commission itself to take action, my opinion is that I think it should give more thought to what the incentive properties of the mechanism could be useful.
Other things to note: There are, unlike other competition contexts, no opt-out options. Actually, I mean, there are some very exceptional circumstances under which. Companies may be exempt from the need to meet these obligations, but in reality they are very restricted and, in particular, do not think about the type of objective justifications or efficiencies that could justify the presentation of a particular company. a particular assumption given the age of their business model, so in general I would say that this list of obligations has an assumption that there is a low level of ambiguity about what the rules are and that it is fairly clear to people who There will be no circumstances under which the benefits of complying with these rules may be ambiguous or multi-marginal, but these are fairly clear and certain rules that we can, we can all assume, are beneficial.
I'm sure we'll get opinions on whether or not those assumptions are well founded or not, obviously there's also a process for the commission to add new obligations over time if they identify them and an additional process from us of some sort of evaluation every three years from the general implementation of dma uh um where I think we could also expect conclusions to be drawn about the effectiveness of the obligations, for example, and whether further changes need to be made, so this will be and is anticipated as a sort of dynamic process , that is, it has built-in review mechanisms.
I think there are two questions that I would like to raise at the beginning of this discussion that we could return to, so one is, as I mentioned, at least a lot or some weight is attributed to it. this boundary between article 5 and article 6 and some obligations fall in article 5 and others fall in article 6. I think we could ask ourselves what is the correct boundary to draw, it is not clear to me whether an obligation, for example, allowing users to uninstall apps that appears in article 6. is actually a more complex obligation or the type that would require guidance from the commission than some of the obligations that currently appear in article 5. so a debate could be had, I think about which side of the border there are particular individual obligations.
You could sit back, but you could also ask if there is another line to draw, as the UK CMA is thinking, I think it is between what you could call prohibitions, obligations or rules, for on the one hand, and what the cma calls for pro-competitive interventions of which article 6 obligations to share data, for example, could be examples because they are things that companies are not prohibited from doing and are not forms of conduct that one wants to stop, are much more similar to traditional Excellent regulatory openness of the market, entry assistance measures, which would not otherwise be a normal feature of a market, are essentially regulatory constructions that are desired to be implemented, much more complicated to design and implement, and at the time they appear. in article six as if they were in a similar category to many of the other prohibitions and obligations, but perhaps another line needs to be drawn when thinking about how we organize the set of tools and the range of measures available to achieve the objectives the second question In my opinion, it is something that certainly at Sarah we have been discussing for a long time and that is that when you think about obligations and interventions, it is useful to be very clear what your objective is and, in particular, whether the objective of these measures is to promote entry and competition in the main platform
marketsin which these companies operate or whether it is to safeguard competition in related
marketsthat could otherwise become dominated due to the leverage of our market power arising at the core. platform services and at least to me it is not always clear when you look at the list of proposed obligations and proposed prohibitions in the dma right now which of those two objectives is being pursued and my experience at least with the regulation is that it is useful to have Very clear from the beginning what your objective is and choose your tools and your rules and remedies accordingly in light of the objective you are pursuing.
We might ask, I think, if it's clear enough at this point. the commission's proposals on what the goal is, that's all I wanted to say, so maybe I'll ask emilia. Thank you very much, Richard. um, that's really interesting and well noted about the rules and tools. I thought about it before moving on to emilia. It could be worse for our audience if you don't have the commission's text in front of you. I understand that Article 5 is the obligations of the designated guardians and Article 6 denotes the obligations of the guardians capable of being specified in more detail in grapes, so I refer to Emilia without further ado.
It would be great if you could share your thoughts on Richard's comments and also on the prohibitions and obligations themselves. Thank you so much. I'm just going to share one slide. I hope it sounds like sharing. Alright. So. Richard did talk about the architecture. I was going to focus on the obligations themselves, but of course there are 18 and it's a very long debate to go into them in detail, so I'll probably be a little more on the architecture side. Also, just to highlight before we start that I am not exactly on the competition and markets authority board, so I am speaking from my academic capacity, but I am obviously very close and understanding of what is proposed in the UK. um and actually I think it's pretty aligned or there's some obvious differences but I think it's pretty aligned with what's recommended uh in the EU um there's one apparent difference which is in the UK um the code will be the code The standards of conduct. for each company they will be carried out in a specific way and developed in a participatory manner with the companies at the same time that the designation process is carried out, so it seems that it could lead to a much more specific set of behaviors for each company. codes, while we have obligations here that apply in the same way to all companies, on the other hand, I think it is worth highlighting that the intention is for the UK code to be based on some general basic principles and I do not believe the cma has yet said whether those principlesbasics would be the same in all companies, but I think they could easily be and to help me think about that question and also the obligations of the dma, I prepared this slide, which is not me.
I promise I'm not going to talk about it because it's very, very detailed, but what it does is put the proposed principles of the cma's
digitaladvertising market study, so those are the principles that the dma developed having analyzed only the market of
digitaladvertising, like that, like that. Google and Facebook, so don't look at Amazon, Apple, Microsoft or any other firm um and I put them next to those principles, the dma obligations and what you can really see is that there is a very strong overlap in terms of the issues , the issues, the substance that is actually being addressed, uh, in those two in these two jurisdictions and I thought that was really very informative at least for me, however, when you look at these, look at them side by side of this Likewise, there are other things that emerge, but it is worth highlighting if they are worrying.
You know I'm less sure, so the first thing that's pretty obvious if you look in detail here is that the principles proposed by the cma are broader than the dma's obligations, which are much more specific under um. uh article five and under article six, um, but actually that's not surprising because the cma principles are meant to be principles and you would expect the principles to be broader, you would expect that when cma goes through the process of creating the Actual code based. codes based on these principles would be specified much more precisely and could begin to look much more like the obligations in the right column without you knowing how to prejudge anything, it is also true that the principles proposed by the cma include much more modify words like improper or unreasonable, I've highlighted them in red or adverse effects and while dma obligations essentially have no modifying words, except for a little bit that says you can't violate gdpr um, but again, it's not obvious to me at least that By the time these principles have become actual codes of conduct for companies and that process, you know is still to go through, they will still have all those modifying words that are very useful to ensure that you don't have an unwanted side . effects, but they reduce the legal certainty and the self-execution of the codes, so based on um, just looking at them, I asked myself some questions, oh no, wait here, we are, oh, that's it, that's a yes, very good, okay , Then which one?
