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100-Hour War: Why Operation Desert Storm Was So Successful | Line Of Fire | War Stories

May 26, 2024
At 8:00 am. On February 28, 1991, silence descended on the battlefields of Kuwait and southern Iraq after the Coalition halted its surprisingly

successful

100-

hour

ground war to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation, begun nearly seven months earlier. in the context of an arid zone. In the

desert

and burning oil wells, the Coalition had used its superior weapons and highly trained combat personnel to wreak havoc on what was then the world's fourth largest army. Powerful images of stealth fighters and highly precise laser-guided missiles became devastating symbols of futility. To resist the impressive combat power of the coalition, the event that triggered the hostilities of January and February 1991 occurred on August 2, 1990, when the citizens of Kuwait woke up to the sound of Iraqi T72 tanks advancing through the streets of Kuwait City, Iraq, a state led by the brutal dictator Saddam Hussein had committed an act of unprovoked aggression that shocked the world within

hour

s of that morning.
100 hour war why operation desert storm was so successful line of fire war stories
Iraqi forces had occupied all of Kuwait, the small Emirate of the Alaba dynasty. Saddam Hussein said Kuwait had returned to the fold. of his homeland Iraq by conquering Kuwait Saddam sent a powerful message to the disaffected Arabs to overthrow the complacent pro-Western tremors that had been created by imperialist whims the painful colonial past of dominated Arabia the justification for invading Q8 um is, for Of course, Q8 was an artificial state created by Western imperialism, of course British imperialism, and had historically been part of the Ottoman province that later became Iraq. Saddam had many good reasons for invading Kuwait, the reasons he gave to his Arab brothers, these were all noble ones.
100 hour war why operation desert storm was so successful line of fire war stories

More Interesting Facts About,

100 hour war why operation desert storm was so successful line of fire war stories...

Embracing Reasons Liberating the West What Saddam didn't mention, but of course the Wall Street Journal and the financial times talk a lot about, was the fact that Iraq was 90 billion in debt after its war with Iran Saddam had gone bankrupt. Iraq fighting Iran Iraq War in the 1980s In the 1990s Sdan was trying to find ways to ease his country's financial burden. He turned to Kuwait to obtain a moratorium on war debts. He tried to use his oil revenue to uh. reduce its debt, the problem was that Kuwait supposedly according to Saddan was actually overproducing its oil exceeding OPEC oil quotas and therefore flooding the oil market lowering the global price of oil and San economists calculate that every dollar of discount in the price of oil reduced Iraq's debt.
100 hour war why operation desert storm was so successful line of fire war stories
Export revenue increases by $1 billion a year, so from a monetary point of view Iraq wants to take Kuwait so they can control Kuwait's oil production and keep production levels lower and thus maintain the price of oil. higher and the higher the price of oil. The more money Saddam Hussein received in an emergency session, United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 quickly condemned the invasion and demanded an immediate Iraqi withdrawal. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President George Bush later called for the establishment of an international military coalition to force Saddam to withdraw while the UN instituted economic sanctions against Iraq in response.
100 hour war why operation desert storm was so successful line of fire war stories
Saddam annexed Kuwait and appeared to concentrate his forces on Kuwait's border. with Saudi Arabia Saddam seems to have hoped that the outside world would not be happy with the invasion, but that the outside world would not react militarily to the invasion, he considered that the United States was hampered by the failures of Vietnam and therefore was little likely to resort to force and, as a party unwilling to assume the risks of resorting to force, Western leaders concluded that Saddam intended to invade Saudi Arabia. and thus control his vast oil reserves there was absolutely nothing between Saddam's formidable divisions and the Saudi oil fields it was simply a military prominence it would be a matter of simply driving south a couple of hundred kilometers all he needed to do was maintain the vehicles kept fuel and he could get there, there was very little Saudi forces could really do to stop him from reaching the oil fields.
If he was

successful

, this aggression would allow Saddam to hold the Western world to ransom by manipulating the price of oil. military, this fear of economic damage to the United States proved instrumental in persuading President Bush to intervene militarily in this Middle East crisis, even though previous regional problems had not prompted such an American response. Bush reacted quickly to this apparent threat by launching Operation Desert Shield on December 8. In August, with the dispatch of the US 82nd Airborne Division to northern Saudi Arabia to deter future Iraqi aggression, on the same day Britain and France announced their intention to send contingents to augment US forces in the Shield Desert, there is a feeling of excitement that, I'm sure, I can feel as the kids in the sheds woke up this morning intent on unloading equipment and eager to get out into the