I think these are some of the questions that will arise later and these are my tentative answers. The first question is: Are the obligations too broad and I think at least if you compare them with the cma obligations? and the cma has probably gone through a more detailed analysis, at least in the context of digital advertising, of the facts of what the problems are, and has thought about it very carefully based on the evidence, what they think they should be his principles. I came to a very similar position in terms of the range of issues, so I think they are possibly not too broad in scope.
Argue that possibly the second question: Are they addressing the right kinds of issues? It seems they are. um Richard already raised this. This is a different question, it has nothing to do with the comparison with the UK, but is this line between article 5 and article 6? I think some people seem to have looked for it to be about the substance of what is required. I think it is a purely pragmatic line, one can address the question: can the obligation be formulated in a way that is precise enough to be self-executing without further specification and without creating unwanted side effects?
Yes, I think you could argue whether you know that everything is exactly in order. the right side of the line and the second, the next question, you know, is actually the article. Richard raised a provision of article six that he thought could be article five. I think you could also look at the provisions of article five and some of the ones I would say are it's not entirely clear and unambiguous, so at this point yeah, I'm not sure that the line is clear, but I think it's a perfectly fine line. reasonable to try to draw myself and that the process we are going through now of discussing and highlighting ambiguities highlighting unwanted side effects should help create greater precision and do the right things, but the right things on either side of that line there are a debate about whether article six um is that the obligations are defined too narrowly, so they have to say yes. things about ied surfaces, etc. are specified quite quickly, everything becomes quite a lot, some of them are quite defined and it is that a problem, clearly it is good, the more defined they can be if we want to be clear about what is required, also highlight that the dma can add obligations. through article 10 after the market investigations so that they can go back to being broader, potentially even even um, you know, once the dma is in place, there are also some who have argued, in comparison, that some of The obligations are actually too broad, at least from the point of view of legislation, yes. are quite broad and what exactly is self-preference, you know, it can be many, many things, so I think that's true, on the other hand, there is this, obviously, there will be this process of further specification through article seven, so what i think that that process should be really helpful in narrowing the limits and hopefully it can look quite similar to the participatory process that the UK is going to follow to develop its code of conduct as well, so I think there's actually that whole process, the article 7.
The process is also very well aligned, I think, with the UK kind of approach. The other thing I just wanted to highlight because I don't think Richard highlighted it. In terms of all these obligations, they only apply to activities specified in the UK as a core platform service in the EU, so the obligations do not apply to all core platform services in which the designated companies participate. , but only to those that are themselves an important gateway, so if you think about Facebook, for example, why are they not here. Um, you might and without prejudging anything, you might think that Facebook would have its um, regulation apply to its social media services, but it might not have the regulation apply to its marketplace services, where obviously currently there are at least a large number. smaller, smaller and I think that also leads to obligations being much more differentiated between different business models and much more, um, much, the specification process will generally generate a lot of things.
I had a lot of other questions, but I'm actually going to leave them for now because I think they're a little replicative of what Richard talked about, so I'll leave it there in general, although I'm pretty positive, as you might expect, about dma, but I also think that this process. What we are going through now is invaluable in terms of learning more and developing more and I hope to see a lot of refinement in the coming months. Thank you very much Amelia and I think it's really interesting. I mentioned it in the introductory triangulation and I think.
In this session, we really have to look at the EU versus the UK versus the US and see the overlaps and the distinctions where we will end up, if one will end up too broad and the other too narrow, clearly there is a lot to play for. um and with that in mind howard schallansky professor of law at georgetown good morning to you on the east coast and thank you for joining us from there um we understand that you can only be with us uh until uh for an hour basically so um it's It's great that your main comments arrive now.
It would be great if you could take a few minutes to talk to us about what you see as the main US-based considerations, particularly around architectural prohibitions and obligations, but I'm sure you may have done that. Some comments on dma themselves also thanks for being here. Thank you very much, Laura, it is a real pleasure to be with everyone this morning. Just as a brief disclosure. I'm using my academic cat, but I've provided legal advice on Facebook. over time, so I just want that disclosure to be available as I make my comments in case you want to discount accordingly.
I'd like to start by agreeing with and agreeing with the questions and concerns that Richard raised. Questions that Emilia has asked when comparing the CMA proposal with the DMA. I think they come up for me too. I think those are the right questions and I think there are some very difficult questions in line drawing that remain to be asked. From the US perspective, if you were to publish a graph that was comparable to Amelia's, there would be absolutely nothing on the left side. We don't have anything that looks like the dma, so let me say we're in a slightly different position in the US.
When we look at this type of proposal which, as Richard pointed out, is actually much more in line with the tradition of a regulatory model that to the kind of exposed doctrinal application approach that we have in the United States, so let me say a couple of words about what I think the right analogy is what I think the way forward will be in the US and what the vision is From this side of the pond in the United States, we have legislation passed that feels very similar. in form and style to the DMA is the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and had a very similar type of approach in the sense that it attempted to facilitate entry and preserve the opening of markets for new entrants in a set of services that had been provided by long-lasting holders. with significant network advantages and there were a number of years during which the Federal Communications Commission prescribed a variety of regulations to ensure access and interoperability to traditional telephone networks.
In a sense, the model we are seeing here at the dma has some similarities to that. However, we don't have any sort of broad competition-focused statute that would generally apply to the types of entities or digital platforms that the DMA is trying to reach, so we're still in the United States in the position of trying to create this rule-making body from scratch and the federal trade commission has rule-making authority, the scope of that authority is somewhat open to debate, it could be strengthened legislatively, but we're really just starting to think about this kind of approach regulatory and we are I would say that they are far behind both the United Kingdom and the European Union in terms of having a draft of such regulations.
There have been proposals. I would refer you to the work of Fiona Scott Morton. Michael Katis. The work of Harold Field. and jean kimmelman and a recent article that bill rogerson and I wrote that talks about the wisdom or viability of these kinds of anti-regulatory approaches to digital platforms, but I think it's safe to say that Europe and certainly the UK will actually implement these regulations. long before we have drafts of them circulating for reflection and comment, and what that means is that the actual behavior of many of these companies will indeed be guided, I believe, by the DMA and by events in the UK. before any kind of legal basis in the US and I'll let Kyle, James and others comment on the extent to which you know and Peter to what extent behavior around the world will be dictated by the cma, but I suspect that much of the Behavioral change will occur as a result of what is happening in Europe before legal obligations are
imposedon us by the US.
There is a legal development in the US that may borrow from the DNA or have some elements of the same. Legislation has recently been proposed. by Senator Klobuchar that would tighten antitrust law and strengthen it in certain ways and I think there are some very good and interesting aspects of that legislation, but it is very much at the beginning of what promises to be a long and I think a somewhat legislative path. controversial and It also won't go as far in terms of imposing obligations on established companies as the DMA does, so that legislation will not fundamentally change the obligations, I think, of digital platforms and others that would be dragged into the DMA, etc. on the US side many of the things, for example, the obligation to interoperate, the obligation to make data available, the obligation to not be discriminatory in terms of self-preference access restrictions, all of those are things that are actually very difficult to achieve doctrinally and through the courts under the existing antitrust doctrine in the US, if anything, the antitrust doctrine over the last 20 years has evolved in a direction that is increasingly hostile to many of the types of provisions found in article 5 in article 6 of the dma, so for example in the USA the obligation to interoperate is only permitted under the trinco precedent in really unusual circumstances and one is absolutely free not todeal with a competitor and, in fact, one is even freer to deal with an entity that is not a competitor, so if what one is trying to achieve is competition, direct competition in the core service that a platform provides or preserve the opening for complementary types of services that would be built on that platform, that is a very difficult thing to achieve, in the US, doctrinally, in fact.
There is even a decision involving Microsoft in the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit that says that the desire to preserve profits for oneself is a perfectly permissible business justification for denying access to a rival or potential rival. Why? Why do we care about a case outside the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, well, it's the United States Court of Appeals, so it's a persuasive, if not binding, authority on other circuits, but we More importantly, that decision was written by then-justice now-justice neil gorsuch and perhaps it would be a sign of ways in which the court could proceed and therefore the supreme court could proceed a couple of comments on the dma in yeah and some of the things that it's trying to accomplish that I think would raise challenges and So, and I think any legal developments in the US would raise real questions.
I share all the concerns and questions that Richard and Amelia raise. So I won't repeat them. I would like to point out that there are some very difficult questions that arise in definitions alone, for example when it comes to data sharing. If you look in the definitions at the references to data and information, I think it's real. The question then arises as to whether there is an obligation to share transformations of data into information that can be truly valuable for the functioning of a platform. In fact, it could be, if you will, the secret sauce to your competitive advantage.
A lot of innovation and thought goes into transforming data into information. Where is the limit in terms of what should be shared? You can see a very easy case. At least I think it's a pretty easy case to say that all data that you get directly from customers is, in some sense, raw data that it's not. platforms in a meaningful sense, but there could be shared ownership, I could totally see sharing that and if a compendium of that raw data becomes an incredibly valuable competitive asset and barrier to entry, we could even imagine sharing that raw data, but that data has been transformed into information that can be used strategically and competitively by the platform, which seems to raise incentive issues about information sharing taking advantage of all sorts of things that are deeply rooted in the types of considerations that arise about whether We don't grant access at least under US doctrine and I think for an economic issue it's incredibly important that the data reporting line I think is not very clear and I think there will be a lot of challenges about what really needs to be shared under the dma, so I think there are a lot of difficult questions to answer, very related to that.
I wonder about self-preference and how far it goes, interoperability and how far that obligation goes when we talk about non-discrimination, to some extent, integration with a plugin. It may just be a matter of exchanging information via an API, but beyond the API, there may be deep levels of infrastructural integration that go beyond software to hardware, which could give a service a real advantage as in that it runs on the platform, so if My proprietary add-on product performs better than third-party add-on products due to degrees of information that go beyond the information. Degrees of integration that go beyond the exchange of information in the API.
How much of that deep infrastructural integration do I have to give up to maintain security? -discriminate or share, so I think there are going to be a lot of very difficult questions when implementing dma now, does that mean we should try to figure everything out in advance? Actually, I think we couldn't discuss it and face it hard. The problems from now to the next century at some level putting into play the regulations that you know and seeing how they work will be complicated, it will be difficult, but a lot will be learned and one can take back the changes, modify them on the fly, but in an In At a certain point, the time to talk stops, you can never completely solve all the questions and the time to solve the problems, you know it in the course of implementation.
As complicated as it may be, it may not be a bad idea, but I just wanted to bring it up. I think there are likely to be some real challenges that arise, moving forward with the dma from an American perspective and looking at it through an American doctrinal lens. Thank you very much, Howard, very interesting and I also listened with interest to some. of your comments towards the end of your speech about the implementation challenges, which actually remind me quite a bit of what we saw in the same dna recommendations about this being a first phase and a new way of regulating and having to evaluate and evaluate periodically see how things were working and treat this as a dynamic regulation, so thank you very much for that and also many comments to date on varieties of business models and with that in mind I think we have met a very important variety of business models.
We would like to open the industry panel now. I think their models cover a broad scope both in their geographic reach and across the entire ecosystem of the platform-based economy, which is why we have some great speakers lined up. I'm happy to report this, it's my pleasure to introduce Kailan, dear Chief Compliance Officer and Vice President of Corporate Law at Apple, um, Kyle, it's a particularly early morning for you on the East Coast, maybe the sun has already risen as it's getting here and Thank you very much for joining us at this early hour for you um peter love gila global head of public affairs at booking.com uh to provide insights to the European online travel company and james waterworth director of EU public policies for Amazon uh again There are very complementary businesses there and we are very excited to have the three of you on our panel today to react and of course ask a variety of questions that we have prepared about the obligations.