desert

and work alongside the US Marines.
It is very exciting, in turn, Saddam sought to internationalize the conflict in a pan. -Arab holy war called on the united Arab world to expel Western infidel forces in the region linked any Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait to the departure of Israeli forces from occupied Palestinian territory and threatened to use chemical weapons against Israel if the Coalition attacked Iraq during September the military Coalition continued to meet in northern Saudi Arabia the force came under the authority of the US Central Command or centcom then led by Mercurial Commander General Storman Norman Schwarz there are several people who really did not like Schwarz his potential for arrogance due to flippancy and his very dry sense of humor, he often seemed brusque.
There were others who really got along with him because he said what he thought. He was a very intelligent military professional. During September it still seemed that sanctions and diplomacy could be resolved peacefully. However, after the crisis, in late October, an increasingly impatient Bush decided to use military force to liberate Kuwait, but Bush insisted that US forces deployed in the Gulf be doubled before the Coalition began its

operation

s to achieve these levels of strength. The Americans subsequently redeployed the American Seventh Core. then stationed in Germany in Saudi Arabia on November 29 UN Resolution 678 approved Bush's decision to use Force by authorizing the coalition to employ all possible means to reverse Iraq's aggression.
The resolution gave Saddam until January 15, 1991 to withdraw from Kuwaiti soil after the Coalition would use military force to force his withdrawal during December and January 1991. Bush made an additional effort for peace through greater diplomacy. But continued Iraqi obstruction only infuriated American diplomats once Iraq invaded Q8. Saddam finds himself in an awkward position when he realizes that he will not be allowed to stay in Kuwait, therefore he has to construct a situation where he can somehow be the heroic victim uh or or uh uh The fighter for rights Arabs Saddam himself called himself a heroic defeat rather than a humiliating retreat and Bush needed something similar, but from another perspective, let's get into this war.
I call on all Arabs to start a holy war. Discover the past with exclusive military history documentaries and adree podcasts presented by world-renowned historians, all in History Hit Watch on your smart TV or on the go with your mobile device Download the app now to see everything from the harrowing history of Band of Brothers to Operation Barbarosa and D-Day. Immerse yourself in the dramatic

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of January 15th came and went that night, the world held its breath waiting for news of the outbreak of war in the Middle East, but everyone remained silent, millions of people around the world had However, they just had to wait a little longer before hostilities began with Vengeance, at 2:10 a.m. m. local time on January 17, 1991.
President Bush ordered Operation Desert Storm to begin the air campaign with Coalition warships launching 52 Tomahawk cruise missiles at inland targets. Iraq roaring through the dark skies at 5 50 mph the deadly missiles were directed towards their targets using the digitized mapping data contained in their targeting software simultaneously. 700 Coalition aircraft began attacking targets across Iraq in Baghdad. The camera-laden Western journalists struggled to capture the striking sights and sounds of those first hours of the war. Darkness gradually spread across Baghdad as its electricity generating facilities succumbed to Coalition attacks, but the hundreds of Jets of Tracer

fire

d from the city's anti-aircraft guns, however, eerily relieved the darkness.
Intermittent violent eruptions lit up the night as Coalition missiles and bombs found their targets with devastating effect. Many of those deadly attacks on Baghdad that night had been launched by dozens of small, angular black planes that had made their way largely unnoticed through the darkness. These black Jets were American Nighthawk stealth aircraft on their way to devastate key strategic targets located within the Iraqi capital the f-117a Nighthawk was one of the most famous weapons of war used during the Gulf War the stealth fighter the fighter that was in quotes invisible to the enemy um and of course it was used in in the initial air campaign, you would try to fly stealthily towards the enemy air defenses, usually with a partner and while one would illuminate the target, the other would launch his laser guided weapons system towards the target and destroyed it.
Saddam reacted to these air strikes. Intensifying his war propaganda, he believed that Western public opinion could not tolerate suffering heavy casualties during the liberation of Kuwait, while his own people could endure such hardships. Consequently, Saddam chillingly promised to turn the conflict into a bloodbath for coalition soldiers by making it the mother. Of all the battles on January 18, Saddam