A reminder to participants that the solid is open for questions, um yeah. would like to let us know who you are, that could be a big help and if you have a panelist in mind for your questions, we have some questions coming up, I think maybe I'll keep them a few more minutes if so. It's okay until the panelists have expressed their main views on DMA and we would like to start with this as we did in the first session because I thought it worked quite well and what we would like to ask is could each of us briefly capture the two main messages you want to convey, a point of alignment with the commission's thinking and then what would be the key aspect of the proposal that you think needs to be reconsidered?
In the following negotiations, we will focus on the prohibitions and obligations and how they are dealt with in the proposal Kyle, since you have woken up so early this morning for us, perhaps we will start with you for this initial question, what would be the main point of agreement and disagreement from you or Apple when it comes to committee text thank you laurie and good morning everyone uh it's a real pleasure to be here and join all of you virtually. I will say that I'm excited about the fact that I'm sitting here in California and not in Brussels, where I understand it's pretty cold and snowy.
So I'm most deeply sorry for that, so to respond quickly, the setup here, I think in terms of things that I appreciate about the DMA, it's great to finally have a concrete proposal on the table that we can all debate. and look and evaluate in the coming months, so over months and years we have heard a wide variety of different things that will be put on the table and now we have something to look at and say, well, what are the economics and facts, where are we guided by what our goals are and I understand that you know that some of the goals right now are things like contestability and justice contestability?
I understand that equity is a little more difficult. I think there are other goals and objectives that need to be taken into account. Things like privacy, things like security, things like innovation, all of which are very important goals, not just in Europe but around the world, that need to be evaluated and judged as we analyze each of these terms, I believe. I know I'm not going to sit here in California and pretend that the digital economy is a panacea and that there are no problems. I fully recognize that there are problems and challenges in today's digital economy and I believe that there are some proposals here that will help address them.
Some of those challenges, just to use an example, I think a challenge that we're all grappling with, both in the industry and outside the industry, is how to evaluate how to look at ad-funded models that rely heavily on data. and I think it obviously exists. There are some issues with past mergers, whether it's Facebook and Instagram or current practices in that market, that competition law is not prepared to address and I think there are proposals in the dma that will help address some of those. challenges in terms of things that I don't necessarily like or worry about and I hope will be removed in the future debate, I think to some extent, in reading the proposals, you have taken a list of grievances and grievances that have been aired in various forums against amazon or microsoft or google or facebook or apple and we put them all on a list and said we are going to take action to address all of these complaints and complaints and apply this set of rules to all five for these companies and Maybe others I think It's a very rigid and complicated way of trying to address specific problems, perhaps with each company, so I'm very hopeful that we'll see a little more flexibility and thinking as we move forward in the debate.
I think there are some terms that make a lot of sense. I think there are other terms that, frankly, I've spent hours and hours and hours with business people, lawyers and advisors, trying to understand how some of these terms apply. Apple, uh, and apply to our various businesses and I can say that I haven't found an answer on most of them, some of them are obvious. I can look at certain layouts like 5c and say, "Okay, I know who wants that layout we have." Been dealing with that company for four or five years they clearly got what they wanted through the DMA.
There are a few others that I look at and say I think this could have a very significant impact on our ability to ensure that our platform is the most secure, private and trustworthy on the market and there are things like 6c and 6f that I think could have an impact significant in user privacy and security, so I have a lot of ideas, but let me pause, I think that sums them up. but I appreciate forums like this and hearing people's questions and thoughts about this proposal. Thank you very much Carlin, it's great for us to hear your thoughts on the proposal too, much appreciated Peter, how about you for booking? com.
Thank you. Lara and hello to everyone who takes the time to follow this panel and it's a pleasure to be there, so the European Commission has certainly put forward an ambitious proposal to keep digital markets fair and open and that is an ambition that we support firmly. and we believe in dna and therefore welcome him. We see that proposal as a solid starting point for regulating businesses where there is no other option for consumers and businesses in order to foster a more level playing field and limit dependency where it exists. Reality. is that a few digital companies have become so powerful that they are inevitable business partners for a large number of companies.
They often control entire digital ecosystems and this lack of choice can allow gatekeepers to engage in unfair practices and sometimes make mistakes. Markets are less contestable and we therefore welcome the DMA's focus on dependency and platform entrenchment as the correct approach to regulating gatekeepers. If I look at the accommodation markets that booking.com is in, the situation is that from both a customer and a business user perspective that it is not a dominant way of booking or distributing accommodation, there are many alternatives that are not only available but which are also being used by both parties and that allows for intense and quite dynamic competition between several major players, including ourselves, Expedia. airbnb trip.com google and many more regional competitors and obviously not forgetting the direct online channels, now we also move to the space site to improve if you wish.
On the designation side, we believe that the commission's proposal should follow a more consistent approach. on how you translate objectives into effective criteria. An excessive emphasis onsize criteria alone risks falsely capturing platforms that are large but not gatekeepers and also risks, at least over time, disproportionately capturing local European platforms that naturally tend to be stronger in their country. market than elsewhere uh, we are very supportive of sarah's recommendations from late last year, which I think very accurately translate the concept of guardian into simple criteria for designating them and we think that dma would benefit from more strongly reflecting these types of criteria .
Specifically, DNA should more explicitly link the definition of gatekeeper to user dependency and, in particular, to the lack of multihoming on both sides of the market. I would argue that the lack of multihoming is the number one defining characteristic of gatekeepers as recognized by competition authorities. expert reports and also in the supporting documents of the bma proposal unfortunately, however, the proposal itself does not explicitly refer to the lack of multiple accommodation as part of the criteria when it comes to the refutation process and the investigation of market. Secondly, I will return to that later in the discussion I believe that the proposal should recognize and adapt more to the very different business models within the platform economy.
This applies equally also to the criteria and definition of monthly active end users which must be differentiated by type of platform service, it simply does not make sense to apply the same definition to the five different types of platform services and the last one to end. I would say that the orchestrator of the ecosystem is also an important criterion, which appeared in the Surrey recommendation that has been left out of the dna criteria. yes I think it is relevant to pay attention to the ability of a platform to control a broader ecosystem and venturing into new markets is an aspect that helps us identify where companies are going and an aspect that distinguishes the gatekeepers from just great platforms thank you, thank you peter um, I think you may have also seen just before this panel that you, booking.com, may have published a blog post about your DNA assessment, which I'm also looking forward to.
I'm going to read in more detail after this, so thanks for explaining it, James, I'm sure. Amazon makes very important contributions to this debate, so thanks for being here. What is your general opinion on dma? Maybe one thing you like could align with more and one thing you would dispute. Thank you, thank you Lara and many thanks to you. and your team for the opportunity to contribute to this very good discussion today, in terms of how we view DMA and indeed the work that you have been doing over the last few months. Firstly, we believe, as does the commission, that the DMA should continue to ensure that there is a fair business environment in which innovators and technology startups have opportunities to compete and innovate online and consumers have more and better services to choose.
That is clear, it should also strive to ensure that there are no barriers preventing consumer businesses or consumers, whatever their size, from taking advantage of the single market, a key element of European policy and indeed innovation. , innovation should be encouraged and made sure that it doesn't stifle it in a sense, from one angle we look at this. As a retailer, retail is omnichannel and from that perspective it is somewhat surprising to see the limited scope of the dma as there is no lockdown in retail in terms of some of the details that have already been mentioned in the article 5c of the proposal. which talks about allowing commercial users to promote their offers and contract with parties outside the regulated service or market and this raises concerns and let me briefly describe what they are every year, just before Christmas, europol publishes its golden rules for purchases and purchases online. from reliable sources is Europol's number one golden rule and we know that trust is something very difficult to gain and easy to lose, so this article runs the risk of being bad for consumers, especially considering that this proposal is being debated alongside the The Digital Services Act, which rightly seeks to ensure that people have high trust in digital services, needs to be carefully examined to ensure that it is viable and viable for a retail environment, finally, in the analysis of the service and work that you and your team have been doing.
In recent months, I think the team rightly recommends that any so-called gatekeeper should be able to defend business practices and potentially avoid some liabilities by showing that they are beneficial, that their business practices are beneficial and this would be, for example, on the basis Although they are in favor of innovation, there are a series of social and economic benefits derived from their practices. It also points to the fact that we need to have a flexible regulatory approach in a rapidly changing environment and that speaks to the idea of a case-by-case basis. evaluation it is going to be difficult to escape the idea that we need a case-by-case evaluation of different business models, different products and, indeed, different practices and situations, finally, and not exactly that point, it is necessary to consider the difference and the different differences between different industries and business models retail is different from software retail is different from search and both the analysis and the proposal must clearly take this into account thank you thank you james uh very clear and of course sarah will also take note your comments on our proposals thank you very much, I think that before delving into the questions about prohibitions and obligations themselves, fortunately we have many good questions through the solido and I am going to privilege the one addressed to Howard first.
Keeping in mind that Howard will have to leave us in a few minutes, so Howard, if this is okay, I'll answer the question that was asked and then maybe if you could give us a couple of key takeaways from what you've heard. So far, that would be great and thank you very much again for being here, understanding that you have to leave early, so Frederick de Baca from Telefónica asks you, as you suggested, that the fine-tuning of the remedies will be a kind of exploratory process, will you? how could this be? created to achieve a collaborative process between regulators, regulated companies and other market participants without becoming an endless game of system type of process, that's a great question and I wish I had the answer.
I think there are a couple of models that one could consider to the extent that what we're really going to have is a dma that sets out some self-executing obligations rather than being what is effectively a statute that will really be like james. Suggested, applied largely on a case-by-case basis, one possibility is to look at the negotiated regulation model used in a number of industries certainly used in the United States, where interested parties are across the board, related to a market or set of particular services. They will come together and define what is really necessary in terms of solutions for access, for interoperability, for integration, all those things and they could articulate a set of, um, a set of backup mechanisms in case that negotiation not be successful, but you could have some kind of outcome where the agency sets a set of carrots and sticks as defaults that neither party will really like and then a set of what is really needed in terms of access and interoperability and data sharing in a particular market or a particular set of services could be established and put on the table and it could become self-executing.
I don't know if it is an easy process. I mean, I'm sure it's not an easy process, but it might be better than many. The kind of one-off solutions that effectively game the system or level leave a lot of darkness. I think it's going to be very difficult to find one-size-fits-all solutions under articles five and six. and then figuring out how you know, according to James and Kyle, the heterogeneity of the different types of entities that will be regulated here can lead to a set of obligations that is relatively appropriate for those different types of entities, a negotiated rulemaking. a process or something like that or a negotiated solutions process that sets some default values could be one way to go, but I think it's going to be very challenging and the bi-annual reviews, which the draft calls for, could end up flooding um, some sort of articulation and effective implementation, so this would be a real challenge in the future and I think that, you know, by way of conclusions, um, my conclusion is really the same, I think there are some very good principles that can be.
In the end, a very high-level set of basic principles is implemented first with many details that are worked out over time, but the implementation problems will be such that I think a lot remains to be seen as to whether dma will be some kind of aspirational document that establishes the types of behavior we would like to see from Nazis, or whether it really becomes a set of self-executing understandings about what companies should and should not do, but we certainly have a lot of work ahead of us. Thank you very much Howard and thank you again for joining us today and thank you.
It's a pleasure to continue the conversation with you. Thanks again. 20 more questions. Let me answer a couple. Many are not directed at a specific panelist. I can intervene and, but here is one from Giulio Piccone, do the panelists believe that the commission's experts will be able to understand the different business models in a timely manner and will be able to impose the different measures required? And then there is another question about the variety of businesses. models, which I think could also be a good point to introduce to our industry panelists. Don't we need a more targeted approach to obligations as we see in the UK and Germany to take into account different business models?
Item 7 seems insufficient in With this respect, would anyone like to try one of those? Kyle sure and let me take the last one first. I think you know this difference is the differentiation that Howard just mentioned and the fact that you have five companies that are very different from each other, from Apple to Amazon to Microsoft to Google to Facebook, these are very different companies in very different markets. , so I think having a process and a framework that allows you to engage each company in the markets and their business model in the way that it is approached.