fire

d Al Hussein's scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia (a modified Iraqi version of the relatively inaccurate short-range Soviet scud B ballistic missile). at an impressive range of 400 m away, the widespread assumption that these missiles carried the chemical warheads Saddam had previously threatened to use created panic within Israel Saddam calculated that if Israel entered the war against Iraq, the Arab contingents within the Coalition would withdraw to fight alongside them. the hated Israelis would have been completely unacceptable to any Arab leader.
Such a development, according to Saddam, would destroy the notion that the Coalition represented the consensus view of the international community rather than the goals of a President Bush and his cronies, including the new British prime minister. John Major, in response, the United States rushed the Patriots to the surface to deliver missile batteries to Israel to shoot down Saddam's incoming Scuds. Thanks in part to this move, the United States would hook Israel from retaliating against Iraq while intensifying efforts already being undertaken by its Special Forces and aircraft to destroy Saddam's elusive mobile scud missile launchers during the rest of january the big scud fighter dominated coalition strategy they initially relied on air power but the problem for air power in denying the threat was that the iraqis used hit and run tactics, placed the missile launchers fire the missile and then they dive into some hiding place, maybe under a bridge or in a hidden bunker, when the Coalition plane arrived there was nothing to target, so the Coalition turned to its special forces, the American special forces and the British sister. dropped behind enemy

line

s to try to deal with the scud threat, the Special Forces had to find those missiles in the moments between the commander stopping the vehicle and mounting the missile and launching the missile or, alternatively, stopping mounting and He launched the missile and continued driving. to another place they had to discriminate between dummy missiles and dummy transporters on the ground and the real ones and they did a very good job with the Special Forces, but they didn't get all the Scud missiles andhis pitchers who couldn't realistically wait. get them all and as long as Hussein still had his modified Scud missiles he could continue to attack the Coalition forces and he could continue to attack the Israelis in his effort to provoke the Israelis into the war in those early days of the war.
Air warfare the Coalition focused on the Strategic Mission of obtaining air superiority over the Kuwait theater of

operation

s. The Coalition achieved this by attacking Saddam's strategic infrastructure to control the Iraqi War Machine, particularly the national interception centers of the Kari air defense system, these vital installations. It acquired and distributed the essential battle management data that the Iraqi air force needed if it was to have any chance of opposing Coalition control of the skies. The first hours of the Coalition airstrikes left the Iraqi Air Force bereft of this battle management data, consequently an already bagged Iraqi Air Force. was woefully outmatched both technologically and in terms of the professional skills its pilots possessed, very quickly the Iraqi Air Force surrendered the skies to the Coalition, either timidly hiding in their Harden bunkers or ignominiously slipping away to the safety of internment in Iran, Iraq's neutral eastern neighbor.
The origins of these strategic aspects of the Coalition air campaign lie in Operation Instant Thunder, the plan drawn up by Colonel John Warden in August 1990. This plan called for a six-day strategic air effort that would single-handedly destroy Iraq. and would force Saddam to retreat. Warden believed firmly in the power of Air Power Strategies that an independent air effort could win a war without ground action being necessary. Colon Warden's instant thunder plan was based on the above concept of five circles that describes his view of the nature of modern warfare. Warden saw the modern battle as a bullseye with five rings in the inner ring was the enemy's c4i strategic capability, that is, command control, communications and intelligence computers, its strategic decision-making capabilities and instant thunder was based on the assumption that a brief strategic air campaign focused on the inner ring would destroy Saddam's ability to control not only the Iraqi state but the Iraqi war machine at the strategic level and that would collapse the Iraqi state and allow the liberation of Kuwait without ground forces were necessary, although Schwarz was not convinced of these ambitious claims at the time Thunder became the basis of the air plan.
However, completed in mid-January 1991, the final flight was longer in duration and range than Instant Thunder and combined strategic aspects of Warden with extensive attrition efforts primarily by B-52 bombers to weaken Iraqi forces. deployed in the Kuwait theater of operations. In fact, Schwarz claimed that these attrition efforts had to degrade the Iraqi ground force by 50% before the Coalition ground war could begin. In fact, the actual Coalition air war, which lasted 43 days, was composed of four very distinct elements. The four phases of the Coalition air campaign began and perhaps the most important was winning. of Air Supremacy, obtaining Air Supremacy allowed the Allies to quickly dominate the air flank and, therefore, be able to do with the air flank what they wanted: carry out bombing raids, transport airborne troops, fly their helicopters, or logistically resupply.
For battlefield air interdiction and close air support all that was to follow the second phase was the bombing of strategic targets, which made it very difficult for the enemy to maintain violence against the Coalition, attack bridges, refineries oil plants, refineries, ammunition depots, even nuclear power stations, destroyed. they found it very difficult to project their forces the third phase became more important as the W air approached the start of the ground offensive this was the battlefield preparation phase this was the phase of attacking the Iraqi ground forces in the Q8 theater once the ground war began the air war moved into its fourth phase operations to support the ongoing ground offensive this would involve close air support AA support to the contact battle and also interdiction missions attacking enemy reserves and forces behind from the front line in late January 1991 As the aerial devastation of Iraq continued, the relative tranquility of coalition ground positions in northern Saudi Arabia was rudely shattered.
From January 29 to 31, Iraqi forces launched a successful surprise attack on the Saudi border town of Alfi, simultaneously with US and Jar space satellites. Intelligence aircraft detected additional Iraqi tank columns moving south towards Alafi to exploit the initial Iraqi success and reacted quickly. Coalition commanders employed anti-tank aircraft and assault helicopters, as well as ground firepower to intercept and destroy these columns. Saddam finally realized how devastating the Coalition's military force was. Saddam had reached the point where he realized that nothing was going to stop some kind of ground offensive and Tas is the acceptable face of the regime.
I suppose it makes it clear that Iraq is willing to withdraw unconditionally and immediately from Q, because it does not fit American and Western requirements, as it would allow Saddam to withdraw from Q, retain his weapons of mass destruction, keep his Armed Forces intact, and to some extent , play the role of the injured party in the conflict. Arab World Now I am going to show you how the relentless airstrikes continued until mid-February. Bush rejected Saddam's proposed conditional withdrawal and all thoughts turned to the now imminent ground war. CRS already believed that his air campaign had been so precise. that collateral civilian casualties had been minimized; events such as the bombing of the Amaria shelter on February 13, where 200 civilians were killed, remained rare exceptions; the air campaign was being sold to the media as a campaign in which civilians were not They were going to die or at least they weren't going to die unnecessarily this was a high tech campaign where missiles were going to be guided through Windows this was where cruise missiles could fly down the main streets and hit a target with unimaginable precision .