Those markets are very important, so you would see things in the German legislation that was recently passed and in the UK proposal that allow for that kind of more personalized, more engaged process, and I think that makes a lot of sense, because I think that as you look the current proposal it is very difficult to understand how many of these apply to a particular business and to have that conversation I will remember something that Richard said at the beginning. You know, it's a tough question about whether you go in and seek guidance, um and I think having a process set up where it's a lot more complicated to have some exchanges would be a big help.
Thanks Kyle, anyone who answers those questions Peter, I would just add a comment at the top. from what Kyle just said, I mean, I think the commission has experience from other regulated industries in case-by-case assessments, I mean, when we look at telecommunications, for example, that's more homogeneous than what we're debating under the dma which the commission has recognized. the need for a case-by-case evaluation of situations, so if that is true for something that is more homogeneous, I think it becomes even more necessary for a broader set of products, services and models, I would be happy to address the question. of specific focus which seems to be a broad consensus if I read it correctly on this panel uh anyway um and I think there are two paths towards that goal: the German and the United Kingdom path, as I would call it, and Amelia um described it before.
With a more principles-based approach that is then applied and enforced by authorities on a case-by-case basis, my fear with the commission's proposal is that it is neither here nor there, I think it generalizes issues that we all know where they come from. From where they originated, to me it generalizes them to a certain extent, which carries the risk of not allowing effective application of those situations where there are real control problems and, at the same time, being too inclusive and incorporating companies and behaviors that They are not problematic, this is the problem I see, so I think it is a space of principles and then executed by authorities or a much more prescriptive, more detailed, personalized and differentiated way of looking at behavior.
I would like to hear Amelia's opinions. on that because I think you started going down that path earlier, so I think there are two ways that question could be resolved: one is in the actual definition of what is in Article 8, Article 5 and Article 6, and then in the process. of the specification process for article 6clearly we don't want anything in article five that is ambiguous or that is going to cause problems when applied to the wrong business model, the business model that it was not originally designed for, so I think that's an area where all companies that could be affected by this regulation should really shout and say, "Look, this doesn't make any sense to us in article six, obviously there is this specification process, so I think the question there is:" t um, it does.
As it is, it causes us problems. Is it because we can see this being specified? Can we not see this being specified in a way that would be appropriate or is it so inherently problematic? I think there is the question of designing them and then there is a separate question: Do we believe that once we have this regulation in place, do we believe that the commission will be able to discuss with companies about the specification process? which actually has a very short period of time associated with it, I think the commission's way of doing it is to put a lot of work into the company, so the idea is that companies have to come in and say this is how we propose these Which ones?
Are the measures we propose that would be effective in achieving this obligation? I think that is quite intelligent from the Commission's perspective. The question then is how are they going to evaluate it when companies come and say we think this is going to be effective. I have hunches. Probably for practical reasons, let's say okay, if you think that's going to be effective, let's run with it and see if it really is effective. So perhaps this is an ongoing process of reviewing the effective effectiveness of these measures. I mean. Overall, I think it's complex, but it's complex in two stages, Richard, I think you just come, you're mute, Richard, you're silent, so, I mean, I agree with a lot of what's being said, just like I think it.
First, I think the uh dma needs to give companies incentives to engage constructively in the dialogue and disclose information early and widely. I'm not sure that's there right now, so I think having that conversation in the context of enforcement proceedings. For example, it's not the right thing to do, it's not a great context to have that dialogue and I remain skeptical as to the incentives to voluntarily have that conversation at this point in the DNA. I think they could always be created, but then there is a very practical way. The point is that there needs to be enough people on the other side of the dialogue to be able to process that information and deal with it with confidence because the danger I see is in a commission with limited resources having these conversations.
I suspect the tendency will be to be skeptical and say well, we're just going to go back to complying with the obligation as the directive says and you're just going to have all the regulation that you just had. to do that and we're not going to give you much more comfort, so I think we need to have incentives for companies to participate in the dialogue in the right way and we need to have resources and capacity on the other side. of the dialogue to be able to then address that within a reasonable period of time. I understand Howard's point about negotiated rulemaking, but my experience is that that takes a long time and I think one of the features that the commission is certainly looking for here is that I need to have obligations that bite fairly quickly, if possible, thanks Richard .
Can I take this opportunity to announce that anyone who is having trouble watching on our website can watch it on YouTube where they believe there is not a crackling problem and you will find the link uh in the event description on the page of the event you are watching right now, let's not miss the opportunity to dig deeper and see when prohibitions and obligations should apply and we will continue to answer questions through the slider, but carefully. time, let's get to the bans and obligations themselves, panelists, it would be great to hear from you and we're touching on this, uh, I think what's been really good so far is that even in the broad scope that we're in in the dma like There are whole obligations that heavily influence that, but how flexible do we consider the specification process to be and what should the process be for a designated platform to seek an exemption?
For example, we are talking a lot about efficiency or objective justification. Commission article five for appointed guardians versus article six for the guardian capable of being specified in more detail is a distinction that actually works and then we have a commission dma text by which obligations can be added but apparently not modified nor eliminate them. This is a problem. Howard has already given opinions on this, but it will be great here from our panel. So, let's start with you this time. What are your opinions? For me, lara, sorry, I thought I'd change the order. Yeah, that's not happy, happy, happy to get in there, so, you know, I think the market research route would seem to be the right basis for adding and removing obligations.
What I would like to add then is that, um, and that. Returning to the customization and differentiation of behavioral applications in more detail, I would say that the new obligations that result from a market investigation can only apply to gatekeepers in these specific markets that have been investigated and do not apply per se horizontally because that would bring us back to what I think is one of the problems with the proposal to take problematic behaviors out of that context and if I may add one or two examples very quickly, we'll get back to 5c uh, the anti-provision. direction where You know, I mean it basically boils down to the question of who is compensated for their services and is it a one-time or extended type of remuneration and yes, I would say that once a platform has been remunerated for acquiring a customer, they would do.
Argue that yes, there should be ways for the trading partner to submit their own offers at the right time, and we all know where this comes from, but apply it now to a platform that provides products or services where very often, refundable fees, if I'm talking about hosting, here they are a very common practice and secondly very much in the interest of the consumer, then you would basically completely legitimize free riding and undermine one business model for the benefit of another if a business partner is an EU regulation allows us to encourage a customer to cancel a reservation made on our site for a refund and do it directly with them because then we have invested and we are not regenerated at all so I think this is the clearest example in my opinion of what I would call an absurd effect of behavior that is taken out of context, thank you Peter, thank you very much, um, James, although perhaps I could take the opportunity to also present a specific question for you that comes through the solido about uh , explaining in more detail, if you can, the non-lockdown retail point of sale that you mentioned earlier, sure, well, there was a business that was built, our business was built to ensure that small businesses can sell around the world in the EU For example, in 2019, companies selling on Amazon exported products and services worth nine billion euros and can and do sell on multiple services, so this has been a very effective way for brands to sell. directly to consumers and compete with large retailers of all sizes on the same terms as large retailers of all sizes, so if we look for a specific problem, it doesn't seem to be there, rather it seems that many brands that would like to enter the classic retail they can't get into classic retail so they can't get distribution in the first place and let me give you an example of one of the slightly strange situations that this proposal raises, which is that in 2020 Amazon launched in two European countries in the Netherlands. and Sweden, and in both countries, our revenue will be small after launch and we compete against much larger retailers who operate both owned retailers and online retailers, offline retailers, so there will be some slightly strange incentives where we don't are potentially subject to them. limitations that Amazon would be subject to even though they are much larger players, so the blockade, to the extent it exists, has more to do with what the opportunity is for brands and merchants to sell to customers of everyone, not just in their home territory, and us.
We are of the opinion that the new models, one of which is the one we have been investing in and that we have an incentive to drive, is exactly what allows small businesses to do that. Excellent thanks James, I don't know if Richard and Amelia wanted to start with something here, I had a second round of questions that we don't have a lot of time to get into, but I think it would be really good because then we'll really get into the kind of great detail of the obligations, um, so kyle, maybe before we do that, could we get your take on the questions we just addressed?
Thank you for what I think you know in terms of analyzing each of these terms and asking if there is an opportunity to raise. Subjective justifications or other types of arguments as to why a particular term should or should not apply to a platform. I think I started at the bottom trying to understand what the goal of each term is and what the harm is that the commission or the term is trying to address. So once you understand that, you can say, "Okay, let's take 6c or 6f, for example, these are very focused on: do you allow third-party app stores?
How much access do you allow to an operating system or even a device?" , uh, and you know, from Apple's perspective, I think you know our focus is that there are other issues that need to be taken into account before applying that originally and I think Richard points out that you may have an agency that doesn't have fully staffed or don't fully understand what those tradeoffs are and that's a very real concern when you're talking about a model that's been built around privacy and security, you know we've provided a lot of access to our platform through the years in terms of creating a technology platform that allows developers to create amazing applications, we also have a process to make sure that we vet them to make sure that they are used in an appropriate and reliable way and suddenly say good.
We're just going to open the doors and not only allow third parties to step in and decide what applications are available, but we're also going to say that we have to open the doors to the entire technology platform without any regards to protecting things. like privacy and security, that's very concerning, so I think the trade-off is something that needs to be considered and obviously I'm focused on it from Apple's perspective, but I think listening to Peter. and for james, I think they're grappling with that too, which is again when you look at a particular term, some of them may just say "okay, I understand how to apply it", that others are going to require a lot of work and commitment and Speaking with a particular agency or regulator and I don't see that opportunity in the text and I'm very concerned about some of the things that Richard said.
Even if it's in the text? Do you have the people equipped to respond? of making those judgments and guessing some sort of business judgment on that, that's concerning, thank you lara, if you'll allow me, very, very briefly, um, because you mainly asked, I think about the exemption based on things like objective justification and what I want to emphasize it is not directly. an exemption, but it is the rebuttal process. In some of the supporting documents there were comments that the commission would expect the rebuttal process to be conducted only in exceptional cases. To allow thoughtful guardians to basically state the case and that's something.
I find it boring because the quantitative criteria are simplistic, they are based on science, first of all they do not talk about dependency and that is why I think that if we accept the quantitative criteria as a first level filter, then it is even more important. Really incorporate multi-hosting reliance into the rebuttal process and make it a truly meaningful path for companies to make the case. Thanks, Peter. It was interesting that rebuttable presumption also came up a lot in the first webinar. He is aware that it is time. I'd like to move on to the last round of questions and I'm going to include in it a couple more that come from solido, so the panelists, if they want and can address those as well, that would be Fantastic and then we'll move on to Richard and Amelia for some final comments, so on your obligations we are really interested in understanding whether you think the same obligations should apply to all designated platforms or adapt to the business model or mix or we can express it as if we read articles five and six as if they applied by same with all business models, that's really the crux of the issue here. um, some questions that arise from the solid on this basis. uh helena asks what they thinkpanelists on the allocation of damages well established in competition policy, for example, mfn clauses and self-preference if we talk about articles 5 and 6 respectively.
Marcus asks if we think the DMA will be able to effectively regulate anti-competitive behavior and retain big players. responsible and we also have interoperability that has come up several times and we have a question from Julieta Richard that perhaps you can address as we are concluding, Richard, which is that a cross-platform interoperability requirement is missing in the DNA despite strong calls for . uh, richard, what do you think of such an obligation? uh the smugglers brought there, um, questions, um, james, we're going to see you first this time, okay, can you clarify which one you'd like me to address?
I was noticing this, but in particular. There are many things I appreciate, but I think in particular whether or not the same obligations should apply across all designated platforms and whether we should read articles five and six as if they apply equally to all businesses, that's really the crux of the matter. question. these quite interconnected articles within the same chapter of the DNA text, yeah, I mean, I think, as I said at the beginning, we have to look at this on a case-by-case basis, given the different business model, the different products and services, the different, uh , that.