I know, 40 years earlier, in World War II, but 10 years earlier and, unfortunately, sometimes things went wrong. The Coalition air campaign had proven devastatingly effective. It had destroyed Saddam's ability to control his forces. It destroyed the logistical infrastructure and maneuver capabilities of his army and devastated it. Iraq's industrial base, but Iraq's battered military machine did not collapse as Warden had predicted, in fact it continued to function or only in some capacity, although the Coalition uh AAL attacks caused much damage to the Iraqi commander's control landlines They managed to survive most of the attack. and it was relatively easy to install new fixed lines with the result that although Iraqi communications were compromised they were never actually destroyed and it is quite clear from the movement of Iraqi troops during the ground war, particularly the Iraqi attempt to blockade the seventh core in southern Iraq, that Iraq retained its ability to communicate with its military formations, after all, air power had not won the war alone, so the Reed Coalition for ground operations once the Air Forces had weakened the enemy and made them deaf.
Mute and blind, it was then up to the ground forces to enter and resolve the situation to destroy them, remove them from Kuwait City and put an end to the war, but without a doubt the air campaign made it possible that in the following weeks the Nuclei 7 and 18 Americans secretly redeployed behind US Marines in the East to assume new positions 200 miles further west around Rafar. Schwarz cop had diverted the main effort of the Way Out West Coalition ground offensive to flank and envelop Saddam's border defense line. Schwarz Cobb's last line of defense. The strategy for the land war represented a well-orchestrated operational-level master plan, each of its various elements coming together to produce a synchronized effort that would quickly produce decisive success.
The first element of the plan involved attacks by US Marines and Arab forces in the East. directly toward Kuwait City, simultaneously, the Navy amphibious forces would maintain the deception of an imminent amp fibus assault on the coast of Kuwait to ensure that the Iraqi army would remain stationary during the operations that the Coalition was going to carry out. That fixes the Iraqi army in place and the way the Coalition fixes the Iraqi army is by advancing towards Kuwait City, which focuses Iraqi attention on Kuwait and ensures that they cannot easily turn to fight the more mobile armored forces of the coalition in Iraq because they are in the midst of the fighting in and around Kuwait, once these attacks had begun, the main Coalition advance would begin in the west, beyond the main Iraqi defense line, while French forces would advance to protect the coalition's left flank.
Lieutenant General Frank's US 7th Corps would turn east in a large left hook to crush Iraqi forces in the Kuwait theater, particularly the Republican Sea Guard, simultaneously, the Kingdom's 1st Armored Division United would advance to protect the inner flank of the 7th Chorus advance on the northern or outer flank of Frank's advance, the U.S. 101st Airborne. The division was to initiate a series of sprays deep into Iraq to establish bases of advanced operations on Highway 8 along the Euphrates Valley, thus blocking Iraqi reinforcements attempting to reach the Kuwait theater of operations. The policy is to get the Iraqis out of Kuwait and not an ounce of effort is spent.
In the Gulf War, if anything else, some animists have expressed surprise that the Coalition did not continue its advance beyond the Euphrates River toward Baghdad. The key reasons why the Coalition stopped short of attacking Baghdad are mainly political. The mandate they were following before the UN. resolutions was to liberate Q8 from Iraqi occupation, whether that mandate actually allowed the coalition to operate in Iraqi territory was suddenly the subject of some logistical debate, they had no chance of mounting a Very Quick attack once they had crossed Kuwait into Iraq and toward Baghdad they needed time to recondition and reorganize, at which point the Iraqis would have dug in, perhaps been much more passionate about defending their own territory, and a whole new Gulf War would have developed around that situation.
Schwarz's police ground war plan supposedly implemented the new American maneuver doctrine of air-land battle, introduced in the early 1980s, sought to restore decisiveness to war by using maneuver rather than traditional approaches. of attrition to make this air-land battle target enemy centers of gravity, such as command and control, to destroy their cohesion. The doctrine also envisioned a joint campaign effort by air, naval, marine and army forces employing cutting-edge technology to see deep into enemy territory and then strike deep using aerial artillery and missiles. Consequently, the modern airland battlefield would be a complicated nonlinear battlefield that would place significant demands on command and control.
The Airland Battle Doctrine also advocates the development of fast-paced, synchronized joint military operations that reflect the principles of agility and depth there were certain aspects of the air battle in this campaign there is not the slightest doubt about it, but the real reality was that the Americans engaged in a battle of attrition in which divisions such as the Taaka and Medina actually held firm and in some cases fought extremely well and it was only the fact that they were outgunned by vastly superior technology that really prevented them. After inflicting at times very serious damage on US forces on February 24, 1991, the Coalition He believed that 500,000 Iraqi troops were facing his forces in the Kuwait theater, but in reality many Iraqi divisions were already under strength before even reaching Kuwait.
By the start of the ground war, the combination of Coalition airstrikes and mass defections had further reduced this figure tosome 250,000 soldiers to resist the attempted liberation of Coalition-occupied Kuwait. Saddam adopted a static defensive strategy; he seems to have hoped that a land war would never occur. If he did so, Saddam hoped the Coalition would simply limit its operations to Kuwaiti soil rather than Iraq. Saddam thinks about military activity with a pair of highly politicized glasses as a result, heh, uh, and he believed that the West would find it politically very difficult. Going to Iraq proper, moreover, Sdam sees the United States as a country that will fear a kind of second Vietnam and will fear the entanglement that an invasion of Iraq itself could produce should military action be required.
It won't be another Vietnam, this won't be a long war. In the event of a ground war, the most Saddam could hope for was to force a compromise agreement to save face for the Coalition, inflicting heavy casualties on them, so his forces set up defenses that were intended to channel attacking Coalition forces. towards previously studied extermination zones where concentrated artillery fire would cause, in the worst case, serious casualties. Saddam feared being driven out of Kuwait, but without his tight grip on Iraq being threatened in the process, losing Kuwait would have been a strategic move. A setback, but not disastrous for Saddam because his forces had already extensively looted the Emirate and because he was able to present this failure as the heroic defeat of a strong Arab leader who had dared to resist Western neo-imperialist intervention in the region: the true scenario of nightmare. for Saddam it was a military campaign that not only liberated KU from Iraqi occupation but in the process undermined his control over the Iraqi state.
Now what Saddam didn't fully appreciate was that no member of the Coalition had the slightest intention of getting him out of Iraq, they might have been happy if Saddam had actually fallen or fallen under an assassin's bullet, but there was not the slightest intention to who was forcibly expelled from Iraq at 4:00 a.m. m. on February 24, 1991, when the ground war began. It began with Coalition forces attacking Iraqi defenses facing Saudi Arabia's northern border, by which time Saddam had positioned 24 regular army infantry divisions along this border as the first line of defense. Behind these positions, Saddam had concentrated his most effective ground formations in northwestern Kuwait.
West of Kuwait's border with Iraq, this mobile reserve comprised eight regular army divisions along with seven elite divisions of the politically reliable Republican Guard. of Saddam; The latter represented a key objective for which Schwarz's police ground plan aimed at destroying the Republican Guard was not only a better equipped and better trained unit. most motivated part of the Iraqi armed forces, the Republican Guard was a separate armed force, especially politically reliable and especially accountable to the Iraqi regime, therefore the deployment of the Republican Guard could be seen in two ways; the first, could be seen as the sword that was actually behind the shield once the shield was opened, the counterattacking forces of the republican guard will be able to push back the Coalition when that arrived or, in fact, destroyed them.
In reality, they were deployed in the northern region of the Kuwait theater of operations. operations so that they could flee and not be destroyed if all that was possible thanks to the rampaging Coalition forces once they managed to break through to be able to return to Baghdad and do their main work in terms of political defense of the BST regime and Saddam Hussein in Particularly during the morning of February 24, the first US and Arab Marines assaulting southeastern Kuwait overran the entrenched Iraqi defenses more easily than the Coalition had expected. This unexpected success forced Schwarzkop to begin the seventh coruse assault that same afternoon earlier than planned.
That night, General Frank's divisions quickly breached the weak western end of Iraq's border defense line during the next day, Frank's core, driven by Schwarz, COV conducted a deep battle using attack helicopters. air and long-range missiles to weaken targets behind the current front line before engaging them using these tactics. The seventh core moved rapidly northeast across the featureless Sandy Plain. ground to invade successive Iraqi positions, the thousands of coalition vehicles were not lost; However, thanks to its use of the new global positioning system, GPS technology in a flat desert without feats, getting lost using conventional maps would be very, very easy with military GPS.
The military being able to know where they were in the middle of the night, in the middle of a sand