It will happen in different countries, so there are risks in terms of what other political and social objectives may be compromised if we don't do this on a case-by-case basis, let me perhaps give you a current example to illustrate this and the importance. of innovation, unless it applies to us, so I hope we can all agree that a product that one retailer could offer, all retailers could offer like hand sanitizer, given the current environment, is something that is an innovation useful not only to consumers, but to society at large, and if the rules were so broad and applied so widely that they prevented the introduction of a product like that at a time like that, I don't think that would be useful. for the customers of a particular store or for society in general, so I think it is an example of how, on a case-by-case basis, the absence of case-by-case specifications can result in losses in terms of innovation, there can be innovations at large. scale, another example would be the voice. assistance voice assistance for those who have used one, they are something that allows an entry point into computing, especially for people with disabilities who may have problems with vision or problems with movement and I think we need to be very careful about the possibility to give up, whether smaller innovations like introducing a hand sometimes sanitize a product at a retailer or major long-term innovations like voice assistance, and unless we look at these rules on a case-by-case basis, we run the risk of giving up. to those beneficial innovations thanks james, what about you?
Of those, would you like me to address anything in particular at this time? I'll leave it up to you, but I'd love for you to understand whether five and six in particular should be read equally across all business models and if you have the time. address any other one, that would be great too, so I think, like I said, I don't think you can take the obligations in five and six and apply them, you know, depending on how you count them. 20 or 30 different core platform services. as it is currently defined, I think it is too ambitious, and the exercise and you, you really need to take into account not only the product itself, but also the type of business model that underpins the business competing in that market, as well Let's take, for example, operating systems.
There is a model that we adopt that integrates with our devices and is very focused on selling devices and we sell them obviously for a price there is another model that is based on providing a free operating system that is supported by advertising and that is then licensed to third party manufacturers of devices those are two very different business models with different incentives and different problems and I think you have to keep them in mind when you look at some of these terms and prohibitions and I'm just using it as an illustrative example that you can go through each of these main services of the platform. and say, "There are some problems with this specific product and there are companies that participate in this market and have different incentives and different approaches to the market that have to be taken into account so rigidly that you know I'm particularly concerned." with article 5 because it's called self-execution, as if it were obvious what the problems are, as I read, that we have had, as I said before, hours and hours, days and days of debate about what exactly that means, article six, at least there is a chance to get some clarity, but I still think there's a lot of confusion there, Kyle, Peter, yes, I gave an example earlier with anti-direction 5c as an example of behavior taken out of context, which has consequences unrelated to the Internet , to add a second example that is more the lack of specificity, uh, I think the self-preferring clause in 60 um to be pretty blunt isn't going to do much about Google's self-preferring and it will travel to something that we've been in the receiving end for many years, um, I would expect The way it's written now, we would see an extension of Google Shopping type discussions for another 10 years without many questions and without much impact, but there was a question about the effectiveness of someone in the audience, so that's my answer on the shortcomings.
In that sense, thank you very much. We think we're running out of time, but before we do. Richard Amelia. Your main conclusions from this panel. Personally I find reflections for ourselves. This is how we like to work, having strong input from business representatives and how they actually view the measures, what are the key learnings that you have gained? There have been many more intelligent slider questions that have come up that would have been great to take up and that we will perhaps also discuss on a future occasion. If I, oh, if I go first, I think what we've really heard a lot is the concern that the obligations do not respect the different business models of companies.
I think those points are very well made. On the other hand, I would personally be very surprised if the commission moved away from the obligations process it has followed. I don't see it going back to the cma type of approach. I think you see it as a pragmatic approach in the face of companies that have enormous resources and the inclination to argue points with them at every point and therefore need to put these obligations on paper, agreed in advance, I think I agree with economic concerns. I hardly see the committee changing its view, so I think what we really need to do is think about how, in the context of a framework of obligations, we can nevertheless reflect and recognize some of those concerns that have been raised so much.
How can we ensure that Article 5 is actually written in a way that allows for self-execution? How can we ensure that the provisions of Article 6 actually work in the specification process? Really work in the way required to allow you to reflect as much as possible the different business models recognizing of course that it only applies to the core platform services that actually have the important input power, so I think you said that I think there's a lot more work to be done in the law, but I just can't see the overall architectures of the orchestra changing, so I think the more granular detailed feedback we can all provide to try to help, but within that marco uh that would be where we should go is my I have a lot of hunches amelia uh richard uh community thank you well I mean I really want to echo that so I thought that was a very useful discussion.
I think it is very important to remember what the committee's proposals are reacting to and what they are reacting to. There is a concern that the existing competition mechanisms take too much time so I think any attempt to improve the proposals which I think there is a lot of opportunity to do that needs to provide mechanisms that ensure that questions will be resolved quickly um and anything that seems will introduce a mechanism whereby the commission will stall uh it will take a long time it will consume a lot of resources on the part of the commission, I think it will receive quite little attention, uh mechanisms that give companies an opportunity to present their case in the context of a deadline or a default, I think he would have a better chance of getting a hearing, so I think I'm sympathetic to the idea that he might need more space. to avoid egregious errors, but I think we need to find a way to catch those errors in a way that allows the commission to feel that in most cases it can move forward without stalling.
Another thing I think is that I very much agree with Howard that learning by doing has a lot to praise. I'm not sure the current dma framework is flexible enough to allow the learning-by-doing feedback loop to work fast enough to For example, I'm not sure you need market research to modify an existing obligation. You may need one to introduce a completely new obligation, but no, I'm not sure you need much more. Thank you very much Richard, we have learned a lot to do today I think, thanks to all our excellent speakers for being here, across time zones at various times of your day, we will get a lot out of the discussion, we will have more conversations in the dma , please.
Please consider subscribing to the free newsletter 7 We will meet again for our next dma appointment on Thursday, March 4. We'll talk about institutional design and its application there, so that those of you who ask questions about it will have the opportunity to go deeper. There will also be confirmed panelists and details available on the website. We will hold a series of other events on various telecommunications and technology media topics. We will look at broader forms of regulatory oversight for the digital economy, for example, on February 23. We'll be talking about AI and accountability in March, so I hope you can join us.
Thank you all again for joining us today. We hope to continue with us and I wish you a great night. Thanks again. Goodbye for now. Thank you. you oh so much you
If you have any copyright issue, please Contact