storm

, was also absolutely crucial and going hand in hand with global positioning systems at night was something called TOGs Thermal Optical Gun s sits, which which meant that with um the ability to understand. exactly where they were and exactly where the enemy was, they could actually attack the enemy at night using the thermals that the enemy vehicles actually emitted, they could attack an enemy at a distance of about 2 and 12,000 M, which meant that before of the enemy.
They even knew that Coalition forces were there and especially the Americans and British who used these systems. They died during February 24 and 25, when Frank's armor charged northeast in a large wheel, the US 101st Airborne Division launched a series of airstrikes up to 110 M deep into Iraqi territory to isolate the theater of Kuwaiti operations from any Iraqi reinforcements, meanwhile in the east, US Marines as a group continued their frontal assault towards Kuwait City. The early successes achieved by each Coalition assault during the first 24 hours of the ground war led Saddam to order a gradual withdrawal northward from Kuwait on 25 February;
However, this retreat soon degenerated into a route characterized by mass surrenders. Some disheartened Iraqi soldiers even surrendered to an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. Meanwhile, in the west, during February 26, General Frank's divisions pressed on. to quickly

storm

East Pass the Wadi Altin in the process devastating the Taaka Republican Guard division in the Battle of 73 Easting that same day. Coalition intelligence detected that some members of Saddam's Republican Guard were preparing to withdraw towards north and this led Schwarzkoff to demand that Frank speed up the advance of his forces. These repeated demands caused a furious disagreement that day between the more cautious Frank and the centcom commander, a commotion later fueled by Frank's decision to stop some of his divisions that night in order to not allow one division to advance.
Uh, to get too far ahead to expose his flanks, Franks has to stop some of his formations to allow others to catch up. The main reason Franks decided to stop his divisions at night on certain occasions was not fear of enemy action but fear of the blue. Onblue incidents friendly incidents away from your own forces in confusing night combat operations. The great speed of advance achieved by Coalition forces made it increasingly difficult to identify them from the enemy on this now fluid battlefield. Unfortunately, several Friendly Fire incidents occurred on the afternoon of the 26th. In February, for example, an American A10 warthog aircraft destroyed two British Warrior armored vehicles, killing nine soldiers.
These sad incidents highlighted the fact that friendly fire now posed as great a threat to the Coalition as the enemy; It was very difficult to recognize who was a friend and who was. Who was the enemy on the battlefield? The technology at that time, which had developed greatly as a result of the Vietnam War, was aimed at discovering what movement was on the battlefield, but it did not differentiate between friendly and enemy forces and , often when quick decisions are required on the very chaotic battlefield, the very high chances of mistakes being made in the Gulf War, the level of casualties from enemy fire to Coalition forces was very, very low and that meant that Friendly Fire deaths became a much larger proportion of those If the enemy is not killing your people, then the few who die by friendly fire become a larger proportion of the statistics during February 27 On the 7th and 18th, the American core launched into western Kuwait to converge with Coalition forces. advancing north past Kuwait City along the east coast that same day, however, shocking images began to flood the world's media showing the carnage that Coalition airpower had inflicted on Iraqi forces who had attempted to escape from northern Kuwait along the Bazra Highway were known to have occurred.
Like Bazaar Road Syndrome, these images quickly altered world opinion creating the belief that the war had degenerated into the murderous route of a Force defeated by the incredibly powerful Coalition, fearing a powerful political backlash, so the Coalition announced a cease fire at 8:00 a.m. February 28 exactly 100 hours into the ground campaign throughout this 4 day ground campaign Coalition forces had encountered only modest Iraqi resistance, this fact largely explains the incredibly low casualty rate they suffered In fact, with a total of only 170 battle casualties, the Iraqis, despite their significant forces and modern equipment, performed mediocre during the conflict, as evidenced by the capture of 48,000 Iraqi soldiers.
In just 100 hours of battle, there is a brilliant computer model that has been demonstrated in recent years. that if you model the battles of the Gulf War on a computer and if on that computer you increase the level of Iraqi training suddenly the war is much less one-sided than it was, it is not so much that the Iraqi soldier was less motivated than the soldier of the Coalition, although the real difference in the Gulf War comes from the fact that the Coalition soldiers were much better trained than the Iraqi soldiers. The day after the ceasefire Iraq announced its compliance with all UN resolutions relating to the invasion of Kuwait shortly after the Shiite and Kurdish minorities in southern and northern Iraq, respectively, rose in rebellion against Saddam, however the Coalition now eager to withdraw from the region refused to intervene in what which they described as an internal Iraqi matter.
This selflessness encouraged Saddam, who sent the survivors to him. The Republican Guards suppressed these rebellions, and in the following months, UN weapons inspectors began the difficult task of locating and dismantling Saddam's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons facilities. The defeat does not necessarily erode Saddam's control over Iraq in many ways, but rather reinforces it in part because it allows Saddam to square the circle he had been facing since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, when he told the Iraqis that they had won a great victory but that their economy and standard of living were improving. severely damaged now he has a wonderful excuse for Iraq's problems in the form of the Coalition and what has done Sudan remained in power.
Subsequent attempts to dismantle their weapons of mass destruction. Its chemical, biological and possibly nuclear capabilities had some success, but. Due to constant bureaucratic obstruction and evasions from within Iran at the strategic level, the Gulf War was a resounding success. Saddam Hussein could not control the price of oil in the world at an operational level, he did not achieve all of his objectives, but he does not achieve it. It matters, as long as you achieve your strategic objective, then you can walk away and say that was a victory today. Saddam Hussein still controls Iraq and still appears to pose a threat to the region through his tenacious obstructionism.
Saddam eventually even managed to get rid of the UN. Weapons inspectors in his absence Iraq has reportedly begun rebuilding its weapons of mass destruction.

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